The Muslim Brotherhood
Page 13
Whilst figures such as Mustafa Mashour had close ties with the Kuwaitis, who had been willing to provide the movement with much needed financial assistance, others had a much stronger personal loyalty to Saddam Hussein. Some of the Syrian Ikhwani had particularly close ties with the former Iraqi leader, who had offered them support when they were being persecuted by the Ba’athists in their country. Dr Hassan al-Huwaidi, Ali Saddredine al-Bayanouni and Adnan Saad Eddine all spent time in Baghdad under Saddam’s protection even though he had persecuted Iraqi Ikhwani; as Adnan Saad Eddine explained, ‘I knew Saddam very closely and knew all the [Iraqi] leaders.’50
Those who felt most honour-bound to stand with Saddam, however, were the Jordanians, who were particularly vocal in their objections to the presence of American troops in the region. According to Kuwaiti brother Mubarak al-Dwaila, ‘The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan were the most aggressive and differed a lot from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt whose stance was good.’51 These loyalties derived largely from the fact that Saddam Hussein was widely considered at that time to be the champion of the Palestinian cause; given the large numbers of Palestinian refugees in Jordan, including within the Jordanian Ikhwan, the brothers there felt duty-bound to defend Saddam. They issued a number of statements following the invasion such as that of 5 August, which made no criticism of the Iraqi invasion but declared: ‘We condemn the stance of the American crusaders that are leading the forces of arrogance. America is the state that is leading all the forces that are hostile to Islam and Muslims.’52 Jordanian brothers also voiced their anger in other arenas and some joined pro-Saddam demonstrations in the streets. One Ikhwani Deputy to the Jordanian parliament, Yousef al-Athaum, declared, ‘Iraqi feet on Kuwaiti territory are better than American feet.’53 Feelings were running so high in Jordan that the Jordanian Ikhwan was eventually forced to issue a statement reminding the Jordanian population that whatever the politics involved, the Kuwaitis should be treated with respect, not least because the ‘Muslim Kuwaiti people gave a lot to our umma and were the most interested in the Palestinian cause. They gave a lot of their money to help their brothers everywhere.’54
Whilst the Jordanian Ikhwan maintains that its protests were aimed solely at preventing external military intervention in the region, the Kuwaiti Ikhwan interpreted them as overt support for Saddam Hussein. This was a very bitter pill to swallow. Mubarak al-Dwaila has commented, ‘The stance of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan was shameful.’55 The Kuwaitis became even more angered when the Brotherhood began mediating directly in the conflict. Following a meeting of Ikhwani leaders and Islamic personalities including Dr Hassan al-Turabi, Rashid al-Ghannouchi and Turkish Islamist Necmettin Erbakan in Amman on 12 September 1990, the Brotherhood sent a delegation to Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran. This delegation – which was headed by the Jordanian Ikhwani leader Mohamed Abdelrahman Khalifa because the Murshid was prevented from travelling by the Egyptian authorities – went to Baghdad to meet with Saddam Hussein. After the meeting they issued a statement in which they declared that they had had a ‘frank and friendly discussion’ with the Iraqi leader, whom they praised for his ‘steadfastness’.56 After concluding that the whole crisis had come about as a result of the ‘absence of Islam’, the statement, like those before it, strongly condemned the presence of foreign forces that sought to ‘destroy the Iraqi military forces in order to serve the Zionist scheme and to enable Israel to absorb citizens from the Soviet Union so it can strike against the intifadah’.57 Once again, the issue of Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait was relegated to generalities related to finding an Arab and Islamic solution to the crisis. This time, however, the statement went as far as to declare, ‘We have to pay attention to Iraq’s demands and look at its legal demands in line with Islamic rulings.’58
It is therefore easy to see why the Kuwaiti Ikhwan felt so betrayed by the Brotherhood. Even those Ikhwani who had traditionally been close to the Kuwaitis proved unwilling to openly condemn Saddam Hussein and his invasion. This was hardly surprising given that the public mood in the Arab world at the time had come to view Saddam Hussein as a hero who was standing up to the imperial forces of the West. Mustafa Mashour made some attempts to redress the balance when he gave a statement at a conference in Saudi Arabia on 19 November 1990 in which he declared: ‘Some people believed that our explanation of what was occurring meant that we were biased towards Iraq. This is a misunderstanding. We didn’t only issue condemnatory statements but we set up an Islamic delegation from several Islamic movements and countries to bring about a peaceful solution for the umma’.59 But even in this statement his focus on fighting the Western presence in the region was still far stronger than his condemnation of Iraq. Even Mustafa Mashour, who had particularly strong ties with the Kuwaitis and Saudis, was so bound by the sentiment of the street that he could do no other than focus on the issue of foreign intervention as the primary crisis of the region. As such, just like the other Ikhwani branches, Mashour and the Guidance Office were ultimately considered by the Kuwaitis to have taken the side of secular Ba’athist Iraq over the conservative religious monarchy of Kuwait.
The Kuwaiti Ikhwani were so angered by the stance of their fellow brethren that they froze their membership of the international movement. Prominent Kuwaiti brother Ismail Shati explained:
I stayed in Kuwait working with those of the Kuwaiti Brothers who stayed … The start of the dispute was the arrival of US troops. Prominent Brotherhood branches visited Baghdad and issued statements condemning the US presence in Kuwait in language that seemed to support Saddam. So we froze our membership of the Brotherhood.60
However, whilst the Kuwaiti Ikhwani condemned the rest of the movement for their stance, some of their protestations appear to have emerged somewhat later in the day. Some have interpreted their position during the early stages of the invasion as ambiguous. According to Kuwaiti researcher Falah Limdaris, ‘the official line of the Kuwaiti Ikhwan was oscillating in the beginning [of the crisis]’.61 The reason for this indecision appears to have been that the Kuwaiti Ikhwan was open to the possibility of an international Islamist force moving into Kuwait to resolve the crisis. This idea had been mooted at a meeting of the Kuwaiti Students’ Association in November 1990. Dr Kamal Helbawy, who had been in Pakistan during the Afghanistan conflict, proposed pulling together the mujahideen who were still in Afghanistan to create a force that could be directed against US troops in Kuwait and that would ensure Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait.62
Although the Kuwaiti government rejected this proposal it was supported by some Kuwaiti brothers, who despite their horror of the Iraqi invasion preferred an Islamic solution to one that involved Western forces. Saud al-Nasser, the Kuwaiti ambassador to Washington at that time, claims that he was visited by a delegation of Kuwaiti brothers that included Ismail Shati, Tariq al-Suwaidan and Abdullah Utaiki, who asked him to give them $50 million for their project to fight against the US presence in the region.63 Although the Ikhwan rejects his allegations, al-Nasser recounts, ‘I can’t forget this incident. I asked them what the suitable alternative would be to foreign forces. They said we have to replace them by Islamic forces. I smiled at this nonsense.’64 Al-Nasser also recalls how he found members of the Kuwaiti Students Association – an organisation heavily dominated by the Ikhwan – harassing delegates at a meeting in a Virginia hotel for those who wanted to sign up as Arabic interpreters for US forces in the Gulf. Al-Nasser claims that the group of Islamists were creating chaos and telling those present not to work for ‘Christians and Jews’.65
However, in typical Ikhwani expediency, as soon as it became clear that the proposal was a hugely unrealistic option, the Kuwaiti Ikhwan split from the international tanzeem. On 31 March 1991 the Kuwaiti Ikhwan formed its own movement, which it named the Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM) and that was independent of Cairo.
This split came as a major blow to the international tanzeem so painstakingly put in place just a decade before. It also had financial implications; Kuwait
had been an important source of funds. More importantly, this episode demonstrated the difficulties of being an international movement. Whilst the Ikhwan could broadly agree on theological issues, politics was a different matter; in spite of the dream of the umma, nationalistic priorities and interests ultimately continued to dominate. Indeed, transnational Islamism proved to be just as flimsy a concept as Arab nationalism before it.
Moreover, the Kuwait crisis reflects a wider conundrum that the Ikhwan has always struggled with. In their quest for survival, individual Ikhwani or branches have tended to display an incredible pragmatism and adaptability. As we have seen, this has resulted in some instances in a willingness to deal with authoritarian regimes abroad even if these same regimes are persecuting their own Ikhwan. The readiness of the Syrian Ikhwan to defend Saddam Hussein during the Gulf crisis was a direct result of the protection and support he had offered them when they were being persecuted by the Ba’athist regime in Damascus, even though he was repressing his own Iraqi Ikhwan at the time.
This opportunistic pattern has repeated itself over and over in the Ikhwan’s history. When asked, many Ikhwani put such behaviour down to the politics of the day or the need for brothers to find refuge wherever they can. However, whilst such a flexible approach has certainly helped individual branches to survive, it has also sowed division and discord within the movement as a whole.
Decline
The Kuwait crisis was to mark the end of the heyday of the international tanzeem, which limped along through the 1990s encountering further crises along the way as different branches pulled away from the centre. By this point, it seems, Cairo had come to acknowledge the limits of its power. This became evident when the General Guide of the Algerian brotherhood, Mahfoud Nahnah, decided to stand in the Algerian presidential elections of 1995.
Nahnah and his group had become part of the formal structure of the international tanzeem in the early 1980s after Nahnah’s Deputy Sheikh Busuleimani attended a conference in Tunis at which Sheikh Rashid al-Ghannouchi invited the Algerians to join the tanzeem al-dawli.66 His bid to stand in the presidential elections was not appreciated by Cairo. It also angered other Islamist groups inside Algeria, including the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS), whose ideology was not far removed from that of the Brotherhood and who had issued a call to boycott the elections. Under the rules of the internal system, Nahnah had to put forward his proposal to the Guidance Office for approval. Jordanian brother Bassam al-Amoush recalls:
I remember Mahfoud Nahnah came and in one of the sessions he talked about nominating himself for the presidential election in Algeria. He was advised by some of those present not to take part but this advice was not obligatory and came in the form of advice. He nominated himself and he didn’t win. The tanzeem al-dawli is not a supreme committee that issues decisions and rulings as some of the countries and governments think.67
It would appear that this willingness by the Guidance Office not to try to oppose Nahnah’s decision was a reflection of the growing realisation that the centre could no longer hold in the way that Mashour and his colleagues had first envisaged. The international tanzeem had suffered so many knocks since its inception that it had been weakened considerably and Cairo no longer had the energy to keep such a tight grip on the actions of the various branches. Moreover, the appointment of Mustafa Mashour as Murshid in 1996 had an impact, as the architect of the international organisation came to focus his attentions much more on the situation inside Egypt. In addition his Deputy, Maimoun al-Hodeibi, who was becoming an extremely powerful figure within the movement, strongly disapproved of the international tanzeem, believing it to have weighed heavy on the shoulders of the Ikhwan.
Al-Hodeibi’s disapproval was so great that in the mid-1990s he is believed to have cancelled Kamal Helbawy’s post as international spokesperson for the Brotherhood. Helbawy had taken on this role after he arrived in London from Pakistan and had set up a Muslim Brotherhood media office in London that began issuing statements and publications in the name of the Ikhwan. However, there was some confusion over exactly what role he had been given. According to Azzam Tamimi, ‘None of us were clear whether this spokesman was able to speak for the Brotherhood outside of Egypt, nor did we know his connection to the International Organisation … no one told us anything.’68 Helbawy maintains that he resigned from the post, explaining, ‘I was caught in the crossfire of the Wasat affair during which I tried to advise both sides. But the situation was difficult and people used fiery language. So I resigned and asked the Murshid to find someone else.’69 However, Mustafa Mashour told Le Monde Diplomatique, ‘The Brotherhood in the United Kingdom appointed him and I don’t know why they ended it.’70 Helbawy has explained that al-Hodeibi was always uncomfortable with the amount of freedom he had in London and that some more conservative elements in Egypt did not appreciate the statements he was issuing. He even received telephone calls from some within the Brotherhood’s hierarchy in Cairo, telling him not to make such statements.71
Whatever the truth of this episode, it is clear that al-Hodeibi and others in Cairo had a somewhat antagonistic relationship with some of those Ikhwan who were outside and became determined to limit their power and influence. Things became even worse for the international tanzeem when al-Hodeibi was appointed to the post of Murshid in 2002. However, by this point the events of 9/11 had given the Ikhwan further impetus to try to relegate the role of the international tanzeem. As the world reacted to the shock of the attacks and began talking about international jihadist networks with a global agenda, the Muslim Brotherhood became increasingly anxious that it might be labelled as an international terrorist organisation and find itself on the list of designated terrorist groups. Since then, the Ikhwan has done its utmost to give the impression that the international tanzeem is simply a coordinating body that meets as and when it gets the opportunity and that has no power over decisions made at the local level by the various national branches. Dr Helbawy offered this explanation in 2007:
When we refer to an organisation, it is something similar to military factions that have a leadership and where its members heed commands and obey, whereas what does exist is international co-ordination. It’s almost like federal work; there are meetings, continuous consultations, exchange of experience, networking and joint efforts.72
Many Ikhwani are keen to stress that each branch is free to make its own decisions. Dr Hassan al-Huwaidi, for many years the Deputy to the Supreme Guide in the international tanzeem, described it as an ‘advisory body’ in which ‘95 per cent of issues are resolved locally. For those that cannot be resolved, they are taken to the international tanzeem for consultation. This has no executive power. It is just an advisory body.’73 Ali Saddredine al-Bayanouni has echoed these sentiments: ‘There is no structural relationship with the international tanzeem, rather there is consultation. Every country has its own conditions.’74 He also claims that the international tanzeem’s meetings are ‘nothing specific’ and that each branch sends a representative but ‘some don’t attend’.75 The former Deputy to the Supreme Guide, Mohamed Habib, also explained, ‘We as the Guidance Office don’t interfere in local entities, in their work or performance … They know their circumstances better. We might have intervened in the past.’76
As such, by the 2000s, the international tanzeem appears to have been reduced to a body that promoted organisational co-ordination without obligation. That is not to say that Cairo did try to convince other Ikhwani branches of what to do or how to act in certain situations. Jordanian militant and former Ikhwani Bassam al-Amoush, who was a member of the international tanzeem, complained in 2007 that whilst it is ‘nothing more than a co-ordinating body between the Ikhwani branches … it suffers from the control of the Egyptian brothers’.77 Similarly, according to one Iraqi brother, although Egypt has not exercised its power to prevent members from taking certain decisions and leaves it to local branches to decide, ‘it sends members to ask what happened and why. If the movement goes astray …
the international Brotherhood decides which faction is the most faithful and says to the one that isn’t “You don’t represent the Ikhwan.”’78
In fact, the Guidance Office has made its disapproval of the actions of some branches overtly clear in recent years. The leadership in Cairo found it extremely difficult to accept that the Syrian Ikhwan had formed an alliance with former Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam. As explained in Chapter Two, the Syrians joined Khaddam to establish an opposition platform called the National Salvation Front. Akef states: ‘I sent for them and I told them my view but they are free to make their own decision. I don’t intervene as long as their decision is based upon their views and their Shura Council.’79 He also says:
I gave them space to move around because I am not under the same pressure that they are because hundreds of their families are suffering under bad laws … So I gave them space to move around, but I am not with their view in this case … If I were fighting with the Palestinians I would oblige them to follow my decision but because I am not fighting with them I give them the chance to take their own decisions.80
This reference to the Palestinians goes to the core of why the Guidance Office and many other Brotherhood groups were so opposed to the Syrian bid to strengthen the challenge to the al-Assad regime. Following the toppling of Saddam Hussein, the Syrian regime became known as the primary champion of the Palestinian cause within the Arab world. Its intransigence towards Israel and the West combined with its support for Hizbullah and more importantly Hamas brought it praise from groups such as the Brotherhood. Bashar al-Assad’s willingness to host Hamas leader Khalid Meshaal was seen as almost heroic by many Ikhwani. Given the primacy of the Palestinian issue in the Arab world and within the Ikhwan’s own platforms, the Guidance Office believed it should be quietly supporting the Syrian regime rather than an opposition platform, even if that platform was shared by the Syrian brothers. Although Cairo did not forbid the Syrian Ikhwan from joining Khaddam’s platform, it certainly brought some serious pressure to bear on the movement over the issue.