The Muslim Brotherhood

by Alison Pargeter

  … had an old fatwa on the issue of Palestine. This is a real difficulty that we have. We have two different positions on that. For me for example I am not a scholar but I follow the position that if we open up this door for suicide attacks then we cannot close it and there are no limitations afterwards … The situation in Palestine for example is something where we should keep it clear what the Islamic framework is. But what people do afterwards may be different because I have never lived in one of the camps and … if you hear some of the stories … you understand why people are doing it but you also have to take a religious position on this.100

  Al-Qaradawi has explicitly praised suicide operations in Palestine, which places those linked to the European Council or the European Islamist organisations that follow his Ikhwani school of thought in a somewhat difficult position. Although al-Qaradawi’s ideas on this very sensitive topic are more reflective of the wider Islamist community, these organisations have to take their relationship with the European states in which they are based into consideration. Once again, they have been forced to put politics before religion, potentially alienating themselves from their core constituencies.

  Yet like its counterparts in France and the UK, the IGD has had to focus on issues of integration. El-Zayat claims to envisage a situation in Germany where ‘the Federal Chancellor in 2020 is a Muslim, born and raised in Germany, the Federal Supreme Court has a Muslim judge, and a Muslim representative will be on the Federal Radio/TV Council to secure Muslim citizens’ constitutionally guaranteed rights’.101 Such talk is clearly aimed at bolstering the IGD’s position and convincing the German authorities that it is a tolerant organisation that supports multiculturalism. However, this tolerance seems to have its limits. In a telling incident in 2006 the German state held its first Islamic Conference in Berlin to discuss issues including the teaching of Islam in state schools and the qualifying of German imams, as well as how to encourage the reading of Friday sermons in German. According to the German media, both the IGD and Millî Görüş objected to this conference, outraged because the German government had invited some secular Muslims and critics of Islam to the conference.102 Informed that a recent poll showed that a maximum of 15 per cent of Muslims participated in Islamic associations such as his and so the participation of secular elements in the conference was justified, El-Zayat retorted: ‘We can’t suppose that the current government doesn’t represent all Germans because some of them didn’t go to vote.’103

  Some of this frustration may have been because the IGD has found it particularly difficult to act as an interlocutor between Muslim communities and the government on account of the suspicion that the German state has towards it. The Interior Ministry of Bavaria, for example, openly branded the IGD as a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and an extremist organisation.104 Moreover, the IGD has been plagued with scandal and investigations in recent years. The freezing of the assets of Ghaleb Himmat, who had been the face of the IGD for so many years, and the investigation into the Al-Taqwa Bank came as a major blow to the organisation’s credibility. It was further alleged that Himmat had ties to the Saudi Arabian International Islamic Charity Organisation (IICO), which was accused of having links to terrorism and of financing Hamas.105

  To make matters worse, in 2002 the federal police launched an investigation into El-Zayat himself, who, it alleged, had transferred more than $2 million on behalf of WAMY. It was claimed that some of the money had been sent to the Albanian charity Taibah, whose Bosnian branch has been designated a terrorist organisation by the US.106 El-Zayat told the media that he had simply been acting as a member of the board of trustees of WAMY when he transferred the money.107

  The IGD has also been investigated in relation to alleged financial irregularities. In 1999 it lost its non-profit status, reportedly as a result of sloppy bookkeeping.108 According to officials, the organisation failed to inform state education bodies that it had lost its non-profit status and continued to receive funding for its private school illegally whilst allowing donors to write off their contributions.109

  By 2003 the IGD had handed over the running of the school to another body, the German–Islamic Educational Enterprise, which was especially created for the purpose. However, in 2004 local officials denied the school a licence because they believed that the new organisation was simply a front for the IGD. Thomas Huber, a spokesman for the district government of Upper Bavaria, explained: ‘We are afraid that the group running the school, which belongs to the Islamic Community of Germany, is using the school to spread Islamist ideology.’110

  It is not clear whether these investigations were simply knee-jerk reactions on the part of the German state, but they have left the IGD more hemmed in than their counterparts in the UK or France, which are able to occupy a much greater political space. As such Germany has become a far less appealing centre for the Ikhwan in general. It would appear therefore that although Germany was an important Brotherhood centre during the 1970s and 1980s, today its importance has dwindled considerably. Even when the organisation was at its peak the Ikhwan was never able to command strong popular support and Germany was primarily a place to facilitate activities and act as a backstop to the Ikhwan in the Arab world.

  The Grip of the First Generation

  Whilst these three countries offer very different pictures of the Ikhwan’s experience in Europe, what is common to them is that they were all born out of the Brotherhood but have sought to distance themselves from the movement. They have struggled hard to be seen as independent and primarily preoccupied with the role of Muslim communities in their respective European countries. However, their bid to represent these communities and to integrate fully into European society has been severely hampered by the fact that for the most part they are still essentially in the hands of the first generation of migrants or refugees. El-Zayat, as a member of the second generation, is the exception; the vast majority of the IGD’s leadership are still from the first generation. As of 2006 only four out of the group’s fifteen Shura Council members were from the second generation.111 El-Zayat is aware of this problem: ‘What I as a second-generation would want to achieve is support in the creation of a German Muslim identity … bridging the gap and leaving [behind] the immigrants of an Arabic basis and to concentrate much more on the second-generation.’112 Other Islamist leaders in Europe have bemoaned the lack of second-generation migrants in their structures.

  However, it is striking to note that in many cases the same few individuals have been in control of these organisations for years and appear unwilling to relinquish power. Figures such as Mahmoud Zuhair or Lhaj Thami Breeze have been in important leadership positions within the UOIF for decades despite the fact that the North African community in France is very well established. Dhaou Meskine has noted of Islamist organisations in general: ‘A lot of organisations retained the backwardness of their own states back home. The leadership can’t give up its position. It reflects the situation in the Third World where the leader can only be got rid of by death or a coup!’113 Moreover, these organisations are like small cliques or in some instances almost a ‘family business’. The same few individuals appear on the boards of each other’s organisations and seem to have the Islamist circuit neatly divided up between themselves.

  One of the problems engendered by this situation is that these leaders are so concerned about their own positions as foreign residents that they are unlikely to try to rock the boat too much, thereby decreasing their clout within their own constituencies. Meskine also noted: ‘The mistake was setting up organisations with those from outside. If someone is linked to outside he says yes to everything they [the authorities] want him to do because he can’t oppose anything or insist on anything. He fears for his papers and residency so he always says yes.’114 In addition, despite their keenness to promote the idea of a European Islam, some of those first-generation leaders continue to feel that they are not truly part of European society. Some Muslim leaders of these Ikhwani-oriented organisations stil
l frame their debates in terms of Muslims versus the West, or us and them, as if they are not themselves part of the Western world and Europe is an entirely different cultural entity.

  In spite of having been in the UK since the 1970s, Ahmed al-Rawi, who established the Ikhwan’s European network, the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe (FIOE), talks about Europeans as if they are part of a separate world. In a 2006 interview he stated: ‘Despite the hostility between us and them [the Europeans] and the negative image that they carry about Islam, they are in general very logical, so if they find someone who mixes with them and explains things to them, they would become convinced [about Islam].’115 This approach is hardly surprising; the first generation may genuinely consider Europe as their home but they are struggling to find their own place in the continent and still consider themselves to be part of the Islamic world.

  Being part of the first generation brings its own anxieties about preserving cultural and traditional values and these organisations repeatedly stress the need to refrain from being ‘contaminated’ by Western values. As a result these groups are keen to emphasise the merits of Islamic educational establishments and in some cases of Muslim communities being dealt with as separate entities. In one mosque in Manchester the Ikhwan-oriented imam was pushing in 2004 to be allowed to legislate for the local Muslim community under Sharia law. In a similar vein, a Libyan Ikhwani in the UK said that he was happy for his daughter to follow the UK’s national curriculum but wanted her in a separate Muslim school so that she wouldn’t be ‘contaminated by the influences of the Western girls around her’.116 Likewise Mohsen N’Gazou expressed his anxieties about the impact that mixing with French society would have on the next generation of Muslim children and lobbied to get the funds to set up a private Islamic school in the city.117 Whilst this is understandable for the first generation, who are still grappling to come to terms with being a minority community, it risks emphasising and encouraging the differences between Muslims and non-Muslims and arguably makes life more challenging for the second and third generations.

  Moreover, whilst the various Ikhwani-oriented Islamist organisations are stressing the need to focus on Europe, for many their primary references continue to be the Middle East and the Islamic world. Furthermore, although they may not be formally linked to the Brotherhood in Cairo, these organisations still consider Cairo to be a key spiritual reference. It is also notable that whilst these organisations stress their independence from the Brotherhood, many Ikhwani in the Middle East still tend to refer to them as extensions of the movement. The former Murshid has said:

  We are present in every country. Everywhere there are people who believe in the message of the Muslim Brothers. In France, the Union of Islamic Organizations of France (UOIF) does not belong to the organization of the Brothers. They follow their own laws and rules. There are many organizations that do not belong to the Muslim Brothers. For example, Shaykh al-Qaradawi. He is not a Muslim Brother, but he was formed according to the doctrine of the Brothers. The doctrine of the Brothers is a written doctrine that has been translated in all languages … Everyone who believes in this doctrine can be considered as a Muslim Brother.118

  He has also said of those institutions in Europe:

  These organisations and institutions are independent and autonomous. We don’t control them. It is the brothers abroad who lead these organisations. The structures linked to Qaradawi are organisations of the Brotherhood directed by the brothers of different countries … Those who cooperate with us are not all brothers … but we tend not to make any distinction between them.119

  In a parallel situation, Mohamed Habib has allegedly said of the Muslim American Society, ‘I don’t want to say MAS is an Ikhwan entity … This causes some security inconveniences for them in a post-Sept. 11 world.’120 Mohsen N’Gazou explains this mismatch thus: ‘Those Ikhwan in the Middle East look at us as an extension of them because we are part of their school of thought. They are more extreme and think that we are lost.’121

  Such contradictions do little to assist Ikhwani in Europe, whose main preoccupation seems to be carving out a niche for themselves within the European polity in order to have a greater degree of influence over their own communities in the continent. Their strategy appears to be to mould themselves as key interlocutors and reference points for European Muslim communities and since 9/11 in particular to demonstrate their willingness to move towards adopting more liberal values. There are of course still more rigid elements within their midst, but this approach is a clear response to the changing context within Europe and demonstrates classic Ikhwani pragmatism. However, by adopting such an approach these organisations will always have a limited appeal and will remain the realm of the few. Ironically, as a result of this narrow support base, other Ikhwani figures who reside in Europe but continue to be members of the Ikhwan in their home countries are much more powerful than those who are desperately trying to play a part in European societies. London-based Syrian Ikhwani leader Ali Saddredine al-Bayanouni was always far more influential than Ahmed Sheikh who leads the MAB or Ibrahim El-Zayat of the IGD. In many ways the power of the Ikhwan in Europe is still based upon its relationship to the Islamic world and the cause that it is supporting. The Palestinian cause will always hold more interest to the vast majority of the community than any discussion of creating a European fiqh. As such, the Ikhwan in Europe may be developing an increasingly sophisticated discourse and may dominate many of the continent’s mosques and Islamist centres, but its ability to influence Muslims in the continent remains as limited as ever.

  5

  The Ikhwan and Violence

  Perhaps the most controversial issue to haunt the Ikhwan since its inception has been its relationship to violence. In spite of its claim to be a pacific movement, it has been castigated in some circles as a violent organisation bent on imposing Islamic Sharia across the world. In 2006 Front Page Magazine carried an article that said:

  On October 28, 2005, President George W. Bush denounced IslamoFascist movements that call for a ‘violent and political vision: the establishment, by terrorism, subversion and insurgency, of a totalitarian empire that denies all political and religious freedom’. The Muslim Brotherhood, also known as the Ikhwan, is a good example of what the President described and what he must protect us against.1

  Others have observed that many of those who have gone on to advocate more militant interpretations of Islam had passed through the ranks of the Brotherhood, where they received their ideological grounding. Some analysts refer to the Ikhwan as a ‘stepping stone’: ‘For someone who is interested in dedicating their lives to a radical Islamist cause, it can be a pathway up … to a more serious dealing with Islam.’2

  Many famous militants have passed through the Ikhwan’s ranks, including al-Qa‘ida ideologue Mustafa Setmariam, also known as Abu Musab al-Suri, who was a member of the Syrian Ikhwan before he moved on to join more radical groups. Similarly, the man known as the father of the Afghan mujahideen, Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, was a member of the Brotherhood before he became more engaged in violent jihad. Even 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta came from a family that was allegedly linked to the Brotherhood. As such the Ikhwan has been accused as acting as an incubator for more radical ideas and of spawning terrorist recruits.

  It is not only in the West that such allegations are levelled at the Brotherhood. They have also been forthcoming in the Arab world. Intellectuals such as the Egyptian leader of the Ta’jamu political party, Rifat Said, have observed that whilst the Ikhwan’s leaders deny that they have taken part in terrorist actions, they try to outdo each other by claiming, ‘I killed more than the others.’3 Perhaps the Brotherhood’s greatest critics, however, were the nationalist regimes of the Middle East. The former Egyptian government repeatedly presented the Egyptian Ikhwan as the political face of a terrorist organisation.4 There were also repeated assaults on and warnings about the Brotherhood in the state-controlled media. An article in Al-Gomhuriya in 2007 declared:


  The victory of Hamas and the Brotherhood at the ballot box does not mean that they are politicians and that they are capable of running the state … All that Hamas is capable of doing is to be crack troops of suicide. Unfortunately, however, they are not committing suicide alone. They are forcing the entire people to commit suicide, and I fear that this is the same tactic and path that the Brotherhood in Egypt is taking.5

  A few months earlier, following a martial arts demonstration by a group of young students linked to the Brotherhood, the editor of the same newspaper wrote:

  The fighting training, martial arts, and self-defence that the students demonstrated at Al-Azhar University revealed that the Muslim Brotherhood has a great measure of Fascism and extremism … Like the Fascists and the Nazis, the Muslim Brotherhood is not interested in whether Egypt is destroyed or conquered … These inciters strive for one thing only – to create a military, or militia, parallel to the Egyptian army … the Muslim Brotherhood wants [Egypt’s] sons to die in battles waged by the regional and neighbouring powers, in which we have no interest. Perhaps they are striving to brainwash the youth and to exploit them for other aims within the country that will lead the youth only to great danger.6

  The Brotherhood fiercely denies such allegations, asserting that it is a moderate organisation that does not advocate taking up arms to gain power but rather prefers the slower approach of educating society from below in preparation for the eventual establishment of an Islamic order. When asked about the Ikhwan’s desire to establish an Islamic state, Mustafa Mashour explained:

  … we are not talking about seizing power in a coup d’état. Our method is peaceful; it is preaching and moulding public opinion to respond to our ideology. If we can succeed in establishing an Islamic state through elections, no one will be able to say that we overthrew the government, because we are using constitutional methods. We are not violent or bloody revolutionaries; we merely say that Islam is the solution.7