Captain Elliot and the Founding of Hong Kong

by Captain Elliot

I have read every word of Elliot’s Paper, and return it to you. Poor fellow! it is hard, indeed, to have been so misunderstood, and so abused with such a case as he has been able to make … he was set to resolve a practical problem … which would have baffled the seven sages of Greece when complicated by the necessity of obeying remote and ignorant Superiors, of guiding hot-headed belligerents, looking after sickly and drunken soldiers, contending with disease and tempest, negociating with a stupid despot, and ministering to the cupidity and the pride of England.4

  He ended on a note of realism: ‘I doubt whether Elliot will ever extricate himself from the web of calumny which all these things have drawn around him. He must wrap himself up in his own virtue and be at peace, and thank God for his good spirits, and that he has done nothing to lower them.’5

  The private letter to Palmerston which Elliot had told Emma he intended to write never materialised, but before his departure for Texas he made sure his case was fully set out for the new Foreign Secretary, Lord Aberdeen. He explained in considerable detail what he had done in China, why he had done it, and the beneficial consequences. He drew particular attention to the commercial value to the Crown of his management of trade:

  Between the 24th of March, 1839, when I was made a prisoner at Canton by the Chinese Government, and the 18th August, 1841, when I was removed by my own, we have turned a trade amounting to upwards of ten millions sterling, despatched more than fifty thousand tons of British shipping, sent to England as much produce as would pour into Her Majesty’s Treasury upwards of eight millions sterling, recovered from the Chinese Treasury about 150 tons of hard silver, warded off from Her Majesty’s Government pressing appeals from foreign Governments at peculiarly uneasy moments and on very delicate subjects, triumphantly manifested the prowess of the Queen’s arms, and still more signally and with more enduring advantage established the character and extent of British magnanimity.6

  Though some individuals on the Chinese side might have considered the British magnanimous, any implication that the Chinese Government did so proved to be extremely wishful thinking. In the same letter Elliot admitted to Aberdeen that he had himself been at fault in failing to send full explanatory reports to Palmerston during the eight weeks in the lull in the conflict at the beginning of 1840. On his overall approach, however, he was unrepentant. Sensitive to accusations that he empathised too much with the Chinese, his response to such criticism set out succinctly the essence of his China philosophy: ‘I submit that it has been caring more for lasting British honour and substantial British interests, to protect friendly and helpful people, and to return the confidence of the great trading population of the Southern Provinces, with which it is our chief purpose to cultivate more intimate, social and commercial relations.’7

  Compensation to the merchants for surrendered opium, about which Elliot was questioned by the Treasury before his departure for Texas, was eventually settled, with remarkable precision, at £1,267,646, 1s 3d.8 It was a huge sum, and for Elliot to have committed the government to paying it (unavoidably without consultation and even though it was to be recouped from the Chinese) had been a major act of faith.

  With China and its aftermath very much in his mind, Elliot arrived in Texas determined, as ever, to do his duty. He had no predecessor as either consul general or, as he also became, Chargé d’Affaires. Earlier in 1841 Lord Aberdeen had dispatched to Texas William Kennedy, a Scot much travelled in North America who had lived in Texas and briefly represented the new republic in London. An acknowledged expert on Texas, and with great confidence in his own abilities, Kennedy had pressed on Aberdeen the need for Britain to have an agent there to report on developments. The major concern for Kennedy was the body of Texan opinion, rapidly gaining ground, in favour of annexation by the United States. It was also a concern for the British government, but in the overall range of current foreign policy issues, not particularly urgent. When the issues of slavery in Texas and annexation had been raised in Parliament in 1836 Palmerston had told the House of Commons that ‘with regard to that question [annexation] he did not think that the events which had yet occurred, afforded any ground to think that there was at present any such probability of a result of that kind as to call upon that House to agree to an address to the Crown with respect to it’.9 In a private letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Spring Rice, in October 1937 Palmerston had elaborated:

  We cannot pretend to exert much influence on the destiny of Texas; & have little to do, but to watch the course of events.

  Mexico will not reconquer Texas; we must see whether the Band of outlaws who occupy Texas will be able to constitute themselves into such a community as it would be decent for us to make a Treaty with…

  …To us perhaps it does not very much signify what becomes of Texas, though in a Political view, it would be better that Texas should not be incorporated within the Union; commercially it would make little difference.10

  William Kennedy’s initial appointment in Texas was not to any specified post, and he accordingly had no official brief to support it. From his letters to Aberdeen requesting that he be sent, it can be inferred that his role was to observe, gather information and report back. He was volunteering his services as an unaccredited agent, he said, ‘for the purpose of Watching events, and exercising whatever influence I might possess for the benefit of my country.’11

  Charles Elliot’s instructions in respect of his appointment as consul general were the standard General Instructions for H.M. Consuls, but Aberdeen drew his particular attention to the need for careful preservation of Consular records, and for gathering and reporting on matters concerning trade and agriculture. His salary was fixed at £1,200 per annum and he was prohibited from engaging in any commercial activity for his own benefit.12 Elliot was unlikely to have contemplated activity of that kind – he had never demonstrated any such inclination; but perhaps conscious of his attempts to appoint paid assistants when he was in British Guiana, Aberdeen added that he was not to appoint any vice consuls without the prior permission of the Foreign Office.

  The instructions for Elliot’s consular duties were issued in May, 1842, before his departure for Texas. On 1 July the Foreign Secretary wrote to Elliot that now that the three treaties between Britain and Texas had been signed, ‘you will take upon yourself the character and duties of HM Chargé d’Affaires to the Govt. of Texas, agreeably to the assurance that was prospectively given you to that effect by Visct: Palmerston in his dispatch dated the 4 of August last.’13 Another letter from the Foreign Office instructed Elliot to ensure that in his communications to London he separated his consular commercial responsibilities from the diplomatic duties he was to assume as Chargé d’Affaires.14 In his 1 July letter Aberdeen made it clear to Elliot that in his diplomatic role he

  should, at first, assume the attitude, rather of an observer than of an actor, of a passive, but not inattentive spectator rather than of an energetic agent or counseller.

  You will watch closely all the proceedings of the Texian Govt., not with any hostile view, but simply with the object of putting Your own Govt. in possession of such facts and circumstances as may enable them to form a just estimate of the power and character of the Texian Govt. and Nation, and to judge thereby of the value of the new relations which H.M. has formed with that Republick.

  His official brief, in other words, like Kennedy’s unofficial one, was to observe and report. Kennedy had arrived back in England on 20 April 1842, having spent a little over three months in Texas. After much renewed soliciting he was appointed consul at Galveston at the end of September. Aberdeen’s letter explicitly confined his responsibilities to the Galveston area and stressed his subordination to Elliot as consul general. Kennedy did not arrive in Texas to take up his official post until early February 1843.

  Until October 1842 the Foreign Office received little of value from Texas. Charles Elliot was unwell, and apart from some initial impressions, his communications to London during the first weeks after his arriv
al comprised little more than local newspapers and acknowledgement of the receipt of his formal appointment details, sent by the Foreign Office in late June and early July. He dealt with a number of local issues and reported on first meetings with the Texan Attorney General and the President, Sam Houston.

  By November he felt sufficiently recovered and confident to be able to send the Foreign Secretary a fuller analysis of the situation in Texas as he saw it. His reports were informed in part by what he had gleaned from President Houston, with whom he had formed a constructive working relationship and a warm friendship. Texas, Elliot implied, had become embroiled in its current difficulties with Mexico by overreacting to the possibility of Mexican aggression. Elliot’s view was that by shaping up to get its retaliation in first, Texas had inflamed the relationship between the two countries and, among other things, involved both sides in unnecessary expense on naval forces. The deterioration had been in spite of the preferences of both Houston and the Mexican President, Santa Anna, for a more conciliatory stance, but persistent localised hostilities in the border areas could not be ignored. Tensions eased, however, when a Texan blockade of Mexican east coast ports was called off in September after nearly six months. The British had been concerned for the safety of their ships operating in the Gulf of Mexico, and were anxious to ensure that Britain was seen to be entirely neutral. Following instruction from Aberdeen, Elliot had emphasised this neutrality to the Acting Secretary of State.

  Though improved, Elliot’s health also remained a problem. He wrote to Henry Unwin Addington, Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, early in September asking for permission to base himself on the coast at Galveston rather than inland at Austin, which had now become the Texan capital, in order to benefit from a kinder climate. In due course Aberdeen not only agreed but told him that ‘in the present unsettled state of the Country’ he could live wherever he judged best for the performance of his duties.15 Elliot was of course grateful for this dispensation, but he derived at least as much satisfaction from the Foreign Secretary’s remarks, in the same letter, about his ‘success in China.’16 Such was his continuing sensitivity about China, though, that he could not convey his thanks without reiterating the rightness, as he saw it, of his actions. His reply said that Aberdeen’s words had

  affected me as I believe Your Lordship will have felt they would. Let me say at this conjuncture that I have always been free of self-reproach or uneasiness respecting my share in those transactions, for I knew that I had done my duty, and, under God’s Providence, depended upon full success. The only ends I ever had in view … have been accomplished; Great public and private distress was averted; a depressed and dark turn of affairs has been changed into a state of security and lasting advantage, and the principles of policy and schemes of operation which seemed to me to be sound for those purposes have not proved otherwise.17

  The Texas brief simply to watch and report was never going to sit comfortably with Charles Elliot. Conscious of the controversy over his China activities he had assured Aberdeen that he would adhere to his instructions. Doing his duty was, as ever, vitally important; but he could not go against his instinctive need to make an impact, to contribute something extra, positive, and if possible, original. From his experience in British Guiana it had been his evidence to the Select Committee; in China it had been Hong Kong; in Texas it was a plan to safeguard British interests in North America and to secure the future of an independent Texas. Elliot set out his scheme, as he called it, in a letter to the Foreign Office of 15 November 1842, referring to it again in two more in December. Wary of engaging directly with Aberdeen with what could be construed as criticism of government policy, he took advantage of personal friendship and addressed his communications to Addington. It was however inevitable that his ideas would find their way to the Foreign Secretary, a certainty of which Elliot himself was of course aware.18

  The maintenance of British trade and influence and a stable prosperity for Texas were the desired outcomes, but Elliot’s starting point was slavery. He was to draw on his own background and upbringing, and on his experiences in the Royal Navy and British Guiana, in making the abolition of slavery in Texas a key part of his scheme. He suggested that there should be

  another Convention in this Country. Slavery to be abolished, the entire abolition of political disabilities upon people of Colour, perfectly free trade to be declared to be a fundamental principle; the right of voting to depend upon a knowledge of reading and writing, and pretty high money contribution to the State, with the payment charge to be made in advance, Congress to have power to lower the rate from time to time according to the state of the public necessities; stringent legislation against squatting, in the form of a land tax and otherwise, improvements upon the well established failure and folly of a yearly elected Legislature and other liberality of the rhodomontade school.19

  The plan was at best unrealistic and at worst a mere flight of fancy, an example of that trait in Elliot’s character which caused him to be described later as a ‘political dreamer’.20 British interests in North America, if not active policy aims, included the preservation of good relations with Mexico as an important trading partner; prevention of the spread of slavery and its eventual eradication; and containment of the territorial ambitions of the United States. Elliot was well aware that all three would be at risk if Texas became annexed to the United States. In his more pragmatic and reflective moments he must also have known that Britain, which had declared itself to be wholly neutral in the continuing hostilities between Texas and Mexico, was highly unlikely ever to attempt to impose a specific constitution on another sovereign country. Nevertheless, he was alert to the need for persistent diplomatic effort if there were to be any chance of annexation being avoided.

  Elliot took much encouragement from his close relationship with President Houston, and his long 15 November letter to Addington contained much about him. He stressed that Houston was the only individual in Texas capable of consolidating the country’s independence and leading it forward, though his admiration was not limitless: ‘Let him speak of men, on public affairs, or the tone and temper of other Governments, and no one can see farther, or more clearly. The moment He turns to finance or fiscal arrangements, you find that he has been groping on the dark side of his mind.’21

  The friendship with Houston was a professional positive to set against the generally dismal and difficult experience of living in Texas without his wife and family and with few material comforts. It soon bore fruit; Houston wished to achieve peace with Mexico, but wanted to do it without formality. He approached Elliot to help him, aware that permission would be needed from the British government. Houston’s letter was forwarded to Aberdeen just before Elliot left Galveston for Washington-on-the-Brazos, where the President had been attending a meeting of Congress on 14 November. As he mentioned to Addington later, the journey upriver to Washington had not been without incident – he had fallen through an open hatch into the hold of the boat and dislocated a rib, an accident which ought, he conceded, to have prompted him to abide by the medical advice he had been given and to stay at Houston instead of proceeding further. He went on, however, to Washington; he informed Addington, perhaps calling to mind among other things the shipwreck of the Louisa, that he was ‘one of the best practised men of my time to strange accidents, and hard rubs of all kinds, and I hope to come straight enough again, for all that is come and gone.’22

  Before the year ended, Charles Elliot reiterated his thinking on future British policy towards Texas to Addington. He could not let it go, and had to be sure that the Foreign Office was in no doubt of how strongly he felt that his scheme was the right way forward:

  The people of Texas are gasping for peace, and the best bidder. I believe that the only safe solution would be a formal offer on the part of Her Majesty’s Government to Texas, to secure the close of this contest upon the basis of It’s consenting to place Itself in a position of real Independence, by an immediate and thoro
ugh organisation of It’s social, political and Commercial Institutions and policy upon sound, and independent principles; an[d] further offering every reasonable facility to England to negociate such a loan as would be necessary to accomplish the proposed objects.

  So far as I can see there is no choice between this, and the virtual, early, and permanent lapse of Texas within the sphere of United States influence, and policy;23

  To re-emphasise his concern about – and dislike of – United States ambition, Elliot resorted to ironic understatement in his last communication of the year to London when he commented on part of President Tyler’s recent Message to the US Congress:

  It has a tang of Texas and Mexico, and is certainly worthy of attention both for coolness of purpose, and dryness of expression –

  ‘Carefully abstaining from all interference in question[s] exclusively referring to the political interests of Europe, we may be permitted to hope an equal exemption from the interference of European Governments in what relates to the States of the American Continent’

  …I presume this means that United States politicians and financiers mislike disturbance on the little Island, forming the Continent of North and South America. But it is possible that this pretension of United States policy may not be equally acceptable to all ‘the States of the American Continent.24

  During the first three months of 1843 Elliot’s letters to London and to the Texan Secretary of State Anson Jones were partly taken up with the questions of compensation for ‘outrages’ done to two British vessels by Texan ships, and land claims.25 British subjects who had been allocated land in Texas by Mexico when Texas was a Mexican province now faced losing it through measures taken under the Republic’s General Land Law of 1837. This legislation was condemned by Elliot as ‘utterly unsustainable, violating universally received principles of a general nature, and carried out by Congress beyond the plain intention and limitation of fundamental authority, that is, beyond the Constitution of the Republic’.26 The correspondence reflected the sizeable gap between Elliot’s personal regard for Houston and his poor opinion of the government over which he presided. He remained intent on pressing the British government for action to end the Texas–Mexico conflict. While he accepted that France might have a role in this, he was adamant that the United States should not. He was accordingly relieved to learn that the Foreign Secretary had rejected a proposal originating from Anson Jones for tripartite intervention by Britain, France and the United States to press the Mexican government towards peace.