Shadow over the Atlantic

by Robert Forsyth

  On the 29th, the officer cadre was bolstered when Hauptmann Georg Eckl, an experienced maritime pilot, having served with an sea-rescue unit, joined 2./FAGr 5.

  Meanwhile, the Gruppe continued to fly operations over the Atlantic with the few aircraft it had available. From 22 November, the Germans began to track the 46-ship southbound convoy OS.59/KMS.33, which had departed Liverpool on 16 November bound for Gibraltar (OS.59) and Freetown (KMS.33). The convoy was carrying coal, coke, ammunition, aircraft, vehicles and general stores, and many of the merchantmen were armed.83 The intention of the BdU was to deploy a newly formed group of 16 U-boats, several of which had been previously assigned to the Schill pack against SL.139/MKS.30, under the name Weddigen and which were to be in position against OS.59/KMS.33 during the night of 23/24 November.84 Unfortunately U-538 was sunk by depth charges on the 21st and U-648 went missing, without explanation, the next day, while U-586 was forced to withdraw on the 24th because it was low on fuel.85 The pack was down to 13 boats. Worse was to come for Weddigen because, aware of enemy intentions, the British sent the 4th Escort Group to cover the southbound convoy.86

  The first reconnaissance initiated by Fliegerführer Atlantik was undertaken by a Bv 222 of 1./SAGr 129 from Biscarosse on the 22nd. The flying boat had an ‘inconclusive engagement’ with a B-24, but was able to signal back details of the convoy and it returned to Biscarosse at 2244 hrs. It was not until the early morning of the 23rd that FAGr 5 despatched two Ju 290s – between 0630 hrs and 0645 hrs on the 23rd, with the third out from Mont de Marsan mid-morning.87 All aircraft returned safely but there are no details about their observations.* In any case, by the evening of the 24th, the Germans were under the incorrect assumption that OS.59/KMS.33 was farther west than it actually was and duly moved boats farther in that direction, away from the convoy. In fact the convoy was 2° south of the line to which the U-boats had been ordered to move.

  Meanwhile, another convoy, SL.140/MKS.31, was steaming north across the eastern Atlantic towards Liverpool. FAGr 5 was placed on readiness to shadow and, subsequently, two Junkers, 9V+BH and 9V+DH, took off around 0500 hrs on the morning of 26 November. At 1550 hrs, aircraft ‘B’ reported that its reconnaissance was completed and that the convoy had not been found. At 1734 hrs, Mont de Marsan signalled aircraft ‘D’ to ask if its reconnaissance had been completed and ten minutes later it transmitted its first report on its observations. Some time later, the aircraft sent a second report in which it stated that it had observed 45 motor vessels and five escorts, steaming at eight knots on course of 270°.88 This was not accurate as the convoy actually numbered between 50 and 70 ships. Based on FAGr 5’s reports, however, the Weddigen boats were moved west to intercept and to a new patrol line between 37° 30´ North, 19° 25´ West and 39° 05´ North, 17° 10´ West. 9V+DH was confirmed as landed at 2206 hrs. The problem was that once this aircraft had left the convoy area to return to base, the convoy changed course to the north.89

  This meant that on the 27th, when air reconnaissance was continued by two Fw 200s of III./KG 40 and a Bv 222 of 1./SAGr 129, still the U-boats could not make a kill because the targets were reported well to the east of them. SL.140/MKS.31 then progressed unharmed through the Weddigen pack on 27–28 November, thanks largely to its escort which had been strengthened by three escort-carrier task forces; the latter sank two U-boats and badly damaged two others.90 These were losses hard to bear: on the 25th, Korvettenkapitän Bernhard Zurmühlen’s U-600 was lost north of Ponta Delgada in the Azores, as a result of depth charges, while on the 27th, U-542, a new Type IXC40 boat, commanded by Oberleutnant zur See Christian-Brandt Coester, was sunk by depth charges dropped from a Wellington.91 By the 28th, with no promise of success for BdU, Fliegerführer Atlantik signalled the end of combined Luftwaffe/U-boat operations against the convoy and the U-boats were withdrawn from the area on the evening of the 28th.92 The Weddigen group’s efforts had accomplished nothing and so far Allied action had sunk a total of eight boats from both Schill and Weddigen. The latter group was dissolved on 6 December.93

  Before its dissolution however, Fliegerführer Atlantik ordered FAGr 5 to undertake reconnaissance over the Gibraltar convoy route, to the south-west of Ireland, with the aim of locating another southbound convoy for the benefit of the remaining U-boats in the area. Initially, two Ju 290s, one of which was 9V+HK, were slated to take off from Mont de Marsan in the early morning of 29 November. After a postponement, possibly on account of weather conditions, the aircraft departed and one machine later reported spotting one motor vessel of 20,000 tons and one of c.10,000 tons in the area of 25° West 62, course 90°, at a speed of six knots, but details of the ships could not be distinguished. These may have been vessels from OS.60/KMS.34, of 48 ships plus an oiler, bound for Freetown and Gibraltar, which had sailed from Liverpool on 25 November. Both Junkers safely returned. Another aircraft went out the following day, but details of the mission are not available.

  Meanwhile, the strength of the Atlantic U-boat force had grown with the arrival of 11 new boats from Germany and three brought down from the Arctic. Together with three from France, plus another two, these boats were formed into a new wolfpack known as Coronel, which, in turn, was divided into three sub-groups. Things got off to an ominous start on 1 December when one of the Arctic boats, U-269, was badly damaged by enemy action and forced to beat a retreat to St Nazaire. The remaining boats took up their positions in the Atlantic, amidst winter storms to the west of Ireland.94

  On the 2nd, from its base at the Hotel am Steinplatz in Berlin, BdU issued a directive that Coronel should be deployed against a westbound convoy, ONS.24 from Liverpool to Halifax, and that the pack should be in position from 1200 hrs on the 5th. It had also been agreed between the Fliegerführer Atlantik and BdU that long-range air reconnaissance to locate the convoy west of Ireland on behalf of Coronel would commence on 4 December.95 The usual problem manifested itself once more: only two Ju 290s were available to carry out reconnaissance between 58° and 52° North and east of 21° West. SKL was sceptical over the contribution of the Luftwaffe: ‘It remains to be seen whether our weak air reconnaissance forces will be able to detect the convoy.’ Indeed, a southbound convoy had already slipped through the Weddigen pack undetected: ‘This is the third convoy that has not been detected.’96

  The Ju 290s A-4 Wk-Nr 0169 (PI+PW) 9V+KK, which had joined 2./FAGr 5 on 25 November, having taken part in air-refuelling trials at Dessau earlier in the month, and the A-3 Wk-Nr 0162 (PI+PP) 9V+EK, also of 2.Staffel, were airborne to the east of a line 53° North. 25° 30´ West–56° 42´ North 25° 36´ West during the afternoon over what was believed to be the area in which ONS.24 should be, but neither aircraft could locate it.97 This was because the convoy, which had departed Liverpool on 30 November, had been routed to the north of the U-boats’ operational area as a result of Enigma decrypts which revealed the position of Coronel.98 Both aircraft returned safely, but without having assisted the U-boats – a result of Allied codebreaking rather than any shortcomings on the part of the aircrews. It was to be the same story on the 5th, when 9V+HK and 9V+DH patrolled to the south-west of the area covered the previous day. Adverse weather conditions prevented a return to Mont de Marsan and both aircraft had to land at alternative fields.99 It looked as if ONS.24 – 30 merchants and 15 escorts, including the Ancylus, a former Royal Dutch/Shell oil tanker which had recently been converted to a MAC ship – had slipped through the net.100

  Despite the dissatisfaction expressed at higher levels over FAGr 5’s lack of accomplishment, in early December, the safety of the still small number of Ju 290s of the Gruppe had become of paramount importance to the Kriegsmarine, which was indicative of the fact that it was prepared to lend its smoke-laying units to only one airfield – and that was Mont de Marsan, presumably as defence against Allied air attacks. Protection of the Ju 290s was deemed ‘more important than the protection of La Pallice or the He 177s.’101

  By 10 December, the winter weather over the Biscay and the Atlant
ic was beginning to curtail the operations of the Gruppe. That day, the attention of the BdU shifted to SL.141 and MKS.32, convoys which had rendezvoused on 4 December to become a combined grouping of 55 merchant vessels and ten escorts bound for Liverpool.102 SL.141/MKS.32’s position at 0800 hrs on the 10th was at approximately 44° 33´ North 18° 55´ West. Fliegerführer Atlantik sent out three Condors from III./KG 40 at around 0100 hrs to be followed later by a pair of Ju 290s from FAGr 5, which would home in a strike force of He 177s from II./KG 40. The Focke-Wulfs found the convoy at 0910 hrs which was reported to consist of ‘many motor vessels and an aircraft carrier, course 360°.’ But with the weather worsening, the Ju 290s would remain on the ground in France, firstly delayed, and then eventually their mission cancelled, thus ending the hopes of an ensuing action by the Heinkels.103

  On 11 December, three of FAGr 5's six Ju 290s were serviceable, along with ten of III./KG 40’s fifteen Fw 200s and one of the two Bv 222s available to Fliegerführer Atlantik.104 That day aircraft from all three of these units would prepare to take part in an operation against ON.215, a 58-vessel convoy which had sailed from Liverpool on 9 December bound for New York carrying cocoa waste, soda ash, coal and general supplies, accompanied by 17 escorts.105 Two Ju 290s of FAGr 5, an aircraft coded ‘A’ and 9V+EK of 2.Staffel, flew from Mont de Marsan, north along the French coast, to Kerlin-Bastard, near Lorient, from where they would operate. According to the subsequent British signals intelligence report for the 12th, ‘Reconnaissance was evidently planned with some knowledge of the sailing of the convoy. The convoy’s position was assumed to be in about 57° North 18° West at 1400 hrs on the 12th and was in fact estimated too far to the Northward, it having been routed on a more Southerly track. At 0800 hrs on the 12th, its estimated position was 53° 47´ North 14° 20´ West.’ This would explain why the Ju 290s’ mission, which saw both aircraft fly out over Penmarch between 0445 and 0515 hrs, proved to be in vain. At 2313 hrs, aircraft ‘A’ reported a problem with one of its engines. It was forced to land at Brest-Lanvéoc on three engines at 0021 hrs.106

  Problems did not seem to be restricted to just engines; the war diary of the operations section of the SKL again blamed the absence of air reconnaissance, or rather failure of even its limited amount of equipment, for the lack of success of Coronel in the Atlantic. The Hohentwiel search apparatus on board a Ju 290 had broken down temporarily just at the point the aircraft’s crew had spotted three ships. Based on dead reckoning, the Coronel I and II packs were moved to the area, around 800 km west of Ireland, on the evening of the 13th.

  ‘If a close reconnaissance with double the number of aircraft had been available,’ fumed the war diarist, ‘there would probably have been a chance of picking up the convoy and reporting it in time. The Fliegerführer Atlantik had all available forces operating. This case clearly demonstrates that the number of aircraft is inadequate. The failure of a single search-gear set resulted in a frustrated operation which had been prepared long beforehand and involved a great number of U-boats. Renewed aerial reconnaissance in the area of Coronel is planned for 13 December, engaging all available forces, i.e., two Ju 290s and one Fw 200.’107

  So it was that on the 13th, Generalleutnant Kessler tried once again to deploy his forces in support of Coronel against ON.215. This time, any attempt to fly the Ju 290s out of Lorient and/or Brest was abandoned, and two more aircraft were made ready at Mont de Marsan for a first reconnaissance, along with a single Fw 200 of III./KG 40 at Lorient. The Condor managed to sight the convoy at 0823 hrs in 25° West 7224, 420 km west of the Irish coast, but subsequently developed engine trouble and crashed near Limerick in Ireland later that evening.

  Ju 290s Wk-Nr 0158 9V+BK and Wk-Nr 0169 9V+KK of 2./FAGr 5 took off from Mont de Marsan around 0430 hrs to head out into the Atlantic. At 1058 hrs, using FuG 200 radar, aircraft ‘B’ picked up a ‘formation’ of ships in 23° West 0325, some 530 km west-south-west of Clifden, in County Galway on the west coast of Ireland. Through gaps in the cloud, the crew observed seven merchant vessels all on a westerly course. This was similar to the sighting made by the Fw 200 earlier that morning.108 Fliegerführer Atlantik asked for more details and at 1420 hrs the aircraft responded that the composition of the formation was unknown although its ‘blip’ on the FuG 200 screen ‘had been large’. It is possible that the blip may have been one of the eastbound convoys, SC.148 from Halifax to Liverpool or HX.269 from New York, which the U-boats had also been warned to expect.

  Four hours later, at 1810 hrs in 25° West 8248, 9V+KK sighted ON.215. The crew signalled that the convoy comprised 40 ships with ten escort vessels, on course 270° at eight knots. The Ju 290 continued to shadow the convoy, but at 1945 hrs it was warned by Mont de Marsan of a strong southerly wind and instructed to return punctually. At 2020 hrs, the Junkers were ordered to break off their mission and return.

  The results of FAGr 5's reconnaissance showed that ON.215 was so far to the south of the U-boat patrol lines as to render useless further reconnaissance for the purpose of homing. The planned take-off by a third Ju 290 (to go out at 1155 hrs) specifically to home the U-boats on to the convoy, was delayed and eventually cancelled. At 2240 hrs, the Coronel boats, which had been ordered to surface at 1830 hrs and maintain a watch for beacon signals, were informed that such signals were no longer to be expected.109

  On the 14th, the weather conditions in the Bay of Biscay brought almost all Luftwaffe activity in the area to a standstill, but the next day Fliegerführer Atlantik once again sent out FAGr 5 to hunt for ON.215.110 The assumptions of both the Fliegerführer and BdU was that, since the last sighting on the evening of the 13th, the convoy was making a westerly or west-south-west course, and both reconnaissance and U-boats were deployed accordingly. A Bv 222 of 1./SAGr 129 was sent out first from Biscarosse at 0350 hours, but returned after some five hours, probably as a result of deteriorating weather.

  Then, with a flight plan that would take them across the French coast at 0420 hrs, Ju 290s 9V+AK and 9V+GK of 2./FAGr 5 crossed the Biscay to the Atlantic. They were followed later that morning by 9V+KK, which was probably sent out as a replacement for the Bv 222. As the day progressed, however, the weather out at sea grew steadily worse and at 1255 hrs, Fliegerführer Atlantik signalled all aircraft to be aware of the ground wind on their return flights. At 1725 hrs, they were asked to signal details of wind direction and strength hourly. No sightings seem to have been made, but this would have been as a result of the erroneous aforementioned assumption of the convoy’s track, which was in fact considerably farther south than thought. The Ju 290s all returned.111

  Fernaufklärungsgruppe 5 had been at war over the Atlantic for 30 days.

  * * *

  *The identity of this second aircraft is something of an enigma. The British listening stations picked up the transmission ‘I’, but the German historians Karl Kössler and Günther Ott believe that this aircraft did not enter service with FAGr 5 until December 1943, although they accept the code was used at some point with ‘great probability’ – see Kössler and Ott 1993, p. 191, 231.

  *Hessler (1989) notes that two reconnaissance aircraft which took off on the 23rd had to return because one had engine trouble and the other a radar defect. These may well have been the two Ju 290s.

  CHAPTER SIX

  THE KOMMANDEUR’S REPORT

  Operational enthusiasm and inspiration is high among all the crews. The loss of two crews has not had any effect. [There is] complete trust in the aircraft type.

  Hauptmann Hermann Fischer, Gruppenkommandeur, FAGr 5

  FAGr 5’s first full month of operations was marked on 15 December and it was the point at which, in a widely circulated report, Hauptmann Fischer reviewed the accomplishments, shortcomings, immediate needs and longer-term, future requirements of the Gruppe. By this stage FAGr 5 had flown 29 sorties against Gibraltar–UK (MKS)/UK–Gibraltar (KMS), Sierra Leone (Freetown)–UK (SL)/UK–Sierra Leone (OS) and North Atlantic convoys (HX etc.), totalling 415 hr 16 min flying
time over a distance of 120,350 km.

  Over a total of 11 days, six convoys had been shadowed, representing a total of 238 merchant ships, one battleship, ten destroyers, nine corvettes and 20 miscellaenous escort vessels. Fischer estimated the ‘catch’ of tonnage by the Gruppe sat between 1.7 and 2 million GRT, of which 18,000 GRT had ‘probably’ been sunk by the He 177s of II./KG 40, while there had been no sinkings as a direct result of cooperation between the unit’s Ju 290s and the U-boats. In his view, with the limited numbers of aircraft available, the results were ‘good’ and he attributed the successes particularly to the ‘good work’ of the FuG 200 Hohentwiel ASV search sets and what he termed as reports from ‘reliable agents’, presumably emanating from Spain and North Africa.

  According to Fischer, there was a considerable difference between flying longer-range missions into the mid-Atlantic, west of Ireland, and flying missions to cover the Mediteranean and Sierra Leone convoys:

  Up to now, successful sorties against the England–America convoys have been sparse. The search area for these convoys, the location of which is especially important for B.d.U., often lie at the outermost range of the Ju 290, so that with the limited forces available, only a relatively small area can be covered. As a result of the great ranges, in general, several search sectors cannot be covered by a single aircraft. Shadowing [a convoy] at greater range is only possible for the shortest period of time.