Shadow over the Atlantic

by Robert Forsyth

  According to dead reckoning the convoy made 6.8 knots from 9.1. and steered a practically straight course between the sighting on 9.1 and 11.1. It could not have skirted the area reconnoitered, as it would otherwise have had to make nine knots, a speed impossible with this collection of ships.

  The operation failed:

  a) because owing to an undetected failure in the Radar set air reconnaissance did not find the convoy in spite of the full use made of the few available aircraft.

  b) because, for this reason, the boats were in unfavorable positions and too far one from the other, so that even when one boat made contact the others could not get there.

  Additional review of Operation:

  8.1 Radar reconnaissance with one Ju 290. Convoy not found.

  9.1 Radar reconnaissance with two Ju 290s. Convoy found.

  10.1 One Ju 290 Set failed. Nothing found.

  One Ju 290 (morning) Set failed. Nothing found.

  One Ju 290 (evening) Set failed. Nothing found.

  11.1 Radar reconnaissance with two Ju 290s (of which one had engine trouble). Nothing found.

  Total: eight Ju 290s

  The results of this reconnaissance show that, apart from the unnoticed failure of the radar set, forces for individual operations were too weak. At least twice the number of aircraft are necessary. Besides extending the reconnaissance area, this would have the advantage that if one aircraft’s radar set failed, the other would be able to carry on and the continuity of the reconnaissance would not be interrupted. It is not possible to shorten the period of reconnaissance in order to concentrate the aircraft, as there must be time enough left to improve the positions of the U-boats. As the operation of U-boats within range of our air reconnaissance depends entirely on the results of this reconnaissance, we cannot leave anything to luck as far as finding the convoys goes. It is necessary to get more operational reconnaissance aircraft.

  (Signed): GODT*

  Chief of Operations Department

  For B.d.U.

  * * *

  *Konteadmiral Eberhardt Godt, Chef der 2. Abteilung OKM/SKL (BdU-op).

  CHAPTER NINE

  BLACK FEBRUARY

  Atlantic Operations, February 1944

  Our tail-gunner, Hans Roth, had made out three dots behind us which, as they came closer, turned out to be fighters. We called them bumblebees, because they were so small and quick…

  Feldwebel Herbert Littek, radio operator, 2./FAGr 5

  Feeling dispirited and under-resourced, in early February 1944, General der Flieger Kessler attempted to seek an audience with Hitler to relay his concerns over the hopeless military situation facing the Fliegerführer Atlantik. In this he failed, but his feelings of discontent had become increasingly well known within the Luftwaffe leadership. Göring was attuned to this, particularly since Dönitz had been lambasting the shortcomings of the maritime operations of the Luftwaffe and its lack of support for the U-boat campaign at the Führer’s headquarters for some time. This was embarrassing for Göring and he also felt that Kessler had been a moaner for too many years, constantly (although justifiably) demanding more aircraft for his command, in the full knowledge that the most urgent need was for fighters to defend the Reich and the Eastern Front. Kessler thus became a victim of Germany’s worsening multi-front military predicament. On 7 February 1944, the position of Fliegerführer Atlantik was disbanded, although, bizarrely, Kessler was not informed of this for another three weeks.1

  There had been changes within FAGr 5 as well, possibly as a reflection of the times. Many units, including reconnaissance units, were being urgently combed for their qualified personnel to bolster the fighter Gruppen of the Luftwaffe. On 21 January, the Gruppe lost its experienced signals officer when Leutnant Hans Wessel, a veteran of 3.(F)/Aufkl.Gr.10, was posted to JG 51 on the Eastern Front. As Oskar Schmidt recalled, ‘It was a difficult farewell.’ The unit’s senior technical/maintenance NCO, Oberfeldwebel Jung, went to JG 1 operating in the defence of the Reich. He was replaced by Feldwebel Merz, but there were new arrivals in the form of senior NCOs Hauptfeldwebel Meyer (to the Stabskompanie) and Willi Proch (to 1.Staffel).2 On 9 February, Hauptmann Konrad Mildenberger of 2./FAGr 5, a veteran of 3.(F)/Aufkl. Gr.Ob.d.L. where he served as Technical Officer, and who had flown as Karl-Friedrich Bergen’s observer in Russia, departed to become Technical Officer in FAGr 101.

  Despite the generally adverse weather conditions prevailing over the Atlantic at the beginning of the month, the Gruppe did engage in training flights closer to home, with at least one crew, that of Leutnant Hellmut Nagel of 1./FAGr 5, using the Ju 290A-4 WK-Nr 0166 9V+DH to fly out of Mont de Marsan over to KG 40’s base at Bordeaux-Mérignac in order to carry out air gunnery practice over the Biscay on 1 February.3

  Operational missions recommenced on 4 February, the first time since 27 January that the Gruppe had put aircraft into the air. However, as the British radio intercept report for that day noted, the two sorties mounted by FAGr 5 that day were, ‘not, as might be expected, to the west of Ireland where U-boats are now disposed, but in the sea area west of Portugal where there are, at present, no boats.’ The British report identifies the two aircraft as ‘B’ and ‘F’, and the evidence points to these being from 1./FAGr 5. At 1250 hrs, ‘F’, possibly Ju 290A-5 WK-Nr 0175 9V+FH, picked up a radar contact on the convoy SL.147 bound from Freetown to Liverpool in 23° West 3839, course 320°/330° to 350°, but its composition could not be determined. At 1549 hrs, the aircraft signalled the convoy’s speed as being seven knots, course 340°. This aircraft landed back at Mont de Marsan at 2221 hrs.

  As far as aircraft ‘B’ (possibly Ju 290 A-5 Wk-Nr 0172 9V+BH) was concerned, the British report commented, ‘No signals of interest were made by aircraft ‘B’ which stated at 1357 hrs that it had carried out a reconnaissance task. ETA [Mont de Marsan] was 1915 hrs. NOTE: The object of reconnaissance in this area is obscure, since as stated above, there are no boats in the area.’4

  However, an account by Hauptmann Josef Augustin, Staffelkapitän of 1./FAGr 5, indicates the purpose of such a sortie at around the same time:

  Early in 1944, together with my crew, which included Leutnant Günther Dittrich (pilot) and Oberleutnant Hans Rehne (observer/navigator), I received the following task: According to a report from one of our agents, there was a British convoy (Gibraltar–England) to the west of Lisbon. We had to find out the location, size and composition of the convoy, its speed, route and course. We also had to signal a weather report from the target area.

  It is most likely that, following receipt of the agent’s information, Augustin and his crew had been despatched to gather information on the convoy so that both the He 177s of II./KG 40 and the U-boats waiting farther to the north of the Portuguese coast could plan attacks. In all probability, the convoy would have been the merged SL.147/MKS.38, which had rendezvoused on 2 February and comprised in excess of 60 vessels. Augustin recalled:

  In tolerably good new year’s weather, we flew to the west along the north coast of Spain. Maximum altitude was 200 m above the sea so as, if possible, to evade enemy radar. Also at Cape Ortegal we went down to low level because there had been reports of a British radar station operating on the Spanish mainland.

  Then we turned to a southerly course, to go along the Portuguese coast. At the time Portugal was neutral. During this part of the flight, we usually went to 1000 m in order to search for enemy ships with the ship-search gear (Hohentwiel). But neither with radar nor with visual observation by the members of the crew could an enemy convoy be made out. Time passed, continually under tension as a result of searching for ships and being on constant alert for attacks from enemy long-range fighters, until we had covered a large area from Oporto to the west of Lisbon.

  We searched the area of sea thoroughly once more, but we could not trace a convoy. We flew out further into the Atlantic, in great search circles, until we again took a general course to the north, during which we would fly back across the Spanish mainland at night. A
round 0500 hrs in the morning we reached the north coast of Spain and pivoted over the Bay of Biscay in the direction of our base at Mont de Marsan to the east. The experience of our crews was that the enemy would try to trap individual machines on their return flights across the Biscay using patrols of Beaufighters of about six machines. That’s why we made the remainder of the flight at the lowest possible height above water (10–20 m) in order to reach the French coast.

  Even here though, once more over our own occupied territory, we had to take hellish care, because on more than one occasion enemy fighters still overwhelmed and attacked our returning machines. We reached base without any credible military success, but we were dead tired and happy to be back ‘home’.

  Any attempt by He 177s of II./KG 40 to attack the target was abandoned.5 But as Augustin concluded: ‘Unfortunately, the flight was unsuccessful. Either the agent’s report was false or the stated convoy had left the specified area long before.’6

  Next morning, attempts to locate SL.147/MKS.38 continued: an aircraft, coded ‘D’, possibly Ju 290A-5 Wk-Nr 0177 9V+DK of 2./FAGr 5, sortied south towards the Gibraltar route. The Junkers made contact with the convoy at 1030 hrs at 24° West 5081 and reported its composition to be 100 ships with 20 escort vessels, speed 15 knots, course 340°. An hour later, the aircraft was still shadowing when it was reported by ships of Escort Group B3 in 39° 52´ North 14° 40´ West. From then on it seems the Junkers made no further sighting reports, possibly as a result of problems with two of its engines, although when asked by control at 1617 hrs whether its task had been completed, the aircraft responded affirmatively and reported the convoy’s position as 24° West 5021. The Ju 290 landed back at Mont de Marsan at 1835 hrs.

  The Gruppe sent another aircraft to undertake weather reports to the west of Ireland, advising at 1344 hrs that it had completed its task. However, U-boats to the west of Ireland were advised that the Ju 290 had also sighted one destroyer and three steamships in 25° West 2686 at 1155 hrs on a course of 260°. In its initial period of operations, FAGr 5 flew its missions without trained meteorological observers on board its aircraft, but from February 1944, as 1./SAGr 129 undertook fewer such operations, weather – or Zenit – flights over the Atlantic were becoming a more regular feature of the deployment of the Gruppe in addition to shadowing and long-range reconnaissance. Subsequently, more specialist meteorological observers joined the Gruppe from this time for that purpose.7

  That afternoon, at around 1615 hrs, Ju 290A-4 WK-Nr 0167 (PI+PU) 9V+HK of 2./FAGr 5 left Mont de Marsan for Kerlin-Bastard, from where it was probably intending to operate over the Atlantic the following day. Adverse weather prevented the aircraft from landing there, however, and it re-routed to Rennes, which it reached at 1817 hrs.8

  Two more Ju 290s, probably including 9V+HK, were sent out on weather flights on the 6th and then, based upon the series of reconnaissance missions flown by FAGr 5, 3.(F)/Aufkl.Gr.123 and 1./SAGr 129 since the 4th, an attack was planned against SL.147/MKS.38 on 7 February using the Fw 200s of III./KG 40. Although the Focke-Wulfs got under way, it seems they were recalled during the afternoon, probably as a result of the Allied air screen over the convoy.9

  Over the night of 7/8 February and during the course of the following day, FAGr 5 contined to send up pairs of aircraft with the dual missions of shadowing for anti-shipping strikes by KG 40 as well as on behalf of the U-boats. By this day there was considerable convoy activity in the eastern Atlantic; the large SL. 147, accompanied by the B3 Escort Group, was directly west of the Bay of Biscay. HX.277 from New York, comprising 67 merchantmen, with 29 escorts from the B1 and B2 groups, was to the north of it, while OS.67/KMS.41 with 65 merchants had departed Liverpool for West Africa and Gibraltar on the 6th and was heading south off the west coast of Ireland accompanied by Escort Group 39 and the new carrier Pursuer with its contingent of Martlet fighters.10

  Shortly after 2245 hrs during the evening of the 7th, the first of two Junkers left Mont de Marsan for the Atlantic, followed at 2329 hrs by the second, Ju 290A-5 Wk-Nr 0174 9V+EH, piloted by Leutnant Hellmut Nagel of 1./FAGr 5.11 At least one of the aircraft, ‘E’, was carrying Schwan-See D/F radio buoys.

  The FuG 302 C Schwan-See (‘Swan Lake’), referred to usually as just ‘Schwan’, was a droppable radio buoy developed by the Flugfunk-Forschungsanstalt (Research Institute for Aeronautical Radio) at Oberpfaffenhofen and the Gesellschaft für Technisch-Wirtschaftliche Entwicklung (Society for Technical-Economic Development) at Reichenau. This was a bomb-shaped buoy measuring 1,920 mm in length and 470 mm at its widest point, including its four tail fins.

  The buoy would be dropped vertically into the water, and on impact, a telescopic rod antenna would extend from the end of the body, which was exposed above the surface. After release, for a period of ten minutes, the aircrew could turn the transmitter on and off as a test and make minor adjustments. The beacon could then be set to transmit for up to 72 hours as it floated in the water. The crystal-controlled transmitter beamed at 3 W on a fixed frequency, but the device was not always efficient.12 The first trials, involving five drops, were carried out between 10 and 16 October 1943 over the Ammersee, but in early May 1944 further tests are known to have been conducted from early Ju 290A-7 variant (see Chapter Ten) Wk-Nr 0189 KR+LT/9V+KK, flown by Oberfeldwebel Otto Joas of 2./FAGr 5 in cooperation with Flieger-Stabsingenieur Paul Bader of the Erprobungsstelle Rechlin.13 Thereafter it had become usual for a Ju 290 to carry one FuG 302 C on an operational mission. The buoy would be dropped without a parachute, and from a low altitude, through a hatch in the floor of the gondola.14

  At 0610 hrs on the morning of the 8th, Fliegerführer Atlantik signalled to Ju 290 ‘E’ the estimated position of what was believed to be SL.147/MKS.38 at 24° West 9743, where the crew was instructed to drop a Schwan buoy, before heading north-west to continue on weather reconnaissance. An hour later, the convoy reported spotting the shadower, and five minutes after that, the Ju 290 signalled that it had located the ships in 24° West 8739. At 0830 hrs the Junkers dropped a buoy and flew off to the north-west as per orders. A little later, the aircraft signalled weather reports for 24° West 98 and 34° West 19.

  The companion of ‘E’ was Ju 290A-5 9V+FH of 1./FAGr 5, which was instructed by Fliegerführer Atlantik to take over the shadowing of the convoy from 0715 hrs for the ‘benefit of an air striking force’. The Junkers continued to shadow until 1200 hrs, when it gave the convoy’s position as 24° West 9866, at which point it broke off and made for home.

  Both aircraft also sent regular Zenit reports on their outward flights and from the area of the convoy, which were indicative of an intention by the Luftwaffe to conduct an air attack against the vessels. Once again, however, it seems adverse weather conditions prevented a bomber strike.

  Meanwhile, BdU had rearranged the tactical grouping of its U-boats in the eastern Atlantic. The Rügen group had been split in early January into two short-lived sub-groups, but on 3 February these were consolidated into new groupings known as Igel (Hedgehog) I and II. These groups, comprising at any one time between 25 and 30 boats, were deployed in a looser fashion than Rügen or its successors, but with the sheer volume of Allied warships and aircraft operating in the area, the Igel groups would have their work cut out.15

  As an early move to support Igel, FAGr 5 sent out another two Ju 290s during the afternoon of the 8th to track the convoy. These aircraft were identified by Allied radio decrypts as ‘B’ and ‘D’ and may therefore have been from 1.Staffel. Aircraft ‘B’ was to be with the convoy from 1900 hrs, but it had to break off its mission at 2319 hrs because of problems associated with its fuel tank. Aircraft ‘D’ located SL.147/MKS.38 at 2120 hrs in 24° West 9948, reporting its course as 350°. At 2158 hrs, Fliegerführer Atlantik requested the aircraft to transmit D/F signals, which it did once every hour until 0442 hrs when it landed at Mont de Marsan. The convoy reported that it had been shadowed throughout the night, though whether the Igel boats acted on the Ju 290s’ information is not kn
own.16

  Despite the presence of four large convoys to the west and south-west of Ireland, the Luftwaffe mounted no long-range reconnaissance sorties between 9 and 11 February, but on the 12th an intention to send out a Bv 222 flying boat of 1./SAGr 129 at 0240 hrs seems to have been frustrated and so FAGr 5 was called in to take over. The reconnaissance was required to pave the way for a dusk attack by a combined force of Fw 200s and He 177s of KG 40 against convoy OS.67/KMS.41.

  At 0511 hrs, Ju 290A-5 9V+DK once again took off from Mont de Marsan for the Atlantic to shadow the convoy. The 2./FAGr 5 aircraft was commanded and piloted by Oberleutnant Otto-Karl Kremser with Oberfeldwebel Sbresny as co-pilot and a crew comprising Leutnant Robert Stein (observer), Oberfeldwebel Fietje Müller (flight engineer), Feldwebel Herbert Littek and Oberfeldwebel Willi Joswig (radio-operators), and Unteroffizier Hans Roth and Obergefreitern Trapp and Kozorek (gunners). Herbert Littek recalled the mission:

  We flew a rigid, westerly course, very low across the Bay of Biscay. Our giant bird was thus very exposed. The turrets, equipped with 2-cm cannon, sparkled in the sun. Normally, it would be ideal flying weather, but as operational weather?

  We talked over the intercom and Roth said: ‘Let’s hope there are no aircraft carriers, because we’re a nice target for fighters.’

  Sitting at the radio equipment, and at the request of the crew, I played the song, ‘Heimat, deine Sterne’ (‘Home, your Stars’) – naturally on the harmonica. It sounded pretty good, and with the help of the intercom, everyone could hear it. The mood was good, but there was a strange feeling. Firstly, we did not know where the convoy was, and secondly, how strongly it would be defended. In their minds, everyone envisaged aircraft carriers, cruisers, and, of course, lots of destroyers.

  North-west of La Coruña, we saw a Sunderland above us, a huge flying-boat, but very cumbersome. We had a great desire to attack it, but that wasn’t a recommended course of action. So the Sunderland was able to fly away to the south without incident. Our co-pilot, Sbresny, reckoned that perhaps it was Mr Churchill flying in the direction of Casablanca. Who knows if the English crew had even seen us.