Shadow over the Atlantic

by Robert Forsyth

  Schmidt is referring to the operations of Kampfgeschwader 200, the special operations wing of the Luftwaffe.

  Much has been written about the activities of KG 200 and post-war literature, both fact and fiction, has sensationalized the ‘clandestine’ nature of the work undertaken by the Geschwader during its existence. Formed on 21 February 1944 at Wildpark-Werder in Berlin (the Geschwaderstab moved to Berlin-Gatow in May) and placed under the command of Oberst im Generalstabsdienst Heinz Heigl, the raison d’être of the unit stemmed from a need for coordinated control of aircraft assigned to agent-dropping duties. Such duties had been the task of the Gruppe Gartenfeld, which undertook missions on behalf of the Abwehr (Military Intelligence Service) and the SS-controlled Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA – Reich Main Security Office). The Gruppe operated a mixed fleet of transport aircraft as well as German and foreign bombers. The unit, together with its commander, Major Karl-Edmund Gartenfeld, was amongst the first to be integrated into I./KG 200 along with elements of the 2./Versuchsverband Ob.d.L. Gartenfeld was appointed the first Kommandeur of the Gruppe. All three Staffeln which constituted I. Gruppe were involved in agent-dropping, most of which were controlled by Amt VI, the Foreign Intelligence department of the RSHA. Based at Finsterwalde, the composition of the new Gruppe was as follows:

  1.Staffel – long-range operations

  2.Staffel – shorter-range operations

  3.Staffel – for maritime operations; previously operating as Sonderkommando

  See with the Versuchsverband Ob.d.L.2

  The operations of the Gruppe spanned from Finland to Persia, from Africa to Ireland and utilized such diverse aircraft as He 111s, Do 24s, Ju 252s and captured American B-17 and B-24 bombers.

  A II./KG 200 became operational at Hildesheim at the end of March 1944 under Major Hans Jungwirt. This Gruppe would eventually undertake a variety of ‘special tasks’. Its 2.Staffel was commanded by a former glider pilot, Oberleutnant Karl-Heinz Lange, who believed that huge damage could be inflicted on the anticipated Allied invasion fleet by committed pilots who would launch manned glide-bombs at enemy ships and who were prepared to die in the attempt. Such radical operations were referred to as Totaleinsatz – ‘total commitment’, or ‘operations with expendable weapons’ (and, in cases, crew) – and Selbstopfer (‘self-sacrifice’). Lange’s idea eventually manifested itself in the form of a handful of Fw 190s laden with 1,100-kg bombs, which were to be carried right onto a target. The unit trained up at Dedelstorf and Stolp-Parow and finally became ready for operations in late June 1944, by which time the whole scheme was cancelled by an order from a senior authority who apparently lacked the stomach for it.

  In the summer of 1944, the various Nazi intelligence services were very active in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and areas of the Mediterranean and Middle East where they attempted to promote dissent and rebellion against the Allied powers, and particularly Britain’s powerful pre-war colonial and economic grip in certain regions. In July 1944, no fewer than 260 agents were dropped, 80 of these by 1.Staffel, at distances up to 250 km behind enemy lines, and as such there was a high demand for long-range aircraft.3

  Probably aware that long-range maritime reconnaissance operations over the Atlantic were in decline, KG 200 was known to have turned to FAGr 5 as a source of suitable aircraft and personnel, and as early as July requested that three Ju 290s and crews should be assigned to the Geschwader for transport operations, although they would remain at Mont de Marsan and continue to perform their normal duties simultaneously.4 Early plans included using a Ju 290 piloted by Oberleutnant Ludwig Herlein of the Gruppenstab/FAGr 5, together with his crew, to fly to Japan via the Polar route in order to collect a cargo of important raw materials badly needed by the Reich. Utlimately, however, the flight did not take place because the Japanese Government feared repercussions from the Soviet Union.

  Crews placed on stand-by for missions under the jurisdiction of KG 200 at this time included those of Oberleutnant Günther Korn (Wk-Nr 0186 9V+FH) and Leutnant Siegfried Wache of 1.Staffel and Hauptmann Hanns Kohmann of 2.Staffel (Wk-Nr 0181 9V+GK).5

  Throughout the summer of 1944, these crews flew several long-range missions for KG 200, starting in July when Oberleutnant Korn, a veteran of 3.(F)/Aufkl.Gr.10, together with his 1./FAGr 5 crew of Oberleutnant Hans Ascheid (observer and aircraft commander), Oberfähnrich Fischer (second pilot), Oberfeldwebel Schade (radio-operator), Oberfeldwebel Engel (flight engineer) and Feldwebel Seifert (gunner), were given the opportunity to fly one of the captured B-17G Flying Fortresses of the Geschwader, coded A3+BB, on a mission to drop three agents over North Africa in which it was intended that the aircraft would fly adorned in its USAAF markings. This aeroplane, B-17G-25-DL, s/n 42-38017, had originally flown with the US Eighth Air Force’s 349th Bomb Squadron of the 100th Bomb Group based at Thorpe Abbot, but during a raid to Berlin on 3 March 1944, its crew had failed to hear a recall order, and together with the other two aircraft in its lead element, continued to fly to the target. Having been attacked by fighters, it was damaged by wreckage from the two B-17s above it. Its pilot attempted to head for neutral Sweden, but landed at Schleswig-Jagel airfield in northern Germany in error.6 The aircraft was repaired to flying condition and handed over to KG 200.

  While taking the American four-engined bomber for a test flight, compared with the Ju 290, Korn and Ascheid, also a veteran of 3.(F)/Aufkl.Gr.10, found it heavy to handle. They were also extremely reluctant to fly the aircraft in American markings, since if they were shot down and captured, they would be treated as spies rather than soldiers and dealt with accordingly. Instead, the airmen requested, in the strongest possible terms, that they be allowed to fly a Ju 290, and their request was granted. They were then ordered to fly their Junkers, 9V+FH, from Mont de Marsan to Athens, where they would pick up the agents, in this case saboteurs who were to be dropped in the valleys along the railway line running from Tunisia to Algeria in North Africa.7

  Preparations for their mission, which was assigned the codename Operation Antiatlas/Sultan Alekbar, were made very carefully, and Ascheid and his crew were briefed by a professor of geography, with specialist knowledge of the region, on pertinent aspects of the terrain as well as supplying them with detailed maps of the drop points to study.

  At 1907 hrs on 25 July 1944, with the agents on board the Ju 290, Korn took off from Athens-Kalamaki and headed across the Mediterranean in the direction of the Gulf of Sidra on the coast of Libya, a course over which the Abwehr had picked up a gap in the enemy’s radar coverage. The Junkers flew at just five metres above the surface of the sea and then turned and climbed to approach the Tunisian coast along an air corridor used by the French Armée de l’Air to fly supplies from Chad to Tunis. The Junkers used its full lighting to make out the first drop point. The first agent, a North African, was then parachuted, as arranged, from a height of between 200 and 400 m into a wine-growing area which lay in a basin on the outskirts of Tunis.

  The second agent, a former French officer, was dropped farther along the coast, without any difficulties, between Bône and Constantine in Algeria, while the last man, another Arab, parachuted out south of Algiers. Shortly after, as dawn broke, Korn turned the Junkers back towards the sea and dropped back down to five metres. As the sea remained calm, the Ju 290 was able to maintain such a low altitude until it reached the French coast, after which it landed at Mont de Marsan at 0830 hrs the following morning. Immediately on landing, Hans Ascheid learned that he had become a father, and some time after that, FAGr 5 was advised by the intelligence services that all three agents had landed safely and had subsequently reported in by radio. This early ‘agent mission’ for FAGr 5 had gone well.8

  Meanwhile, Hauptmann Kohmann had been sent in Ju 290 9V+GK to Zilistea in Rumania in order to conduct similar missions over the southern sector of the Eastern Front. On 9 August, the aircraft was flown from Medias in Rumania back to the Junkers works at Dessau, most likely for overhaul. However, this machine was lost d
uring a bombing raid on Dessau on 16 August.9

  Korn, Ascheid and their crew were called upon for another mission, this time codenamed Operation Polka, which commenced on 12 August and which would involve the dropping of 13 Turkmen nationals in Soviet uniforms into Turkmenistan. On this occasion, the Ju 290 left Mont de Marsan for Medias in Rumania, but was moved farther east to Zilistea because of the threat of another USAAF attack on the Ploesti oil refineries, in the case of which Medias would also be threatened. The plan was to drop the Turkmen in the area of the Main Turkmen Canal, a landmark easily recognizable from the air.

  At 1539 hrs on the 13th, the Ju 290 took off from Zilistea and flew out across the Black Sea, but, while over the hills near Sinop on the Turkish coast, its left-side inner engine failed. Unfortunately, all efforts to try to fix the problem from within the aircraft proved in vain and Korn and Ascheid decided to abort the mission. Despite hoping to wait for the delivery of a replacement engine to Rumania, the crew eventually ended up having to fly the aircraft in stages to the Junkers plant in Dessau where reliable repairs could be effected. Polka was eventually executed using another crew.10

  Aside from adversities caused by enemy air operations, agent-dropping flights also depended to a great extent on weather conditions and they were frequently subject to postponement. The aircrews would prefer to be over a drop zone at night with as little moon as possible. The ‘agents’, of whom the crew knew very little, if anything, and with whom there was no communication, were usually dropped with black parachutes, as was their equipment if applicable. In an aircraft as large as the Ju 290, conditions were comfortable enough to accommodate several agents along with weapons, radio sets, clothing, and provisions. This was an advantage and complied with the requirement in particular of the RSHA not to drop just one agent per flight, but rather to land, wherever possible, two or more agents per sortie.11 However, when an aircraft climbed steeply from low, anti-radar level to cross a hostile coast, agents would feel airsick and would frequently have to be ‘encouraged’ towards the fuselage exit door, especially as the aircraft flew farther and farther away from the intended drop point.12

  Just over a fortnight after the Polka mission, on 28 August, the Korn crew took off from Udetfeld in Germany to fly via Lublin to the Pinsk Marshes, territory recently recaptured by the Soviets as they advanced against the retreating Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Centre). It would be the first of three such flights. The Ju 290 carried 12 heavily armed agents wearing Soviet uniforms, who were to be dropped into an area the size of a football pitch, east of Chernihiv in northern Ukraine, which was to be illuminated by three fires.

  Their route across the marshes was trouble free, because the moonlight cast a white glow on the banks of the main rivers, which acted as a great help towards navigation. But when the low-flying Junkers reached the drop area, Oberleutnant Ascheid was astounded to note that the entire forest was aflame. Suddenly, machine-gun fire rose up towards the aircraft from the ground, and Ascheid told Korn to break off the mission and turn for home. The Ju 290 landed back at Udetfeld at 0515 hrs on the 29th. For future attempts, Ascheid proposed using coloured identification markers.

  Two days later, another mission, under the codename Operation Wolf, was devised to drop a ten-man sabotage group with weapons east of Toropets, a town some 400 km to the east of Moscow. Taking off at 1925 hrs from Udetfeld, Korn flew the Ju 290 through thick cloud – conditions which made navigation difficult – towards the target. Eventually, the aircraft reached the large, open field where the agents were to be dropped; the fuselage door was pulled open, and one by one, they left the aircraft. However, as the Junkers pulled away after the drop, searchlights suddenly switched on, bathing the drop point in bright light and Soviet vehicles started to move in towards the agents to round them up. Evidently, the operation had been betrayed. After landing back at Udetfeld at 0448 hrs on the morning of 1 September, Ascheid immediately informed military intelligence of the fiasco.13

  On 3 September, Korn and Ascheid tried once again to reach Chernihiv, departing Udetfeld at 2025 hrs. This time arrangements had been made to light green markers at the drop point, and when the Ju 290 arrived over the spot, it had to make three passes in order for all 12 men to parachute out. The aircraft returned in the early hours of the 4th, and during the evening of the 5th, the Junkers took off for the third and last time, carrying another team of agents, who on this occasion, carried with them three tons of explosives packed into large, felt-lined, plywood containers. Needless to say, this increased the state of wariness among the aircrew.

  In the Lublin area, the Ju 290 ran into a sudden thunderstorm of such severity that Ascheid thought initially of turning back, but they pressed on. Reaching Pinsk, the aircraft then attracted heavy Flak fire, something which caused great consternation because all aboard knew that felt-lined plywood would offer little protection for the explosives against a close Flak burst. Somehow the aircraft evaded being hit, and all agents and their equipment were dropped as planned. The crew was able to see them being welcomed by their comrades already on the ground. The Junkers returned to Udetfeld at 0507 hrs on 6 September.14 This marked the end of Günther Korn’s association with KG 200, for after this mission he was assigned to Alt-Lönnewitz as a pilot with the Arado firm to test-fly the new Ar 234 jet.15

  ____________

  Shortly after arriving at Neubiberg from Mont de Marsan in mid-August 1944, a detachment of officers from FAGr 5 was ordered to relocate to a subsidiary of the Messerschmitt aircraft manufacturing conglomerate known as the Metallbau Offingen (Offingen Metal Construction), a small production facility in the village of Offingen near Günzburg, to the east of Neu-Ulm. This detachment was led by Hauptmann Georg Eckl, Staffelkapitän of 2./FAGr 5 and included, from the Gruppenstab, Oberleutnant Ludwig Herlein; from 1.Staffel, Leutnant Günther Dittrich; and from 2.Staffel, Oberleutnant Horst Degenring, Leutnant Lothar Hecker, Oberleutnant Hans Münsterer, Oberleutnant Reinhard Sigel, and Leutnant Lohberg – all experienced airmen with sound technical awareness. The plan was that these officers, based at the offices of the Metallbau Offingen, would used their experience and expertise as aviators to work with senior civilian personnel in the aircraft industry to improve manufacturing quality, production processes and procurement methods. As Eckl recorded: ‘A detachment from the crews was ordered to go to Offingen. There I would lead a “Kommando Nebel”, which was involved in the procurement and supply of materials for the Me 262; the assembled aircraft were test-flown nearby in Leipheim.’16

  Indeed, Professor Willy Messerschmitt’s state-of-the-art Me 262 jet interceptor had first taken to the air from Leipheim using pure jet power just over two years earlier on 18 July 1942. By August 1944, small numbers of the jet fighter had been delivered to the first dedicated test unit of the Luftwaffe and there was great hope that the Me 262 would be the aircraft that would turn the tide of the air war back in Germany’s favour.

  However, only a short time after the reconnaissance flyers had arrived at Offingen, their brief was changed and they were ordered to report to Hauptmann Wolfgang Nebel for new tasks. Nebel was another experienced Luftwaffe reconnaissance pilot from 2./Versuchsverband Ob.d.L. Before serving with the Versuchsverband, he had flown with Oberstleutnant Theodor Rowehl in the Versuchsstelle für Höhenflug, a specialist high-altitude group and officially part of the Aufkl.Gr.Ob.d.L. Here, amongst other tasks, Nebel had flown a number of secret missions dropping spies and saboteurs over Iraq, Iran and other areas of the Middle East.17 Later he was assigned from 2./Versuchsverband Ob.d.L. to the Stab of GL/C-E (the Amtsgruppe Entwicklung, or Development Department) at the RLM under Oberst Georg von Pasewaldt for the purposes of assessing the development of new aircraft, particularly long-range types.

  In this capacity, on 25 January 1944, the then Oberleutnant Nebel travelled to the Messerschmitt works at Augsburg to discuss the building of five prototypes of the Messerschmitt Me 264, a four-engined, ultra-long-range design project instigated by Professor Messers
chmitt and intended to offer the Luftwaffe an aircraft capable of crossing the Atlantic as far as the US eastern seaboard, and of operating in the roles of reconnaissance, bomber and anti-shipping aircraft. By this stage and since December 1942, the first and thus far only prototype of the Me 264 had been undergoing flight-testing at Augsburg and Lechfeld, which involved a programme of ironing out creases in the aircraft’s performance. Throughout 1943, the Me 264’s development had been the cause of considerable protracted debate within the RLM, as its various departments, along with Generalfeldmarschall Milch and senior Messerschmitt personnel, argued over the pros and cons of retaining the Ju 290 and the He 177 for Atlantic reconnaissance, against investing time, resources and money in other new, competing projects such as the six-engined Ju 390 and the similarly-engined Ta 400 from Focke-Wulf.

  Nebel was tasked by the RLM to investigate the realities of manufacturing a short run of Me 264s. On 26 April, the recently promoted Hauptmann Nebel visited Memmingen to test-fly the Me 264 prototype on an assessment flight for the RLM. On 3 May, he made three further flights, but there were persistent minor problems with the aircraft.18 Generalmajor von Barsewisch, the General der Aufklärungsflieger, was also present at Memmingen to fly the aircraft, but he judged the machine to be too slow for combat missions.

  On 18 July 1944, however, aircraft of the USAAF Fifteenth Air Force bombed Memmingen and the Me 264 was destroyed. For Willy Messerschmitt and his dreams of building a long-range aircraft, the loss of the only fully assembled Me 264 prototype must have been a blow. Yet, as with so many other military and technical projects developed in the Third Reich in 1944, despite the prevailing adverse war situation and worsening conditions on the home front, the physical destruction of the aircraft did not signal the end of the Me 264 programme.