Victory in the East

by John France

  120 Alexiad, pp. 329–31.

  121 RA, pp. 62–3, 94, 100.

  122 Alexiad, p. 353; J. L. Cate, ‘The Crusade of 1101’, in Setton, Crusades, 1. 354.

  123 France, ‘Tatikios’, 143–5; AA, 314.

  124 RA, p. 73.

  CHAPTER 5

  The size of the crusader army

  * * *

  After the conclusion of the agreements between Alexius and the leaders, the crusader forces gathered in Asia Minor. Godfrey’s army had crossed in Lent of 1097 and doubtless they were joined by other contingents such as that of Robert of Flanders. Bohemond’s force crossed under the command of Tancred in late April though he stayed with the emperor, while the army led by Godfrey, Robert of Flanders and Tancred, including the ‘feeble debris’ of the ‘People’s Crusade’, marched along the Gulf of Nicomedia to that city via Rufinel to begin their approach to Nicaea. The Anonymous says that they were too numerous to take the road used by the ‘People’s Crusade’ and opened up their own route direct to Nicaea using 300 men to clear and mark the way. This probably means that the old Roman road from Nicomedia to Nicaea was badly overgrown and had to be cleared for the army. This road crosses the Naldökan Daglari, mountains which rise to over 1,400 metres, and the crusaders marked it with crosses for those who would follow them (see figs. 2 and 5). They arrived at Nicaea on 6 May 1097 and even at this early stage food was short and the army was relieved when Bohemond arrived with supplies.1 The count of Toulouse had also stayed behind, according to Anna Comnena establishing very cordial relations with Alexius, and did not arrive before Nicaea until 14 May, while the north French under Robert of Normandy and Stephen of Blois only arrived at Constantinople on that day and did not reach Nicaea until 3 June. The crusader force was augmented by a Byzantine contingent of some 2,000 under Tatikios, to which was later added a smaller force under the command of Boutoumites with boats to cover the Ascanian Lake which lay along the city’s western perimeter. Both these men were trusted confidants of Alexius and had considerable experience in dealing with westerners. Alexius himself settled at Pelekanum (on the north coast of the Gulf of Izmit, opposite Civitos) and from there manipulated the activities of his commanders.2 It was only slowly that the full strength of the western army gathered and it seems likely that it did not reach maximum until after the siege of Nicaea, for at that time Alexius (at Pelekanum) was at pains to demand the oath be taken by those who had not done so, which suggests the late arrival of some contingents.3 But as more than one crusader source produces a figure for the strength of the army at this time, when they were about to march into enemy territory, it is an appropriate juncture to consider the matter of numbers.

  Fig. 5 The Siege of Nicaea and the Turkish attack of 16 May 1097

  It is often said that medieval people were not good at numbers. It was an essentially local world in which large gatherings were uncommon and therefore impressed themselves unduly upon the imaginations of participants. Literacy was relatively rare and numeracy even rarer.4 But the fact is that most people in most eras are pretty bad at estimating large numbers of people. I recall one large demonstration in which I participated in Hyde Park in the summer of 1982 for which the organisers claimed an attendance of 300,000 and the police suggested 60,000 – a discrepancy of positively medieval proportions. Of course politics has something to do with such estimates; the police, as the guardians of law and order, try to play down such events while the organisers have the opposite tendency. Just such political considerations entered into the crusade’s own estimates. Simeon, Patriarch of Jerusalem and Adhémar wrote to the west asking for reinforcements and stating: ‘We have 100,000 mounted knights and armoured men, but what of it? We are few in comparison with the pagans, but verily God is fighting in our behalf’.5 The rhetoric warns us that though this may be a serious estimate, the writer must have been anxious not to pitch the figure too high or too low lest he discourage people from coming, hence also the stress on the magnitude of the task. We must recognise that large numbers in round figures need to be treated with caution, but that smaller figures may be quite accurate if there is reason to believe that the source is in any way authoritative. Furthermore, the leadership must have felt the need to know what troops were at their disposal and this must have become very acute in the later stages of the crusade when numbers seem to have been heavily reduced by the attrition of battle, starvation and illness. The Papal Legate Daimbert who arrived in the East at the very end of the crusade wrote to the West announcing its success and stated that an army 300,000 strong at Nicaea had been reduced to 20,000 by the battle of Ascalon on 12 August 1099. We need not accept these numbers, or even the proportion of losses implied, only that the crusaders themselves recognised that they had suffered terrible attrition.6 Since nobody actually tried to conduct a count of participants we can only hope to arrive at a general estimate, but a view of numbers is vital if we are to understand why the crusade was successful.

  However, before numbers can be calculated we need some definition. The contemporary chroniclers refer to the leaders, whom they often call ‘Princes’, knights, foot and the poor. Setting aside the Princes and lords of high rank of whom we often have some individual knowledge, men like Anselm of Ribemont, two of whose letters to the West have survived, or Raymond Pilet who played a notable semi-independent role, it is important to realise that knights, foot and poor are not watertight categories. Knights were social superiors well equipped for war – yet on the road across the Anti-Taurus many abandoned that equipment and many more lost horses in the course of the campaign. Raymond of Aguilers distinguishes between knights and milites plebei, poor knights who seem only to have been mounted at times when horses were plentiful.7 Such poor knights must have slipped easily into the great mass of the army – but who were they? The term ‘poor’ is a difficult one. Contemporary sources were clearly aware of armed men other than knights – the letter of Simeon and Adhémar to the West written in October speaks of mounted knights and armoured men who were presumably the professional retinues of the lords and the greater knights.8 As horses became scarcer knights reinforced this group which became a very important element of the crusader army by the end of the siege of Antioch. But in addition to this group there were the servants, who must have formed the largest single group in the army. Many of these would have had a military function – to look after horses and arms as well as to perform menial tasks. Horses need a great deal of looking after and for this purpose alone knights must have taken large numbers of followers. In the West we have noted that a whole infrastructure was needed to support the warhorses of the upper classes, but humbler riding and draught animals also needed much care. Every knight must have started with at least three animals: a warhorse, a palfrey and a pack-horse. The mercenaries which William Rufus and Henry I arranged to employ from Robert of Flanders were each to be provided with three warhorses, but I am assuming that this represents the equipment of a really professional soldier. Many of the knights would have had as many warhorses plus numbers of palfreys and pack animals and undoubtedly the richer knights and great nobles had many more.9 Thus, in association with the knights (whose numbers are below estimated to have been about 6,000–7,000) a minimum of 20,000 horses would have begun the journey, and in addition there were pack and draught animals including oxen for the carts. The servants needed in order to look after these 20,000 alone would have constituted a substantial army. In the following of important men, servants and retainers of all kinds must have been numerous; almost any knight would have had at least one. If those with a quasi-military function could arm themselves they could be pressed into service easily, but on the other hand if his master died a man of this type could easily find himself in the wider mass of general domestic servants and non-combatants. For the army attracted large numbers of poor pilgrims, some infirm, with women and children. This last group of genuine non-combatants must have dwindled quickly under the impact of deprivation and disease, for they must have been the poorest and th
erefore most vulnerable to disease. By 1099, however, anyone fit enough to bear arms, except for clergy, was probably in the infantry. They were disciplined and trained by sheer force of circumstance. Many of them were dismounted knights who might from time to time find horses. Thus an army with a huge civilian tail became progressively smaller and more militarised as time went on, under the pressure of enemy attack.

  Fulcher of Chartres’ statement that the army gathered at Nicaea was 600,000 strong including 100,000 ‘protected by mail hauberks’ is clearly sheer fantasy, as is Ekkehard’s figure of 300,000. Albert of Aachen says the army was 300,000 strong at Nicaea (manuscript variants say 600,000) with women and children in addition, and he also indicates that the Turks believed that 400,000 were attacking Nicaea. Anna Comnena says that Godfrey’s army alone numbered 10,000 cavalry and 70,000 infantry, which is surely as wild as the statement by Albert that Godfrey led 60,000 knights to the rescue of Bohemond at the battle of Dorylaeum.10 On the other hand, Albert reports Godfrey attacking the enemy leader with fifty sodalibus during this battle and adds that the enemy suffered losses of 3,000, a surprisingly modest figure in the light of the implied size of the Turkish army – which Anselm of Ribemont placed at 260,000 and Tudebode at 360,000.11 Indeed, when it comes to specific battles the total numbers suggested by the sources reduce dramatically. On 31 December 1097 a force under Bohemond and Robert of Flanders sent out to forage ran into the army of Damascus attempting to relieve Antioch. Albert of Aachen says that the westerners had 15,000 foot and 2,000 knights and the Anonymous gives an overall figure of 20,000 – though Raymond of Aguilers suggests that there were only 400 Frankish knights present.12 There is a much greater consensus on the second battle fought against the relieving force of Ridwan of Aleppo on 9 February 1098. On this occasion the approach of an enemy army came at a moment when suffering in the bitter winter was at its height and losses in horses had been heavy. The council of leaders decided to send all their knights under the command of Bohemond to ambush the enemy at a narrow passage between the river Orontes and the lake of Antioch, leaving the foot to defend the camp. Albert says that only 700 could find horses and this figure is confirmed by Raymond of Aguilers and by Stephen of Blois in his second letter to his wife Adela.13 Of course this is a measure of horses rather than men as we have already noted. The figure 700 occurs again for Albert says that when the crusaders were preparing for the betrayal of Antioch at a time when Kerbogah’s relief army was approaching, they pretended to repeat the tactics of the Lake battle and allowed the garrison to see 700 cavalry march away – suggesting that even then this was the size of the cavalry component.14 In the later stages of the crusade Albert’s estimates of the total size of the army grow much more modest. In February 1099 Godfrey de Bouillon and Robert of Flanders were forced by public opinion to leave Antioch with an army 20,000 strong which when joined to that of Raymond of Toulouse, Robert of Normandy and Tancred at ’Akkār made a total of 50,000, of which only 20,000 were fit to fight. The total figure had risen at Jerusalem to 60,000 ‘including both sexes’, which I take to mean including non-combatants. By the end of the siege the Christians could muster only 20,000 fighting men against the Egyptians at Ascalon on 6 August 1099.15 These figures suggest that in the later stages of the crusade there was a core fighting force of 20,000 men which could be augmented in emergency by a number of less well-armed people drawn from amongst the poor. There is nothing impossible about these figures in themselves, but the suggestion that in the army at Ascalon Godfrey alone could lead 2,000 cavalry (and 3,000 foot) does not sit well with the attrition of horses which we have observed, and generally 50,000 seems a lot after three years of fighting and marching. In many ways the evidence of Raymond of Aguilers is far more impressive.

  Raymond of Aguilers says that at the start of the siege of Antioch the army had 100,000 armed men (armatorum), a figure which reappears in the two letters sent by Simeon Patriarch of Jerusalem to the west, although in the second, that of January 1098, it is specifically stated that this figure includes losses so far incurred.16 As both these letters were inspired by Adhémar, and Raymond was in his mouvance, we can assume that this was some sort of quasi-official estimate of numbers at the start of the crusade. As such it is likely to be an overestimate, and we must note that it does not include non-combatants. But it is for the later stages of the crusade that Raymond of Aguilers furnishes us with very consistent and convincing indications of numbers. Historians have noted some of his figures but have not noticed how full a picture he offers of the manpower situation of the crusade in the period after the fall of Antioch.17

  As we have noted, after the capture of Antioch the army fell to quarrelling over its fate and the advance to Jerusalem was stalled in North Syria for over 5 months (July 1098-January 1099). By this time Raymond of Aguilers was a chaplain to the count of Toulouse and thus close to an important leader. At Rugia on 4 January 1099, Raymond of Toulouse offered money to the other leaders, and we know that amongst them was Tancred who accepted it: ‘on the agreement that he would be in his service until they gained Jerusalem’.18 We can assume that similar terms were offered to the other leaders. Such a deal would have restored momentum and had the effect of making Count Raymond leader. The offer made was as follows: 10,000 solidi to Godfrey de Bouillon and Robert of Normandy; 6,000 to Robert of Flanders; 5,000 to Tancred. This must reflect the strength of the forces disposed of by each leader at that time, and as the quality and constitution of the foot element was uncertain probably reflects their strength in knights. Now Tancred accepted and followed Count Raymond with forty knights and a number of foot-soldiers.19 On this basis we can guess that Robert of Flanders had fifty knights, while Robert Curthose and Godfrey each had 100. In addition, Raymond says that money was given to other leaders proportionately (prout). This presumably refers to secondary figures whose stature has been discussed above, but we know no details of the offers made to them. The sources give the impression that Raymond of Toulouse had by far the biggest of the armies, and at this very juncture, as the army was contemplating the march south, Raymond tells us that the count had 300 knights in his army.20 When he was joined, therefore, by Tancred and Robert of Normandy Raymond of Toulouse had only some 450–500 knights, allowing for any independents who may have joined him, while 150–200 remained in the service of Godfrey and the count of Flanders at Antioch and its environs, together with those in any independent groups who refused the offer. Raymond of Aguilers makes clear that all this must be read in the context of a shortage of men. At Ma’arra where they were starving some Provençals deserted, despairing of proceeding ‘without the help of the Frankish people’, and when the count decided to conduct a razzia to revictual his army they complained that he could not do that and hold Ma’arra with a mere 300 knights. Furthermore, the count was so anxious about the manpower situation that when he marched south he made the bishop of Albara leave only a tiny garrison of seven knights and thirty foot to hold the city.21 The razzia improved the food situation and at Homs a friendly reception from its ruler enabled the pilgrims to buy precious horses, increasing their cavalry strength to about 1,000. When an attack on Jabala was proposed Tancred opposed it, pointing to the weakness of an army which had started with 100,000 knights and 200,000 foot and now had barely 1,000 of the one and 5,000 of the other.22 This shortage of manpower must explain the many doubts and hesitations of the leaders in the summer of 1098 and their desperate hope for reinforcements expressed in their letter to Urban II of 11 September 1098.23

  The count of Toulouse must have had the question of numbers very much in his mind when, after a prosperous march with much good foraging and looting, he halted the army before ’Akkār which was conveniently close to the coast where sea power facilitated communications with the other forces in and around Antioch. Godfrey and Robert of Flanders eventually left Antioch and besieged Jabala, then came to the aid of Count Raymond when he announced that an enemy army was in the field. This proved to be a chimera and the joining
of the two forces was marred by bitter divisions over whether to continue the siege of ’Akkār which was eventually abandoned in early May 1099. Raymond gives no figures for the combined force at this stage. In his account of the discussions at Ramla when a suggestion was made that the army should attack Egypt, those who were against it pointed to the weakness of an army which had barely 1,500 knights and few foot-soldiers.24 He gives an estimate of their strength on the eve of their assault on Jerusalem on 13/14 July 1099. There were, he says, 1,200–1,300 mounted men and 12,000 foot, with in addition the disabled and the poor: the reduction in the number of knights from 1,500 probably reflects the deaths of horses and men during the siege. These figures arc broadly in line with those we have already noted: a force of around a thousand knights and 5,000 or more infantry under Count Raymond was joined at ’Akkār by one of 200 knights and, we may guess, roughly 4,000–5,000 infantry. These would have been augmented by stragglers, and by men from the English and Genoese fleets.25 In August the crusaders marched out of Jerusalem against an Egyptian relief force gathering at Ascalon and destroyed it in battle on the twelfth of that month. On the eve of the battle Raymond estimates the crusader army at 1,200 knights and 9,000 foot.26 These figures suggest that the capture of Jerusalem had cost the army almost a quarter of its fighting strength. It may seem odd that the complement of knights recorded is not much smaller, but fluctuations in their number were related to supply of horses and while they must have suffered losses, the garrison’s horses were captured during the sack.27 These figures have the ring of truth, as many commentators have remarked, but what is impressive is the consistency with which we can trace numbers in Raymond’s account since the time of the fall of Ma’arra and the Rugia meeting. In January 1099 a force of some 14,000 fighting men, including at the most 1,500 mounted troops, was available to march to Jerusalem. This allows for losses due to sickness and disease, the fighting around ’Akkār and, in addition, some coming and going of which we hear no trace. These figures relate to numbers of fighting men – there is simply no way of estimating the non-combatants. By the time Ascalon had been fought this number had dwindled to not many more than 10,000, of whom something like 3,000 stayed at Jerusalem.