Victory in the East

by John France

  At Heraclea, or shortly thereafter, the princes must have decided to implement their Armenian strategy which probably aimed to reproduce the principality which Philaretus had ruled in the years before 1085, elements of which (such as Edessa) remained independent and in some sense attached to the empire. Gabriel of Melitene seems to have held aloof from the crusade. The idea of creating such a liberated zone was probably developed in discussions with Alexius – Tatikios was his man on the crusade and he seems to have aided and abetted the process – but it was made possible by the success at Dorylaeum and the reaction of the native population to it. After Heraclea the leaders decided to capitalise on their success and launched the main army into a long diversion over very difficult territory, driving back the forces of Hasan. Into the more sheltered area of Cilicia a small force led by Tancred and Baldwin was dispatched. It was a risk, but one which succeeded handsomely. The establishment of a great bastion of Byzantine power on the Syrian border was welcome to both Alexius and the crusader leaders. It would enable the Byzantines to conquer southern Asia Minor. For the crusaders liberation of the persecuted Christians of the east was one of the objectives of their journey. Furthermore, such a Byzantine bulwark would provide a secure base for the real objective of their endeavour – Jerusalem. We have to remember that they had come for Jerusalem, for Palestine, not Antioch or some North Syrian domination. It is a point which the mass of the army would make forcibly to its leaders in the later months of 1098.143 As things turned out this plan was never properly realised. Its central assumption was a common interest between the Byzantine empire and the crusaders; the stress of events undermined this. Even so, despite a heavy price in garrison troops detached from their force the conquests paid off handsomely for the First Crusade. Food, useful intelligence and supplies reached the crusade from the Armenians whose merchants frequently visited the city and Armenians helped in the routing of Turkish forces and the slaying of Yaghisiyan.144 The possession of so many bases in the general area of Antioch, the old dominion of Philaretus, gave the crusade a much needed platform for their assault on Antioch. Baldwin’s possession of Edessa enabled him to send aid and supplies to the army at Antioch. It was also a powerful distraction for local Islamic leaders. In May 1098 this factor caused Kerbogah to divert his huge relief army for a three-week siege, which was fatal for his chances of success against Antioch.145 Militarily, the policy was a striking success and the choice made on the road from Heraclea proved to be a correct one, dangerous though it must have appeared. It enabled the crusaders to confront their second enemy, the Turks of Syria, with a considerable territorial base and much assistance which was extremely valuable.

  * * *

  1 RA, pp. 42–3; AA, 314; FC, pp. 81–2.

  2 A. M. Schcider and W. Karnapp, Die Stadtmauer von Iznik-Nicea (Berlin, 1938); S. Eyice, Iznik-Nicaea: the History and the Monuments (Istanbul, 1991). Stephen of Blois was exaggerating when he said that the city had 300 towers: Hagenmeyer, Kreuzzugsbriefe, p. 149.

  3 At present the north gate is 250 metres from the lake, but the extensive marshes at this point are very much closer and point to the advance of the shoreline since the eleventh century. The same phenomenom is remarked by the south gate which at present is 350 metres from the shore, but there modern filling has taken place on a large scale. The re-entrant of the walls on this south-west corner of the city is probably to be explained by the shoreline and marsh in ancient times. The three landward gates of the city and almost all the enceinte still surround the small town of Iznik, although the walls are ruinous in places by the lake, where the watergate has long perished. There is an outer wall which terminates north and south on the shore, protecting the littoral of the city, but this is a late construction and its crudity is particularly evident at the gates in comparison with the fine work of the inner Roman gates. It is a construction of the thirteenth century.

  4 Alexiad, pp. 335–6, 130, 206; on the last occasion Alexius’s commander was Tatikios.

  5 Alexiad, p. 330–1.

  6 France, ‘Anna Comnena’, 22–3.

  7 See in particular Runciman’s declaration of faith, 1. 171: ‘he [Alexius] believed that the welfare of Christendom depended on the welfare of the historic Christian Empire. His belief was correct.’

  8 C. Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey (London, 1968) pp. 19–20.

  9 C. Cahen, ‘The Turkish invasion: the Selchukids’, in Setton, Crusades 1. 139–40.

  10 B. Lewis, The Arabs in History (London, 1958), pp. 49–63.

  11 C. E. Bosworth, ‘Recruitment, muster and review in medieval Islamic armies’, in V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp, eds., War, Technology and Society in the Middle East (London, 1975), p. 60; J. D. Latham and W. F. Paterson, Saracen Archery (London, 1970), p. xxiii; this cycle of rulers throwing off tribal dependence is a major theme of Ibn-Khaldûn, especially pp. 123–263.

  12 H. A. R. Gibb, ‘The Caliphate in the Arab States’, in Setton, Crusades 1. 81–2.

  13 D. Ayalon, ‘Preliminary remarks on the Mamluk military institution in Islam’, in V. G. Parry and M. E. Yapp, eds., War, Technology and Society in the Middle East (London, 1975), pp. 51–4, Bosworth, ‘Recruitment, muster and review’, pp. 62–3; O. S. A. Ismail, ‘Mu’tasum and the Turks’, Bulletin of the School of African and Oriental Studies, 29 (1966), 12–24.

  14 Cahen, ‘The Turkish invasion’, 143–6.

  15 S. Vryonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor (London, 1971), pp. 87, 94–5.

  16 C. Cahen, ‘Les changements techniques militaires dans le Proche Orient médiéval et leur importance historique’, in V. G. Parry and M. E. Yapp, eds., War, Technology and Society in the Middle East (London, 1975), 115 comments on the need for research on Turkish horses. Lindner, ‘Nomadism, horses and Huns’, 3–19; Bundari, Dawolat al-Saljuq (Cairo, 1900), p. 37 – I owe this reference to Professor A. K. S. Lambton.

  17 A matter which Davis stresses. See above p. 73.

  18 al-Jahiz quoted in Latham and Paterson, Saracen Archery, p. xxiii.

  19 AA, 344, 359, 369, 400.

  20 AA, 331–2, 362: La Chanson d’Antioche, ed. S. Duparc-Quioc, 2 vols. (Paris, 1977–8), 2. 1606, 8979 mentions Gerard at Nicaea and later at the battle against Kerbogah.

  21 Latham and Paterson, Saracen Archery, pp. xxv, 30; AA, 334, 377, 424; FC, p. 85.

  22 RA, pp. 50–1; RC, pp. 639–41; AA, 362, 408; see below pp. 192–3, 206, 271–2.

  23 Latham and Paterson, Saracen Archery, pp. xxiv–xxxi; C. Cahen, ‘Un traité d’armurerie composé pour Saladin’, Bulletin d’Etudes Orientales de l’Institut Français de Damas, 12 (1947/48), 132–3 and ‘Les changements techniques militaires’ pp. 116–17, points to the development of this light crossbow which threw large numbers of darts, hence its nickname ‘hailstone’, which is described in some detail by Latham and Paterson, pp. 145–51.

  24 There are some fine eleventh-century examples in the armoury of the Topkapi Palace in Istanbul.

  25 D. Nicolle, ‘Early medieval Islamic arms and armour’, Gladius, special volume (1976), 53.

  26 Nicolle, ‘Early medieval Islamic arms’, 26, 53–82; M. V. Gorelik, ‘Oriental armour of the Near and Middle East from the eight to the fifteenth centuries as shown in works of art’, in R. Elgood, ed. Islamic Arms and Armour (London, 1979), pp. 30–63; RC, 621.

  27 On the destruction of the People’s Crusade see above p. 93–5; W. E. Kaegi, ‘The contribution of archery to the Turkish conquest of Anatolia’, Speculum, 39 (1964), 96–108 rather exaggerates the influence of archery. After all, many Turks fought for the Byzantines with the same tactics.

  28 The general explanation of Byzantine decline here relies on: M. Angold, The Byzantine Empire 1025–1204, a Political History (London, 1984), pp. 1–113 and Vryonis, Hellenism, pp. 70–142. See also Charanis, in Setton, Crusades 1. 177–219; Jenkins, Byzantine Empire; Ostrogorsky, Byzantine State, pp. 280–315.

  29 On the Byzantine army see J. D. Howard-Johnstone, Studies in the Organisation of the Byzantin
e Army in the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries, unpublished D. Phil, thesis, University of Oxford, 1971; H. Ahrweiler, ‘L’organisation des campagnes militaires à Byzance’, in V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp, eds., War, Technology and Society in the Middle East (London, 1975), pp. 89–96 is particularly useful on its subject. See also Ostrogorsky, Byzantine State, pp. 87–90; on Dorylaeum which had baths for 1,000 troops see Vryonis, Hellenism, pp. 31–2.

  30 Angold, Byzantine Empire, pp. 63–5; C. Mango, Byzantium (London, 1988), p. 57.

  31 W. C. Brice, ‘The Turkish colonisation of Anatolia’, Bulletin of John Rylanad’s Library, 38 (1955), 18–44.

  32 On Manzikert see C. Cahen, ‘La campagne de Mantzikert d’après les sources musulmanes’, Byzantion, 9 (1934), 613–42, and for corrections based on the Greek sources Vryonis, Hellenism, pp. 96–103; A. Friendly, The Dreadful Day. The battle of Mantzikert, 1071 (London, 1981), pp. 163–92; J. C. Cheynet, ‘Mantzikert. Un désastre militaire?’, Byzantion, 50 (1980) 410–38.

  33 Cheynet, ‘Mantzikert’, p. 431 suggests losses of five to ten per cent in total much less than those of Alexius Comnenus’s, reputedly 5,000 at Dyrrachium ten years later, on which see above pp. 75–6.

  34 J. Schlumberger, ‘Deux chefs normands des armées byzantines au XI siècle: sceaux de Hervé et de Raoul de Bailleul’, Revue Historique, 16 (1881), 289–303; L. Bréhier, ‘Les aventures d’un chef normand en Orient au XI siècle’, Revue des Cours et Conferences, 20 (1911–12), 99–112; see also Marquis de la Force, ‘Les conseillers latins d’Alexis Comnène’, Byzantion, 11 (1936), 153–65.

  35 On Philaretus see J. Laurent, ‘Byzance et Antioche sous le curopalate Philarète’, Revue des Eludes Arméniennes, 9 (1929), 61–72; T. S. R. Boase, The Cilician Kingdom of Armenia (Edinburgh and London, 1978), pp. 3–4; Skoulatos, Anna Comnena, pp. 263–5; Cahen, Turkey, pp. 76–7; Vryonis, Hellenism, pp. 109–10. E. Sivan, L’Islam et la Croisade; Idéologie et Propagande dans les Réactions Musulmanes aux Croisades (Paris, 1968), p. 19 suggests that Sulayman was acting for the emperor in his capture of Antioch.

  36 Cahen, Turkey, p. 76; Ostrogorsky, Byzantine State, p. 257.

  37 A. R. Gadolin, ‘Alexius I Comnenus and the Venetian trade privileges. A new interpretation’, Byzantion, 50 (1980), 439–46, suggests that the great trading concessions, extended to the Venetians in the Golden Bull of 1082, were intended as much to stimulate the damaged Byzantine economy as to persuade them to give support against the Normans; M. Angold, ‘The Byzantine State on the eve of the Battle of Manzikert’, in A. Bryer and M. Ursinus, eds., Manzikert to Lepanto: the Byzantine World and the Turks, 1071–1571, Byzantinische Forschungen 16 (Amsterdam, 1991), 33.

  38 Sivan, L’Islam et la Croisade, p. 19 stresses the lack of any spirit of jihad amongst the Seljuk leaders. In taking over Antioch, Sulayman was at pains to safeguard the Christian population; Cahen, Turkey, p. 75.

  39 Vryonis, Hellenism, pp. 114–16; Cahen, Turkey, pp. 76–82.

  40 Matthew, 30–33; Michael the Syrian, Chronique de Michel le Syrien, Patriarch jacobtte d’Anttoche 1166–99, ed. and tr. J. B. Chabot, 4 vols. (Brussels, 1963, reprint of 1899–1910 edition) [hereafter cited as Michael], vol. 3. 179; see below pp. 168–9, 304–7.

  41 Cahen, Turkey, pp. 77–80.

  42 Cahen, ‘The Turkish invasion’, 161–3.

  43 Cahen, ‘The Turkish invasion’, 157.

  44 Lindner, ‘Nomadism, Horses and Huns’, 8, 15.

  45 A. V. S. Lambton, Continuity and Change in Medieval Persia (London, 1988), pp. 21–4 and especially 21, n. 60.

  46 FC, pp. 82–83; GF, p. 21.

  47 Nicephorous Bryennius, Commentarii, ed. A. Meineke (Bonn, 1836), pp. 41–2 cited and tr. Kaegi, ‘Archery’ p. 106.

  48 GF, p. 19; RA, p. 52 Krey, First Crusade, p. 135; AA, 320, 328–31.

  49 GF, p. 30; RA, p. 52; AA, 375.

  50 On which see below pp. 200–6.

  51 GF, pp. 23–4.

  52 Vryonis, Hellenism, pp. 112–13; Cahen Turkey, pp. 76–7, 83–4.

  53 GF, p. 22.

  54 Matthew, 28; Cahen, Turkey, pp. 81–2; Michael 3. 179.

  55 RA, p. 43; GF, pp. 14–15; AA, 320–1. It must be admitted, however, that some aspects of Albert’s account of the early siege are confused. A long list of those present, 315, includes Robert of Normandy who, however, is not amongst the leaders who urged Raymond of Toulouse to hurry, 319, yet is recorded as taking part in the battle, 320. In fact he did not arrive until 3 June. I would guess that Albert was trying to reconcile confused and contradictory information from his sources.

  56 GF, p. 15; AA, 320.

  57 Alexiad, p. 334.

  58 GF, pp. 14–17; RA, pp. 43–4; Alexiad, pp. 335–6. The famous ‘Greek Fire’ was not included in the aid which Alexius offered to the crusaders. Much has been written on the nature of this mysterious substance; J. Bradbury, ‘Greek Fire in the West’, History Today, 29 (1979), 326–31; H. R. E. Davidson, ‘The secret weapon of Byzantium’, Byzantinische Zeitschrift, 66 (1973), 66–74; J. Harvey and M. Byrne, ‘A possible solution to the problem of Greek Fire’, Byzantinische Zeitschrift, 70 (1977), 91–9; J. R. Partington, A History of Greek Fire and Gunpowder (Cambridge, 1960); C. Zenghetin, ‘Le feu grégois et les armes à feu byzantines’, Byzantion, 7 (1932) 265–86; the crusaders claimed it was used against them at Jerusalem: see below p. 350.

  59 BD, 27–9; HBS, 181; Robert the Monk, Historia Iherosolimitana, RHCOc. 3. (hereafter cited as RM), 756; FC, p. 82.

  60 Rogers, Siege Warfare, studied this and other sieges and has helped to clarify my thinking considerably. Rogers prefers ‘armoured roof to my term ‘penthouse’.

  61 Murray, ‘Army of Godfrey de Bouillon’, says that Henry was related to Godfrey de Bouillon (his brother Godfrey was also on the crusade) and came of a family which held the castle of Esch-sur-Sûre in the Ardennes; AA, 321–2; see above p. 105.

  62 AA, 322–5; RA, p. 44.

  63 AA, 325 and n.a.

  64 AA, 325–8.

  65 Alexiad, pp. 337–8.

  66 AA, 325; Hagenmeyer, Kreuzzugsbriefe, p. 145.

  67 Rogers, Siege Warfare, p. 81: Alexiad, p. 336; GF, p. 16; RA, p. 44; FC, p. 82.

  68 FC, p. 82; AA, 320; GF, p. 17.

  69 RA, p. 44; FC, p. 83; Hagenmeyer, Kreuzzugsbriefe, pp. 140, 144–5; GF, p. 17–18.

  70 Alexiad, p. 336.

  71 HBS, 181, 189–90, 212; GF, p. 37; RA, pp. 58, 109–10. On this embassy and the whole issue of diplomatic relations between the crusaders and Islamic powers on the First Crusade see M. A. Köhler, Allianzen und Verträge zwischen frankischen und islamischen Herrschern im Vorderren Orient (Berlin, 1991), pp. 1–72.

  72 Gibb, ‘The Caliphate’, 85–95; P. M. Holt, The Age of the Crusades (London, 1986) pp. 9–15; Y. Lev, State and Society in Fatimid Egypt (Leiden, 1991); on the fragmentation of the Seljuk power and its impact on the crusade see below pp. 357–8.

  73 Hagenmeyer, Kreuzzugsbriefe, p. 140.

  74 Alexiad, pp. 372–4; Boase, Armenia, pp. 3–4.

  75 Runciman, Crusades, 1. 299; Boase, Armenia, p. 4.

  76 Matthew, 30.

  77 Michael, pp. 173–4; Matthew, 35; ‘Anonymous Syriac Chronicle’, ed. and tr. A. S. Tritton and H. A. R. Gibb, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1933), 69.