Victory in the East

by John France

  In the armies which the crusaders now faced the speed, mobility and fire-power of the elite Turkish cavalry remained an important element. Such tactics were not usually in themselves enough to win against determined enemies; for that, battle at close quarters was essential. The Turks were fully prepared to fight at close quarters, and indeed it was precipitate haste to do so which caused their defeats at Nicaea and Dorylaeum. As we have noted they probably wore rather lighter armour than the Franks but at Dorylaeum were fully prepared to fight at close quarters.26 As the crusaders moved into the more settled lands of Islam they understood that the armies facing them were rather different, as has been noted already. Infantry was clearly a feature of these armies, in contrast to the entirely mounted nomads. They were bowmen or spearmen, and in general were not armoured.27 The western chroniclers do not often describe their enemies but the Anonymous reports that in the army of Kerbogah there was a heavily armoured element, even more comprehensively protected than the crusaders because their horses wore a special kind of armour: ‘The Agulani numbered three thousand; they fear neither spears nor arrows nor any other weapon for they and their horses are covered all over with plates of iron.’

  The description inevitably reminds one of the heavily armoured Persian cavalryman so feared by the late Roman army, the ‘cataphract’ or in colloquial Latin clibanarius, ‘boiler boy’. There was a marked tradition of heavy cavalry in Persia which may well be where these people originated, although it should be noted that rather similar troops appear in Egyptian armies.28 Cahen thinks it is possible to see a general development in Islamic armies towards a heavier type of horseman. This probably arose from settlement, for the skills of the Nomad, particular for his kind of fighting, vanish with the open ranges which dictate his way of life, hence the emphasis in Islamic thinking on recruiting Turks directly from the steppe. Almost certainly any such tendency to heavier horses was accelerated by the experience of the crusades.29 Certainly from about the time the army approached Antioch references grow to well-armoured Turks with hauberks. Albert mentions them at the crossing of the Iron Bridge and comments on them again in the battle on the St Symeon road in March 1098, while it is difficult to see how the desperate closequarter fighting within Antioch during the second siege could have been possible if the Moslems lacked armour. In the battle against Kerbogah Engelrand of St Pol was clad, according to the Chanson d’Antioche, in a splendid eastern ‘haubere jaseran’. Raymond of Aguilers was presumably registering the differences between well-equipped and less well-equipped Turks when he spoke of the garrison of Antioch having ‘two thousand of the best knights, and four or five thousand common knights’.30 The garrison must have had ordinary infantrymen who also formed an element in the relief forces, and specialist troops equipped with siege machinery. Albert mentions a mangonel used against the crusaders in the early fighting near to the Dog Gate, while Fulcher records petrariae and fundibula. It was, Albert tells us, with such a machine that the garrison of Antioch tossed the heads of two of their more notable victims, Adalbero of Metz and his lady back to the crusaders.31 The sources also speak of Armenian archers fighting in the garrison at Antioch. In the fighting on the St Symeon road the Anonymous says that the Armenians and Syrians, under the command of the Turks, were made to fire arrows at the crusaders – he had earlier commented that the Turks held their wives and made them spy on the army. Armenians had a high reputation as archers, both on foot and on horseback; Albert says that Baldwin attacked Kerbogah’s army as it approached Edessa ‘with the bows of the Armenians and the lances of the Franks’. There were Armenian archers in the service of all the Islamic armies at this time. In Egypt the ruling Vizirs, Badr al-Jamali (1074–94) and his son al-Afdal Shahanshah (1094–1121), were Armenian Moslems and so numerous was the Armenian community at Cairo, which provided nearly half the regular army stationed in the capital, that they had their own church and Patriarch.32 The Islamic armies in no way lagged behind the crusaders in the range of military skills and capacities. Their military technology was clearly the equal of that of their new enemies and their officers enjoyed a tradition of training and writing about the theory and practice of war unequalled in the West. If Ibn-Khaldûn is accurate Moslems had long recognised the need for fighting in close formation, though he acknowledges the speciality of the Franks in this art. The novelty of Turkish mounted bowmen in Latin sources should not disguise from us the fact that Islamic armies understood the need for all arms and formations to work together in disciplined formation.33

  The Armenian strategy followed by the crusader army since it left Heraclea created a large friendly area to the north and west of Antioch, acting as a shield for their siege. The march down the Amouk and the capture of ’Artāh provided a strong grasp over a rich agricultural area. The road now brought them to the ‘Iron Bridge’ which the Antiochenes held in force.

  This was a fortified bridge across the Orontes with a tower at either end, probably built shortly after the time of Justinian (527–65) (see fig. 7).34 The Anonymous mentions the fight at the Iron Bridge briefly and Raymond of Aguilers not at all, but Albert provides a vivid description. The army had concentrated at the approaches to the bridge and received a sermon from Adhémar alerting them to the dangers which they faced, so on the morning of 20 October they approached the Iron Bridge in battle order – Robert of Normandy and his knights going ahead as a vanguard, supported by a corps of foot-soldiers 2,000 strong. The garrison of the bridge, a hundred strong, offered fierce resistance. Then another 700 Turks from Antioch (the figure is probably exaggerated) arrived at the river bank to prevent the army using the fords across the river. They were well equipped with mail shirts, and a duel of archery ensued in which the Turks had the upper hand. In the end Adhémar exhorted the soldiers and they formed a tortoise (testudo), a wall of interlocked shields held over their heads against the enemy missiles, and by this means seized the bridge. Once this had happened, others charged across the river by the fords and drove the enemy back in an engagement in which Guy, the French king’s Dapifer, distinguished himself.35 But the enemy were not pursued for the army was determined to approach Antioch carefully and it rested on the battlefield.36 It might almost seem perverse for the crusaders to have taken this route obliging them to challenge a well-defended crossing, but its seizure meant that they commanded the road from Aleppo and the extensive agricultural resources of the Orontes valley. It was not that the bridge was all that formidable an obstacle – Kerbogah would seize it in June 1098 although it was defended. Probably the fords close by, which Albert mentions as a feature of the battle, made it vulnerable.37 Rather, possession of this crossing made it impossible for any large enemy force to surprise the crusaders encamped around Antioch and it provided a bridgehead for raids out into Syria. Possession of the valley of Ruj held by the Provençals also facilitated such raids. The other major fortress commanding the approaches to the Iron Bridge, Harem, was not attacked and was causing the crusaders grave difficulties by November 1098. Harem stands on the northern spur of the Jebel Talat, which forms the east bank of the Orontes with superb views of the Iron Bridge and the Antioch-Aleppo road.38 Its garrison was well placed to harass the Franks around Antioch and make communications with Ruj difficult (see fig. 4). It fell to the Armenians only after the defeat of Ridwan’s relief army in February 1098, improving control over the approaches to the Iron Bridge; later Kerbogah captured it.39 But the crusader army had put Antioch in a vice; the only possible approach for a relief army lay along the Aleppo road across the Iron Bridge which was thus an outwork of defence for the besiegers. Of course small parties could always attack, and as we shall see they did. But Antioch had been largely cut off by the Armenian strategy of the crusader army and it was further isolated by sea-power which made a vital contribution to the success of the First Crusade.

  Fig. 7 Antioch and vicinity

  We hear a good deal about naval activity in support of the crusade. Ships from Genoa, Pisa, Venice, Greece and England are all menti
oned as being active during the crusade.40 Of their value to the crusaders there can be no doubt at all. By Christmas 1097 the army had eaten up everything in the immediate vicinity of Antioch and, despite its ability to draw upon a friendly hinterland across which much of the army had dispersed, was forced to mount major military expeditions to fend off starvation. In these circumstances food brought in by sea was probably a vital element in sustaining the army. Raymond of Aguilers speaks of western ships plying to Cyprus and protecting Greek shipping engaged in the same task and the visionary Peter Bartholemew sought food in Cyprus, while Bauldry mentions the sailors and merchants living by the coast who were killed during the second siege of Antioch.41 Ralph of Caen says that goods were imported into Laodicea from Cyprus and sent on to Antioch.42 Indeed, Cyprus seems to have played a key role as a source of food and supply for the army; when the leaders discussed their strategy with Alexius at Constantinople and Pelekanum, Cyprus must have been seen as a very important supply base. The crusaders arrived at Antioch about 20 October 1097; by the end of the month Adhémar, the Papal Legate, was sending a letter back to the West in conjunction with Symeon, Patriarch of Jerusalem, who is known to have been a refugee in Cyprus at this time, during which he sent lavish presents to the crusaders at Antioch.43 When Alexius promised to send supplies to the crusaders he was presumably thinking of Cyprus, the convenience of which, for the projected siege of Antioch, would have been known not only to the emperor but to all concerned. Most trading ships making for the Levant would have used Cyprus as a port of call and it was certainly known to pilgrims. Ordericus tells us that Abbot Thierry of St Evroul (1050–7) rested at St Symeon, the port of Antioch, before taking ship for Cyprus where he died.44 Ralph of Caen says that during the siege of Antioch, Robert of Normandy resided at Laodicea but sent food, brought from Cyprus, to the main camp at Antioch. As the army of Raymond of Toulouse, Robert of Normandy and Tancred marched south, it was the prospect of contact with Cyprus which was one of the factors which decided them to turn towards the coast instead of inland along the Damascus road.45 It is remarkable that chroniclers, as hostile to the Byzantines as Ralph of Caen and Raymond of Aguilers, mention Cyprus as a source of food for the army. This underlines the importance of the Byzantine alliance, and it was probably the Cyprus connection that made the other leaders reluctant to support Bohemond’s bid for Antioch at the conference of November 1098. The food and supplies they had received made it difficult to argue that Alexius had never supported them, and there was the prospect of more yet to come. This logistical and naval support was essential for the crusaders – it is hardly possible to believe that without such Byzantine help they could have survived the siege of Antioch.46

  Sea power was important to the crusaders’ communications. According to a manuscript of Bauldry of Dol, a Greek living on the coast near to Antioch was able to take ship for Constantinople three days after the victory over Kerbogah on 28 June 1098 and bring news of it to Alexius in eleven days. At almost exactly the same time Hugh of Vermandois was sent to Constantinople overland, but did not arrive until 25 July.47 The relative speed of sea travel explains why the crusaders could write letters home. The risks of the slow overland journey to Constantinople were revealed when Hugh of Vermandois and Baldwin of Hainault were ambushed on their diplomatic mission to Constantinople and the latter killed, and by Albert’s story of the Danish reinforcements who were killed near Philomelium during the siege of Antioch.48 Adhémar of Le Puy was in contact with Symeon Patriarch of Jerusalem in exile on Cyprus within a fortnight of the arrival of the army before Antioch. He was probably in Cyprus again early in 1098; for he almost certainly inspired Symeon’s letter to the West of late January 1098 and it is likely that he was not present for the Lake Battle on 9 February. We are told that arrangements for the battle were finalised ‘in the house of the bishop’ which implies his absence. The bishops of Orange and Grenoble were brought to the East on a Genoese fleet.49 According to Ralph of Caen, when the crusaders at ‘Akkār thought an enemy was threatening, they dispatched Arnulf of Choques to Antioch on a little boat which travelled via the ports of Maraclea, Valania, Jabala and Laodicea to Antioch, while Stephen of Blois fled by sea, probably to Attalia, before striking inland to meet Alexius at Philomelium. One manuscript of the work of Bauldry of Dol reports that two clientes of Bohemond, who were present at Philomelium were determined to give their lord a Christian burial and so went to St Symeon by ship from Cyprus and there found 500 reinforcements newly arrived, presumably by boat. Reinforcements were brought by sea – Albert of Aachen mentions 1,500 arriving at St Symeon in August 1098 from Ratisbon, only to die of plague.50 Bruno of Lucca boarded an English ship in late 1097 and was at Antioch by early March 1098. Sea travel in winter was very hazardous and this journey demonstrates the determination of the sailors. He returned by the autumn of 1098 when his proud fellow-citizens wrote to inform the world of all that had happened.51 His journey shows just how far the crusaders could remain in touch with the distant West. Their envoys to the Egyptian Caliphate were told to go by sea and the Egyptian envoys, who came to Antioch in February 1098, certainly also travelled by boat. After the defeat of Kerbogah’s army, Bohemond sent the defeated prince’s tent to Bari as a trophy of victory.52 The naval power of the Greeks and the West which was concentrated in the Levant was absolutely essential to the success of the crusade, for although the reinforcements they brought were probably few their skills were of very great importance to the land army.