Victory in the East

by John France

  Perhaps the inaction was due to a mistaken appreciation of the purpose of the attack. Kerbogah has been much blamed for spending time attacking Edessa, giving the crusaders the opportunity to seize Antioch. It is worth noting, however, that he did not know Antioch was going to fall and that his arguments with Yaghisiyan’s son over terms seem to have gone on very late in the day. More importantly, we need to recognise that the army which he raised was an alliance and that this had implications. Kerbogah was acting on the authority of Bagdad but he had to deal with independent rulers and at some stage he had to gather his army. It is possible that he chose to bring much of it together at Edessa where an attack might bring results and would in any case please the local Moslem rulers. His attack there was perhaps not at first perceived as a threat to the main crusader army at Antioch, especially as his force may have been gathering strength. Kerbogah could not take the short route from Mosul to Antioch via Sindjar and Aleppo because of the hostility of Ridwan. Instead he must have travelled via Nusaybin (ancient Nisbis) to Edessa. Albert says that Kerbogah concentrated his forces at Sooch, perhaps Tell ach-Chaikh near Mardin, before moving on to Edessa.75 He had to get together a very large number of allies; Fulcher lists twenty-eight of whom seven are also mentioned by Albert. Of the twenty-eight no fewer than fourteen can be identified including five of those in common with Albert who, however, adds another three, Pulagit, Amasa of Niz and Amasa of Cuzh who are unknown, plus Ridwan who definitely never joined the army. Of those identified five are confirmed by Kemal ad-Din and four by Ibn al-Athir who adds the name of Arslan-Tasch of Sindjar.76 We can, therefore, identify with some certainty some of the allies of Kerbogah: Duqaq of Damascus, Arslan-Tasch of Sindjar, Qaradja of Harran, Balduk of Samosata, Janah-ad-Daulah of Homs, Tughtigin atabeg of Damascus, Sokman of Mardin whose Artukid clan also held Jerusalem, the Arab commander Wassab ibn-Mahmud to whom can be added the sons of Yaghisiyan, Shams-ad-Daulah and Muhammed.77 Fulcher’s Emir Bajac may well be Albert’s Balas of Amacha and Sororgia, for this town was involved in the politics of Edessa and would have been known to both of them.78 Overall, it was a huge army; Matthew of Edessa suggests incredible figures of 800,000 cavalry and 300,000 foot attacking a Frankish force of 15,000 knights and 50,000 foot, while Bar-Hebraeus and Michael the Syrian settle for 100,000 mounted men. Such figures are probably fantasy, but the Damascus Chronicle says that they were an ‘uncountable force’.79 It was certainly a very large army indeed and its concentration must have taken time both for military and diplomatic reasons. Further, the concentration at Edessa could only have been partial – the chroniclers are surely listing the army as it was at its greatest and we have already noted the comment of Kemal ad-Din that en route Duqaq subjugated Tell-Mannas, a city to the east of Ma’arra (Ma’arrat, an-Nu’mān) which had asked for Frankish aid.80 This and simple geography suggest that the Damascene force came up to meet Kerbogah at Antioch. Kemal ad-Din also reports the presence in the Moslem army of nomads, probably from Asia Minor, who feared Ridwan, and Bar-Hebraeus reports that Kerbogah’s army, perhaps meaning elements of it, encamped at Baghras which is at the foot of the Belen pass (see figs. 4 and 7).81 In his account of the reconnaissance forces sent out by the crusader leaders, Albert stresses that they reported to the leaders that the enemy were coming from all directions.82 This suggests an army gathering strength as it went along, a process requiring careful military and diplomatic preparation which may well explain both the delay at Edessa and the failure of the Franks to recognise its size and ultimate purpose.

  Once the nature and scale of the threat which Kerbogah posed was known to the crusader leaders they acted very quickly. Bohemond had demanded a price for entry into the city and something like it was quickly conceded. Albert simply says that all promised the city to Bohemond, but the Anonymous makes the promise conditional and makes the leaders say that ‘we will thereafter give it to him gladly, on condition that if the emperor come to our aid and fulfil all his obligations which he promised and vowed, we will return the city to him as it is right to do.’83 Even this is probably an overstatement. As we have noted the Anonymous tends to exaggerate the obligations of Alexius to the army, and if there had ever been any question of the emperor coming in person, as this passage suggests, then there would have been no grounds for an argument in November 1098. Rather, even under the extreme pressure of this desperate situation, the leaders were mindful of the oaths they had sworn and of all the benefits that they had received in the past and might receive in the future, and promised only that Bohemond could have the city if the emperor did not make arrangements to take and protect it. This promise appears to have been made by a very small coterie of leaders. Albert says that all met to discuss the report of the coming of the enemy army and a debate took place with Godfrey, Robert of Flanders and Raymond of Toulouse urging that the army as a whole march out to attack Kerbogah, while others urged that the camp should be manned and the army divided as before. It was then that Bohemond took aside Godfrey, Robert of Flanders and Raymond of Toulouse to a secret place and told them of the plot with Firuz and his demand to be ruler of the city, to which they then agreed.

  Ralph of Caen tells us later that Tancred was kept in ignorance of the plot to seize the city and the arrangements for it.84 The Anonymous says that it was Firuz’s idea to pretend that a section of the army was going out as if to plunder Syria in order to lull the defences. Albert credits Bohemond with the plan and says that Godfrey and Robert of Flanders led out this force of 700 knights on 2 June as though signalling to the garrison of Antioch their intention to repeat the tactic of the Lake Battle by ambushing the enemy’s vanguard, but they came back under cover of night by secret paths led by Bohemond the Turk and approached the section of the wall held by Firuz. The Anonymous simply says that by night knights returned by the plain and the footsoldiers by the mountain to the appointed spot.85 On 2 June this expedition set out and under cover of night turned back and returned to what the Anonymous has Firuz call ‘the western mountain’, the southern side of the defences, for it is clear that Firuz’s tower was on that side of the city.86 The Anonymous has Firuz suggest this feint so that the army ‘should pretend to go out and plunder the land of the Saracens’, which is rather an odd statement, for at this critical juncture nobody would have been thinking of such a thing. However, it is probably expressed this way because the direction of their march reminded the Anonymous of the expedition which led to the Foraging Battle, for it was surely in that direction that they set out. Once into the mountains by Daphne the army probably rested, then the infantry took the paths into the mountains towards the back road and Firuz’s tower, while the cavalry rode back up towards the St George Gate then climbed on foot to the appointed spot (see fig. 11). Once they had gathered under cover of night they prepared to mount a two-pronged attack. Albert’s informants were with Godfrey, while the Anonymous was with Bohemond’s force, and this conditions their accounts.

  The Anonymous participated in the secret entry into the city and describes it as a commando raid by an élite group. A party of knights approached the wall with a ladder just before dawn and sixty of them mounted into the tower of Firuz, who became worried by the absence of Bohemond and the small numbers. Bohemond and his followers, including the Anonymous, then came to the foot of the ladder and showed themselves, calling up. A large number of them ascended when suddenly the ladder broke, but those inside opened a small postern gate and as more and more crusaders poured in cries of horror arose in the city and the main army began its assault and a great slaughter.87 It is very much the story of a participant, vivid and clear but lacking in context which is to some extent provided by Albert. According to him a Lombard interpreter from Bohemond’s household approached the tower and spoke in Greek (mentioned by the Anonymous as the language used between the traitor and the Franks) to its occupants who urged the Franks to come up and get established before the coming of the watchmen who toured the defences every night – a detail mentioned by Raymond of Aguil
ers who, however, says the Franks waited until they had passed.88 There was much hesitation amongst the attackers, according to Albert, and this may have been because of the earlier experience when Guy the Constable was killed. However, Godfrey exhorted those who were hesitating, a rope was lowered, a leather ladder hauled up and sixty men entered until the weight of people dragged down the portion of the wall to which the ladder was attached causing losses; this is rather different to the Anonymous’s statement that the ladder broke. Raymond of Aguilers adds that Fulcher of Chartres was first up and Ralph gives the name as Gouel. The watch then arrived and was killed and as the fighting spread most of the 700 knights were admitted through a postern gate and hard fighting ensued.89 The two accounts and that of Ralph are generally compatible, but Albert gives a very prominent role in the commando party to Godfrey and Robert of Flanders. Bohemond, Raymond of Toulouse and Tancred then, he says, rallied the main army which was totally surprised to find Christian forces in Antioch – a detail supported by Raymond of Aguilers.90

  However, Albert does add some interesting information which provides us with a strong clue as to the location of Firuz’s tower. He says that as the assault force got into the city it sounded trumpets as a signal to Godfrey and Robert of Flanders who attacked a gate near the citadel; the purpose was surely to seize the citadel – in which they failed. The next day Bohemond would make a determined but fruitless attempt to seize the citadel in the course of which he would be wounded by an arrow in the leg.91 So the night attack was two-pronged. Almost certainly Bohemond led the effort to enter Firuz’s tower which it appears was quite close to the citadel for Godfrey and Robert of Flanders, who led the attack on it, were in the same general area. The contemporary sources are very vague on the location of Firuz’s towers. The Anonymous says cavalry reached it by the plain and infantry by the mountain. Albert confirms that a force of 700 knights was led to it by night over small paths by Bohemond the Turk, while Ralph of Caen describes it as a long way from the tents of Bohemond. William of Tyre is much more specific; he tells us that Firuz held a tower called the Two Sisters in the south wall of Antioch, close to the St George Gate, and this has been presumed to reflect traditions current in the Principality of Antioch in the twelfth century.92 However, it is evident from Albert’s description that the point of entry must have been much closer to the citadel. The implication of the Anonymous’s account is that Firuz’s three towers were in a lonely place. Raymond of Aguilers speaks of them being ‘on the hill of the city’ and Ralph says that it was at a point too wild for horses to venture; this argues against the vicinity of the St George Gate which had been invested by Tancred and would have been well manned. Furthermore, the Wadi Zoiba is a formidable barrier along these southern defences. In addition, the Anonymous reports that as day broke and the Franks became established in the city Bohemond set up his banner where all could see it on ‘a hill opposite the citadel’. It has been suggested that this must refer to the high point to the south of the citadel where there is a tower still visible across the whole of Antioch, however this is not precisely opposite the citadel. There is another tower further along which is at the top of the south side of the gully facing the citadel and though this could not be seen across the whole city, it could be seen plainly by the main crusader army mainly concentrated outside the northern defences (see fig. 13). William of Tyre says that by this time the Franks had captured ten towers, and by counting we can arrive at Firuz’s towers, roughly at the point where the defences turn west to form the south wall of the city, descending Mount Silpius. Moreover, the accounts agree that near Firuz’s tower was a postern and there is one in this area. There can be no certainty, but it is very likely that these towers at the south-east corner of the defences were those betrayed by Firuz (see fig. 11).93

  The failure to seize the citadel was to have considerable consequences for the crusader army. But what followed the break-in to the city was a terrible massacre in which many Christians, as well as Moslems, died – how could it be otherwise, as Albert says, when much of the fighting was in the shades of night; 10,000, he says, perished, and the Franks were assisted by an uprising of the native Christians.94 One of the casualties was Yaghisiyan himself who fled the city and was killed by local Christians.95 Kemal ad-Din says that he panicked, thinking that the citadel had also fallen, rode off with an escort and later fell off his horse and was killed by Armenians, a story confirmed by Bar-Hebraeus and Ibn al-Athir, who adds that he was decapitated by an Armenian butcher. The Damascus Chronicle simply says that he died at Armanaz near Ma’arrat Masrin on the Aleppo road north of Idleb, through constantly falling off his horse.96

  Fig. 11 Crusader capture of Antioch, night of 2/3 June 1098

  The capture of Antioch is a great story in the best Bulldog Drummond tradition. Such incidents have so often formed key moments of films about the Second World War that one can almost see the participants in khaki bearing sten-guns, rather than encumbered with swords, shields and armour. And it is a cliff-hanger in another sense – for advancing towards the city was the huge army of Kerbogah. The plot to get into Antioch was a last ditch effort by the crusader army. Had it failed, then disaster would surely have followed, but that, of course, is in the best tradition of all great stories. Naturally this is to look at events in our idiom. For the crusaders, what happened was nothing less than a miraculous delivery by the hand of God. Raymond of Aguilers rejoiced in the slaughter of the enemy – ‘the Lord had confounded them!’ and bewailed not the massacre of people but the loss of horses when some Turkish riders were driven off a cliff: ‘Our joy over the fallen enemy was great, but we grieved over the more than thirty horses who had their necks broken there’.97 Reports of the spoils after the victory are contradictory. Raymond of Aguilers describes a vast booty, but Albert says there was not much. Above all there was not much food – hardly surprising, for Antioch had been invested for nine months and its stores were badly run down.98 In any case, there was little time for plundering, although Raymond of Aguilers accuses the army of dallying over pagan dancing women and so failing to take the citadel, because on the day after its fall the vanguard of Kerbogah’s army arrived at Antioch.99

  The siege of Antioch had lasted for over eight months and during it the crusader army suffered appalling privations and terrible casualties. It was a close blockade rather than a set-piece siege in the usual sense of the word. The central problem which the army faced was simply staying alive in the face of enemy efforts to deny them food. By early February 1098 the army was in a desperate situation and it was saved by the brilliant victory over Ridwan’s army. But the crusader leaders showed themselves well able to organise their huge force and avoided overstretching it. Leaders and led learned a lot about their enemies in the course of the siege during which all the techniques of contemporary war were tested. Raiding, wasting, small-scale combat by horsemen and infantry were the day-to-day experience of an army which was becoming more cohesive and more experienced. In the long agony of the siege the morale of the army, their faith in their destiny was tested to the full and this was what delivered them in the end. But the army was also becoming much smaller and the fall of the city produced no relief, but yet more disasters.

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  1 Hagenmeyer, Kreuzzugsbriefe, 150, 157–60.