Victory in the East

by John France

  Fig. 15 Siege of ‘Akkār: 14 February–13 May 1099

  It is very difficult to understand the attitude of the Islamic world to its invaders in the years of the crusade. The attitude of the nomads of Asia Minor is impenetrable, but we ought to know more than we do of those in the civilised heartlands which the army had now reached. Unfortunately, although our sources are often based on contemporary material they are overlaid by later attitudes and knowledge. The Islamic powers may have seen the coming of the army in terms of the great expeditions which the Byzantine emperors had once been wont to send to the east, but it is difficult to believe that this idea persisted beyond their arrival.27 The spirit of jihad was not entirely dead for there were Volunteers’ in the Islamic armies, certainly in that of Kerbogah and later in the Egyptian army which fought at Ascalon.28 But for the most part the authorities in the cities were untouched by any such spirit. For them the newcomers were another force in the complex middle-east political game and one which was not so different in its nature from others. In this area there were ancient centres of settlement – Antioch, Aleppo, Damascus, Shaizar and the rest which create an appearance of stability. But sweeping around them were much more restless forces – the Bedouin, the Arab tribes, invaders from the steppe, of whom the most recent were the Turks, in the past Byzantine armies. They might be unwelcome, but the risks of confrontation were high – better to pay them off and see what the future has to bring. These cities had a long tradition of neutrality (perhaps opportunism puts it better) in the Seljuk-Fatimid conflict and saw no reason to abandon this.29 As to the crusade’s ultimate objectives, these must have seemed opaque to the Islamic powers. Their attitude is best exemplified by the Kemal ad-Din’s brief dismissal of the fall of Jerusalem, a mere one-line notice of an event which took place in a far-away land, not worth, perhaps, the bones of an Aleppan soldier. Once the major powers of Syria had failed in their policy of confrontation with the Franks before Antioch, accommodation, albeit grudging, became the rule.30

  Military activity in that summer and autumn of 1098 was much more purposeful than has usually been recognised. Godfrey and Robert of Flanders were strengthening their hold on an area which they had long dominated. Bohemond left to strengthen his hold on Cilicia, a vital buttress of the emerging Principality of Antioch, though we know nothing of his activities. The problems for a medieval army of resting in friendly territory were clearly illustrated by Albert who reports that after the ‘Azāz campaign knights and nobles in groups of fifty or a hundred, including quite notable people like Drogo of Nesle, Gaston of Béarn, Renaud of Toul and Fulcher of Chartres trailed along to Edessa driven by want. It may have been Baldwin’s generosity to them which provoked an Armenian plot against him. Certainly Balak of Sororghia was concerned by the rising power of Baldwin and tried unsuccessfully to trap him by offering to surrender Amasya. Fulcher of Chartres was given command of Sororghia in order to harass Amasya.31 Albert’s picture of knights in want, trekking out to offer their services in Edessa, supports Raymond of Aguilers’ general picture of a disgruntled and rather dispersed army and forms the background to the discontent which would well up in the winter.

  In July 1098 the Provençal knight Raymond Pilet, lord of Alais in the Limousin, led a raid which captured Tell Mannas, the Christian population of which surrendered to him and became his allies. His force was later badly mauled by the garrison of Ma‘arra (see fig. 4).32 Such expeditions by lesser figures may have been much more common than we suppose, for they answered the imperative to feed and support idle troops. As the army lingered in the summer of 1098 such men must have found many opportunities opening up for them. Raymond Pilet was probably back in the service of Raymond of Toulouse when he captured Tortosa in mid-February 1099 and he played a notable role in the siege of Jerusalem.33 It was because of the poor that Raymond of Toulouse joined in the expedition against ‘Azāz in mid-September. But Count Raymond probably had other motives for his attack on Albara, not far from his base at Ruj, later in the month. Ruj formed an important base for the Provençals, and it was surely from there that Raymond Pilet was operating when he seized Tell Mannas to the east of Ma‘arra. Albara and the neighbouring Roman cities of Sirjyla, Deir Sambil and Ba’ouda dominate the Jebel Barisha massif and they are so close to one another that the fate of one must have been the fate of all. The bishop of Albara once held a great dominion in this area, including the important city of Kafartab, and it was probably for this reason that Raymond of Toulouse installed Peter of Narbonne as bishop there. Later, even when he was very short of troops, Raymond would permit a small force to be left to garrison Albara. Most commentary on Peter’s appointment concerns the fact that he was the first latin bishop in the east, which suggests that the Count saw this city as being outside the terms of the agreements with Alexius. However, equally interesting, especially in the light of the later expedition to Ma‘arra, is the fact that the count of Toulouse was building up a powerful bastion in Syria about 100 kilometres south-east of Antioch, whose eventual conquest of Ma‘arra would threaten the roads between Aleppo and the southern cities of Hamah, Homs and Damascus.34 Thus a whole group of nascent Frankish dominions was emerging – Edessa, Antioch, the ‘Afrin valley, Ruj and the Jebel Barisha. With hindsight we know those which would endure, but at the time this was not so evident and the rise of these dominions must have been deeply worrying to many crusaders.

  It is against this background that the visions of Peter Bartholomew, acting as spokesman for the rank-and-file and demanding that the crusade press on to Jerusalem, must be seen.35 This is the context of the conference on 1 November 1098 which the leaders had arranged for the resumption of the march to Jerusalem. The conference revealed an army bitterly divided. Raymond of Toulouse would not accept Bohemond’s seizure of Antioch. Raymond of Aguilers says that the other leaders sympathised with Bohemond but were afraid to say so lest they be charged with oath-breaking.36 Perhaps they were also mindful of the aid which they had received and might hope to go on receiving from Cyprus. In any case, the stubborn stance of Count Raymond was now a barrier to the obvious solution of giving Bohemond the city, because Raymond held the Palace and the Bridge Gate. Judgment between the two risked open offence to the Byzantines and “alienating the loser – it seemed that they were trapped in the situation. In military terms the failure of a whole contingent to join the march must have seemed to presage disaster. In the end it was popular pressure which forced the leaders to what Raymond of Aguilers, in a striking phrase, calls a ‘discordant peace’ (discordem pacem). The Anonymous does not use the phrase but describes the reality – Bohemond and Raymond were to promise to press on to Jerusalem, but each was free to fortify his position in Antioch.37 The demoralisation of the rank and file of the crusader army who had been left to their own devices through a bitter summer comes out in their cynical view of the parties to the quarrel in which each side is merely out for gain; Count Raymond in the pay of Alexius, Bohemond seeking his own benefit: ‘Let them who wish to have the emperor’s gold have it, and those who wish to have the revenues of Antioch likewise. Let us, however, take up our march with Christ as leader, for whom we have come’.38 This revival of the spirit of the People’s Crusade was generated by the strains of the long summer in Antioch. Albert gives no account of the conference as such, but he tells us that after the count of Toulouse had gone south, the forces of Bohemond, Robert of Flanders and Godfrey lost men who were anxious to press on, and that this eventually forced these leaders, with the exception of Bohemond, to resume the march.39

  Fortified by the ‘discordant peace’ the crusader army prepared for its march southwards and the Provençals and the Flemings arrived before Ma‘arra on 27 November 1099 (see fig. 4). Its citizens were defiant, for they had defeated Raymond Pilet’s force during the summer and the city was prepared for a siege which the crusader forces systematically applied. It was neither a large nor an important place and its defences were not strong. The city wall enclosed only some five square kilometre
s and there may have been a citadel. As it is situated in a flat plain Ma‘arra enjoyed few natural advantages. Only along the south side was there a ditch and since his army is reported as trying to fill it in Raymond of Toulouse evidently attacked from this direction, and the other forces from the north.40 It seems odd that a city of such little importance should have been assaulted. Much more important places would later be bypassed, sometimes after the conclusion of an agreement affording free passage, but sometimes, as in the case of Sidon, without. Perhaps the leaders felt that for reasons of prestige they needed to destroy a city which had defied them once. Perhaps also it suited them to delay for the peace within the army was fragile and Ma‘arra was chosen because it was on the very edge of the Provençal dominion – Albara is only some ten kilometres away. Such a siege would satisfy the opposition within the army and bring them into contact with enemy lands which could be ravaged. This impression is reinforced by the clear evidence that at least one major prince and probably two were not at Ma‘arra. Raymond of Aguilers who was present throughout the siege says that Raymond of Toulouse and Robert of Flanders opened the attack with an assault on 28 November, which failed because they had only two ladders and needed four more. The next day Bohemond arrived and another assault was made without success. He mentions no other princes and adds that Godfrey was not at the siege.41 The Anonymous mentions only Raymond of Toulouse and Bohemond, and as he clearly describes the assault which took place when Bohemond was present it seems likely he was in his army. Robert of Normandy is never mentioned in his account of the siege, but he later states that Robert joined Count Raymond in January 1099 at Kafartab after the meeting at Ruj. Albert of Aachen says that Count Raymond was supported by Robert (but does not tell us which Robert), Tancred and Eustace; his account of events is fairly schematic but it is evident that Godfrey was not present. Ralph of Caen does not mention Bohemond’s participation but says the city was captured by Raymond and Robert of Normandy who is not mentioned by anybody else; perhaps this is a confusion with Robert of Flanders. Fulcher says that Bohemond and Raymond attacked Ma‘arra while the other princes stayed around Antioch.42 Since it is very clear that Godfrey was not at Ma‘arra it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the siege was a stop-gap activity which kept the army occupied but did not represent a serious beginning to the campaign for Jerusalem. Its proximity to Count Raymond’s dominions probably explains much of the suspicion which emerged after its capture.

  However, the siege was conducted very vigorously. Raymond of Aguilers says that after arriving on 27 November the forces of Count Raymond and Robert of Flanders launched an assault the following day, and that it failed due to lack of scaling ladders. Bohemond’s force then arrived and a new assault was launched on 29 November involving, on the count’s sector, an effort to fill in a ditch before the wall, and this too failed. The Anonymous evidently arrived with Bohemond’s force for he begins by describing this assault which clearly again depended on vigour and was unsupported by machinery: it was a matter of scaling ladders and raw courage.43 Thereafter Count Raymond began more systematic preparations for an assault on the south wall including the building of a siege tower, but while the Anonymous goes immediately into his account of the final attack, Raymond of Aguilers makes it clear that some time supervened before this was launched on 11 December 1099. According to him Peter Bartholemew had yet another vision – much mocked by Bohemond’s men. There was great hunger in the army, a point supported by Ralph of Caen and by Albert of Aachen who says that during the great siege of Antioch this area had been scoured of food causing many of its people to flee. There certainly may be truth in this last point, but it should be remembered that exactly one year before the army outside Antioch had begun to suffer badly from famine. Obviously seasonal factors were at work and the army needed to extend its foraging range.44 Both accounts make it clear that Bohemond and the count of Toulouse attacked the city from opposite sides and that it was Count Raymond who built and employed a siege-tower, using, according to Albert, wood found in the mountains near Talamria which he seized in a raid.45 This wooden tower was simply pushed up against one of the towers of Ma‘arra once the ditch had been filled in. It had no bridge; those in its top storey, including Evrard the Huntsman and William of Montpellier, cast heavy stones down upon the wall, and so covered undermining operations which were conducted at its base. In the final assault on 11 December the men of Bohemond who used only ladders made no progress on their sector. On the Provencal side the siege tower attracted fire from enemy catapults – the crusaders seem to have built none of these. The defenders also tried unsuccessfully to set fire to it, while Raymond adds that they cast lime and beehives at the crusader force. However, while the enemy defence was preoccupied by the tower, ladders protected with mantlets were brought forward and Geoffrey of Lastours was the first to get onto the wall. Although he and his party were cut off when the ladder broke the enemy were disheartened by progress made on undermining the wall and fell back into the town. The Anonymous says that the breakthrough came as evening fell, and Raymond adds a curious sequel – that the poor in the Provençal army broke in and carried on the fighting by night, so winning much plunder in a ferocious massacre. Bohemond, he says, got a lot of booty thereby arousing jealousy, and the Anonymous says that this was by negotiating a surrender in his sector of the siege.46 The Chronicle of Aleppo confirms that the Franks used a tower and broke through by night when a massacre followed with a very systematic search for loot. However, the Damascus Chronicle says that the crusaders had several times offered the city surrender on terms, about which the citizens had been divided, and that when the city fell there was a terrible sack during which the crusaders broke promises of conditional surrender. Ralph of Caen says that the crusaders debated the question of terms, but those in favour of a massacre won.47 This seems to reflect the confusion on the fall of the city, with Bohemond offering terms at the same time as the Provençal poor broke in and carried out a massacre.

  In a military sense the chief interest of the siege of Ma‘arra was the construction of the siege tower. Its function was to dominate the city wall and so to cover mining operations and the placing of ladders.48 The assault was not delivered by troops mounting the tower and passing over a drawbridge onto the walls. The fact that Raymond of Toulouse built it and that his force played the leading role points to his clear emergence as the leading figure in the army. This was not to the liking of Bohemond, who tried to use his possession of part of the city as a bargaining counter to obtain Raymond’s strong-points in Antioch when the latter wanted to give Ma‘arra to Peter, bishop of nearby Albara. This broke down the ‘discordant peace’ which had made the attack on Ma‘arra possible and reopened the great quarrel between Bohemond and Count Raymond. According to Raymond of Aguilers, the bishop of Albara and the rank-and-file petitioned Count Raymond to lead them to Jerusalem, while Bohemond tried first to delay the journey, and then to bring it forward. The Anonymous does not mention these quarrels, but tells us that the army stayed a month and four days at Ma‘arra although food was so short that desperate elements amongst the poor, the Tafurs, resorted to cannibalism.49 Ralph of Caen and Albert support Raymond of Aguilers’s account of starvation and despair in the army after the fall of Ma‘arra, but his is much the most detailed. He says that Bohemond left the army and returned to Antioch whereupon Count Raymond tried to assume the leadership of the crusade by calling a meeting at Rugia and offering money-fiefs to the other leaders. This further delay provoked the poor to attempt to demolish the fortifications of Ma‘arra and in the end Count Raymond was forced to agree to leave for Jerusalem on 13 January 1099, taking in his train Robert of Normandy and Tancred who had evidently accepted the money. As we have noted, during this time the Provençals felt they had been deserted by the Franks and complained that their force was quite small. In preparation for his departure, Raymond of Toulouse led an aggressive raid into enemy territory which brought in welcome plunder for the poor, and thus prepared the army
marched south on 13 January 1099.50 His decision to do this was probably reinforced by Bohemond’s seizure of the Provençal strong points in the city after the failure of the Rugia conference. By this time it must have been clear that Count Raymond intended to march south and this enabled Bohemond to use force in Antioch with little fear of retribution.51