Victory in the East

by John France

  Not all the regular troops of Egypt could be available for an expedition abroad, but the fact that al-Afdal himself was to lead the army which gathered at Ascalon suggests that a maximum effort was made on this occasion. It was the usual policy to augment the regular forces with irregulars – Bedouin and Arab light horse, city militias and volunteers. Moslem sources speak of 10,000 infantry dying at Ascalon and 2,700 volunteers, while an overall figure of 20,000 in the army has been mentioned.78 In the light of the military potential of the Fatimid Caliphate and the forces which it later mustered against the crusaders, this would seem to be a reasonable figure though perhaps a little on the large side. This force slowly gathered at Ascalon in the wake of the Frankish conquest of Jerusalem. The crusaders at Jerusalem had little to do but bicker, and Tancred became involved in a quarrel with the Patriarch and was sent with Eustace of Boulogne, on 25 July, to receive the submission of Nablus. However, while there they received news from Godfrey of the coming of enemy forces and so this joint force rode for the coast at Caeserea, then turned south and skirmished with Egyptian forces reaching Ramla on 7 August (see fig. 16). On their information Godfrey, Robert of Flanders and the Patriarch ventured out on 9 August. With them was Arnulf bishop of Martirano who was sent back to Jerusalem to summon help, was captured by the enemy and vanished.79 Albert says that Godfrey, Tancred, Eustace and Robert of Flanders went out looking for the enemy, received news of their gathering at Ascalon, and called Raymond of Toulouse and Robert of Normandy to join them at Ramla in preparation for battle.80 This seems like an abbreviated version of the events described by the Anonymous. The sources suggest that Count Raymond was unwilling at first to join the army. The Anonymous says simply that he wanted to make sure the enemy really were in the field, but Albert says he hesitated out of a desire for vengeance on Godfrey and Raymond of Aguilers speaks of his resentment and determination to go home. With him was Robert of Normandy who perhaps regarded himself as still bound by the promise made at Ruj.81 It was not until their own scouts had seen the enemy that Raymond, bearing the Holy Lance, and Robert left Jerusalem on 10 August and they joined the North French in the plains near Ramla. The next day the army began to advance the forty kilometres to Ascalon and, fearing ambush in this gently rolling countryside, adopted a special formation of nine squadrons in three lines of three which would enable them to face attack on any front. Towards evening on 11 August their scouts seized huge herds of animals gathered to feed the enemy army and captured guards who told them of the enemy’s positions and his intention to attack them in Jerusalem. That night they encamped by a little river which Raymond of Aguilers says was some five leagues from Ascalon. This must be near to the modern Yavne or Yibna which the crusaders later called Ibelin, twenty-five kilometres north of Ascalon. The captured herds assumed a considerable importance in the events which followed, for according to Raymond of Aguilers and Fulcher of Chartres they moved with the army the next morning, suggesting to the enemy that it was far bigger than it actually was. Albert of Aachen confirms this and adds that the Arab governor of Ramla who shortly after converted, warned them that the beasts were left there as a trap so that the Franks would scatter to pillage, and so it was ordered by the Patriarch that none should plunder until victory was won.82

  Next morning, 12 August 1099, the army, according to Albert loud in its rejoicing, prepared for battle and resumed its defensive formation so that it could not be ambushed. They were, adds Raymond of Aguilers, only 1,200 knights and 9,000 foot in all.83 Close to Ascalon the land becomes flatter and from about eight kilometres slopes down towards the city; Raymond of Aguilers’s pleasant valley. There they found the enemy encamped just to the north of the city. Ascalon was an ancient city and in the late eleventh century of considerable economic and military importance, for it was the nearest port of the Palestinian littoral to Egypt. Its enceinte was D-shaped with the flat side of the D running almost one kilometre along the coast. In the south the fortifications follow the line of a ridge curving northwards for some one and a half kilometres on top of a huge artificial earthwork which is perhaps as old as the Middle Bronze Age. By the twelfth century, when William of Tyre described it, this was a double wall and he commented on its strength and the number of its towers which later sources estimate at fifty-three. This massive strength enclosed a natural depression, deepest in the south-west where the Sea Gate gave access to the port. To the south was the Gaza Gate and to the north the Jaffa Gate but more important was the Jerusalem Gate in the northeastern sector of the enceinte (see fig. 18).84

  Fig. 18a Battle of Ascalon, 12 August 1099. Phase I

  Fig. 18b Battle of Ascalon, 12 August 1099. Phase II

  As the crusaders approached the enemy camp they deployed into line of battle, with Raymond of Toulouse on the right by the sea, Godfrey on the left and the others including Robert of Normandy, Robert of Flanders and Tancred, in the centre. The archers and foot were thrown forward of the knights to protect them. Albert of Aix says that Godfrey’s force blockaded the gates of Ascalon to prevent the enemy sallying forth. This probably means that the army was not aligned west-east from the coast but west-south-east, shadowing the curve of the northern wall of the city and so keeping its principal gate in view. The formation of the army reflected all that they had learned about the need to use infantry and cavalry together.85 Raymond of Aguilers gives no real description of the battle, but he says that the enemy stayed in their camp; this is not borne out by other sources and appears to mean that they were there at first. The Anonymous, who gives a mere sketch of events, says that Tancred charged into the midst of the enemy tents and Albert speaks of fighting in the camp. All of this points to the enemy being surprised in their camp and having to fight an improvised battle, and this is certainly Raymond of Aguilers’s understanding, for he says that the enemy were over-confident because they had information that the Franks were few, and believed that those in their proximity were just raiders. In any case, he adds, the enemy had consulted soothsayers who had for the moment advised against an attack. This impression of a surprise is strongly confirmed by the Damascus Chronicle, which says that al-Afdal was still awaiting forces when he was attacked.86 Fulcher of Chartes says, however, that the enemy took the initiative and attacked in a stag-horn formation with infantry forming a solid centre and cavalry on the wings. A group of light Arab cavalry detached itself from the enemy right and swung round into the crusader rear, but they were driven off by Godfrey. Albert gives a vivid description of an enemy attack in the centre to the sound of drums and trumpets. Under a hail of missiles the Azoparts, as the Ethiopians were called, crashed into the crusader line wielding their war-flails which smashed horse and man regardless of armour. They were supported by archers, slingers and spearmen from various races in what seems to have been a savage battle. Albert says that it lasted the greater part of the day, although the impression given by the other sources suggests a much briefer battle, and that as the enemy attack flagged, so the crusaders charged.87 It was evidently this crusader charge into the enemy camp which decided the battle, for it is the main feature of the descriptions. The Anonymous reports that Robert of Normandy charged at and captured the enemy’s standard and after that the enemy melted away, while Fulcher and Raymond of Aguilers say that resistance collapsed once the enemy camp was taken. Albert says that many of the crusaders started to pillage in the camp, and this allowed the enemy to rally and counter-attack until Godfrey came up and drove them off. In the pursuit which followed some of the enemy fled towards the port and were massacred by Count Raymond’s men, while others were simply confused and cut down where they stood, and some who climbed palm trees were shot out of them. A large part of the enemy army tried to take refuge in Ascalon and were crushed in the gate of the city. For their part the crusaders rejoiced in a vast booty (see fig. 18b).88 The army of al-Afdal seems to have been badly surprised by the appearance of the crusaders. He sent forward his infantry, presumably because they took less time to prepare for battle, supported
by some light horse. However, Arab sources stress that much of the Fatimid army, and in particular the heavy cavalry, never came to battle. The initial charge of the Fatimid infantry was blunted by the Frankish infantry, then it wavered and was scattered by the Frankish knights who fell upon the enemy’s heavy cavalry which was as yet unready for battle. Fatimid armies could fight very well, and indeed at Ramla on 17 May 1102 would inflict a heavy defeat upon the Franks. On this occasion they were caught by surprise and destroyed by an enemy inferior in numbers.89 Surprise, speed of movement and sheer boldness in attacking a huge enemy force were the causes of the crusader victory. The third enemy had been defeated and the Franks rejoiced in God’s favour with masses in the Holy Sepulchre, to which was given the enemy commander’s silver standard as a token of victory.

  The sequel was as sour as that to the triumphant capture of Jerusalem. After the celebrations at Jerusalem Raymond of Toulouse negotiated for the surrender of Ascalon which was completely demoralised as the Arab sources admit. Raymond used Bohemond the converted Turk who is first mentioned during the siege of Antioch. Godfrey was determined that he and not Count Raymond should hold the city, and when the quarrel between the two Frankish leaders became known to the citizens they refused to surrender. Ascalon remained a thorn in the side of the Franks until 1153. Albert accuses Count Raymond of having sabotaged Godfrey’s arrangements for the surrender in a spirit of vengeance. However that may be, such divisions and the passage of time stiffened the resolve of the citizens.90 Shortly after, Raymond of Toulouse attacked Arsuf, but abandoned the siege when he heard that Godfrey was approaching and joined the other leaders who were gathering near Caeserea for the return home. So angry was Godfrey that he was prepared to attack the Provençals, but in the end he was dissuaded, there was a reconciliation and towards the end of August Count Raymond, the two Roberts and their armies left Godfrey and marched north.91 The returning army reached Laodicea where they discovered that Bohemond had enlisted the aid of Daimbert archbishop of Pisa, the new Papal Legate in the east who was supported by a great fleet, in an effort to seize the city from the Greeks In the event Daimbert was persuaded to desist and Bohemond was forced to return to Antioch. Raymond of Toulouse took possession of the citadel of Byzantine Laodicea and the rest of the army sailed for the west on Greek and other ships.92 It was on this sour note of personal ambition and internecine quarrels which had dogged the crusade, but never quite undermined its military effectiveness, that the great adventure ended.

  * * *

  1 See above, pp. 252–3.

  2 Ekkehard, pp. 171–2; HBS, pp. 214–15.

  3 It is interesting that RA, p. 110, accuses the Egyptians of negotiating with the Turks as well and shows a real knowledge of the importance of the line of descent from the Prophet in the disputes of Islam.

  4 RA, pp. 109–10; HBS, pp. 181, 189–90, 212–215; AA, 379, 463; Köhler, Allianzen und Verträge, pp. 67–8 argues that, once al-Afdal knew that Alexius had turned against the crusaders, they lost all credibility in his eyes and hence were made only a very limited offer. However, it seems to the present writer that he would have known, for some time, the kind of people with whom he was dealing and simply overplayed his hand.

  5 See below, p. 358.

  6 See below, pp. 329–30, 357–61.

  7 A. S. Ehrenkreutz, ‘The place of Saladin in the naval history of the Mediterranean sea in the Middle Ages’, Journal of the American Oriental Society, 75 (1955), 100, says that, at this time, Egypt was the ‘strongest naval power in the Mediterranean’ but Y. Lev, ‘The Fatimid navy, Byzantium and the Mediterranean sea 909–1036’, Byzantion, 54 (1984), 220–52, doubts if it was ever so powerful and draws attention to the rise of Byzantine naval power in the early eleventh century. A. R. Lewis, Naval Power and Trade in the Mediterranean, pp. 225–49, sees the late eleventh century as a period of decline. In fact, Byzantine naval power could hardly have been on the increase after 1071 and Alexius’s hold on Cyprus must have been strengthened by friendship with Egypt. M. Lombard, ‘Un problème cartographié, le bois dans la mediterranée musulmane’, Annales Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations, 14 (1959), 54, points out that the Egyptian navy suffered from a shortage of timber because of depletion of resources in North Africa and the Middle East, and had long been importing from Europe. It seems likely that, because of this, they were anxious to hold on to Lebanon with its forested mountains.

  8 RA, p. 134; on the Maronites see Hamilton, The Latin Church in the Crusader States, pp. 207–8; on fleets see above pp. 209–20.

  9 RA, pp. 107, 117.

  10 GF, p. 86; AA, 407–8; I understand that a new book The Laws of War on the Crusades and in the Latin East 1095–1193 by W. G. Zajac will discuss prisoner exchange.

  11 GF, p. 86; RA, p. 135; AA, 457–8; J. France, ‘The text of the account of the capture of Jerusalem in the Ripoll manuscript, Bibliothèque nationale latin 5132’, English Historical Review, 103 (1988), 645–6.

  12 AA, 458–60; RA, p. 141; FC, p. 115; AA suggests that when they were at Acre they discussed the three possible routes, via Damascus, the Jordan valley or the coast at Acre. The first of these was geographically impossible as a route to Jerusalem by that time. However, it is possible that at Acre they considered the route into the Jezreel Valley and down to Jerusalem via Nablus, and that AA’s informants simply confused this with an earlier discussion in the vicinity of ‘Akkār/Tripoli which, RA says, considered the route via Damascus, on which see above p. 317.

  13 I. Roll, ‘The Roman road system in Judaea’, The Jerusalem Cathedra, 3 (1983), 137–61; on the battle of Ascalon see below pp. 360–1.

  14 GF, p. 87; RA, pp. 136–7, 125–6; FC, p. 115; AA, 460–1. Köhler, Allianzen und Verträge, p. 68 suggests that this idea of an attack on Egypt arose from the long negotiations conducted with al-Afdal. During his persecution of Christians in 1009/10 the Caliph Al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah (996–1021) ordered the destruction of the shrine of St George as Glaber, pp. 132–5, noted at the time.

  15 FC, p. 115; on the approach to Jerusalem see J. Prawer, ‘The Jerusalem the crusaders captured: contribution to the medieval topography of the city,’ in P. Edbury, ed., Crusade and Settlement in the Latin East (Cardiff, 1985), p. 5, who acknowledges his debt to C. Shick, ‘Studien über Strassen- und Eisenbahn Anlagen zwischen Jaffa und Jerusalem’, Mitteilungen aus Justus Perthes geographischer Anstalt von A. Petermann (Gotha, 1867), pp. xiii, 124–32. The ancient road from Ramla passed north-eastwards through the Latrun area on the edge of the Judean hills (where the crusaders later built an important castle) and followed something like the present track between Beit Liqya and Beit I’nan, to approach Jerusalem via Qubeiba and Nabi Samwil. This is well to the north of the dramatic gorges which carry the modern Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road along which the twisted remains of vehicles destroyed in the 1948 war are still to be found. Even so, the hills are pretty forbidding and excellent for ambushes.

  16 RA, p. 138; Hill and Hill, Raymond IV, p. 129, doubt the truth of Raymond of Aguilers’ statement.

  17 PT, p. 50; RA, pp. 145–6; GF, p. 92.

  18 Riley-Smith, Idea of Crusading, p. 79.

  19 RA, p. 112; AA, 470.

  20 FC, p. 122; AA, 482–83; RC, 699–703.

  21 RA, pp. 107, 137, 143; FC, p. 122; GF, pp. 91–2; Nicholson, Tancred, pp. 96–8.

  22 J. France, ‘The election and title of Godfrey de Bouillon’, Canadian Journal of History, 18 (1983), 321–30. For a different view of these events see A. V. Murray, ‘The title of Godfrey de Bouillon as ruler of Jerusalem’, Collegium Medievale, 3 (1990), 163–78.