One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War

by M. Dobbs

  "They had decided to settle": Fursenko, Prezidium Ts. K. KPSS, 623, Protocol No. 62.

  His intelligence folder on Friday: Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, 261-2.

  "Robert Kennedy and his circle": Ibid., 249.

  Khrushchev understood the Lippmann column: Soviet envoy Anastas Mikoyan later told the Cubans that this column had prompted Khrushchev to propose the Cuba-Turkey swap. See memorandum of conversation with Cuban leaders, November 5, 1962, NSAW Cuba. See also Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, 275. Lippmann's column appeared in WP and other newspapers on October 25.

  "You are worried about Cuba": Problems of Communism, Spring 1992, author's trans. from the Russian.

  "It is categorically": Malinovsky message to Pliyev, October 27, 1962, 1630 Moscow time, NSAW.

  The Americans "know very well": Gromyko message to Alekseev, October 27, 1962, NSAW. A former Khrushchev aide, Oleg Troyanovsky, has claimed that the Presidium had "no idea" that publication of the Turkey-Cuba offer would create problems for Kennedy ― see Troyanovsky, 249. However, the instructions to Alekseev make clear that the struggle for public opinion was an important part of Khrushchev's strategy.

  "Who gives you the right": Theodore Shabad, "Why a Blockade, Muscovites Ask," NYT, October 28, 1962. See also "The Face of Moscow in the Missile Crisis," Studies in Intelligence, Spring 1966, 29–36, CREST.

  a "training ground on which": Petr Vail' and Aleksandr Genis, Shesdesyatiye ― Mir Sovetskovo Cheloveka (Moscow: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie, 2001), 52–60.

  "amused, disturbed": Report from Eugene Staples, U.S. Embassy, Moscow, October 30, 1962, State Department Cuba files, NARA.

  Soviet "state interests": Malinovsky message to Khrushchev, October 27, 1962, MAVI.

  "Cuba, give us back": Vail' and Genis, 59.

  "quite intricate phrases": Alekseev, November 2, 1962, NSAW dispatch.

  "Dear Comrade Khrushchev": Castro letter to Khrushchev, October 26–27, 1962, NSAW Cuba, trans. by the author.

  "Razvernut'sya!": Roshva interview. For details of the deployment, see Gribkov et al., U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni, 89–90, 115-19; interview with Vadut Khakimov, former PRTB officer, in Vremya i Denghi, March 17, 2005.

  Inside the naval base: GITMO intelligence reports.

  "The U.S. authorities in Guantanamo": December 6,1962, report from M. B. Collins in Cuba Under Castro, Vol. 5, 565. The CIA subsequently misidentified the FKR cruise missiles at Mayari Arriba as coastal cruise missiles known as Sopkas. The two missiles were similar to each other in appearance, but the Sopka did not carry a nuclear warhead and was intended for use against ships ― see the discussion in CWIHP, 12–13 (Fall-Winter 2001), 360-1.

  CHAPTER NINE: HUNT FOR THE GROZNY

  were "fully operational": CIA memorandum, The Crisis: USSR/Cuba, October 27, 1962, CREST.

  Ham radio operators along: Reeves, 92.

  "a war room for the Cold War": Michael K. Bohn, Nerve Center: Inside the White House Situation Room (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2003), 30.

  There was a continuous clatter: Salinger, With Kennedy, 253.

  "a pigpen": Bohn, 32.

  Communications intercepts started: NSA and the Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1998 monograph, published by NSA.

  Contrary to later myth: Bouchard, 115. See also Graham Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 128.

  A tactical strike force: JCS Scabbards message 270922Z, JFKARC; Cuba Fact Sheet, October 27, 1962, NSAW.

  mobilized "at a rapid rate": CIA memorandum, The Crisis: USSR/Cuba, October 27, 1962, CREST; JCS Scabbards report, October 28, 1962, Cuba National Security Files, JFKL.

  All twenty-four Soviet SAM: JCS Scabbards message 270922Z, JFKARC.

  Half a dozen Soviet cargo: Khrushchev message to U Thant, October 26, 1962, NSAW.

  In fact, the consensus at the CIA: See, e.g., CIA memorandum, The Crisis: USSR/Cuba, October 27, 1962, CREST; "Operation Mongoose Sabotage Proposals," October 16, 1962, JFKARC.

  "there are damned few trains": ExComm debate, October 25, 1962, JFK3, 254.

  Three more reconnaissance planes: History of 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, October 1962, AFHRA.

  A subsequent investigation: USAF accident report, October 27, 1962, AFSC; author's interviews with John E. Johnson, navigator on the RB-47 that aborted, and Gene Murphy, electronic warfare officer on backup plane, December 2005.

  Carney spotted the Soviet ship: History of 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing; Sanders A. Laubenthal, "The Missiles in Cuba, 1962: The Role of SAC Intelligence," FOIA; MacDonough message 271336Z, Grozny file, CNO Cuba, USNHC.

  "weary and discouraged": Andrew St. George "Hit and Run to Cuba with Alpha 66," Life magazine, November 16, 1962. See also CIA memos on Alpha 66, October 30, 1962, and November 30, 1962, JFKARC.

  "A hell of a fine piece": Letter from William R. Hearst, Jr., to Clare Boothe Luce, Clare Boothe Luce Papers, Library of Congress.

  By her own account: Telephone conversation between William Colby and Clare Boothe Luce, October 25, 1975, CIA files, CREST. A good account of Luce's dealings with Keating appears in Max Holland, "A Luce Connection: Senator Keating, William Pawley, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," Journal of Cold War Studies (Fall 1999).

  The CIA suspected him: CIA memo, July 25, 1975, CREST.

  an "honorary member": CIA memorandum on Alpha 66, November 30, 1962, JFKARC.

  The two Cuban exiles: Vera interview, January 2006.

  "Hands off Cuba": NYT, October 28, 1962.

  To counter such skepticism: JFK was also "disturbed" by the release of the photos, and demanded an explanation. Bruce told the White House that the CIA had given approval for their release ― Bruce message to Michael Forrestal, October 24, 1962, National Security Files, JFKL. A CIA representative in London, Chester Cooper, said he called Washington but "couldn't get anybody," and sent a wire "just saying I was going to do it unless I got a Washington veto" ― Chester Cooper OH, JFKL.

  "a slight oscillation": Bruce message to Secretary of State No. 1705, October 28, 1962, JFKL and SDX.

  to "get close to Jack": Reeves, 291.

  In the meantime, Macmillan quietly: Record of conversation between British service chiefs, October 27, 1962, DEFE 32/7, Public Records Office. For discussion of British military moves in crisis, see Stephen Twigge and Len Scott, "The Thor IRBMs and the Cuban Missile Crisis," Electronic Journal of World History, September 2005, available online.

  "the most dangerous spot": Beschloss, 217; Reeves, 68.

  "soldiers and weapons": Reeves, 250.

  The answer was thirty-five hours: JCS memorandum, October 6, 1962, NARA.

  The CIA reported on October 23: CIA Office of National Estimates memo, October 23, 1962, JFKL.

  East Germans were still fleeing: Reports from Berlin, UPI and NYT, October 27, 1962.

  In the afternoon: CIA memorandum, The Crisis: USSR/Cuba, October 28, 1962, CREST.

  "We will give": See Taubman, 538-40; Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev's Cold War, 457-60.

  "We are just beginning": Troyanovsky, 247.

  "who took every mission": Author's interview with former U-2 pilot Robert Powell, June 2003.

  Anderson was engaged: History of 4080th Strategic Wing, appendix on special operations, October 1962, FOIA.

  Initially, Anderson's name: SAC message CNO 262215Z to CONAD, October 26, 1962, CNO Cuba, USNHC.

  Eager to rack up more: Heyser and McIlmoyle interviews.

  One pilot, Captain Charles Kern: Unpublished Kern memoir; Supplement 8, Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba, October 28, 1962, CREST.

  The flight plan: SAC reported various incorrect times for Anderson's takeoff. I have used the time in the original execution order, outlined in SAC message 262215Z, copied to U.S. air defenses, on file at USNHC. This flight plan coincides exactly with the time Anderson entered Cuban airspace, as logged by the Soviets. A map of Anderson's flight route is contained in Supplement 8, Joint Evaluation of Sovi
et Missile Threat in Cuba, October 28, 1962, CREST.

  It was a CIA bird: Anderson's aircraft was the third U-2 to roll off Lockheed's Skunk Works assembly line in Burbank, California, in 1955. It was a U-2A upgraded to a U-2F. Heyser, the pilot who first photographed the Soviet missile sites on October 14, flew in model no. 56-6675, the second U-2 ever produced. The U-2 flown by Maultsby during his overflight of the Soviet Union was 56-6715. All three planes were destroyed in crashes, a fate shared by most of the early U-2s ― History of 4080th Strategic Wing, October 1962, FOIA.

  "looking for fault": McIlmoyle interview.

  He carried photographs: State Department telegram 1633 from New York to Secretary of State, November 5, 1962, SDX.

  He was still feeling: Author's interview with Anderson's daughter Robyn Lorys, September 2003; Anderson medical report, October 11, 1962.

  "Aren't I doing": Col. John Des Portes OH interview, NSAW Cuba.

  "Okay, Rudy": Herman interview; see also WP Magazine article, October 26, 2003.

  "Lost Cause": Bruce Bailey, We See All: A History of the 55th SRW (privately published), 111. I am indebted to Rob Hoover, the unofficial historian of the 55th SRW, for putting me in touch with his fellow pilots and ravens.

  "noise of silence": Author's interview with RB-47 pilot Don Griffin, December 2005. Griffin flew a mission to Cuba on October 27.

  "fire to destroy": SAC Historical Study No. 90, Vol. 1, 3, NSAW.

  Hunched over their monitors: See McNamara and Taylor comments to ExComm, JFK3, 446, 451. Taylor mistakenly refers to the Fruit Set radar as a "fruitcake" radar. According to McNamara, the Fruit Set signals were picked up by the intel plane "at the same time" the U-2 was overhead.

  The senior raven: History of the 55th SRW, October 1962, FOIA. Willson detected three "Big Cigar" radars on October 27. He reported a total of fourteen miscellaneous "missile intercepts," i.e., radars associated with different Soviet missile systems.

  "whip anybody else": Martin Caidin, Thunderbirds (New York: Dell, 1961), 109.

  gone "terribly wrong": Maultsby memoir. All passages describing Maultsby's personal thoughts and actions are taken from this unpublished memoir; they have been checked against other sources, including contemporaneous astronomical charts, and a State Department chart of his flight route.

  seemed "highly suspect": Ibid.

  "especially important": Letter to Adm. George Burkley, October 24, 1962, Kraus files, JFKL.

  "personal effects": Memo from Burkley, October 25, 1962, JFK medical file, JFKL.

  "to live every day": Dallek, 154.

  "addicted to excitement": Reeves, 19.

  "capacity for projecting": Dallek, 72.

  "This war here": Quoted in Stern, 39–40.

  "every officer in the Army": Reeves, 306.

  "How did it all": Sorensen, Kennedy, 513. 227 "The book says": Reeves, 306.

  "the red button": JCS Emergency Actions File, Scott Sagan records, NSAW.

  These were hardly abstract questions: See, e.g., Fred Kaplan, "JFK's First Strike Plan," Atlantic Monthly (October 2001).

  "orgiastic, Wagnerian": Reeves, 229-30, 696; target data from Kaplan, "JFK's First Strike Plan." When Power briefed McNamara on SIOP-62, he told him with a smirk, "Well, Mr. Secretary, I hope you don't have any friends or relations in Albania, because we're just going to have to wipe it out."

  "a substantial deterrent to me": White House transcript, December 5, 1962, quoted by David Coleman in Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (May-June 2006). See Reeves, 175, for Civil War comparison.

  "insane that two men": Goodwin, 218.

  CHAPTER TEN: SHOOTDOWN

  As Anderson entered Cuban airspace: Gribkov et al., U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni, 124.

  The ground floor of the command post: Yesin et al., Strategicheskaya Operatsiya Anadyr', 273; memoirs of former PVO officer Col. Pavel Korolev in Gribkov et al., U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni, 246-53; author's interview with PVO political officer Col. Grigory Danilevich, July 2004.

  "Target Number 33": Gribkov et al., U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni, 124.

  "a pile of junk": Philip Nash, The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 1–3.

  Kennedy was so concerned about: October 22, 1962, memo, McNamara Papers, OSD.

  "Our guest has been up": Gribkov et al., U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni, 199–200. The Soviet defense minister later reported that the U-2 was "shot down with the aim of not permitting the photographs to fall into U.S. hands" ― Malinovsky memo, October 28, 1962, CWIHP, 11 (Winter 1998), 262. According to Derkachev, 56, Pliyev was furious when he learned about the shootdown. "You shouldn't have done this," he reportedly told his subordinates. "We can seriously complicate the [diplomatic] negotiations."

  "establish a pattern of operation": JFK3, 240; flight tracks for October 27 reported in NPIC Photo Interpretation Report on Missions 5017–5030, CREST.

  The canvas covers had been taken off: JCS meeting notes for October 27, 1962, Havana 2002, vol. 2. The notes were made in 1976 by a JCS historian, Walter Poole, on the basis of original transcripts. According to the JCS, the original transcripts were subsequently destroyed. Photographs taken by these missions are contained in SAC Historical Study No. 90, Vol. 2, FOIA.

  "First of all": Malakhov notes, MAVI.

  "The people at large": British Archives on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 242.

  "a city of children": Saverio Tutino, L'Occhio del Barracuda (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1995), 134.

  "Of course we were frightened": Desnoes interview.

  "We are expecting": Adolfo Gilly, "A la luz del relampago: Cuba en octubre," Perfil de la Jornada, November 29, 2002.

  "Keep two or three buckets": FBIS trans. of Radio Rebelde, October 28, 1962.

  "Love Thy Neighbor": October 27 UPI report from Havana; see NYT, October 28, 1962.

  On a hill above: Author's interview with Alfredo Duran, former inmate, December 2005.

  "Destroy Target Number 33": Gribkov et al., U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni, 124; Putilin, 111-12. There are slight variations in the time of the shootdown. I have relied on the time given by Col. Korolev, who was on duty at the Camaguey command post (see Gribkov et al., 250). For the location of the wreckage, see October 28, 1962, report from Unidad Military 1065, NSAW Cuba.

  "Que vivan los Sovieticos": Gribkov et al., U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni, 235.

  a "munitions storage site": See NPIC reports, October 26 and October 27, 1962, CREST.

  The commander of the missile troops: Yesin et al., Strategicheskaya Operatsiya Anadyr', 67.

  On the other hand: Statsenko report; Yesin interview.

  "You are irritating": Malinovsky (Trostnik) order to Pliyev, October 27, 1962, NSAW Cuba, author's trans. See a different trans. in CWIHP, 14–15 (Winter 2003), 388.

  "bearded, energetic man": Gribkov and Smith, Operation ANADYR, 69.

  "the definitive victory": Verde Olivo, October 10, 1968, quoted in Carla Anne Robbins, The Cuban Threat (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983), 47.

  "established a military command post": CIA memorandum, The Crisis: USSR/Cuba, October 26, 1962, CREST; author's visit to Cueva de los Portales; Blue Moon missions 5019–5020, October 27, 1962, NPIC report, CREST.

  the "final stage": Blue Moon missions 5023–5024, NPIC report, CREST.

  The Soviets had even dropped a live: See, e.g., David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 326-8.

  Nuclear-capable IL-28s: CIA memorandum, The Crisis: USSR/Cuba, November 6, 1962, CREST. The CIA reported that the Air Force IL-28s "almost certainly" arrived on the Leninsky Komsomol, which docked near Holguin on October 20. According to Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, 173, NPIC already had its eye on Holguin because of construction activity similar to that seen in the Soviet Union prior to the deployment of IL-28s. Unlike the IL-28s at San Julian, the planes at Holguin were never taken from their crates, and were removed around November 26 ― Brugioni, 536.

  "those
things that nobody": Anastasiev interview.

  According to the original Defense Ministry: Malinovsky memoranda, September 6 and 8, 1962, trans. in CWIHP, 11 (Winter 1998), 258-60. See also Raymond Garthoff, "New Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis," ibid., 251-4.

  "In the event": CINCONAD message 262345Z, CNO Cuba, USNHC; for JCS reply, see Chronology of JCS Decisions Concerning the Cuban Crisis, October 27, 1962, NSAW Cuba, and OPNAV 24-hour resume of events, 270000 to 280000, CNO Cuba, USNHC.

  "an atomic delivery": Chronology of JCS Decisions, October 28, 1962, NSAW Cuba.

  "any movement of FROG": CINCLANT history, 95.

  After earlier discounting: Blight et al., Cuba on the Brink, 255, 261; amendment to CINCLANT history, JCS request for casualty estimates, November 1, 1962, CNO Cuba, USNHC.

  The nuclear cores for the bombs: Polmar and Gresham, 230; USCONARC message to CINCLANT 291227Z, CNO Cuba, USNHC.

  a "surprise first strike": Taylor memos to McNamara and the President, May 25, 1962, JCS records, NARA.

  "I know the Soviet Union": Sorensen OH, JFKL.

  At the same time that U.S. generals: JCS memo to McNamara, October 23, 1962; Gilpatric memos to President and Bundy, October 24, 1962; Sagan Collection, NSAW; Sagan, 106-11. On October 22, Gilpatric had told aides that he saw no reason for a change in rules governing the two-stage weapons ― Gilpatric desk diary, OSD.

  "so loose, it jars": Lt. Col. Robert Melgard quoted in Sagan, 110.

  As the B-52 began a series: Author's interview with 1st Lt. George R. McCrillis, pilot on CALAMITY, February 2006.

  "Three minutes ― NOW": Procedures described in Dominic Operations Plan, September 1962, History of Air Force Participation in Operation Dominic, Vol. III, DOE.

  CHAPTER ELEVEN: "SOME SONOFABITCH"

  Alone in the vast blackness: Maultsby memoir.

  The befuddled pilot: Data tracking Maultsby's U-2 and Soviet interceptors are taken from U.S. government charts. I found the most detailed map in the files of the State Department Executive Secretariat, SDX, Box 7. A second map tracking Soviet interceptors that appear to have taken off from an air base at Pevek is located in National Security Files ― Cuba, Box 54, Maps, charts, and photographs folder, JFKL.