The Devil's Chariots

by John Glanfield

  In reply Swinton made the fair point that until an experimental machine had been built it was premature to condemn it out of hand. In any case the War Office had 75 Holt tracklayers on order right then. As to height, he visualized ‘a heavy motor lorry with caterpillar attachment carrying a large metal tank’.9 As to weight, the tracks would greatly reduce ground pressure but the destroyers could be partially dismantled for road movement if necessary.

  Glyn was back at GHQ on 7 June. He had told an astonished Swinton that the Admiralty was indeed conducting experiments and actually building landships. Knowing that Fowke’s negative views could yet lose the day, Swinton sought an authoritative counter. He tried to see Lord Cavan whose 4th Guards Brigade had fought all over the Western Front. The general was not at Brigade HQ when Swinton called. Over the roar of a battery of howitzers nearby he gave a shouted explanation of his visit to Cavan’s Staff Captain. The general wrote in reply the same day:

  I welcome any suggestion in this extraordinary war that will help to take an enemy’s trench without a cost of 50% of the leading company and 75% of that company’s officers – for this is what the present day assault amounts to – even with every precaution… The great and serious trouble is that one cannot tell, especially now in high crops – whether the enemy’s wire is cut – or not. Here comes in your ‘Juggernaut’. We know if 5 ‘Juggernauts’ have passed through that the wire is no more. This is a certain saving of hundreds of lives and a fat legacy to ‘moral’. I think it should be possible to pass Platoons up actually hanging on to the back of the ‘Juggernaut’ itself, without waiting for its enfilade fire up and down the hostile trenches, as this is easily overcome by good traverses… I hope very much indeed your idea may have a good trial…10

  It was a timely endorsement, though Cavan came to view tanks as a disruptive threat to military conformity by the time he was appointed Supreme Head of the Army as Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) in 1922. Swinton’s memorandum next passed to the recently formed BEF Experiments Committee which evaluated the many suggestions for new weaponry now reaching GHQ. It concluded that his proposal had considerable tactical value and recommended that an experienced vehicle-maker should comment on the possibility of producing trench destroyers. That clinched it. On 22 June French forwarded Swinton’s paper to London with a powerful endorsement. It contradicted the reaction of the War Office to current landship design and marked a major advance in its evolution. Twenty-four hours earlier, the War Office had approached the Admiralty proposing joint action to build the weapon. The production team, their design objectives and the end users were coming together at last.

  Swinton was recalled home on 19 June for a few days to relieve Hankey who was abroad. Fearful that any private lobbying might compromise the official train that he had set in motion, he confined himself to meeting Col Bird, the Director of Staff Duties, who confirmed Glyn’s account.

  Churchill chaired the first joint conference of the two Services at the Admiralty on 29 June. It was agreed that the army should address tactical aspects, armament and performance requirements, while the DNC’s team would carry on with design and construction. The War Office passed control of the project to Maj Gen Sir Stanley von Donop, as Master General of Ordnance. The joint committee arrangement would continue with Scott-Moncrieff as President. Churchill’s attendance was invited. The Army Council had been wrong-footed and driven into acceptance of an inter-Services role; it was now up to them to determine the function, tactics and performance requirements of the landships.

  Churchill lacked executive power, but while Asquith’s coalition government settled in, his drive and experience were of value. He supported Balfour at the Admiralty and had been given a seat on the new Dardanelles Cabinet Committee which eventually displaced the War Council. In a perceptive appreciation of the war situation circulated on 18 June Churchill fiercely condemned the lack of progress in mechanical warfare. French losses in Gen Joffre’s May offensive totalled 220,000 men. The BEF in the Ypres salient and elsewhere had suffered the loss of 4,000 officers and 96,000 men since 22 April. The ground gained by both armies was a mere 8 sq miles. He continued:

  The French cannot afford to lose men at this rate for no return… It is remarkable that during eight months of trench warfare, ingenuity seems to have had so little success in discovering means of offence and advance. We are now somewhat readily accepting the proposition that high explosive shells used in unprecedented and extraordinary quantities will achieve decisive results. This has certainly not been proved by the results so far attained by the French offensive… The method is effective for clearing a few miles of ground; but its applicability to the reconquest of Flanders and the advance through Germany is doubtful.

  The problem of crossing two or three hundred yards of open ground and of traversing or destroying barbed wire … ought not to be beyond the range of modern science if sufficient authority had backed the investigation. The absence of any satisfactory method cannot be supplied by the bare breasts of gallant men.11

  While the Bullock machines were being readied, the Landships Committee had decided to put on a show at Barlby Road immediately after the joint Services conference on 29 June, to demonstrate progress. The only available hardware was the little Killen Strait tractor (which was now a testbed at the Wormwood Scrubs depot), a turreted Rolls-Royce armoured car and two of Diplock’s 1-ton Pedrail wagons on which sheet armour had just been mounted as infantry screens. Stern tried and failed to get the Bullock machines driven down from Burton for the event; he forgot or ignored the need for authorization, bypassed Boothby and got himself a reprimand. Churchill postponed the demonstration to Wednesday 30th to ensure the presence of David Lloyd George, the newly appointed Minister of Munitions. Among others who attended were the Duke of Westminster, Sir Frederick Black (the Director of Munitions Supply) and Maj Gen Sir Ivor Philipps from the Ministry, Maj Gen Scott-Moncrieff, Col Holden and Louis Jackson – now a brigadier-general and Head of Trench Warfare at the MoM, who had so stoutly supported Swinton and Tulloch on the Holt trials.

  Hetherington had become expert at throwing Strait’s tractor into and over obstacles on the Talbot recreation ground adjoining the works. Lt Oliver Thorneycroft had fitted a scissors-like torpedo net cutter to the front of the tractor, which Hetherington now drove into a cat’s cradle of tensioned barbed wire prudently strung precisely at cutter height. Dummy shell holes and small piles of railway sleepers were crossed by the machine which rose at crazy angles to the sky, throttle wide open and emitting a gratifying thunder from the straight-through exhaust. Stern had brought along Wilfred Stokes with his new trench mortar for a closing feu de joie. Stokes got five shells into the air in 11 seconds, all falling inside a 12yd circle. Lloyd George immediately ordered 1,000 mortars. It was obvious that the Strait machine was too light for landship work but Hetherington’s bravura performance made an adequate case for keeping going. Scott-Moncrieff promised to produce a landship performance specification the following day, but Churchill was not reassured. Convinced that the project would waste away if left with the War Office, he encouraged Lloyd George to take it on and nurture it at his Ministry of Munitions.

  The Killen Strait machine became the world’s first tracked armoured vehicle when, shortly afterwards, Lt Symes fitted it with a turretless Delaunay Belleville armoured car hull. Symes was by now a valuable member of the team and had growing expertise in all things armour. He had just been commended for developing an armour-piercing bullet. The conversion was on Boothby’s instructions following a short visit of inspection to Gallipoli in May. He wanted the machine to join the armoured cars out there but the imminent disbandment of his force intervened. It ended its days as a tow tractor at the RNAS Barrow Airship Station, having accompanied Boothby there when he took command in September 1915. He sent back a Pierce Arrow lorry in exchange.

  The months of enforced second-guessing ended for Crompton with the arrival of the army’s specification two days after the demonstration.
The requirement was for a lightly crewed fighting machine – the big troop carrier was not wanted. Another major and urgent redesign was necessary.

  SECRET. CATERPILLAR MACHINE GUN DESTROYER.

  Suggested conditions to be adhered to in design, if possible. These are tentative and subject to modification.

  Speed: top speed on flat not less than 4mph. Bottom speed for climbing 2mph. Steering: to be capable of being turned through 90 degrees on top speed on the flat…

  Reversing: to travel backwards or forwards (equally fast?).

  Climbing: to be capable of crossing backwards or forwards an earth parapet 5ft thick and 5ft high…

  Bridging: all gaps up to 5ft in width to be bridged directly without dipping into them. All gaps above 5ft in width to be climbed (up to a depth of 5ft with vertical earth sides). Radius of action: to carry petrol and water for 20 miles.

  Capacity: Crew and armament. To carry 10 men. 2 machine guns. 1 light Q.F. gun. Note by DFW. For each pair of machines: 6 – 2 pounders, 4 – Maxims and 25 men are considered better by G.S. [General Staff].12

  Eight tons were allowed for armour, ammunition, armament and crew. Save only for Scott-Moncrieff’s footnote on armament, these data originated word for word from Swinton’s June memorandum. The army had accepted his fighting landship and tactics. Crompton saw little difficulty in meeting the requirements, though crossing gaps between 6ft and 17ft wide presented problems for a coupled ship. To climb vertical faces up to 5ft high would require the rear half to raise the front half 20°, a kingpost having to be added to his cable linkage to heighten the support of the stays.

  Crompton roughed out plans for a Mk III on the lengthened Bullock tracks. The Pedrail system was set aside but he held fast to the principle of a coupled machine. Each half-ship would now shed its troop-carrying wing sections. Instead of an oversize superstructure straddling a pair of in-line tracks, a narrow 21ft long and 5ft wide box body was set low between the tracks. A stepped roof profile allowed for two turrets, one above and behind the other, each mounting a 2-pdr QF gun. Two machine guns were fitted in the bows. Turning radius was reduced from 40ft to 30ft. Weight remained unchanged at 14 tons. Machinery was below floor level, accessible internally from hatches. Crompton rented a Kensington stable at 12 Drayton Mews and construction of a full-scale matchboard mock-up began there on 9 July.

  It soon became clear that Swinton’s rejection of troopship tactics in favour of a more realistic gunship would further delay Crompton’s already slow progress. The committee had lost Metropolitan, and Tritton was out of the picture. D’Eyncourt had got away with a US farm tractor once, but a purpose-built trials machine was sorely needed to demonstrate progress to the War Office and the upper reaches of the Admiralty. Boothby was not alone in questioning Crompton’s coupled ships approach, telling the colonel:

  I am not very happy in my own mind about the landship with the joint in the middle. I believe the forepart will drop into the trench and the drive of the after part will give a downward movement driving it further in. Do you not think a [single chassis] six wheel unit might be better, the fore and aft units being caterpillars on bogies and the centre unit either a wheel or caterpillar?13

  Boothby’s point was that two adjoining axles must always remain on the ground when the third was airborne, to avoid nose or tail-diving. His month with the committee drove d’Eyncourt to give Sueter an ultimatum; unless the wing commander was withdrawn he would resign. He said Boothby was involving himself in matters of design and increasingly challenging his authority as chairman. Boothby was removed on the understanding that a single Bullock half-ship would immediately be prepared for trial over trenches, and that Crompton’s experiments with articulated machines would be stopped unless there was an early breakthrough.

  Stern asked Wilson: ‘If you were put in charge of this job who would you sooner work with, Colonel Crompton or Mr Tritton?’ Wilson replied: ‘If Tritton and I are put on the job we would soon produce a machine that could do something.’14 Tritton was familiar with the issues and had demonstrated his ability to produce ‘design and build’ work at speed. D’Eyncourt and Stern decided to transfer both functions to Lincoln.

  Crompton was told only that he should invite Tritton to take over the Metro contract. He expected to have full drawings for his Mk III twin-hull machine by ‘about the end of the month’. Tritton accepted, and called to see d’Eyncourt on 15 July. They took a taxi round to Thriplands expecting to collect some finished blueprints. The colonel could only produce a sketch of the machine, and makers’ drawings for the engines and McEwan’s gearboxes. Tritton sent William Rigby his draughtsman to Thriplands on the 19th with instructions to produce detailed drawings strictly to Crompton’s designs, initiating nothing himself. Rigby returned on the 24th with one print. Tritton cabled the DNC that he had received ‘a mere sketch and quite unfit for our purpose, we have no instructions, drawings nor details as to the various mechanisms we have to incorporate. We are therefore at a standstill pending full particulars.’15 Relations between the two men had deteriorated further since Crompton’s criticism of Tritton’s proposal to power his ship electrically.

  Tritton had received a telegram from Stern on 21 July asking Foster’s to prepare to build up to 12 landships. The committee met next day. It was decided that Tritton should build a single half-ship as an independent unit before proceeding further with the twin-hull Mk III. Crompton was shaken by what amounted to a vote of no confidence in the coupled design, and by his failure that day to persuade the committee to place an immediate order for one. He was asked to devise steering via wheels or tracks for the solo half-ship, and produced a heavy trailing two-wheeled frame with Ackermann steering.

  Tritton met d’Eyncourt and Stern at the Ministry on 30 July. Stern had been phoning Lincoln for progress reports almost daily, always to be told there were no drawings so they could not start cutting metal. Tritton was informed that Crompton and Legros would be retired and their designs abandoned. Foster’s was to receive immediate design responsibility, with Wilson in attendance as Admiralty superintendent. They were to start again, using the extended Bullock tracks and the howitzer tractor’s Daimler engine and transmission to cobble together an experimental machine in three weeks if possible. Tritton thought he could rivet up a hull in boilerplate in 14 days. He cabled Lincoln: ‘Whole landship job handed to us with Wilson as overseer. He and Legros coming to Lincoln. Ask Starkey [chief draughtsman] start two more draughtsmen if possible will wire later on after further interview with d’Eyncourt this afternoon.’

  The DNC finalized the order next day, telling Tritton his people were to work day and night to complete it. This marked Tritton’s first official involvement with tracks, the system he had so often condemned. He had told Legros in March ‘The caterpillar system is no bloody good for the job’ and repeated these sweeping sentiments to him while en route to the Bullock trials. However, his objections, based on the nutcracker action of the Hornsby tracks, lost much credibility when a year later he told d’Eyncourt that, ‘All makers of Centipede type of vehicle have avoided this [nutcracker] type of construction.’16 Soon after the war Tritton produced a book promoting Foster’s pioneering activities with the tanks. He made no reference to their work for the Landships Committee prior to August 1915, saying only that he was first sent for by d’Eyncourt on 30 July when the DNC ‘admitted’ to him that they had made no progress.17

  The Bullock trials began in August, primarily to test Crompton’s linkage, establish the performance of coupled machines over differing obstacles, rehearse the new tactics and find methods of clearing barbed-wire entanglements. McEwan, Pratt & Co. was an internationally respected firm building small diesel locomotives. Robert McEwan, the Managing Director, and Maj Ernest Baguley of parent company Baguley Cars Ltd gave enthusiastic support. The major had recently come home from France to be invalided out of the army. (Shortly after the trials he lodged a claim for an invention relating to them, the details of which are unrecorded. The c
laim was refused by Bertie Stern.)

  The first experiments with a single Bullock Giant began on 10 August. Boothby had rejected Wilson’s first trials site in McEwan’s yard as being too visible to the public despite plans for temporary screening up to 18ft high. Instead they had rented a secluded field nearby in Sinai Park at Shobnall. The official party was joined by numerous sightseers from a local hotel as guests of Wilson and his brother Percy, who had followed him into the RNAS in May. The tractor was fitted with a torpedo net cutter and first tackled a wire and steel cable entanglement. Anything it failed to shear was flattened. It was then reversed over a narrow fire trench where one of the tracks fell into a traverse. The differential, which was non-locking, came into play, the other track ceased to drive and the machine had to be winched out. Track tension had to remain slack to allow for the binding effect of mud. Consequently when crossing a trench the unsupported lower arc sagged badly, while under lateral pressure on a slope the machine could ride right off its tracks. It was not a promising start.

  The two big tractors were first coupled back to back on 19 August. It quickly emerged that when the linkage was tensioned to hold the two halfships rigidly together for trench crossing, the set became unsteerable. The coupling also became over-stressed if one of the chassis took a severe tilt relative to the other.

  When Crompton was asked to modify the half-ships as separate fighting units, the question of how to get them over trenches without nosediving was carefully avoided by the committee. The proposed solution was so painfully ineffective that nobody claimed it. A rectangular iron frame like a flat roof canopy was built over one of the tractors, set some 6ft above the platform. Three heavy poles each fitted with a broad base-plate were suspended from either side of the frame to hang just clear of the ground. It was hoped that when the ship surmounted a trench parapet and rocked over into its descent, the lead pair of crutches or ‘elephant feet’ could be swung forward to rest on the far side of the trench. With its nose suspended over the gap the machine was theoretically free to drive across on the heels of track still in ground contact. The remaining feet were intended to keep the machine upright during the manoeuvre. The idea was a total failure, amusing only in retrospect. It was indicative of mounting desperation at Burton.