The Devil's Chariots

by John Glanfield

By the time Swinton arrived in Whitehall in July 1915 the control of d’Eyncourt’s small team had become dangerously split between the Admiralty, the War Office and Lloyd George’s Ministry of Munitions. He contacted Tulloch who advised a round-table conference to clarify departmental objectives and responsibilities. Swinton was no longer a distant colonel with a mad fixation. All doors were now open to him and he was more than Donald Hankey’s deputy. The Prime Minister had been persuaded by Hankey to let Swinton concentrate on weapons development in general and landships in particular.

  Swinton convened an inter-departmental conference on 28 August in the War Cabinet offices at 2 Whitehall Gardens. Scott-Moncrieff took the chair. It was agreed that the War Office would continue to specify operational requirements, the Admiralty would control design and experiment for the time being, and the Ministry of Munitions would eventually take over the whole work of the ‘land cruisers or armoured caterpillar motor cars’. The need for secrecy and for large numbers of skilled men to build, crew and service the machines was agreed. No. 20 Squadron would be increased to 600 men drawn from Boothby’s recently disbanded force. Louis Jackson’s Trench Warfare Department would find them plenty of construction and experimental work until they were needed.

  Tulloch entered a reservation strongly objecting to any aspect of landships work passing to the MoM. He said the preliminary experiments by d’Eyncourt’s committee would provide the data necessary to reach a decision on the weapon’s future. If it was decided to take it on from there, all responsibility should pass to a small full-time directorate with wide powers, dedicated solely to the development and production of the fleet and its recruitment and training. The Inventions and Trench Warfare Departments were unsuited to this work, he said. Logically it should go to the War Office to be managed as a specialist branch like the Flying Corps – but Tulloch was three and a half years ahead of the event. Churchill minuted ‘Agree. Capt Tulloch’s view strikes me as most important and ought not to be overlooked.’12 Adm Tudor would urge a similar course after the first demonstration of the tank.

  Tulloch had not changed his opinion on scale. He remained convinced that the army needed a giant machine, proof against field-gun fire; it had to be able to smash through the enemy’s first, second and reserve lines and destroy his heavy guns in a single strike. Tulloch wanted to see a 500-ton articulated and steam-powered land battleship. Churchill agreed. More rationally, von Donop received a report of the conference and was asked if he would use his good offices as Master General of Ordnance to obtain 100 naval 6-pdr guns for the first landships. His pained reply was predictable:

  I am not prepared to take any responsibility for the decisions arrived at by this conference and I cannot give any information as to the possibility of supplying the guns and ammunition until I am provided with the designs of both… I view with dismay the manner in which this subject is being dealt with. A War Office committee was appointed for it, the C.I.D. is also dealing with it, a conference decides on what should be done – they are called Admiralty landships – the personnel is to come from a Naval organisation and I am asked about the provision of guns and ammunition the patterns of which I have not seen and about which I have not been consulted.13

  Von Donop was right in one respect, too many people in and out of uniform were involved with the project and calling the shots, but he also bitterly resented the Ministry of Munitions taking over his responsibilities for ordnance production. Ernest Moir had been provoked into making a formal complaint to Lloyd George, alleging that the MGO was, in effect, damaging the war effort.14

  Relishing his new appointment, Swinton sprayed the War Office with ideas reflecting his inventive mind and sense of humour – he specialized in Greek puns. He proposed that the floor surface of the ‘Armouredillos’ should be profiled with deep ridges which would become horizontal firesteps when the floor tilted to perhaps 45° as the vehicles breasted trench parapets. The gunners would otherwise skid down the steel deck just when maximum fire was required. For the same reason Swinton recommended that instead of fixed mountings, the machine guns should be hung from the roof in slings. The gunners would be suspended in bosun’s chairs. To repel boarders at ranges too close for fire through the revolver ports he suggested an external ring of nozzles discharging atomised acid spray. As one of the objectives of the weapon was to draw enemy rifle and machine-gun fire away from advancing infantry, Swinton also wanted landships to carry in front of them a large noticeboard inscribed with a snappy insult, such as:

  GOTT STRAFE DEUTSCHLAND

  but having a few letters displaced as:

  GOTT SETRAF DUSTECHLAND

  ‘The misplacement of the letters if cleverly done will just suffice to make every German who sees it try to read it instead of shooting at our infantry. This device may appear ludicrous but it is based on sound psychological grounds.’15

  Swinton was becoming a focus and clearing house for all manner of landship matters. Tulloch was convinced the ships would receive considerable protection from artillery if a double skin of armour was adopted. He offered Swinton his services together with those of an expert from the Explosives Loading Company of Faversham which he had jointly set up in 1912. (Until the war it was the only factory in the country to specialize in loading shells with TNT. It supplied the government with 100,000lb of TNT from stock in August 1914.) The idea was taken up by Crompton and later by Wilson and Symes before being dropped.

  Maj Henry Guest, Secretary of the BEF Experimental Committee in France, forwarded a scheme to Swinton devised by Maj A.I.R. Glasfurd of 27th Infantry Brigade. He visualized a Pedrail-based fleet of armoured machines the size of 2-ton trucks which would rely on surprise to penetrate enemy defences without a preliminary bombardment. The difference lay in their primary armament. Glasfurd wanted to fit cyanide projectors with a 120ft reach.16 Swinton circulated the major’s paper to the Committee of Imperial Defence for consideration, but it got no further.

  From France Capt J. Rose asked Swinton ‘Has the idea of NOISE [sic] ever been mooted? I mean noise on a great scale such as a big syren [sic] or buzzer. Nothing is more nerve shattering at close quarters and all orders would be upset if a syren [sic] could be carried and let loose on arriving amongst the enemy.’17

  Tritton and Wilson had left London on 4 August with d’Eyncourt’s instruction to produce an experimental machine from readily available parts, including the lengthened Bullock tracks, for delivery in three weeks if possible. Tritton thought he could do it in two using the howitzer tractor’s power train once more. To avoid the distractions of working from Foster’s and going home nightly, Tritton booked himself into Lincoln’s White Hart Hotel and converted the first-floor Yarborough Room to a drawing office. He went into semi-retreat there with his chief draughtsman Mr Starkey. Wilson also put up at the hotel and divided his time between Burton and Lincoln, spending long evenings with Tritton. The day’s sketches were destroyed each night for security. They broke off to attend the Bullock trials on 10 August to see wire-cutting experiments. Cut or uncut, Tritton maintained that the wire would cause a track failure, but he was wrong. Legros, who was present at the trial, considered that day marked Tritton’s belated conversion from big wheels to chaintracks.

  Wilson was more colleague and partner than official supervisor to Tritton. Construction of what became known as the ‘No. 1 Lincoln Machine’ or the ‘Tritton’ began on 11 August in a corner of the Wellington Foundry, completing on 8 September. The machine was a simple boiler-plated box body with dummy roof turret. Tritton had fitted a heavy rear-mounted steering tail, much like Crompton’s earlier version. A tiller bar steered the two 4ft 6in wheels through linkages to each hub, the tiller being cable-connected back to the driver. Against the advice of Mr James, Hornsby’s Chief Engineer, Tritton wisely installed brakes on the differential’s drive shafts for secondary steering if the wheeled system failed (it usually did). James feared the brakes would absorb excessive power and the linings would quickly burn out (they did).
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  The machine never moved out of Foster’s yard on the Bullock tracks as they were received from Chicago. The flanges on the rollers mounted the specially lengthened tracks and ran the vehicle right off them. Tritton made some modifications, after which it was driven on 19 September to Cross Cliff Hill where, largely concealed under a tarpaulin, it was demonstrated before d’Eyncourt, Moir, Swinton, Hetherington and Stern. Swinton was shocked to see a large crowd, mostly Foster’s employees and their wives, lining the boundary fence, but Tritton and his directors appeared unconcerned. The 16-ton machine just managed to climb a 2ft parapet before casting a track while crossing a 4ft 6in trench. The flanges of the track rollers had peeled right off. It took two days to get the machine back to the works where mild steel rollers were made up and tried with no better result.

  Lt Field also saw the machine sliding about on its tracks and noticed that:

  the tracks were fitted … in such a manner that it was impossible to utilise the specially designed bracing members in spite of the fact that they had been received by the Lincoln people and full instructions issued for satisfactory erection. The rocking of the tracks was uncontrolled also, and the tracks were therefore improperly erected. [I] pointed this out, but was informed that ‘a whole lot of junk had been received of which no use could be made, besides which, it was not required’.18

  Field had detailed knowledge of the special bracing which he claimed was never fitted. The track was certainly assembled by Foster’s at breakneck speed. Time was saved by mounting the engine at the rear with the drive-end forward, consequently if a forward gear was selected the machine would have moved backwards. Swinton had absolutely no difficulty putting it about that the machine was a failure and had been abandoned.

  The War Office had not formally confirmed its requirements for trench crossing and climbing, but it was clear from the start that the Lincoln Machine’s track length and front profile were inadequate for such work. Knowing this, Tritton and Wilson had begun to consider an alternative in mid-August. The hull would have to be at least 20ft long as against its predecessor’s 14ft. They expected severe problems with track override and power loss from the weight of additional armour; ground clearance and stability were other difficulties. It seemed unavoidable that the turret and armament would have to be at roof level to provide an all-round field of fire, but a high hull would be dangerously top-heavy. How to reconcile these factors?

  Wilson thought the unthinkable. Instead of extending the low track frames, which would not help climbing, he suggested running the track right around the hull with a steeply angled front end. The armaments could then be mounted on either side between the upper and lower runs of track, instead of on the roof. He sketched a low lozenge-shaped machine. Because the design’s tracks were integral with the hull, separate frames were avoided and weight reduced. The bottom arc of each track was the footprint equivalent of a giant wheel but without its unwanted mass. The track’s curvature also limited the number of shoes in ground contact, thus reducing drag when steering, saving power and tightening the turning radius. Wilson bolted a removable halfround gun casement (‘sponson’ in naval parlance) to either side of the hull; they projected like bay windows and added 3ft to overall width. (Responsibility for introducing the sponsons was later contested between Tritton and d’Eyncourt.) The 26ft long hull stood 8ft high and 13ft 9in wide over the sponsons. The machine was first called the ‘Wilson’ and later ‘Big Willie’ or ‘Centipede’ after Foster’s 1913 crawler, though there all resemblance ended. Later it simply became ‘Mother’. Maximum speed was expected to be 2mph.

  A day or so later, on 23 August, Tritton visited d’Eyncourt to report progress on the No. 1 Lincoln Machine. It was so obviously inadequate that he felt compelled to reveal the far from complete new design, sketching it on scrap paper. He returned to Lincoln with instructions to build a test vehicle with all speed. Tritton apologized to Wilson for his impromptu disclosure, but the cat was now out of the bag and they had yet to overcome the most threatening problem of keeping the machine on its immensely long tracks. Stern arrived on the 26th with War Office performance requirements: the weapon must cross trenches 5ft wide, climb a 4ft 6in parapet (previously 5ft) and climb a 1 in 1 slope.

  Tritton and Wilson wrestled with track design for the next four weeks. In place of the Bullock system they considered multiple roller chains, or even a mat-like track of densely woven wire strands on to which driving teeth could be riveted. Standard rubber and webbing Balata belting was briefly talked of until Tritton’s firemen turned their hoses on a suspended length, the wet fabric shrinking and deforming the belt. D’Eyncourt was horrified at the idea, sending Lt Symes up from London on 21 September to dissuade them from its use. By the time he arrived an all-steel track had been devised by Tritton, its links riveted to armour-plate shoes which were profiled with a supporting lip to prevent sag. Spring flanges on the rollers held them fast under lateral pressure to prevent them riding off the track. The design proved so reliable that it remained basically unchanged for the rest of the war. That evening Tritton sent the Admiralty an historic telegram from the White Hart:

  Balata died on test bench yesterday morning. New arrival by Tritton out of pressed plate. Light in weight but very strong. All doing well, thank you. Proud Parents.19

  A full-size wooden mock-up of ‘Mother’ was hastily made and sent by road to the Wembley experimental ground where it was kept out of sight under guard in a small circus tent. It was viewed on 29 September by representatives from the War Office, Ministry of Munitions and d’Eyncourt’s committee, with Lt Col R.N. Harvey, Maj J.T. Dreyer and Maj Henry Guest from the BEF Experimental Committee. Swinton stood on a packing case and talked them through the key features. They were well pleased with what they saw.

  Armament was hard to come by and had to fit the limited sponson space. Their preference was for a 6-pdr gun but Brig Gen Guthrie-Smith, the D of A, had earlier told Swinton none could be spared from aerial defence. He refused Swinton’s suggestion that he order more, saying he would look a fool if the war ended next day.20 A 2.95in mountain gun had to be turned down because there were only four in the country. Von Donop could not supply 50 2-pdr Vickers-Maxim automatics (a larger pom-pom) in less than five months. One of each of these last two guns had been fitted on the model for comparison, but it was finally agreed that the machine should carry a 6-pdr 57mm QF naval gun on a pedestal mounting in each sponson, one Vickers-Maxim machine gun firing forward, and four Lewis or other automatic rifles projecting from loopholes to secure all-round fire. Thanks to d’Eyncourt and the Admiralty 100 Hotchkiss 6-pdrs were forthcoming. An eight-man crew was also agreed, duties to be decided later. Every member was to be trained to drive and to fire the guns.

  Albert Nesfield had called to see Swinton four days before the viewing. He produced his small working model with bicycle chaintracks which, though not carried across the roof like Wilson’s, broadly resembled the track alignment on ‘Mother’. After watching the machine climb books in his office Swinton took him over to the Admiralty and left him with the DNC. Nesfield continued to press his claim as the ‘inventor’ of the successful track until the end of the war and beyond.

  An early indication of War Office thinking on the number of machines to be built appeared in an exchange of minutes in mid-September 1915 between von Donop and Gen W.D. Bird, the new Director of Staff Duties, who thought perhaps 50 would be required. Days later six divisions of Haig’s First Army went over the top at Loos into largely uncut wire after an inadequate artillery barrage and the first use of gas by the BEF. Modest gains were paid for with appalling losses totalling nearly 60,000 British casualties by the time the campaign ended on 14 October. After the failures of guns and gas, the landship would be the last shot in Britain’s munitions locker with any chance of achieving a breakthrough. Tritton and Wilson could not have realized at the time how great was the burden of responsibility they carried. The army’s future demand for tanks would be measurable in thousands
.

  Getting the materials together took Foster’s a further month before construction of ‘Mother’ could start on 28 October. Security at Lincoln was unorthodox but effective. Instead of swearing his workforce to secrecy Tritton encouraged ridicule, letting the work be seen as the Guv’nor’s crazy idea. Its purpose was further obscured by treating the hull and chassis construction as two quite separate orders, and assigning different job numbers to each on drawings and factory worksheets. The hull was designated a ‘Water Carrier for Mesopotamia’ and to those in the boiler shop the structure was simply ‘that bloody tank’.21 Paperwork for the engine, transmission and track assembly was marked ‘Demonstration & Instruction Chassis’ destined, if anybody asked, for the Royal Marines Artillery at Eastney Barracks, Southsea, where Foster’s howitzer tractors had gone.22 The first of the Tritton tracks was completed and bench-run on 22 November. Shortage of materials delayed its mate but both tracks were made up at 12ft centres and fitted on 3 December to the Lincoln Machine, now purely a testbed and renamed ‘Little Willie’. They performed well in Burton Park on the 8th.

  Asquith wound up the Dardanelles Committee in November in an attempt to dampen criticism of inefficiency in the direction of the war. Churchill’s exclusion from its successor, the smaller Cabinet War Committee, brought his resignation from the government on the 11th. Nine days later he was a major in the trenches. Sir John French had offered him command of a brigade after time to familiarize himself with local conditions, but in the meantime Churchill was attached to the 2nd Battalion of the Grenadier Guards, going into the line on the 20th. When he came out he submitted a characteristically radical memorandum to French. His Variants of the Offensive proposed several novel means of attack as alternatives to the ‘bare breasts of men’. It opened with The Attack by Armour, and after considering the advantages of hand-held shields and composite screens mounted on caterpillars, he examined fighting tracklayers: