Anley was so short of tanks by the close of 1916 that instruction at Wool continued round the clock in three shifts. He needed 50 machines to cover the five battalions under training. By January he was down to 15 very tired Mk Is with five under repair at any one time. Mks II and III were considered valueless for fighting and all 100 were assigned for training only; Anley was promised 75 and Elles 25. Some at least, were accordingly plated in mild steel.3 To avoid delay the 50 Mk II were fitted with Mk I pattern sponsons rather than awaiting conversion to Lewis mountings. So far so good, but it soon emerged that Haig was unlikely to get the new Mk IV in time for the opening of his spring offensive. Elles combed the workshops and training areas for machines. Stern saw a disaster in the making, knowing that a mass failure of worn-out or inadequately protected tanks on the battlefield would probably kill the weapon for good. He cautioned Anley against releasing his 25 newly arrived Mk II tanks, warning that they were not bullet-proof. Anley disbelieved him, writing to the D of A on 24 February 1917:
The information that only 15 tanks at Wool had bullet-proof front plates [i.e. Anley’s Mk I machines] was based on a minute from the MWS Department. I proceeded to Wool to verify by testing plates with a chisel, and the minute from the MWS Department was found to be incorrect; this was confirmed by a further minute from the MWS Department. The actual position is that 25 Mk II tanks can be sent to France from Wool, of which the majority will be in fair running order suitable perhaps for a short action.4
Stern told Addison on 12 March:
As Director General of the Department which has been responsible for the design and which has produced every tank, I have persistently opposed the premature employment of tanks this year. At the War Office meeting last Sunday General Butler assured me that 60 machines of Mark I, II and III which are being kept in France ready for action only as a temporary measure, and which are really practise machines, will be returned for training purposes as soon as they can be replaced by the delivery of Mark IV machines.
I consider it more than unwise to use practise tanks in action under any circumstances. They have all the faults that necessitated the design of last year being altered to the present design of Mark IV. In addition the training of the men is being delayed by this action. Their failure will undoubtedly ruin the confidence of the troops in the future of Mechanical Warfare. For the sake of 60 machines, the whole future of thousands of tanks will be most unjustifiably prejudiced.5
The first Mk IV machines reached Wool on 2 April, almost three months later than planned. The offensive opened the following week. By then the original programme would have given Haig some 400 Mk IV fighting tanks plus training machines. The first 19 arrived at Havre on the 17th/18th, nine days after Gen Allenby’s Third Army moved out from Arras supported by the 60 obsolescent and patched-up tanks scraped together by Elles. They included Anley’s 25 Mk II machines. Half the force had been knocked out by the time the first of the new types arrived. The great gallantry of the crews, especially of those in soft-skinned tanks, secured some local successes, but for the new arm it was a bad start to the season.
The Army Council had virtually ignored the provisos on labour provision and protection which Montagu attached to his tank delivery forecasts. Stern had requested 2,000 more workpeople. He got 275 and later claimed he had been let down by the Ministry’s Labour Department and the Army. The adjutant-general’s department continued to trawl the tank factories for recruits in spite of the weapon’s Priority 1 status for labour and materials. Labour protection for tanks only came at the end of April on Haig’s orders. It appears, however, that Stern’s appeal for labour was greatly inflated by Metropolitan which put in a request for over 1,000 men in October 1916 when it was contracted to build 600 Mk IV tanks. The company was placed on a special priority list, but Ministry checks revealed that consistently from that date it had almost no vacancies registered with the labour exchanges serving its Saltley and Oldbury tank plants.6
The War Office had sought ministerial confirmation in December that tank orders could be met from existing resources. Montagu, on the point of resignation from the Ministry, supported Stern in refusing to give any such assurance. On 6 February 1917 Stern forecast completion of Mks II and III by mid-month, followed by the first 120 Mk IV in March. He expected output to rise to 280 monthly by September, subject to continuation of the current Priority 1 which attached only to tanks and optical munitions. Stern’s forecast was torpedoed five days later when Haig was forced to put aeroplanes and gun repair above tank production. The priority on supply of engines fell further, to P4, after the demands of aeroplanes, petrol tractors and light railway engines. Construction of 200 tanks in Glasgow was simultaneously threatened by an Admiralty order for 70 ships at ten a month which monopolized Scottish capacity for large stampings. By the end of February the MWSD faced a 200-tank shortfall in deliveries over the period March–May.
Labour shortages actually worsened in March as the army withdrew men from tank work without notice. Others were ‘debadged’, leading them to expect imminent conscription and resulting in some slackening of effort in the factories. Tritton asked the MoM for 250 skilled men – he was sent one fitter. Gore Anley sent two workshop companies – 110 officers and 368 other ranks – to Metropolitan at the end of the month, and a third followed in April. Fears of trade union hostility proved groundless and the effect on tank output as well as on mechanical training was impressive. Anley wanted to draw 600 men from training battalions for further schooling as workshop personnel; this would prime the pump to maintain a regular pool of that number of trainees passing through Metro’s tank factories. Whigham approved, providing their overall training period was not extended. The system was maintained despite attempts by the War Office to drain the pool. It had reduced to 200 men by February 1918.
Addison and Stern were summoned to a meeting of the War Cabinet on 22 March to explain the discrepancy between forecasts and deliveries. Addison reported that a serious miscalculation had been made in the original estimate. After the lessons of Flers, he said, design approval for the Mk IV had been delayed until 23 November. The drawings were completed on 7 January. He hoped the programme would only be a month to six weeks in arrears. Considering their labour difficulties, he thought this a good performance. Addison said he was, however, dissatisfied with the ‘tank organization’ and was taking steps to improve it.
Butler was pressing Whigham for more civilian labour for tank production, the CIGS replying that if a large number of men who were potential soldiers were diverted to tank factories, the army (and the tanks), would have to go that number short. Butler persisted, urging that tanks should have the same manpower priority as guns and ammunition. He reminded Whigham that the army planned to double the number of battalions from nine to 18, and this was reflected in the current supply programme which required deliveries for the new battalions to begin in September– October. For that reason the War Office authorized production to run on after the first 1,000 ‘at a rate which cannot be fixed at present, but which experience in the Field will determine’.7 Glad of so imprecise an instruction, Stern ordered Metropolitan to build a further 560 Mk IV, bringing the total to 1,400 machines. Contracts for the remainder had been placed earlier with Foster’s, Armstrong’s of Elswick and Coventry Ordnance in Glasgow (100 each), and Mirrlees Watson and Wm Beardmore, both of Glasgow (50 each). From Mk I onwards, all Foster’s tank plates were riveted to the standard girder pitch adopted by the other suppliers. Tritton’s ‘Mother’ tank was identifiable by the evenly spaced and closer boilermakers’ pitch with which the company was more familiar.8
On his visit to France in September 1916 Stern had been much impressed with the petrol electric transmission of the French St Chamond tank which gave much faster speed changes than Tritton’s labour-intensive system. Wilson was critical, preferring an epicyclic gearchange for the next generation. With conflicting advice from other quarters, Stern called for a range of transmissions to be evaluated in a field competit
ion. In the meantime, a Daimler petrol electric system was installed in ‘Mother’. It linked the engine directly to a generator which powered two electric motors, each driving its own track. Stern was so confident of success that he ordered 600 sets on 6 January 1917 before the system had been tested. He planned to upgrade Mk IV after the first 220 machines, putting the petrol electric transmissions into a Mk IVA as a transitional type before a completely new design was introduced. Tests soon afterwards were disappointing – the tank could only pull out of a shell hole in a succession of violent jolts while racing its engine at 1,800 revolutions and suddenly shifting the brushes to deliver 1,000 amps. The order was cancelled. Elles was informed at once, commenting that none of the other types would be of practical value inside six months and that Stern’s plans to build 500 Mk IVA by the end of August were unachievable.
Of the other two petrol electric systems selected for the contest, the St Chamond installation was not completed in time after a slow response from the French suppliers, and the British Westinghouse Company submitted a bulky transmission weighing 5 tons. A complex but lightweight multiple clutch assembly by Wilkins was a late cancellation after problems. Walter Wilson had designed a promising light (2 tons) epicyclic arrangement built by Metropolitan. He had realized the speed of steering was critical to the tank’s survival under fire and accordingly evolved the epicyclic control in preference to a clutch mechanism as, he explained, ‘a brake can stand more punishment than a clutch and is easier to judge in its application’. Wilson’s gears ran a virtually trouble-free 300-mile test. The other candidates were hydraulic variable speed systems by Hele-Shaw (5 tons), which also failed to complete in time, and Williams-Janney with an almost equally heavy adaptation of its gear to rotate naval gun turrets. Mk II assembly began at Oldbury in December 1916, and six in mild steel were earmarked for installation of these systems.9
Having already established the winners and losers, Stern laid on a demonstration rather than formal trials. He wanted to counter negative attitudes with a show of vigorous progress in British tank development, and to stimulate expansion of the new arm on both sides of the Channel. The ‘Oldbury Trials’ were staged in great secrecy on 3 March at the 20 Squadron experimental ground, in conjunction with a London conference on the tactical employment of tanks. Over 100 senior representatives of the British and French general staffs and their tank forces, designers, manufacturers and munitions officials travelled up by special train. The course was a simulated battlefield, the largest craters naturally fronting the viewing stand. Stern added two prototype machines. Tritton’s twin-engined chaser had first run four weeks earlier, showing impressive speed and manoeuvrability despite cooling problems. The other vehicle was the sole Metropolitan-built experimental gun carrier, designed by Wilson and Greg. It was first driven on 1 January and mounted a 5in 60-pdr gun which had been successfully fired from the machine. An ‘original standard machine’ completed the line-up. It has recently been suggested that this was Mk I No. 555, a very much modified (female) machine used solely for experimental work. Alternatively it could have been just about the first Mk IV, the initial nine or ten of which were built that month and delivered 2 April.
Wilson’s machine had engine trouble but its epicyclics easily won the day. His transmission provided one-man control at last, releasing the two gearsmen for more destructive work. It was further refined before installation in the Mk V in January 1918 where it was coupled to a purpose-built 150hp engine designed by Harry Ricardo, a brilliant 32-year-old who was forbidden to use aluminium or high-tensile steels in the construction. Stern ordered 700 Ricardo engines for the tank in January 1917 before a single engine had been built and tested. He later refused an instruction from the Engines Priorities Committee to cancel the order. Instead, he doubled it. Ricardo’s 150, 225 and 300hp engines became standard tank power plants.
The conference which followed the Oldbury trials sought agreement on tactics. The British General Staff viewed the tank as purely an infantry support weapon and wanted a faster machine to keep up with attacking troops. The designers – Stern and d’Eyncourt – were convinced that this was too limited a role. They wanted tanks to operate on the flanks of an attack, moving over firm unshelled ground far enough from the infantry to avoid drawing enemy fire on to them. They would act as cavalry and attack gun positions in the enemy’s rear. D’Eyncourt stressed the value of a surprise attack led by tanks rather than infantry. The general opinion of the Allies was that at present the tanks were too unreliable for such roles, and were of greatest value as infantry support in the later stages of an advance where ground conditions would be good. A surprise mass tank attack was not dismissed, but would have to await larger numbers.
After Oldbury the French Ministry of Inventions rated Britain’s tank research and development very highly. Stern proposed that his experimental work should be expanded on a factory site, with French military and engineering representatives permanently attached to his office. He sought Addison’s approval for the requisitioning of Foster’s works at Lincoln under the Defence of the Realm Act, on terms no less favourable than the company’s anticipated returns. Tritton would be freed to devote his whole time to research, backed by the full resources of the Ministry.10 Stern desperately wanted to keep ahead of the field, Allied and enemy, but Addison was not persuaded. He was never a fervent supporter of the tanks programme and this was not the first time that he had shown undue caution in its affairs. His relationship with Stern was often bruising, most of the pain, it has to be said, falling on the Minister. The two men were temperamentally poles apart.
Foster’s instead became a ‘Controlled Establishment’ that month under the Munitions of War Act. The customary entitlement to retention of 40 per cent of profits was reduced to 20 per cent, the balance being taken as tax. In return, additional capital allowances were given to aid expansion and purchase of equipment. To service its first tanks order Foster’s had to build a new erecting shop and enlarge the boiler shop. Other workshops were dismantled and re-equipped. In the ten months to June 1917 Fosters spent £15,600 on land and buildings and over £12,000 on new plant and tools.
A heavy repair workshop, stores and railhead were established under Maj Brockbank’s command at Erin-sur-la-Turnoise. Lt Stephen Foot, its resourceful Adjutant, had taken a working party of engineers on to the snow-swept 26-acre site in December 1916. He soon acquired four decrepit local sawmills which he manned with Heavy Branch personnel. The mayors of six villages mobilized their flocks and horses and wagons to fell and haul logs. When Foot’s needs were met he bartered timber for other stores, the demand up the line for planks and spars being insatiable. Tank repair sections worked outdoors in bitter conditions, short of engineering equipment and tools, and improvising primitive casting and machining locally.
The Heavy Branch engineers were joined around this time by a number of men from London’s bus fleets which completed conversion from horses to motors in 1914. In the process an élite of heavy-transport engineers and designers had formed. They were headed by Frank Searle, chief of Daimler’s commercial vehicles division, who had accompanied Stern’s party to Flers in September 1916. On Stern’s recommendation he was persuaded to join the Heavy Branch, arriving in France as a major in November. Searle was immediately promoted lieutenant-colonel and appointed technical adviser to Elles. He was an entrepreneur and a first-class engineer, rough and tough, an unpolished diamond of a man. After service as Locomotive Superintendent for the Gold Coast Government Railways he had returned to London in 1903 aged 29 to find himself caught up in the omnibus revolution. A failed venture in imported bus chassis led to his engagement by the London General Omnibus Company (LGOC) in February 1907 as Superintendent of their Mortlake garage. He became Chief Engineer four months later with 15,000 horses on the books and a motley fleet of 170 motor buses. Searle began bus manufacture in-house, his first ‘X’ Type appearing in 1909. His minimal diplomatic skills resulted in Col Crompton acting for LGOC in lengthy negotiations
with the police to secure an operating licence for the new vehicle, the spur-driven gearbox of which had failed strict noise limits. Searle introduced his live axle ‘B’ Type the following year. By December 1913, 2,500 were in operation. Over 1,000 went to war on the Western Front. The last one ceased service in 1926.
Searle was summarily dismissed from LGOC in 1911 by Capt Dumble (he of the Landships Committee) after a dispute with the board. The two men had joined the company at the same time, Dumble quickly becoming General Manager. Searle was soon the most sought-after bus engineer in the capital and had refused terms to remain unconditionally with LGOC. He moved on to Daimler’s of Coventry to establish a successful commercial vehicles operation, and caught up with Dumble and Crompton at the 1914 Daimler–Foster tractor trials. Before joining the tanks, Searle headed a successful British War Mission to the United States to purchase machine tools and other precision equipment for UK munitions plants.
John Brockbank was Searle’s loyal assistant at London General, choosing to resign with him in 1911, and rejoining him in France in December 1916. Another from the same stable was George Rackham who had joined LGOC as Chief Draughtsman a month after Searle and Dumble. He helped Searle design the ‘B’ Type before moving to David Brown & Sons. Rackham’s association with tank development began in May 1917 when he was engaged by the MWSD as assistant to Walter Wilson.
Elles had been calling for spares with increasing urgency since January 1917 but the situation was now critical. Stern had seen it coming. So had Walter Layton, the young Director of Munitions Requirements & Statistics (DMRS) and the Minister’s right-hand man at the MoM, who had drafted a minute to the War Office the previous September on ordering procedure for tank spares. He had said that it was hoped a supply of parts would soon be available. Stern stopped its despatch: ‘Please cancel this minute for the present and leave well alone. From my experience I consider this the wisest plan.’11 He had no intention of prompting the War Office into making what he considered would be a premature switch from tank production to spares. Stern was driven by one imperative – to keep tanks coming out of factories nose to tail. Any break in continuity was anathema to him. What came to be called ‘the battle of the spares’ began. It would continue for the rest of the year and beyond.
The Devil's Chariots Page 24
