Stern had promised to send a weekly supply in response to Elles’ pleas, but nothing followed the first despatch. After three weeks Elles learned that no spares could be sent for a further three weeks. He sent Uzielli over in February 1917 to agree lists of parts for assured weekly despatch. Stern maintained that supply had been agreed on a quarterly aggregate basis, not on uniform quantities weekly. The complexities of production made a fixed weekly parts supply impossible. He slipped into the lecturing tones of the banker, admonishing the Heavy Branch for ‘failing to cut its coat according to its cloth’. Having agreed a given ratio of spares ‘their expenditure on replacement parts must not exceed that ratio or they will always be in difficulties’.12 Elles was fighting a war not running a garage, and resented such homilies. But his engineer officers had certainly been sending MWSD huge demands for parts, often quite unrelated to the requirements laid down by them in a ‘Spares Book’ produced by Searle in January.
Rates of wear could be immense. Over 7,000 track shoes were requested in February, on top of 6,000 supplied earlier. Sprocket wheels weighing 200lb were wearing out after 30 or 40 miles because the constant mud was an effective grinding paste. The ‘Spares Book’ entry for sprockets (20 January) called for supply of 50 per 100 tanks. By 10 March demand was running at 1,500 per 100 tanks. Track guide rails and rollers were also in high demand, and mud penetration was wrecking the secondary gears. Lacking replacement rollers, the Erin workshops were filling old ones with cast iron as reinforcement. Stern, Tritton and others attested that the tank had been designed for a 50-mile ‘life’. Stern told the MGO that the fighting tank had little need of spares once committed to battle. In other words, training tanks would require spare parts; fighting tanks would require spare fighting tanks.13 D’Eyncourt (now Sir Eustace) acknowledged that earlier spares estimates had overlooked the fact that training machines frequently covered 100 miles in a week.
Stern was struggling to produce sprocket wheels and other steel castings despite a return to Priority 1. Demand had tripled between January and April. His programme already called for 16,000 tons of castings over the next seven months. The six firms building Mk IV were asked to send in weekly returns of castings ordered and received. Stern undertook to put pressure on the foundries to honour these, despatching his assistant, Lt Cdr P. Barry, to Leeds with instructions to stand over them and force production. Others were sent on similar missions. A new plant was laid down to produce 1,000 tons of castings per month for tank assembly and spares, but no new foundry could produce satisfactory material in less than six months. Steelfounding was still an inexact science with variable batch quality. In the first half of 1917 from 33 to 40 per cent of track link castings were being rejected on account of blowholes, and segregation of sulphur and phosphorous at the points of the link where sound steel was essential. The shortage of track links was a limiting factor in tank production and seriously affected Stern’s delivery forecasts. Because of the small size of the 14lb links, only the first part of the ladle of molten steel could be used in casting them. The remaining 60 per cent was fit only for much heavier castings up to 180lb each. Unfortunately there were few foundries which were equipped to produce castings across that range. Stern’s department initiated experiments which eventually raised tensile strength by heat treatment from 28 to 40 tons per square inch without reducing output. It was a significant metallurgical advance which eased the link shortage.
The tank builders and the fighting men were separated by much more than 22 miles of salt water. The balance of technical expertise lay firmly with Stern’s team which expected its views to prevail. Stern was determined to keep his distance from a War Office bureaucracy which had nothing constructive to offer, while the Heavy Branch in France was demanding more involvement in matters of design and production than he considered sustainable. Stern knew how precarious his manufacturing base was, and saw no reason to increase liaison when all his energies were concentrated on maintaining uninterrupted production. On 24 March Searle’s first report exploded in the near silence. His findings were characteristically blunt:
So far as tanks are concerned, this summer’s offensive is going to see one of the worst failures and scandals of the war unless certain spares in sufficient quantities are forthcoming and/or certain modifications in design are put in hand immediately… Of spares required, we have only been able to maintain an average of 25 tanks in service out of 125 tanks in France; 60 of this number were certainly left [abandoned] on the Somme, but many of these could have been brought in had spares been available… I feel it would be a crime to manufacture and send to this country machines which there is no possibility of maintaining. With a modification in design the quantity of spares necessary could be halved … but I understand the Ministry of Munitions do not agree… You have here in the various Battalions a lot of enthusiastic, capable engineers and I am satisfied the same spirit and talent exists in the engineering department at the MWSD. It is surely criminal to keep them apart in water-tight compartments.14
Searle went on to criticize the designers for failing to visit France for the past four months. He deplored the design and ordering of 200 Whippet chaser tanks without prior consultation with the end users. He recommended halving the order pending full field trials in France. He conceded that ‘colossal’ quantities of spares had now arrived but were unrelated to the parts actually wanted. The 1,000 machines in the pipeline would consume spares at the rate of 400 tons every 50 miles. In a covering letter Elles added that the original policy of ‘any tank is better than no tank’, agreed in November to maximize output, had failed. Not only that, he saw no reason to believe that future production would be maintained or that the necessary spares would be forthcoming. ‘I therefore urge very earnestly that the present situation regarding design, output and maintenance be definitely stated by the Ministry of Munitions.’15 (An earlier draft read ‘extracted from’ in place of ‘definitely stated by’.) He ended with an appeal for a conference with the Ministry and, if necessary, a new policy based on facts rather than fantasy.
The report precipitated a meeting chaired by the Minister on 3 April. Those present included Maj Gen Furse (the MGO), Anley, Searle, Stern, d’Eyncourt and Wilson. The military men laid down that they required the same number of spares for training as for fighting machines. Stern objected that compared with a training tank, the fighting machine was a projectile and after an action it was effectively expended. This was not accepted, and the future spares requirement was confirmed at the same high level. (Five weeks later, Heavy Branch in France more than halved its spares estimates for fighting tanks.) MWSD officers would visit France ‘at least monthly’, and a working party would report back on the spares situation.
Stern, Wilson, Symes and others from MWSD crossed the Channel on 13 April for a ten-day series of meetings with Elles and his staff at Bermicourt, and with French tank experts. The tank actions of a few days before in the battle of Arras had again demonstrated the weapon’s value, though all machines were confined to supporting roles. Two had been cut off and captured. French tanks fought for the first time on the 16th over a wide front on the hills overlooking the Aisne. Eight companies of Schneider tanks went in. Three of them were cut to pieces by artillery. The remaining 18-tank companies crossed the second line of enemy defences but heavy MG fire prevented the infantry from following them. They suffered heavy losses before rallying at nightfall. Of the 132 deployed, 76 remained ditched or broken down near the enemy lines. They had greater success on 5 May when Schneider and St Chamond tanks led an attack on Laffaux Mill.
Stern’s party reviewed the spares situation and tank supply with Uzielli, Searle and others. Searle took an aggressive line, having earlier challenged Stern’s assertion that it was impossible to obtain castings for gear pinions in less than five weeks. He had earlier produced a letter from his company, Daimler’s, confirming recent receipt by them of stampings for pinions from the Albion Drop Forging Company in seven days from date of order. It was a co
ntrived comparison. The MWSD required final drive gears in the form of steel castings, these being superior to gears cut from mild steel stampings which were almost always low carbon because of the near impossibility of making acceptable stampings in higher-grade steels.
Searle had next written directly to the Minister, enclosing Daimler’s letter and complaining that training tanks had been laid up for want of these parts since they were ordered in mid-January. He now accused MWSD of lacking knowledge and energy. Stern took Searle aside and warned him not to create bad blood between the departments, to which he agreed. Their further discussions were balanced and valuable, many design defects being noted for correction. Stern announced that orders had been placed for the Mk V (actually this was very premature – Metropolitan was on stand-by but the design was unfinished and the first contract was not placed until August).
Stern lunched in Paris with Lloyd George, Hankey and numerous generals, and later met Haig and Butler. His diary records that the C-in-C again told him that he wanted as many tanks as possible and instructed him not to delay while perfecting them. Haig considered them second only to aircraft, and a tremendous lifesaver. He asked who at the War Office did not believe in the tanks. Stern named the adjutant-general’s department which continued to recruit skilled men engaged on tank production. The following day Haig wrote to Gen Robertson in London that tank output to date was ‘most disappointing’ and asked him to take a personal interest:
The further experience of the recent battle around Arras confirms my view that as large a number of reliable tanks should be put into the Field as soon as possible. Although the present tank is admittedly defective in many respects, the excellent service rendered by a percentage on every occasion on which we have used them has made it quite clear that a force of well organised reliable tanks is a necessity for the modern battle, and is likely to greatly contribute to winning a victory and reaping its fruits. I also hold that tanks will greatly contribute to economy in men, because not only can a few men accomplish in a tank, without loss, far more than a much greater number of men can do, without a tank; but the employment of tanks has been found to reduce casualties in the attacking infantry. Consequently I am of opinion that the allocation of personnel either to the Heavy Section in the Field, or for the manufacture of tanks in England should not be restricted in such a way as to interfere with the development of tanks to the fullest extent possible. Hoping that you will personally be able to support my recommendations in this very important matter [Haig’s emphasis].16
Stern returned to London on the 25th. Elles convened a board next day to inspect the Lewis gun mounting which was giving trouble in the newly arrived Mk IV tanks. It reported that they were arriving in France unfit to fight – the aperture in the ball mountings was too small and Central Workshops could not grind hardened steel. No date could be given for battle readiness. The three-man board, which included Searle, went on to record 16 other defects. Similar reports were arriving from Wool. The inherent weakness of self-inspection by the producer department was only too apparent. Stern at once repeated his plea that a single representative body be established to give authoritative decisions for the army on tank matters. He also asked that his department be given its own workshops in France and at Wool. He was absolutely right to do so, but this still begged the question of effective inspection. Haig simultaneously called for a WO Tanks Department. The fight for control of the weapon’s design, production and development was reopened.
In response to Haig’s letter, Lord Derby, the Secretary of State for War, called a WO/MoM meeting on 1 May at which a War Office Tank Committee was formed to correlate battle experience with design and production. Maj Gen John Capper, a divisional commander, was appointed President. As a pioneer of army aviation Capper had overseen the formation of its first Airship Battalion in 1906. He was joined by Lt Col E.B. Mathew-Lannowe (Anley’s GSO 1), Lt Col Sir John Keane (War Office), Lt Col Stern and Sir Eustace Tennyson d’Eyncourt. The absence of anyone from the Heavy Branch in France was an extraordinary omission in view of the committee’s purpose and Elles’ repeated pleas to be given a direct voice on precisely this subject. The committee would produce performance specifications for the designers and would give design approval before any construction was begun. All field trials for tanks of new or approved design would be conducted under the orders of the committee. Addison, who supported Lord Derby’s initiative, considered that the tank weapon was now established and its production should be administered exactly as any other munition. He was also tiring of Stern’s corner-cutting and constant invoking of his charter in inter-departmental disputes. He readily agreed that the army should collect its tanks in England and provide all subsequent transportation. However, this was never implemented because 20 Squadron already operated a highly efficient system and the reorganization required for an army version was unjustified, but Heavy Branch officers took charge of acceptance trials before the squadron shipped the machines across to France.
Addison also agreed to transfer responsibility for inspection from Stern’s department to the Ministry’s munitions inspectorate. It was a necessary move but Stern stalled the handover for months. His contracts and finance sections similarly lost their independence on Addison’s instructions and were placed under the central authority of the Ministry. This unsettled the tank contractors and brought protests from those threatened with renegotiation of previously agreed terms. Much more seriously, Stern’s charter became waste paper overnight. Without freedom to control its finances and contracting, his department was now exposed to scrutiny and the inevitable delays and procrastinations of bureaucracy. Stern and d’Eyncourt were also faced with a military majority on the new committee. They would now have to fight their battles on two fronts.
Stern at once condemned the balance and functions of the committee, telling the inaugural meeting that he believed the imposition of the standard War Office organization would wreck tank development. The connection between the fighting tanks in France and the people responsible for design and construction must be instantaneous and direct, he emphasized, bypassing a WO filter. Stern proposed the appointment of a director general responsible for all aspects save action in the field, nominating Capper and urging his appointment to the Army Council. He said Capper should leave design and supply to MWSD but give final design approval. The duties of the MWSD should widen to embrace not only inspection, transport and research, but also all repair, including the Central Workshops at home and in France. He was heard out in silence.
Promotions and appointments followed. Capper replaced Gore Anley, who had been appointed only six weeks before as Administrative Commander of the Heavy Branch and given a London HQ. Brig Gen W. Glasgow took command of the Wool training centre. Hugh Elles was gazetted brigadier-general.
Stern repeated his proposals in a long and anguished memorandum on 18 May, co-signed by d’Eyncourt. It catalogued eight months of frustrated plans, labour and materials shortages, repeated and disruptive design changes and alleged military misjudgements. The latest concerned the proportions of male and female types. Stern’s department had originally set equal numbers of each. This was altered during the winter by the WO to one male for every two females. Subsequently the army wanted three to two, but there were insufficient 6-pdrs to achieve this. On 13 June a WO weapons requisition confirmed yet another change to all-male type.
Their joint memorandum shocked the War Office which directed retaliatory fire at Stern; none was ever aimed at Tennyson d’Eyncourt who, despite his undeviating support for Stern, lived a charmed life. Capper called on Stern to tell him that CIGS Sir William Robertson wished him to withdraw the paper, assuring him that his criticisms would be met with alterations. It was a hollow promise. The military members of the committee soon began to impose arbitrary rulings on points of detail in design and production – matters of which they knew next to nothing. They forced a decision on 30 May that experiments should no longer be conducted as and when the MWSD decided. Inst
ead, the committee would decide the main lines of enquiry and would itself initiate experiments involving matters of principle. They wanted free access to Stern’s experimental department and called unsuccessfully for Wilson to join the committee.
Haig’s pressure brought a dramatic increase in the tank programme. On 5 June he confirmed the adoption of two classes of fighting tank – the current ‘heavy’ and the lighter and faster ‘medium’. He planned to form nine battalions for each. The production programme for the 1918 fighting season was accordingly identical for both types – a first establishment of 540 tanks plus replacements at 108 per month for 12 months, totalling 1,836 heavy tanks and a like number of medium machines. Additionally, 203 infantry supply tanks were required, giving a total of 3,875 machines.17 It was a near quadrupling of the 1917 programme. Haig nominated Mk V as the preferred replacement for the heavies. As to priorities, aircraft, motor transport, light railway locomotives and gun ammunition would all take precedence over tank production.
The Tank Committee viewed mock-ups of Wilson’s Mks V and VI at Saltley on 23 June. Both machines were to take his epicyclics. The military members decided to adopt the more advanced Mk VI in spite of the preference at GHQ for Mk V, and d’Eyncourt’s reservations that the Mk VI was under-gunned and too great a technical leap in the dark. In place of sponsons it was to mount a single short-barrel 6-pdr forward between the track horns, with secondary armament of six Hotchkiss MG. There was an overall saving of 5 tons of armour. Other changes included much wider tracks, more interior space due to an offset engine, and a slight increase in speed. The following week the War Office ordered 1,600 Mk VI, the first 700 of which were required for training well before a battle-ready deadline of 1 March 1918.
The Devil's Chariots Page 25
