The Devil's Chariots

by John Glanfield

  Johnson had been working on a radically new approach to the problem of track inflexibility. Higher speeds over uneven ground would increase the damaging shock loads, and because steering would entail heavily braked skid turns, the stresses of higher turning speeds on the track plates would be unsustainable. In June Johnson’s old employers, Fowler’s, made up and fitted his flexible track to Mk V experimental tank No. 9425. The standard rigidly linked track plates were replaced by narrow wooden shoes which were free to pivot laterally on swivel links, strung together on an endless tensioned wire cable and hanging at all angles like a shark’s-teeth necklace. Because the ‘free’ shoes pitched randomly in all directions the machine looked like a heap of scrap, but once in ground contact they were responsive to braking turns and surface irregularities. The testbed Mk V also incorporated Johnson’s suspension system. It was brilliantly simple. A steel cable was secured to a powerful spring anchored inside the front of the track frame, and then led rearwards threaded over and under the track rollers before securing to a similar rear-mounted spring. In this way the tensioned cable itself became an elongated spring so that the rise or fall of alternate rollers over rough ground was damped by the opposing cable pressures on the adjoining rollers. Fowler’s was instructed in August to make four experimental Medium D tanks in mild steel, all to be capable of flotation for river crossing. Four more were ordered from Vickers in September, plus a ‘Star’ and a ‘Two Star’ variant with progressively wider hulls to compare stability in the water. By December the experimental Mk V with a Ricardo 150hp engine had covered 530 miles with little track or suspension wear at speeds on the level of 10–12mph, reaching 25mph on slight downgrades.

  Fired by the possibilities of Johnson’s system, Fuller had submitted an imaginative and radical paper on 24 May, ‘The Tactics of the Attack as affected by the Speed and Circuit of the Medium D Tank’. It became ‘Plan 1919’. In his refreshingly crisp style uncluttered by military jargon he set out a scheme for paralysing the enemy’s brain before smashing his main body of troops. The German command structure behind the front was to be disrupted before the main assault. A large ‘Disorganizing’ force of Medium Ds would punch straight through along a 90-mile front and drive on regardless, to reach and scatter the German divisional, corps and army headquarters up to 20 miles beyond. The ‘Breaking Force’ of tanks, infantry and artillery would strike next, and when the defences were fully penetrated a ‘Pursuing Force’ of Medium Ds and Cs with lorried infantry was to sweep ahead. Fuller proposed a British contribution of 27 heavy and nine medium tank battalions, requiring 2,998 tanks and a further 37,000 of all ranks.

  It was obvious to some that without a tank policy from GHQ the army was having to devise tactics around Ministry designs instead of the reverse. Harington in London confessed that: ‘Re tanks … I am trying hard to get a General Staff policy laid down… I have had more difficulty in getting the hang of the tank question since I arrived than all other questions put together.’2 Gen Sackville-West, the British Military Representative at the Supreme War Council, agreed: ‘For some unknown reason anyone to do with tanks seems to be seized with a spirit of opposition to everybody else who has to do with tanks. The result is it is quite impossible to get any sort of collective view on the subject.’3 Even Gen Guy Dawnay on Haig’s Staff was confused, telling Sackville-West that though he well knew the views of Fuller, Elles and Capper on tanks, ‘I do not know the views of the General Staff. The fact is that [their views] have not solidified on the subject. I could not explain to you my own views at all convincingly and, as you say, no two tankists agree.’4 Harington cut through this intellectual sloth and wrote a General Staff policy at the end of May with Gen Henry Wilson’s approval. It centred on an offensive timed for 1 June 1919 and employed tanks on a large scale to penetrate on a broad front of 40,000 to 100,000yd. Fuller’s ‘Plan 1919’ had arrived only days before and had not been digested. Harington’s tactics were less unorthodox, involving a series of frontal attacks with tanks supported by infantry in tracked carriers, the rapid pile-driver blows giving the enemy no time to regroup and counter-attack. The size of the force and number and type of fighting tanks was not stated, it being left to the Supreme War Council in Versailles to quantify and agree national contributions.

  The barely concealed contempt in which the tank was held at GHQ is revealed in its response to Harington’s paper. In a hitherto unremarked ‘Note on Proposals for the use of Tanks in 1919’ written in June, it quoted his proposition that ‘a definite break-through on a broad front can only be made successfully by the employment of a very large number of tanks’, before commenting:

  If the time and the opportunity were available to train sufficient divisions to the standard of the original Expeditionary Force it would be another matter, but as matters stand at present the above [proposition] can be accepted in principle. In any case it is agreed that tanks are a necessity.

  The implications of the statement and its disregard for the terrible lessons of the past three and a half years need no further comment. Haig apparently sent the notes to London with a personal covering letter, a draft of which survives, confirming that they represented his views.5 A modified ‘Plan 1919’ was the basis of the policy finally adopted in late July in a ‘Memorandum on the Requirements for an Armoured Striking Force for an Offensive in 1919’. Fuller’s pre-emptive first strike at the enemy’s ‘brain’ was put back to follow closely behind the main assault. It called for a total of 10,500 tanks from Britain, France and America, and a British quota of 7,296 cross-country supply tractors.

  In June the Tank Committee agreed the outline specification for another fast tank to be called the Medium E. At Elles’ suggestion a design competition between selected firms was agreed, but Johnson kept ahead of the field and the ‘E’ Type investigation lapsed.

  When the Americans asked Stern to build a camp at Chateauroux for instruction of members of the AEF, he told Lord Milner, Secretary of State for War, that he saw great advantages in expanding this to a Central Military School and training ground for an ‘Inter-Allied Heavy Tank Army’ serving the British, French and American forces. Standardized tactical training would allow the pooling of reserves of manpower and machines, and economy in rail transport. Stern believed reason would triumph if he were authorized to negotiate on these lines. Though the subject was entirely outside his remit, Stern put the idea to Loucheur and the two dined with Gen Petain on 24 April. Stern lunched with Gen Foch next day, both commanders agreeing the inter-Allied training proposal and the absolute necessity of pushing tank production to the utmost. Still uncaring of the proprieties, Stern contacted Gen Sir Henry Wilson who told him he would inform Haig that evening – he never got around to it. Stern then asked Churchill for full powers to develop the scheme. They were not granted, and the French later opened an identical school near Fontainebleau.

  Stern, a mere colonel, had dined with the French High Command, opened discussion with them on sensitive matters entirely without authority, and spoken directly to the CIGS, all career-breaking military crimes. Capper in particular was incensed. He had never forgiven Stern for withdrawing his assurances on the convertibility of Mk IV. He told Harington he considered Stern to be unfit for his post and called again for him to be parted from his uniform.6 Capper’s shrill objections failed to impress the New Order and Stern got off with a caution.

  Bertie Stern had other reasons to feel isolated. Since becoming premier Lloyd George had worked to establish a unified system of Allied command in place of ad hoc conferences. He succeeded in November 1917 in setting up the Supreme War Council, based in Versailles with inter-Allied permanent military representatives and a planning staff. The British section was attached to the War Cabinet Office rather than the War Office. The Council formed an Inter-Allied Tank Committee to coordinate national tank programmes and formulate tactics. It first met at Versailles on 6/7 May 1918. Gen Harington appointed Fuller to represent Britain. GHQ blocked the assignment saying, rightly, that Fu
ller would present his own views rather than those of the High Command. Capper took his place. Gen Estienne spoke for France, Col Gargiulo for Italy and Col Rockenbach for the USA. Stern cabled Duckham on 6 May: ‘Does this cancel my charter of last November and will [Capper] be responsible for all tank matters as I am unaware of what action he is taking or what policy he is following.’7 Stern and Draine attended none of the four meetings of the committee, but Capper succeeded in persuading it to agree that ‘a large increase in our tank force will give the best prospects of success in 1919’. They set a British contribution of 3,300 tanks and 45,000 men. The committee produced much paper of negligible value and was wound up in October.

  Stern was unable to persuade Churchill to back him officially in his attempts to unseat Capper and take his place on the Versailles Committee. He told all who would listen that he would fight everyone until he was satisfied with tank organization, and he threatened to put the whole situation to the press. Gen Harington had reached his own conclusions and was able to persuade Stern to put the pin back in his hand grenade by assuring him on 30 May that the War Office intended to assimilate the Tank Corps as an integral part of the army. The tactical side was to be removed from GHQ and placed directly under the General Staff in London. This was confirmed by the War Office in late July and Capper’s Tank Directorate was accordingly closed down. The WO proposed to reform and retain the Tank Committee under the Master General of Ordnance, Gen Furse, its military members to outnumber the Ministry men 2:1. Three weeks of proposals and counter-proposals followed during which Churchill appointed an old friend, the energetic and ebullient Maj Gen Jack Seely, as Deputy Minister. Seely had been Secretary of State for War until March 1914, and had commanded the Canadian Cavalry Brigade until some criticism of his command and a recent gassing brought him home. He and d’Eyncourt emerged as pivotal figures in the reshaping of the Tank Committee. Like Stern, the DNC was weary of partisan and ill-informed bodies. He wrote a near-ultimatum to Lloyd George on 30 July.

  Dear Prime Minister

  The whole question of tanks is again in the ‘cauldron’; only bubbles and hissings come forth, otherwise I might have used the term ‘melting pot’ from which something might emerge. Committees are proposed and turned down. The War Office and Munitions are not at one, and individuals in each are grinding axes. Unless a really representative council or board with a good head with the necessary authority is appointed, the output and whole use of tanks as far as this country is concerned will further decline. We shall become a laughing stock to the Americans and other allies, and shall not contribute as we should, to providing the best material necessary to beat the Boche.

  I have just seen Lord Milner, and informed him that I can do no good by joining an invertebrate committee on the old lines and therefore propose to retire altogether from ‘Tanks’ unless a council or board as suggested [by me] is formed. I have always as you know been most keen to do all I can for ‘Tanks’ but as there is continual obstruction I must now retire beaten.

  I am, [etc.].8

  Following a dispute over the accuracy of Moore’s production forecasts which had been pitched far above actual monthly outputs, Churchill relieved him of his post as Controller, MWD on 4 August. Moore was appointed Chief Superintendent of the Central Tank Testing & Experimental Station, Newbury, then under construction on the racecourse. He would also be Controller of Experimental Design, Testing and Despatch, but these titles failed to mask the fact of his demotion. James Borrowman Maclean, a highly successful industrial organizer and head of the MoM engineering department, took his place. Churchill told the Prime Minister that the admiral had not been a success and that his replacement by Stern would have involved endless difficulties with the army. He reassured him that there were plenty of tanks for the comparatively small numbers of personnel currently provided, but warned that the Corps would need 100,000 men for the tanks arriving by June 1919.

  Lloyd George chaired a War Cabinet meeting on 8 August at which d’Eyncourt deplored Stern’s earlier dismissal. He quoted tank production for the past four months – 555 machines – which was barely half Moore’s original forecast. Backed by Seely, d’Eyncourt recommended the creation of a tank board controlled by the Ministry with army representation, to determine tank development, design, production and supply and with full powers to coordinate an international tank production programme. He was willing to serve as Vice-President and Controller of Tanks under Seely, with Stern as his deputy. He nominated Fuller to speak for the army and advocated the retention of Moore to control ‘experimental design’. His formula was largely accepted. Seely presided over a Tank Board which first met on 15 August and included d’Eyncourt as Vice-President, Furse, Elles, Fuller (now transferring to the War Office at Gen Harington’s request to head the new Tank Department), Maclean, Stern (as Commissioner, O&A) and Swinton, newly returned from America and now a major-general. Churchill’s friend Adm Bacon, inventor of the portable 15in howitzers, was now Controller of Munitions Inventions at the MoM, and joined the board in September. One of his first tasks was to investigate the fitting of Medium C tanks with scythes on a revolving disc – they were not adopted. The board coordinated demands and held a watching brief on production issues and War Office policy. All orders to the Mechanical Warfare Department were transmitted from the board rather than the War Office. Despite the growing scarcity of labour and materials, Seely’s board proved a great success. New ideas were enthusiastically received and obstructions bulldozed aside.

  As the War Cabinet debated on 8 August, the Allied offensive opened east of Amiens to the total surprise of the German Second Army. It was spearheaded by Canadian and Australian units of Rawlinson’s Fourth Army. This was Cambrai on a grander and generally superbly planned scale. A total of 604 tanks was employed, the entire available strength of the Corps. Nine battalions of heavy tanks – 324 machines – led the attack along a 13-mile front. Two battalions of Medium A Whippets, 96 in all, stood by under cavalry corps orders to follow through. The first day’s advance of up to 8 miles brought in 16,000 prisoners and marked a turning point in the war. Ludendorff called it ‘the black day of the German Army’. The only disappointment was the decision by GHQ to marry tanks with horses. Instead of the Whippets racing through the 11-mile breach in the German defences to wreak havoc on a fleeing enemy 5 or 6 miles beyond, they were hung up in assisting cavalry units caught by rearguard machine-gun fire. When the two cavalry divisions finally reached their third objective, with blanket orders to press on, they sat tight, awaiting confirmation from their own headquarters. It requires an effort of will to understand the thought processes of the staff officers who so mismatched armour with horseflesh and lightly armed troopers. Fuller confirmed that Haig had not one officer on his Staff with any experience of tanks.9

  Moore resigned his new appointments on 13 August. Maclean had told him he intended to separate physically the design and working drawings sections to stop designers fine-tuning drawings after they had been issued to factories. A stream of design revisions had seriously delayed jig production for Mk VIII in April/May. Moore argued against change and in any case wanted to hang on to the design team, leaving drawings to Maclean who refused. To his great credit the admiral had successfully expanded production capacity and it was no fault of his that the programme remained in permanent flux. He had been given little chance to hit moving targets. The army’s increasing removal of skilled men from the factories was now pushing production towards free-fall. The munitions industry had lost 100,000 highly trained men since January, including draughtsmen and gauge and tool makers. Metropolitan’s tank factories lost 600 men precisely when the army wanted maximum output. For the sake of making up a few companies of infantry, the equipping of perhaps four or five battalions with tanks had been lost. Churchill wrote Lloyd George on 22 July:

  Questions which the Prime Minister’s conscience should be asking him:

  1. Am I not one of the original founders of tanks?

  2. What am I
doing to push them forward now?

  3. Am I doing enough?

  4. Can I not do more with my great power?

  5. Are they going to be frittered away in more incidental fighting next year 1919 – as every other year?

  6. Have I not still got time to get a real move on? W.S.C.10

  A radically different body was formed at the end of July. The ‘Tank Production Committee’ was a high-risk attempt by Seely to bypass the bureaucratic control of production from London and place it directly in the hands of the builders. The committee comprised senior representatives of the major contractors and would receive and action all future tank production orders. It would quote for the work, place contracts, allocate materials and ensure delivery to schedule. A bonus arrangement and penalty clause would be applied by the Ministry. The committee met once, then lapsed as Maclean successfully created further regional groups of manufacturers.

  Col Kitson Clarke, of Leeds locomotive builders Kitson’s, set up and led a local tank construction group in August to build 200 Medium C machines at ten per week. He did so in response to a Ministry embargo on further tank assembly at his factory, rolling stock having the higher priority. The consortium was to form the nucleus of the North of England Group capable of turning out 100 tanks each month. It began production just before the war ended, completing 12 tanks.