The Devil's Chariots

by John Glanfield

  The first ‘D’ Type was rolled out by Fowler’s in March 1919. It was demonstrated to a gathering of staff officers and others on 29 May at Roundhay Park, Leeds, where it averaged a very satisfactory 23mph. Johnson’s flexible track and cable suspension showed their worth in the finale when the tank was driven straight at the assembly at maximum speed before breaking off dramatically in a sharp turn and an involuntary shower of displaced wooden sole plates. Several spectators turned and fled, according to Johnson. The machine went on to the Experimental Bridging Establishment in Christchurch in June for amphibious trials. After a promising start it caught fire and was written off.

  The War Office had alerted Maclean in January 1919 that it proposed to order 500 Medium D tanks, subject to Treasury approval. Funding problems cut this to 75 in June, 45 in September, and finally in November to 20 of a modified type, the Medium D (M), incorporating changes requested by the Tank Corps. Elles and Fuller wanted a long-barrel 40-calibre 6-pdr, but Johnson warned that the gun was already located well forward of the amphibious tank’s point of balance and the heavy mounting would sink it. A 23-calibre gun was agreed. Sixty Rolls-Royce Eagle aero engines were set aside. The heavy cost of making jigs and gauges for only 20 machines was accepted in the hope that more money would be forthcoming later. Only three ‘M’ Types were built and they were constructed at the Royal Ordnance Factory, Woolwich. They were broken for scrap in 1925.

  Furse was replaced by Gen DuCane, who at Johnson’s urging merged control of all tracked military vehicle development into a single department, A5, in March 1920. The DTDE moved that August from its cramped hillside at Dollis Hill to the large park adjoining Charlton House, a Jacobean mansion near the Royal Ordnance Factory. Johnson was demobilized a few weeks later, but continued in post with a reduced design staff and with civilian mechanics in place of Tank Corps men. These changes were ominous. He was currently working on an amphibious Light Infantry Tank of some 7 tons, based on the ‘D’ series. Its successful trials in September 1921 were followed in December by the news that quite unknown to Fuller and Johnson, A5 had secretly been designing a light tank of its own. Indeed, a prototype for evaluation had been produced by Vickers with the Variable Speed Gear Co. and two more had been on order since 26 August. The first ‘Vickers Light Tank No. 1’ arrived on 17 December at Pinehurst Barracks, Farnborough, a tank testing station set up by A5 four months earlier ‘on a temporary basis’. The slab-sided and sponsonless machine was not unlike the Medium B in appearance but its new features included simple coil-sprung bogies. Three machine guns were carried in a dome turret, the first with a full 360° traverse to be fitted to a British tank. The tracks were independently steered through a Williams Janney variable speed hydraulic gear for each, as in the Mk VII. It competed with Johnson’s light tank in trials at Aldershot later that month. Johnson’s machine reached 20mph, while the Vickers with an 86hp engine was so underpowered that it was beaten by a Medium C. Vickers produced a male version at almost the same time, mounting a 3-pdr gun plus four MG including one on the roof for anti-aircraft work.

  Gen DuCane was fully entitled to commission the Vickers design providing he had General Staff approval, but no mention of it had been made by him to his Tank Committee. The decision not to inform and involve Johnson signalled a terminal loss of confidence in him and his department. He had not perfected a design fit for volume production in more than three years of development work. Fuller thought it would take another two to reach that stage. Fuller’s earlier recommendation to abort construction of Medium C in favour of the ambitious and unproven ‘D’ series had boomeranged. Without the ‘C’ Types a generation of light tanks had been lost and a black hole had opened in the supply sequence. Fuller was now told, quite correctly, that the funds allocated for tank construction in the army estimates for that financial year were at risk of forfeiture to the Treasury unless orders were placed immediately. The mediocre performance of the Vickers prototype could be disregarded – the third was never built – as the company was already working on the much superior Medium Mk I. The first entered service in 1923 with the 3-pdr gun, six machine guns and a design speed of 18mph, which proved to be nearer 30mph in practice. It heralded the beginning of Vickers’ dominance between the wars in the market for cheap and versatile light tanks. The company’s Medium series was convertible to other roles as artillery tractors, bridgelayers, weapons carriers and command vehicles. To the delight of the Treasury the development costs were shared by many foreign buyers.

  The DTDE limped on through 1922, reduced to begging for old car chassis in order to test track and rope suspension systems for ‘soft’ vehicles for reconnaissance and supply use. The experimental ‘D’ series machines were then the world’s fastest tanks but they came at a price. There were compromises in armament, hull design and the track profile to achieve flotation. The sophisticated track and suspension gained a reputation for unreliability, allegedly put about by detractors and hotly denied by Johnson. More seriously, at 30ft their great length (31ft 10in for the Two Star) became an unacceptable weight penalty when the trench-crossing requirement was no longer relevant. Fowler’s completed three ‘D’ Types and Vickers two, plus a Two Star version and, almost certainly, a Star. The remainder were cancelled. Johnson had also produced four small experimental Tropical Tanks, built at the Woolwich Ordnance Factory. The sole Light Infantry Tank was withdrawn from service in June 1922. Simultaneously, much of the work at Charlton Park was shut down. Johnson’s department closed the following year. As a civilian, his dismissal presented no problem.

  The War Office had inherited a world-beating tank design team in 1919. It was blown away after four and a half years of military vacillation over the future shape of the tank arm, failure to recognize the differing functions and timescales of tank design and pure research, and severe financial constraints imposed by a government and nation wearied by war. In those circumstances the Vickers option seemed irresistible. The resulting series of low-budget machines reflected a need for lightly armed and armoured tanks for ‘policing’ roles around the world. By 1939 the lack of a credible main battle tank left the Royal Tank Corps grievously ill-prepared for another continental war, despite frantic efforts then and throughout the ensuing conflict to catch up with Germany and Russia. France and America were no better off. The British Army had to await the post-war arrival of the Centurion with its superb 105mm gun to resume a lead in the field which, with the aid of the pioneers, it had first made its own.

  15.

  BUT WHO INVENTED THE TANK?

  ‘I got £1,000 for winning the war.’1

  Maj Gen Sir Ernest Swinton to Sir Basil Liddell Hart, 24.2.1948

  The idea of armoured cross-country fighting machines had been around for years. H.G. Wells entered the field in 1903 when he wrote ‘The Land Ironclads’ for the Strand Magazine, a short and rather chilling story of machine warfare involving vast landships on Diplock’s Pedrail wheels. The Listener published a feverish letter from Wells in 1941 in which he claimed that he and Diplock had effectively invented the tank in the 1903 piece. Wells accused Swinton of ‘lifting’ the idea and falsely claiming the invention.2 For this absurdity he had to make written apology and send Swinton a cheque for £500. The initial explosion of public interest in the tanks and their origins in September 1916 was accompanied by parliamentary statements naming several of the men associated with the machines though barely mentioning Tritton and Wilson. Intense curiosity as to who really invented the tank later faded as the popular press continued to caricature it in near-pantomime terms. The question flared again in the autumn of 1919, but secret nominations for award had followed the 1916 Hatfield trials.

  Bertie Stern had written to Lloyd George recommending ‘in the strongest possible terms’ that at least £1,000 each should be awarded to Wilson and Tritton. The Minister was not persuaded, but Stern continued to press their case. After the first tank action in September 1916 the Admiralty received claims from ‘certain officers of the RNAS’ a
nd from Robert Macfie, Albert Nesfield and the Holt Caterpillar Company, which later withdrew. The Admiralty took out a secret ‘blanket’ patent covering all relevant features, to head off any private attempt to secure rights to any part of the weapon. Tritton and Wilson voluntarily withheld application in order to preserve secrecy, putting at risk their prospects of re-establishing rights to the design.

  Stern persuaded Christopher Addison to appoint a small committee in June 1917 to consider the two engineers’ entitlement to award. Stern and d’Eyncourt were members, and at Stern’s suggestion it recommended that both men should receive £10,000 on the basis that while Tritton’s contribution was greater than Wilson’s, Tritton had already received a knighthood. D’Eyncourt objected, pointing out privately to Churchill (who had just replaced Addison), the disparity between his own salary of £3,000–4,000 and the sum proposed, which, he said, ‘is more than I get for the design and responsibility of all His Majesty’s ships’.3

  Churchill considered that no monetary award should be given to anyone in receipt of a public salary. He referred the matter to a committee of his Munitions Council which was joined by the Comptroller-General of the Patents Office. It recommended payment of £11,000 to Tritton and £5,000 to Wilson. Churchill again refused to accept the findings. He asked the Treasury to arbitrate awards for all claimants relating to the tanks, explaining that he did not wish to adjudicate because of his close connection with the subject. The Treasury declined. Churchill was aware of the wider consequences if the Ministry opened its funds to a run of claims across departments. He played for time, setting up a third inquiry in May 1918 which was chaired by Lord Moulton, a leading barrister in patent law. Adm Bacon and Gen Scott-Moncrieff sat with him. They were in no hurry, but their conclusions came as a shock eight months later. The panel recommended payment of £50,000 jointly to Tritton and Wilson, who had agreed to share any award equally. Churchill was saved by the bell – the government set up a Royal Commission on Awards to inventors in 1919 to hear all claims.

  The Commission’s task was immense. Over the next 15 years it received 1,834 applications for awards ranging from better bombsights to innovative nosebags for draught-horses. Its terms allowed it to consider claims arising from Crown use of unpatented inventions for which the claimants had no strictly legal entitlement to reward. This covered all the ‘tanks’ applicants, who would have to rely on the discretion of the Crown as advised by the Commission. In Mr Justice Sargant it had a chairman respected for his common-sense approach to complex issues. ‘Looking at the matter broadly’ was his favourite opening phrase to a summation. He was supported by five assessors. The tank hearings took place over six days in October 1919 at London’s Lincoln’s Inn Hall. The proceedings were formal and judicial. Evidence was taken on oath and open to cross-examination. The Crown was represented by the Attorney-General, the Solicitor-General and two eminent counsel. They mounted a determined exercise in damage limitation on behalf of the Treasury, courteously but remorselessly dismissing claims out of hand or attempting to diminish their worth. Most claimants had felt intimidated before the hearing by the Crown’s perfunctory written disclaimer, and had felt obliged to engage counsel at heavy cost. They found themselves and their activities subjected to rigorous and challenging scrutiny. Winston Churchill was first called by the Crown. He was not a claimant, and in taking the Commissioners through the course of events he emphasized his belief that while credit was due to all concerned with the creation of the tank, no single man was its inventor.

  The Commission’s findings were fair but hardly generous.4

  Maj Gen Swinton’s Claim

  This officer, acting outside the scope of his general duties, made an important contribution to the invention and adoption of the Tank. This contribution included, first, the conception in October 1914 of a machine gun destroyer of the general character of the Tank. Secondly the persistent, energetic and successful advocacy from then onwards of the value and feasibility of employment of such an instrument of warfare, and thirdly, the specific definition in June 1915 of the necessary characteristics of the weapon, the conditions of its use, and the tests which it must be required to satisfy.

  We conceive that the terms of reference to us do not contemplate the recommendation of awards for general services such as those secondly above mentioned, but limit us to those which contributed to the invention and design of the actual weapon of warfare in question; and in respect of these latter services we recommend an award of £1,000. But beyond this we desire expressly to recognise the still greater value of that part of Major-General Swinton’s work for which a pecuniary award is not appropriate.

  Swinton was the only applicant to present his own case. He claimed a very large share of the credit, and so far as the army was concerned, the sole credit for the introduction of the tank. His difficulty lay in the fact that while he was certainly associated with its origination, his only claim to invention was the performance schedule to which the designers worked. The Commission had stretched a point in recommending a token award. Ernest Swinton took its modest value as an insult to be added to his dismissal as Britain’s first tank force commander. He received a belated but very well-earned knighthood in 1923.

  Cdre Sueter’s Claim

  This officer contributed in a definite degree to the evolution and adoption of the Tanks. He appreciated at an early date and urged on Mr Winston Churchill the importance of caterpillar traction for attack across country. He organised the Diplock trials in February 1915, and he was the main cause of the appointment of the DNC Committee in the same month. We think that his services were of great value. But on the other hand he was acting throughout within the scope of the duties assigned to him, and no specific invention of great merit is attributable to him.

  We consider that the case of this distinguished officer falls within the general rule to which we have given effect on previous occasions that (unless in quite exceptional circumstances) no award should be made to a servant of the Crown for the efficient discharge of duties definitely assigned to him.

  Murray Sueter had claimed the greater of half the total awarded to all other claimants, or £100,000. His application centred on his Pedrail demonstration to Churchill on Horse Guards Parade and his later activities in support of the Landships Committee, of which he had never been a member. His good work on the armoured cars and lorries had no direct bearing on the tank’s invention, but it was Churchill’s evidence which sank him. Churchill told the Commission that Sueter ‘failed altogether to solve the mechanical difficulties connected with the production of tanks’.5

  Claims of Lt Col Boothby and Maj Hetherington

  In each of these cases we consider that valuable services were rendered by the officer in question for which he deserves high credit. But inasmuch as in each case these services were rendered within the scope of the employment of the officer, and there was not any such exceptional invention or discovery as might possibly justify an award even under these circumstances, we are unable to recommend an award to either claimant.

  Boothby told the Commission that he had obtained a Killen Strait tractor on about 2 February 1915 and had arranged for its demonstration to Sueter. He said this resulted in the formation of a ‘Sueter Committee’ which employed Crompton, and which later that month became the Landships Committee. Boothby claimed to have been present at Churchill’s bedside meeting when the committee was formed, to have joined it then, and to have remained a member until about the end of June. His account intermittently coincided with reality.

  Churchill had made the point that there were two types of claimant – those who vigorously advanced the idea and fought apathy, and those who made specific technical suggestions resulting in the machine itself. Hetherington was firmly in the first category, his problem being his espousal of giant wheels and the perception that he had backed the wrong horse, as Sargant himself observed when he interrupted counsel’s opening statement for Hetherington. Hetherington’s counsel went on to suggest
that his client’s continuous and active membership of the Landships Committee was reason enough for award, provoking Sargant to tell him that that was a monstrous proposition. Hetherington’s case never recovered from these opening exchanges.

  Claims of Mr Macfie and Mr Nesfield

  These are separate claims but we deal with them together because they are in effect rival claims to the merit attaching to the conception, embodiment and communication of the same set of ideas. These ideas were of considerable value, but on a careful review of the evidence, there is no conclusive proof that they were brought to the notice of or communicated either directly or indirectly to the actual designers of the Tank, so as necessarily to form a link in the chain of causation resulting in the evolution of the Tank. In view, however, of the general similarity of these ideas, as evidenced by Mr Nesfield’s provisional specification with those embodied in the Tanks, we have given these claimants the benefit of the doubt and credited them with some share in the evolution of the weapon, and we estimate the value of this share at £1,000… We recommend the award to each of them of a sum of £500.

  Nesfield produced a model, the design of which was also claimed by Macfie. Its quite advanced hull and track configuration was not adopted until after the appearance of ‘Mother’, though the projecting and angled track in front bore similarities. It was confirmed that the model was held in Boothby’s office in July 1915 and was seen by Crompton, Hetherington, Sueter and others, but Wilson had no knowledge of it until ‘Mother’ had been designed. Nesfield had engaged a KC and two supporting counsel to present his claim for 5 per cent of the cost of manufacture of all British tanks to date. He resented both the amount of the award and its apportionment. He refused the money, telling the Commission that as his claim was contradicted by Macfie’s and as one or the other must be false, he could not accept ‘the benefit of the doubt’. He added that £500 was less than half his costs. Years later he withdrew his objections and unsuccessfully sought payment of the award.