Rendezvous with Destiny: Ronald Reagan and the Campaign that Changed America

by Shirley, Craig

  The Carter team was thrilled, since the media were doing exactly what the president wanted: making Reagan the issue. Pat Caddell said, “Doubts about [Reagan] are growing, his lead is shrinking, and more and more people are wondering whether he's up to the job. If this impression hardens, he'll be out of the race.”89

  In mid-September the Washington Post released a new poll that showed the two combatants tied at 37 percent apiece. Carter scored well ahead of Reagan on getting the hostages out of Iraq, but Reagan bested Carter on the ability to “get things done.” In two crucial areas Reagan was losing. By a 48–40 percent margin, voters sided with Carter, wanting military parity with, instead of superiority over the Soviets. They also now sided with Carter on the issue of the conservative's tax cuts, opposing them by a margin of 51–39 percent.90

  Reagan had not even come close to closing the sale with the American voter.

  31

  THE TORRENTS OF AUTUMN

  “The past few days have revealed a man capable of far more petty vituperation than most Americans thought possible even in a dank political season.”

  As the presidential race tightened, the war of words between Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan only escalated. Reagan said Carter had replaced the Declaration of Independence with a “Declaration of Indifference” over the broken American dream, and blasted the Carter record as a “litany of despair, of broken promises, and sacred trust abandoned and forgotten.”1 Carter returned fire, accusing Reagan and the Republicans of behaving in a “distorted and irresponsible fashion.”2 Both candidates knew the stakes: political experts rated the race a tossup in seventeen states that accounted for a pivotal 236 electoral votes.3

  With tensions boiling over, debate negotiations between the Carter and Reagan campaigns broke down. No future meetings were contemplated between Robert Strauss and Jim Baker. In the eyes of the media, Round One of the debate over the debates had gone to Reagan and his corner man, Baker, as Carter had come off looking petty for not allowing John Anderson to participate. This was quite an achievement for Baker and the Reagan campaign, since Strauss was without peer as a media schmoozer.

  George Bush attacked Carter for not agreeing to debate his two opponents. When journalists asked Bush about his own experience debating Reagan in their Nashua Telegraph confrontation months earlier, the VP nominee was ready. “I learned the hard way. Jimmy Carter will learn too.”4 The Houstonian's mission was clear: Take it to Carter, don't screw up, and focus on the local media, not the national media.

  Cynicism was rampant across the land. Many voters had tuned out all three candidates, complaining about the same old, same old. A lot of them were telling pollsters they had no plans to vote. It was the most fluid election anyone could remember in a long time.

  MANY, BUT NOT ALL, of the kinks had been worked out on Reagan's plane and back at his Virginia headquarters. The speechwriting was being vetted better, the schedule made more sense, the candidate was doing only a couple of big speeches a day, usually on the same theme, and the media for the most part were being held (unhappily) at bay. Reagan had just completed a successful tour of the industrial Midwest, meeting tens of thousands along the way while providing good visuals for the cameras. With the media off his back temporarily, Reagan went back to using the four-by-six cards that he preferred but that his advisers had stopped him from using to try to curtail gaffes.

  As part of the effort to smooth out operations, the campaign had taken control of the press shop at the campaign HQ away from Lyn Nofziger. Nofziger did retain the title of press secretary, but now his role was limited to the plane.5 The hand of Jim Baker, who was quietly asserting himself more and more, was suspected in some quarters. The two men never had much use for each other and would shortly come to loathe each other.

  Reagan's plane was officially named LeaderShip '80 by the staff and unofficially the Ponce de Leon by the traveling press. Life on the stretched-out Boeing 727 was for the most part riotous, if also tiring and haphazard. In addition to Mrs. Reagan's trick of bowling an orange down the aisle, takeoff was often marked by enterprising reporters and staffers putting food trays in the aisle and attempting to “surf” their way down the plane.6 Things were even more rollicking on the second, “chase” plane that the Reagan operation leased as the campaign moved into overdrive. This one was nicknamed, not too inaccurately, The Zoo Plane. The campaign referred to the tarmac press conferences as “feeding the animals.”7

  One might think that traveling with the president of the United States would be more prestigious and luxurious, but the Carter team had turned Air Force One into a model of penny-pinching. The law stipulated that when a president was traveling for even partially political purposes, his campaign had to reimburse the federal treasury in full. It was not unusual for the Carter campaign to bill the traveling media at twice or even three times the cost of flying first class on commercial airlines. The campaign even billed senators and representatives for the privilege of flying with the president. Most campaign staffers were banned from the plane, as their seats could be turned into profit centers for the Carter campaign.

  Walter Mondale's plane was an even less desirable spot. For fiercely competitive reporters, and especially for the network correspondents, it was all about covering the presidential candidate, not the understudy. Mondale made so little news that the media dubbed his plane Morpheus 2.8

  WHILE REAGAN WAS MARGINALLY ahead of Carter in several regions of the country, he was again well behind the president in most of the South. To try to make inroads there, the campaign sent Reagan and Bush on a trip to Texas. Reagan always liked the Lone Star State, and more importantly, Texas loved Reagan. Reagan's field staffers liked Texas, too. Whenever one staffer would stop by the state headquarters of Democrats for Reagan, a former funeral home, he and a comely young assistant would quietly retire to the basement, where they would avail themselves of a left-behind coffin for an afternoon assignation.9

  Carter headed to Texas as well, needing to carry the state as he had in 1976. In Houston he spoke before enthusiastic Democrats, hitting Reagan for being “muzzled” by his staff.10 The president seemed to believe that the only way to get his second term would be to increase the attacks on Reagan. That was certainly what Pat Caddell was advising campaign surrogates: pound Reagan. Any hope Carter had of riding a revived job market into a second term had been dashed by the latest economic reports. The second quarter, in which the economy had perked up a bit, had proven to be an anomaly; the newest projections for the third quarter had the economy in negative growth, as it had been for much of 1980 and all of 1979. Two million Americans had lost their jobs in the previous twelve months. Economists everywhere were gloomy.11

  The prospects looked little better on the foreign-policy front. Secretary of State Edmund Muskie told the American people it was doubtful that Tehran would release the hostages before the election.12 Carter said something more hopeful while in Texas, but he quickly scaled back his Pollyannaish view when reporters complained about the contradiction. The first anniversary of the taking of the hostages would fall on November 4—Election Day. Privately, the president fretted that this would hurt his chances unless the hostages were released beforehand.13

  Muskie wore a yellow pin to signify support for the captives. Yellow ribbons had adorned America's trees, buildings, and cars for the past year. The ribbon campaign was taken from a Tony Orlando song about a released convict. Some Americans didn't like the implication, the color long being associated with cowardice. Americans no longer wanted to be cowards on the world stage.

  The GOP was eager to highlight party unity, and in mid-September Reagan and Bush joined Republican members of Congress and 150 aspirants to House and Senate seats for a major rally on the steps of the U.S. Capitol. Reagan spoke, proposing a “solemn covenant with the American people.” Reagan and the GOP congressional leadership announced five goals, among them tax cuts, budget cuts, and increased defense spending. All the attendees signed a document pledging their
fealty. Congressman Guy Vander Jagt jibed that the Democrats were “running away from their nominee” while “we are proud of our nominee.”14 The event concluded with Reagan and Bush clasping hands over their heads as the harmonically challenged Republicans sang “God Bless America” whether the audience wanted them to or not.15

  The rally almost did not come off. A freshman congressman from Georgia, Newt Gingrich, had fought with some in the campaign to make the event substantive rather than just a big photo-op. He'd been working with Bill Brock on the ceremony but threatened to have it canceled unless Team Reagan supported at least the semblance of a framework for Republican governance. “Young man, I assumed you wanted my attention,” Bill Casey condescended to Gingrich in a phone call. “This is going to be horseshit,” Gingrich shot back. He pushed the five-point plan, arguing that it “is just a perfect example of … where is Reagan.” After a short discussion, the Reagan campaign endorsed the Gingrich model.16

  Though Gingrich was only a freshman, he spoke frankly about the GOP's problems: “We have a party here that's not very used to winning. It's not even used to fighting very well.”17

  ACCORDING TO A GALLUP poll, Carter was getting the lion's share of the evangelical vote, 52 percent to only 31 percent for Reagan.18 A Los Angeles Times poll, however, showed it much closer, 40 percent for Reagan and 39 percent for Carter.19 The Religious Right was assiduously organizing for Reagan. Carter's relationship with the evangelical community had soured badly since his 1976 election eve broadcast with Reverend Pat Robertson.20 He received no help from his controversial secretary of Health and Human Services, Patricia Harris, who compared the “Christian Right” in America with the “mullahs” running Iran. She said she was scared that America might one day have its own “ayatollah,” but that instead of “a beard … he will have a television program.”21

  The Reagan campaign hired from the Moral Majority a man named Robert Billings to act as a liaison. Reagan was also making inroads with the Catholic community. There were those, though, who worried about the explosive mixture of God and state. A Reagan staffer, a self-described conservative, told U.S. News & World Report, “This marriage of religion and politics is the most dangerous thing, the creepiest thing I've ever seen.”22

  CARTER ACHIEVED THE DESIRED result from his weeks of pounding Reagan. A New York Times–CBS poll showed Carter moving again ahead of Reagan. This survey put the race at 38 percent for Carter, 35 percent for Reagan, and 14 percent for Anderson. According to the poll, Carter was winning the South and East handily, he and Reagan were tied in the Midwest, and in the West, Reagan's lead was down to 5 percentage points. Carter led for the first time in the seven largest electoral states, 39–34 percent. He led among African-Americans, 77 percent to 6 percent, and was almost splitting the white vote, 38 for Reagan and 34 for Carter. The president was even getting a healthy percentage of the conservative vote, 31 percent to Reagan's 46 percent. Conversely, Carter was getting 48 percent of the liberal vote and Reagan only 23 percent. Carter was also winning every age category; only among voters under thirty was Reagan competitive with his Democratic opponent. Since the previous Times poll, in August, Carter had gained in every category, every region.23

  When word leaked out that the Republicans would not release details of a poll taken by Bush's former numbers man, Bob Teeter, the gossip fed media suspicions that Reagan was faltering. Carter's men were growing in confidence daily, believing that only Anderson stood between them and a big win in November. Their internal polling had shown movement away from Reagan toward “undecided” or to Anderson, so they needed to wheedle these voters to keep moving to Carter.

  Carter kept taunting Reagan. In Texas he said, “You probably noticed that the campaign staff of my Republican opponent have put him under wraps.”24 In Georgia he tried out a new campaign theme: charging Reagan with being a racist.

  President Carter went to Atlanta to speak at the Ebenezer Baptist Church, home of Dr. Martin Luther King Sr. “You've seen in this campaign,” Carter said, “the stirrings of hate and the rebirth of code words like ‘states rights’ in a speech in Mississippi, in a campaign reference to the Ku Klux Klan relating to the South. This is a message that creates a cloud on the political horizon. Hatred has no place in this country.”25

  Carter's newest barb at Reagan started the race debate anew. It also galled his opponent.

  Reagan was slow to anger, and for the most part he had kept his temper in check during the campaign. But when he did get mad, watch out. Lyn Nofziger said there was the real Reagan fury and the bogus Reagan anger. When Reagan tossed his eyeglasses on a table, that was just for effect, such as when someone interrupted him while he was working on a speech. When he broke a pencil or threw something across the room, you knew that was the real anger.26 Once, in 1973, he threw his keys into Mike Deaver's chest, furious over Spiro Agnew's resignation.27 Reagan got especially angry when he was called a racist.

  The mistake many of Reagan's foes made was in going too far in attacking him. When Reagan got angry, he became more focused and he improved as a campaigner. In 1966 Governor Pat Brown ran a mean-spirited ad that made Reagan furious, and the Gipper went out and mowed over Brown, winning by nearly a million votes. In 1976, as his campaign was faltering in the late stages, Reagan got angry after Ford's campaign ran an appalling commercial implying that Reagan was a warmonger; the ad spurred Reagan to push through to the convention, despite all odds. And during the 1980 primaries, Reagan had gotten angry at George Bush over the attacks on his tax-cut plan and the hints that he was too old.

  Now many felt Jimmy Carter had gone overboard. A headline in the Washington Post screamed, “President Says Reagan Has Injected Hatred and Racism into Campaign.”28 Every other newspaper in America picked up the president's charge.

  Carter had ignored a warning from Pat Brown. In a letter to the president that was released for publication, Brown advised, “First and above all, don't underestimate Mr. Reagan personally. He's not a clown or a buffoon.… He is a very astute—even superb politician. Second, you've got to take his views seriously.”29

  Disgusted over Carter's comments, Reagan held his first impromptu press conference in weeks. Taking a break from campaigning in 106-degree heat among the Mexican-American community in Texas, Reagan went right at Carter's remaining strength—his perceived decency. “It's harmful and it's shameful because whether we're on the opposite sides or not, we ought to be trying to pull the country together, not tear it apart,” he said, with just the right touch of moral indignation.30 Reagan then fired at Carter: “I just don't know how much further he'll go to try and divert attention from the fact that he could say all these things to a nationwide audience … if he just wanted to debate.”31

  Bush jumped in and sharply attacked Carter for “ugly little insinuations” against Reagan, calling them a “new low.”32 Gerald Ford also came to Reagan's defense with a contemptuous condemnation of Carter: “Mr. Carter does not just owe Governor Reagan and the Republican Party an apology.… Mr. Carter owes the American people an apology. His intemperate … misleading statements demean the office of the presidency itself.”33

  Ford's well of good will was deeper than Carter's and the former president's comments especially stung.

  Jody Powell was sent out to deny that Carter had called Reagan a racist. Notably, many prominent Democrats did not defend the president. Lieutenant Governor Mario Cuomo of New York said of Carter's charges against Reagan, “It's not nice. It's not sporting.”34

  The Georgians knew Carter had a self-inflicted wound that badly needed tending. Gerald Rafshoon fretted privately to Hamilton Jordan, “It's that old Carter hyperbole. He just can't help himself sometimes.”35

  On September 17 Carter held a press conference to try to quell the growing controversy. The president had held only seven press conferences in all of 1980, “hardly a record of openness and accountability,” Reagan acidly stated.36 Now Carter leveraged the live network television coverage to give an opening s
tatement that was a five-minute recitation of his administration's accomplishments. When he turned to his comments about Reagan, he refused to apologize and denied that he had called Reagan a “racist in any degree.” He then attacked Reagan yet again for bringing up “code words.”37

  But Carter was nailed by an unexpected source: Lisa Myers of the Washington Star, whose writings some Reaganites thought too harsh on their man and too easy on Carter. Myers pointed out to President Carter that “it was your own cabinet secretary, Patricia Harris, who first interjected the KKK into the presidential race.”38 Following Myers's lead, other reporters bore in and asked Carter whether he was being too “mean” in attempting to “savage” Reagan.39 Carter's White House aides glared at the nervous but determined young “Brenda Upstart.” She did not back down and pressed Carter even harder about bringing race into the election. It was an important turning point, sparked by Myers.

  Carter spluttered, “I am not blaming Governor Reagan. That's exactly the point. The press seems to be obsessed with this issue.”40 The Los Angeles Times reported that Carter was “shaken” by the exchange.41 The event did not go at all as Carter's aides had planned.