King William's War

by Michael G Laramie

  Here the governor waited a week for the four hundred Ottawa warriors that Cadillac had promised would rendezvous with the army. These forces, in part due to the recent Iroquois negotiations and in part due to the influence of the Jesuits, had refused to join the expedition. With no sign that the Ottawa were coming Frontenac ordered the boats to be readied, and after leaving Captain Du Luth and forty men to garrison the fort, he set sail on July 26.

  Two days later the flotilla appeared off the mouth of the Oswego River. Detachments were landed to occupy both banks as the flotilla entered the narrow waterway and crept forward another five miles before stopping for the evening. The next day the army divided into two columns and marched forward along the banks of the river as the vessels slowly made their way upstream. On the thirtieth they halted at Oswego Falls (Fulton, New York). The twelve-foot waterfall required that all the expedition’s vessels and supplies be ported around the obstacle. In their exuberance the mission Indians told the seventy-year-old Frontenac to remain in his canoe, and fifty warriors “singing and shouting with joy” carried the vessel around the falls with the count in it.5

  By August 2, the French and Indian force had sailed up the length of Lake Onondaga and started work on a small palisade fort along its southern shore. Scouts returned that evening with news of fresh tracks from the main Onondaga village toward the Oneida and Cayuga villages. It seemed likely that the women and children had fled toward their allies, but of more concern was that the tracks could just as easily imply that large reinforcements had arrived from the other cantons. A yellow glow in the direction of the village spotted after sunset seemed to answer the question, and most agreed that the Onondaga had put their village to the torch.

  The fort was completed the next morning, and after leaving 140 troops under Captain Crisasy to garrison the stronghold and protect the boats, the army advanced in line, with Callières commanding the left, Vaudreuil the right, and Frontenac being carried in an armchair behind the artillery, stationed in the center. After encamping for an uneventful evening the army returned to its march the next morning. As in the day before it was a cautious march over difficult terrain where almost every part of the forest before them seemed ideal for an ambush. There was little to fear, however. The army arrived before the smoldering remains of the Onondaga village late that afternoon. The double palisade walls and four bastions at the corners belied English influence in the town’s construction, but ultimately the strength of these works was not enough and the Onondaga had chosen to abandon their village as opposed to risking a direct engagement with the French.6

  A few prisoners, mostly elderly and women, were rounded up and soon confirmed that the tribe had burned their homes and fled. As the army moved forward to destroy the Onondaga’s crops and secure the ashes of their village, Frontenac dispatched Vaudreuil with seven hundred men to the Oneida villages with orders to burn them, destroy all the surrounding crops, and seize whatever influential chieftains he could get his hands on. To the governor’s delight Vaudreuil accomplished his task in less than three days, returning with thirty-five Oneida, including several of the principal chieftains. Vaudreuil also brought news from several prisoners, including a liberated French girl, that three hundred English were on their way from Albany to reinforce the Oneida.

  A council of war was held that evening. With the destruction of the Onondaga and Oneida villages as well as their crops there was little left to accomplish. Talk turned toward attacking the Cayuga in the same manner and erecting forts in all three cantons to prevent the towns from being reestablished. It was an old idea first proposed by Tracy in the 1660s, and it found an audience with Frontenac and his council. Callières even volunteered to stay and command, but the resources were not in place to carry through with this plan, and the idea, along with an attack on the Cayuga, was soon set aside. With no more suggestions before them all agreed that nothing more was to be done and that the army would return to its boats the next day. After burning their newly constructed fort Frontenac’s troops made their way back to the lake without incident and by August 15 had successfully returned to Fort Frontenac having lost only a handful of stragglers. The expedition’s cannon and a good deal of its supplies were left at the fort to help secure the western stronghold before a long procession of boats and canoes pushed on for Montreal, reaching the town five days later.7

  Accolades were quick to be heaped upon the expedition, some far out of proportion with what had actually been achieved. Although initially against a large campaign Frontenac was one of the first to praise his army’s success. “The blessings which heaven has been accustomed to shower upon your Majesty’s arms,” the count wrote the king, “have extended even to this New World, and we have ocular proofs thereof in the expedition I have just terminated against the Onondaga, the chief and principal of the Iroquois Nations.” The Onondaga and Oneida villages were now ashes, and although the enemy had fled, the loss of their crops and possessions “will cause more of them to perish of hunger than we could have destroyed by fire and sword.” The Iroquois had been taught the force of French arms and, just as importantly, that the English could not protect them. The Ottawa and Huron who had refused to join the expedition were also convinced of French power, and soon any thoughts of a peace treaty between them and the Iroquois were replaced by strings of war parties headed south to attack their ancient enemy. Lastly, Frontenac took pleasure in highlighting the crucial role Fort Frontenac played in the success of the expedition. The arguments against the fort, the governor pointed out, were fine for those who had never visited the place or possessed true understanding of what warfare in North America entailed but did not stand before the realities of the situation. Without this post it would have been impossible to conduct an operation some 450 miles from Montreal, and without a place of retreat a small incident could place the entire army at risk. Now the fort stood as a sentinel in the west, proof of French power and commitment to her allies—a secure launching pad and supply depot for further attacks against the Five Nations.8

  Frontenac had been fortunate. After reports that a number of tribes had reached peace terms with the Iroquois, the governor needed a one-sided victory to bring back his high country allies. Politically he found what he was looking for, but militarily the triumph was exactly what he had expected. The Iroquois ran and left their villages to be burned. This scenario had played out in the past, and the campaign of 1696 against the Onondaga and Oneida took a similar course. In this sense little was accomplished, but the affair, and a noticeable lack of English assistance, had sent a clear message to the Iroquois, which would once again cause them to question the validity of their alliance. The campaign also brought an additional benefit. Although a handful of enemy raiders were spotted along the shores of the St. Lawrence, for the most part the harvest and the remainder of the year passed without a serious threat posed by the Five Nations.

  For the Onondaga and Oneida there were few choices. Rumors of a French expedition against the Mohawk in the spring had escalated to the point that Governor Fletcher had forwarded ammunition to his allies and called out the militia. It proved yet another false alarm, although it is interesting to note that Frontenac had considered just such an operation. Fletcher wrote the colonial governors for their agreed-upon troop quotas and then argued with each in turn when the designated men did not materialize. Better news was that the two additional independent companies of English regulars, those originally dispatched over a year before, arrived in May. Once they had secured their equipment, Fletcher forwarded them on to Albany to bolster the frontier defenses. A few weeks later the governor was complaining to the Board of Trade about the quality of recruits sent. Not long after their arrival, there had been a large-scale desertion in one of the independent companies stationed at Schenectady. A few of the deserters were shot when the party was caught and a brief firefight ensued. The entire lot had been sentenced to death, although this was later commuted for all but one man.9

  In early July far more a
larming news reached Fletcher. A Frenchman taken prisoner near Albany had reported that the Canadian militia was being called out for an expedition that summer against the Onondaga. A large number of French mission Indians and the Ottawa were to join this force. Meeting with his council at Fort William Henry, the governor suggested that four hundred men be sent to reinforce the Onondaga. There was unanimous agreement with the idea but no money in the colony’s coffers to execute the plan. The matter appeared again later in the month when two new French prisoners confirmed that three thousand French and Indians had marched on the Onondaga. This news was supplemented by credible reports that a French army had departed Montreal twelve days prior. Fletcher asked once more for men to support their allies, but his council pleaded poverty and instead suggested “that a letter be wrote to the Indians to give them encouragement and to acquaint them the King of England has sent them some presents & desires them to be watchfull.”10

  By early August Fletcher had obtained several private donations and had raised a number of troops that he would personally lead to Albany. It was far too late. By the time the New York forces arrived at the northern post the Onondaga and Oneida villages were in ashes and their inhabitants seeking asylum elsewhere. Fletcher met with the Five Nations on September 29 to console them on their losses and pledged to supply both the Onondaga and the Oneida with corn throughout the winter. For their part the Iroquois thanked the governor for the kettles and food he had provided. The spokesman then informed him that “We come to desire you to acquaint the Great King that the enemy has brought us to a very low Condition and have destroyed five of our Castles; one is now left, and if that be destroyed we know not what to do; we know not what shall become of us next; pray let the Great King know this.” They then pleaded for the colonies to unite and for the “Great King” over the seas to send men and ships to conquer Canada. “And if he will not send forces to destroy Canada,” the spokesman continued, “then to send us word thereof that we may make peace for ourselves, forever, or for some time.”11

  For Fletcher, whose days as governor were numbered, it was simple logic. The Iroquois had been worn down and exasperated by their English allies. Although the English colonies badly outnumbered the French, for the sake of self-interest they had left the Five Nations to do the majority of the fighting, and now, even as the cantons reached the breaking point, the English urged them on. They promised to take up the cause and strike at the French, but few within the Iroquois camp saw this as anything more than hollow words. With the English faltering and the French growing stronger, a lasting peace treaty, one that did not include the English, became one of the few options left to the Five Nations.

  Part Four

  Uncertain Peace

  CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

  The Fall of Pemaquid

  THE NARRATOR OF THE “Most Remarkable Occurrences in Canada for 1696,” the official colonial journal delivered to the French court, opened his account with, “It will not be difficult to fill this Relation with facts of importance. . . . For never has a year, since M. de Frontenac’s return to this country, been so fully occupied, nor the war waged with greater vigor.” Given the events with the Onondaga alone it would be difficult to argue with the narrator, but a French offensive in the east was to be launched as well—one that would prove as successful as the campaign in the west.1

  The plan had been submitted by Governor Villebon a few years before and called for the capture of Fort William Henry at Pemaquid. If France could provide a pair of frigates to rendezvous with a French and Indian force at St. John, the combined detachments could besiege the fort. The ships would provide the cannon, and their crews would man the guns as well as help with the siege. Once this task was complete the warships would then be free to raid the New England coast.

  For the French court there seemed little choice but to act in the direction of Acadia. Should the Wabanaki Confederacy collapse or agree to a long-term peace treaty the region would prove vulnerable to the New England colonies. This would mean the possible loss of the Acadia fishing industries and likely the extensive fishing interests in Newfoundland as well. Given the circumstances and consequences there was general agreement among the king’s ministers to go forward with Governor Villebon’s plan. This consensus was aided in part by inserting the plan to attack Pemaquid into a larger scheme that called for seizing all of Newfoundland and then expelling the English from Hudson Bay.2

  Execution of this broader plan was given to Pierre Le Moyne de Iberville. Iberville was one of eleven brothers, sons of the Montreal legend Charles Le Moyne. Like his older brothers St. Helene and Maricourt, Pierre learned his woodland skills from his father during the latter’s many fur trading expeditions, and like his father, he would have a long connection with the Compagnie du Nord. It seems that Iberville had decided on a naval career early on for he frequently sailed on his father’s trading vessel on the St. Lawrence and as a young man had visited France. His first official opportunity to serve New France came in 1686 when, alongside his older brothers, he was appointed a lieutenant in Troyes’s expedition to James Bay. His woodlands knowledge and abilities were instrumental in navigating the eighty-five-day voyage north from Montreal to the Hudson Bay Company posts. After serving with distinction on this front for several years, Iberville returned to Quebec in time to participate as second-in-command in St. Helene’s attack on Schenectady in 1690. After this he returned to his interest in seeing Hudson Bay secured for the French cause, of which we shall have more to say about later.3

  Iberville was given a pair of thirty-four-gun frigates, the Envieux and the Profond, along with the transport vessel Wesp. His orders directed him to set sail for Spanish Bay, Cape Breton, and from there sail to St. John and rendezvous with Governor Villebon’s forces. Here he would offload supplies and munitions needed by the governor to reestablish a fort at the mouth of the St. John River. Once this was complete the combined forces would lay siege to Fort William Henry at Pemaquid. Upon the capture of the English fort Iberville was to set sail for Placentia, Newfoundland, and there join forces with Governor Brouillan for a descent upon the English-held eastern coast of the island. Brouillan was to command the naval element of the expedition while Iberville, accompanied by his Canadians and some sixty Micmac volunteers, would command the land forces. With this task complete and the English settlements on this island destroyed, if time permitted the young mariner was to set sail for Hudson Bay and attack the English trading post on the Nelson River. To assist in these plans the court had sent letters to Villebon, Frontenac, and the governor of Placentia, Brouillan, informing them of the project. Frontenac in particular was to raise a company of eighty Canadians who would accompany Iberville on his mission to Newfoundland, while Villebon and Brouillan were to organize their forces so as to be ready to cooperate with Iberville’s detachment.

  It was an ambitious plan that required four separate parties, three of them in the New World, to meet their timetable, and it was riddled with questions concerning command and the responsibilities of the various elements involved. The problems started almost at once. Iberville’s squadron, which was loaded with provisions, gifts, and artillery for the new fort at St. John, was late getting out of La Rochelle. The tender Wesp was sent on to Quebec to collect the company of Canadians who were to rendezvous with the expedition at Placentia, while the Envieux and Profond steered a course for Cape Breton and dropped anchor at Spanish Bay on June 26, 1696. Letters from Governor Villebon awaited the vessels. Three English warships were patrolling the mouth of the St. John River and had effectively blockaded the intended landing area. Iberville stayed at Spanish Bay only long enough to make minor repairs, replenish the crew’s provisions, and take on a number of Micmac and Abenaki recruits. On July 4, everything having been seen to, he set sail in search of the English warships.4

  The poor weather slowed Iberville’s approach, and on the morning of the fourteenth the fog was dense enough that he dropped anchor off the northwest coast of Nova Scotia some twen
ty miles from St. John. The weather started clearing that afternoon and around two o’clock lookouts pointed to three English warships on a course for St. John. The vessels proved to be the frigate Sorling, which Captain Bonaventure of the Profond had fought the year before, the frigate Newport, and a small tender. Captain Fleetwood Eames of the Sorling had stationed his flotilla near the St. John River in expectation of intercepting the seasonal French supply fleet. Now, as his lookouts pointed to two large ships at anchor, Eames ordered the squadron to steer for the vessels while he and his officers eyed the craft closely. Both French vessels weighed anchor, and a pair of duels began as the Sorling bore down on the Envieux and the Newport targeted the Profond. In an attempt to make himself look like an unarmed merchantman, Captain Bonaventure ordered the gunports closed on the Profond and raised an English flag to make the vessel look like a prize in tow by the Envieux. The French warships, however, could only carry on the masquerade for so long. When the ploy was discovered the Newport unleashed a broadside but soon found itself the target of far more cannon and a huge volume of musketry from the Profond’s crew as well as the Micmac and Abenaki on board. The Sorling and the Envieux fired passing volleys at one another and circled about in a twisting affair of passing fire for the next several hours, repeatedly scoring hits upon one another.

  Seeing that he was outgunned by the pair of French frigates, Eames ordered the squadron to make sail to the southwest. The decision to retreat came too late for the Newport. Iberville and Bonaventure, keeping the weather gauge in their favor, exchanged broadsides with the English frigate. Badly outgunned it was only a matter of time for the Newport. It had been hit several times between wind and water and there was five feet of water in the hold. Iberville’s ship scored the decisive blow when a broadside from the Envieux cut the Newport’s main mast. The warship, out of control, turned into the wind and slowed to a crawl before the two enemy frigates. Helpless, Captain Paxton wisely struck the vessel’s colors. Not happy with just the Newport, Iberville ordered a prize crew onto the captured vessel and then, along with Bonaventure in the Profond, set out after the fleeing English squadron. The Sorling and the tender were fortunate, as fog banks and misty rains rolled in masking their escape.5