King William's War

by Michael G Laramie

  In furtherance of the French cause there is little question that Frontenac’s war of terror on the colonial frontiers coupled with a guerre de course naval policy yielded results. Both approaches strained the English and left them scrambling for an immediate response when there was none. To the satisfaction of the French both paths were cheap, never risked a large number of resources, and occupied far more of the enemy’s resources to counter. Perhaps one of the best examples of this approach in action would be Iberville’s campaign against Pemaquid in 1696 and Newfoundland shortly thereafter. French naval commitments enabled both of these successful ventures while Iberville, with a handful of men, employed Native American tactics to essentially expel the English from the Maine frontier and the Avalon Peninsula.

  The French were also successful in using their petite guerre in coercing the English into a defensive-minded policy, which further stretched colonial resources across the frontier. This allowed the French and Indian war parties the freedom of movement—to mass, select a target, and essentially command the terms of the engagement. With the English stretched thin the French became masters of using their enemy’s paralysis to seize an opportunity to switch over to the offensive in the form of a major operation, which in turn instilled more panic, leading to more resources committed to a failed defensive policy.

  While successful in their actions the leadership and citizens of New France drew a wrong conclusion from the results of the conflict. The French underestimated the scope of English disunity. This in turn magnified the outnumbered colony’s victories and led to a sense of overconfidence, which then manifested itself into a false belief that Canada was a match for its larger English neighbors and, more importantly, that it was capable of defending itself without any extraordinary efforts to strengthen the colony. The author of a 1701 memorandum on the threat posed by the English colonies reflected this attitude in his opening remarks regarding New England.

  That country, ‘tis true, is twice more populous than New France, but its people are cowardly to an astonishing degree, absolutely undisciplined and without any experience in War; the smallest party of Indians has always got the better of them; in fine, they have no Regular troops there. This is not the case with Canada. There are 28 Infantry Companies of detachments from the Marine, there; the Canadians are brave, well disciplined and indefatigable on the march. Two thousand of them will always beat, on any ground, the subjects of New England.2

  After all, had not the Five Nations been laid low? Was not the West now open to the colony and the number of French-allied tribes increased? Had not the French reestablished themselves in Hudson Bay and with their Wabanaki allies fought New England and New York to a standstill? Had not English Newfoundland been destroyed by Iberville and a handful of men, ruining the enemy’s commerce by devastating their fishing industry and coastal economies?

  Among the leadership of New France the feeling was even greater that the English colonists were no match. The French had adapted Native American tactics into a successful policy that leveraged their allies and their population’s natural skills into an operational model that pinned down large numbers of their adversaries. This feeling of superiority on the battlefield was supplemented by a psychological element as well. The inhabitants of New France had been mentally toughened by their long conflicts with the Iroquois to endure the hardships of war. Their English adversaries on the other hand, “loving their trade better than war,” would always be at a disadvantage facing such a determined foe. As it was, this false sense of security would soon haunt New France when the War of Spanish Succession arrived upon the shores of North America in 1702.3

  While justifiably declaring themselves the victors, the defenders of Canada and the court of France also drew the wrong conclusions from two policies: the French navy’s shift toward guerre de course and the war of terror on the English colonial frontier. Both of these approaches yielded surprising results at little cost and effort, but both would eventually doom New France. The decision to shift resources away from France’s well-equipped and large navy would not only fail to influence the outcome of any of Louis’s European struggles, but it would make Canada’s lifeline to the mother country vulnerable and would one day call it into question. The raiding of the English frontier by Frontenac also set in motion a similar policy that would be followed until the last days of New France and, like the guerre de course, would yield results at little risk. One of the issues, however, is that Frontenac found an important ally in the form of English disunity that, as we have seen, played into the hands of the French. This too would prove to be a common theme that the French would exploit throughout the subsequent conflicts. Ultimately, however, such an approach was a losing effort on the part of New France. It was clear from King William’s War that the best Canada could hope for in a conflict was a draw or at best a minor victory. Even at this point in time the English colonies were simply too large and too populated to think otherwise. This meant the survival of the French colony would likely rest in a negotiated settlement—an honorable treaty that restored the colony or lost parts of it back to France at the end of any conflict. The problem here was that the French underestimated the generational hatred that would come from seventy years of raiding the English frontier. One day, calls of “Carthago delenda est” (“Carthage must be destroyed”) would ring out throughout the English colonies, and with unity imposed by Old England, the resources and manpower of these colonies along with that of the mother country would become focused on the conquest of Canada. When this was complete the decision was made that Canada was not to be returned; the French colony could not be trusted.

  What is clear from King William’s War is that the French and English colonies had far too many issues to expect a peaceful coexistence under any treaty. The basic contentions, claims, and ambitions on both sides would simply make this an impossible proposition. By late 1696 official requests that the crown “take into consideration the reduction of Canada, the unhappy fountain from which issue all our miseries,” began arriving at the highest levels of English government while representatives of the crown in New York arrived at a similar conclusion. “We offer the following suggestions for the securing of New York and the English dominions on the main land of America,” they wrote to the Board of Trade in late 1696.4

  The best and surest means would be the dispossessing the French of Canada and settling an English Colony there. Hereby all future expense of garrisons would cease; the whole of the fur-trade will be secured ; the Indians will be deprived of all power of doing mischief to the English, but will be wholly at their command, there being no other nation from whom they could obtain the goods which long trade with Europeans has made necessary to them ; and the inland parts of the country, which are reported to be full of minerals, could be more easily explored.5

  To the north similar sentiments were being expressed. Governor Callières, after interrogating a number of prisoners from the siege of Quebec in 1690, learned that the English general had informed his troops “that we must subject them, or they must become our masters.” “This opinion is sufficiently well founded,” Callières wrote the minister of the marine, “and it will be difficult for our colony and theirs to exist except by the destruction and conquest of one or the other.”6

  Neither side would have to wait long to test their theories.

  Notes

  ABBREVIATIONS

  DCB (Dictionary of Canadian Biography)

  NY Col. Doc. (O’Callaghan, Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York)

  DHSNY (O’Callaghan, Documentary History of the State of New York)

  RAPQ (Rapport de l’Archiviste de la Province de Quebec)

  NAC (National Archives of Canada, Ottawa)

  NEHGR (New England Historical and Genealogical Register)

  NYHSC (New York Historical Society Collections)

  MHSC (Massachusetts Historical Society Collections)

  JR (Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents)

/>   Cal. A&WI (Calendar American & West Indies Papers)

  RAPQ (Rapport de L’Archiviste de la Quebec)

  CHAPTER 1: THE BEAVER WARS

  1. O’Callaghan, History of the New Netherlands, Vol. I, 47–48, 76–78. The trading house at the fort’s center measured thirty-six feet by twenty-six feet. About this was a fifty-foot square stockade covered by an eighteen-foot-wide moat. The fort’s first commander was Jacob Jacobz Elkens, who remained in this post for four years. (O’Callaghan, History of the New Netherlands, Vol. I, 76.) The rebuilt fort was located a few miles below Castle Island at Norman’s Kill.

  2. Trigger, “The Mohawk-Mahican War (1624–1628),” CHR, Sept. 1971, 278–279; Hunt, The Wars of the Iroquois, 32–33.

  3. The fivefold increase in the value of the Dutch fur trade can be clearly seen in the table below (Brandao, Your Fire Shall Burn No More, 86).

  4. Hunt, The Wars of the Iroquois, 33–35.

  5. “Journal of the New Netherland,” NY Col. Doc., I, 179–182.

  6. Steele, Warpaths, 115; Narratives of the New Netherlands, 160–164; 274; NY Col. Doc. I, 150; Jesuit Relations, Vol. XXII, 35–37. For Kieft’s commission, see NY Col. Doc., I, 104.

  7. Hunt, The Wars of the Iroquois, 74–75, 169–170; Steele, Warpaths, 115. NY Col. Doc., I, 150–151, 182. One observer noted that “not only the Colonists, but also the free traders proceeding from this country, sold for furs in consequence of the great profit, fire-arms to the Mohawk for full four hundred men, with powder and lead.” (Ibid., 150).

  8. O’Callaghan, History of the New Netherlands, Vol. I, 355–356; NY Col. Doc. XIII, 18.

  9. JR, 24, 287–288, 295.

  10. JR, 27, 63–65. Lalemant blamed much of the Iroquois problem on the advantage the Iroquois possessed over the native allies of New France, “through the arquebuses that they obtain from certain Europeans,” in clear reference to the Dutch. (Ibid., 71).

  11. NY Col. Doc., I, 311–312, 392, 495–502, XIII, 35–36; Goodwin, The Dutch and English on the Hudson, 67; Narratives of the New Netherlands, 1609–1664, 370–372, For Stuyvesant‘s appointment and commission, see NY Col. Doc., I, 175–178. Legend has it that Stuyvesant’s ghost can still be heard thumping about the aisles of St. Mark’s Cathedral, now located near his final resting place (Goodwin, The Dutch and English on the Hudson, 67).

  12. JR, 40, 49–51.

  CHAPTER 2: NEW FRANCE AND NEW HOLLAND

  1. JR, 40, 89. The Jesuit recorder of this event was amazed by how the Onondaga, after all the treachery that had occurred between the French and the Iroquois, arrived unarmed and felt secure, satisfied with the mere word that had been given them for their sole defense. Ibid., 91.

  2. JR, 40, note losses and events in August.

  3. JR, 40, 157. The Seneca and Cayuga did not officially conclude a peace treaty with the French until 1655 although they were represented by the other tribes present.

  4. NY Col. Doc., I, 541–549; Birch, A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe, I, 721–722, II, 418–419, 425. The controversial document entitled, “The Second Part of the Amboyna Tragedy; or a True Account of a Bloody, Treacherous, and Cruel Plot of the Dutch in America,” can be found in Appendix G of History of the New Netherlands, II.

  5. O’Callaghan, History of the New Netherlands, II, 261–265; Fernow, The Records of New Amsterdam from 1653 to 1674, I, 208–223.

  6. JR, 27, 221.

  7. History of the New Netherlands, II, 482–483; NY Col. Doc., XIII, 245–251, 256–257. A later document dated June 17 states that forty-six Dutch were being held prisoner. (NY Col. Doc., XIII, 252).

  8. Brodhead, The History of New York, Vol. II, 32.

  9. Narratives of the New Netherlands, 1609–1664, 414–415, 451–452, 460–465; NY Col. Doc., II, 248–253, 469. In Holland Stuyvesant was unfairly criticized for giving up New Amsterdam without a fight. Given the state of the city’s defenses, the militia’s refusal to fight, and the strength of the English the governor rightly concluded that any resistance would have been senseless.

  10. NY Col. Doc., III, 67, 71, 73–74; Cal. A &WI, V, 236–237.

  CHAPTER 3: THE KING’S HAND

  1. Tracy entered the service as a captain of light horse in 1632. He fought in Germany throughout the Thirty Years’ War, eventually commanding a regiment before being appointed commissary general for the French armies in Germany. He fought for a time in the ranks of the Fronde but later returned to the king’s service. He was created lieutenant general in 1652 and served briefly in Guiana before being appointed “Lieutenant General throughout the length and breadth of the continental countries under our authority situated in South and North America.” Although the official title of viceroy in the Americas belonged to Comte d’Estrades, Tracy held and exercised all the powers of this office and acted unimpeded in this role. (Prouville de Tracy, Alexandre de, 1596–1670, DCB, I).

  2. Verney, The Good Regiment, 13–17. As well as being the finance officer or accountant for the colony, the intendant, who was second only to the governor, was also responsible for the judicial system and the police.

  3. Jesuit Relations, Vol. 50, 127–131; Verney, The Good Regiment, 38–41.

  4. This lake was called Lac St. Sacrement by the French. To avoid confusion I have elected to refer to it by its more modern name throughout the text.

  5. Jesuit Relations, Vol. 50, 133–135, 181.

  6. Lotbiniere, Le Bulletin des recherches historiques, 33, #5, 264–282; Jesuit Relations, Vol. 50, 135, 181–183. Schenectady was also known by its Dutch name of Corlac.

  7. Verney, The Good Regiment, 67–68; The King to Tracy, 24 March 1666, Ministere des Affaires entrangeres, Correspondence politique, vol. 88.

  8. Jesuit Relations, Vol. 50, 141; Marshall, Word from New France, 321–322.

  9. Ibid., 322–323; Jesuit Relations, Vol. 50, 143–145.

  10. Marshall, Word from New France, 324–325; Jesuit Relations, Vol. 50, 145.

  11. Marshall, Word from New France, 325. There may have been fear on the part of the Mohawk sachems that such a campaign would have weakened the Mohawk fighting force to such a point that they would have been vulnerable to the various Canadian and New England tribes which they were at war with or had been at war with in the past.

  12. DHSNY, I, 77–78; Jesuit Relations, Vol. 50, 145.

  13. Ibid., 147, 201–203.

  14. Ibid., 145.

  15. Marshall, Word from New France, 327; Jesuit Relations, Vol. 50, 237. Cadwaller Colden in Volume I of his History of the Five Nations (1727) makes no reference to any hardships suffered by the Mohawk in the proceeding winter nor are there any references to be found among the correspondence of the various New York officials of the period.

  16. Colden, History of the Five Nations, Vol. I, 17–18; Jesuit Relations, Vol. 50, 209–211. The treaty concluded Tracy’s and the Carignan-Salières Regiment’s task in Canada, but given the previous dealings with the Mohawk it was deemed unwise to call for their immediate return to France. Tracy and the two La Colonel companies departed for France in late 1667, but the bulk of the regiment and the Marquis de Salières were to remain in Canada manning and consolidating the defensive works along the Richelieu River for another year. When the regiment finally did embark for France in 1668 over four hundred officers and men chose to accept the king’s offer of land and money and decided to stay in Canada. (Verney, The Good Regiment, 116–117).

  CHAPTER 4: THE FRENCH AND THE FIVE NATIONS

  1. JR, 51, 171.

  2. Royal Fort Frontenac, 108–114; NY Col. Doc., IX, 85–90, 117–118.

  3. NY Col. Doc., IX, 114–116.

  4. Ibid., 126.

  5. Charlevoix, III, 194–196; NY Col. Doc., 128–149.

  6. J. Stockdale, A Collection of Treaties Between Great Britain and Other Powers, Vol. I, 133–150. Under the Treaty of Breda the New Netherlands was exchanged for the West Indies sugar colony of Surinam. NY Col. Doc., III, 85–144, 163–166, contain a number of Nicolls’s letters pertaini
ng to this period. These are supplemented by excerpts and corrections in the Calendar American & West Indies Papers, Vol 5 (1661–1668). “Tis not easily to be imagined what pains I have taken,” Nicolls wrote the Earl of Clarendon in regard to his approach toward the conquered colony. (Clarendon Papers, NYHSC for 1869, 119.) NY Col. Doc., IX, 95–114; Eccles, Canada Under Louis XIV, 1663–1701, 103; Colden, The History of the Five Nations, 18–19.

  7. Whitmore, Memoir of Sir Edmund Andros, xvii–xviii; NY Col. Doc., III, 214–220, 227, 233, 260–265, 283, 302–308; Brodhead, History of New York, II, 287–296. See Church, History of King Philip’s War, and Lincoln, Narratives of the Indian War, 1675–1699 for contemporary accounts of King Philip’s War and the First Abenaki War.

  8. Kingford, Hist. of Canada, I, 455–467, 475–478; Charlevoix, III, 211–212; Tonty Relation, 35–45. The number of Illinois captured varies widely. Frontenac put the number at six hundred to seven hundred.

  9. La Salle Relation, 249–265; Westover, 49–54; Charlevoix, III, 212–213.

  10. Charlevoix, III, 218–219; Eccles, Frontenac, 110–111.

  11. NY Col. Doc., IX, 147–148.

  12. Eccles, Frontenac, 111–118; Royal Fort Frontenac, 142–144.

  13. NY Col. Doc., IX 167–168; La Barre, DCB, I.

  14. NY Col. Doc., IX, 194–195.

  15. Ibid.

  16. Charlevoix, III, 224–226; NY Col. Doc., IX, 194–198.

  17. Ibid., IX, 222–223.

  18. Charlevoix, III, 244–247; Tonty Relation, 115; Lanctot, History of Canada, II, 87–88; DHSNY, I, 99–103.

  19. Ibid., 100–101.

  20. Cal.A&WI, XI, 740; NY Col. Doc., III, 417–418; Charlevoix, III, 251.

  21. NY Col Doc., IX, 239–242; Eccles, Canada Under Louis XIV, 132–134; Charlevoix, III, 245–250; Royal Fort Frontenac, 149–151. La Barre’s army at Fort Frontenac consisted of: King’s Troops (Free Companies of the Marine) 137, Vanguard 206, Rear Guard 215, Reserves 228, Fort’s garrison and misc. 35, for a total of 821. (NY Col. Doc., IX, 234–236.)