Electromagnetic Pulse

by Bobby Akart

  China is by far the world's largest producer of commercial drones, selling over a half a million this year, including popular models like the Phantom III. It is a small step from there to building small military drones, and MAHEM could take the striking power of small drones to another level.

  If Pentagon watchers are accurate, MAHEM will be more effective than existing anti-tank weaponry while also being deadly against other targets, including small buildings, armed pick-up trucks, and electronics targeted by drone strikes.

  CHAMP by Boeing

  A recent weapons flight test in the Utah desert may change future warfare after the missile successfully defeated electronic targets with little to no collateral damage.

  Boeing and the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory situated at Kirtland Air Force Base, in New Mexico, successfully tested the Counter-electronics High-powered Microwave Advanced Missile Project —CHAMP, during a flight over the Utah Test and Training Range.

  CHAMP, which renders electronic targets useless via an electromagnetic pulse, is a non-kinetic alternative to traditional explosive.

  During the test, the CHAMP missile navigated a pre-programmed flight plan and emitted bursts of high-powered energy, effectively knocking out the target's data and electronic subsystems. CHAMP allows for selective high-frequency radio wave strikes against numerous targets during a single mission.

  "This technology marks a new era in modern-day warfare," said Keith Coleman, CHAMP program manager for Boeing Phantom Works. "In the near future, this technology may be used to render an enemy’s electronic and data systems useless even before the first troops or aircraft arrive."

  The action of the high-power microwave had the same effect as an electromagnetic pulse. A cruise missile, which was launched from a U.S. bomber, was pre-programmed to fly over a target and shoot a burst of high-power microwaves at a two-story building. It knocked out rows of personal computers and electrical systems that were shown in a video taken of the test. Following the first target, the cruise missile, then was guided to six other targets, resulting in knocking out all electronics.

  The effects of a CHAMP are very similar to what would happen during an electromagnetic pulse caused by a high-altitude nuclear detonation or by a powerful solar storm, just on a much smaller, more focused scale. Unlike an EMP bomb, which are area weapons and indiscriminate as to who they target within their blast area, CHAMP is an EMP assassin that comes in and surgically eliminates an enemy’s war enabling technology, barely leaving a trace that it was there.

  JASSM-ER by Raytheon

  The AGM-158 JASSM (Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile) is a long-range missile developed and produced by Lockheed Martin. This conventional, air-to-ground and precision standoff missile was designed primarily for the U.S. Air Force. The one-ton class weapon offers high capability and precision in destroying stationary, as well as mobile targets.

  The JASSM, and the extended range version, JASSM-ER, have the flexibility to be integrated into various platforms such as B-1, B-2, B-52, F-16, and F-15E aircraft and is currently deployed on Australia's F/A-18A/B aircraft and Finland's F/A-18 C/D aircraft. It offers enhanced survivability, lethality, and a long-range precision strike to the warfighter, during day and night operations.

  The JASSM flies automatically through a predetermined route by using the onboard navigation system that includes an Anti-Jam Global Positioning System.

  CHAMP has cleared all of the necessary hurdles for deployment, so it needs a proper platform for use against the enemy. JASSM-ER is a logical platform for CHAMP, as it can be launched by both bombers and fighters, and is a proven design that has already evolved into a highly advanced anti-ship missile. Also, it is smart and stealthy, able to actively detect threatening radars, and evade or attack them, making it survivable against the world’s most capable air defense systems.

  Conclusions

  Electromagnetic bombs are weapons of electrical mass destruction with applications across a broad spectrum of targets, spanning both the strategic and tactical. The use of EMP technology in advanced weaponry offers a very high payoff in attacking the fundamental information processing and communication facilities of an adversary. The massed application of these weapons will produce physical paralysis in any target system, thus providing a decisive advantage in the conduct of electronic warfare.

  EMP weaponry can cause hard electrical kills over larger areas than conventional explosive weapons of similar mass. Also, they offer substantial economies in force size for a given level of inflicted damage and are thus a potent force multiplier for appropriate targets. The non-lethal nature of electromagnetic weapons makes their use far less politically damaging than that of conventional munitions, and therefore, broadens the range of military options available.

  It is incumbent upon Washington, to appreciate both the offensive and defensive implications of electromagnetic pulse technology. Failure to consider the consequences of the proliferation of EMP technology, and to take measures to safeguard our vital assets and critical infrastructure from possible future attack, could be catastrophic for the Unites States.

  PART FOUR

  THE THREAT IS REAL

  Chapter Eight

  Components of a Credible EMP Attack

  Based upon what we know, could AN EMP bring down the U.S. Power Grid?

  A high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) attack upon our nation’s critical infrastructure would have devastating consequences for the U.S.

  Such an attack would have the effect of collapsing the electric grid and other critical infrastructure for months or years, including unprotected military and civilian electronics. The U.S. missile defense system is capable of defending against a nuclear missile from the north. If such an attack were to come from the south, we would be unprepared, according to experts. Iran is regarded as already having nuclear missiles capable of making an EMP attack against the U.S. North Korea is rapidly developing orbiting satellites that could potentially launch an EMP attack from space. Recently, critical NORAD operations have been moving back into Cheyenne Mountain, which is EMP hardened.

  While this is considered prudent, the American people are largely unprotected from the ramifications. It’s estimated that in the event of a yearlong nationwide blackout, ninety percent of Americans would perish from starvation, disease, and societal chaos, according to members of the Congressional EMP Commission, which published its last unclassified report in 2008, the executive summary of which is found in Appendix C.

  Experts claim that the Obama Administration has not acted on the EMP Commission’s proposed executive order to protect national infrastructure considered essential, to provide for defense against an EMP attack. Hardening the national electric grid would cost several billion dollars, an insignificant amount when compared to the potential loss of life following an EMP attack. Congress has also failed to act on the recommendations of its own EMP commission, to protect the electric grid and other civilian infrastructure that depend on a viable electric grid—such as communications, transportation, and banking—that are essential to the economy. Several bills have gained bipartisan support in the House but died in the Senate. Fortunately, states are not waiting for the federal government, with Texas being among the states that have an initiative underway to deal with an EMP attack.

  As is often the case, legislation gets caught up in the politics, and lack of action on the EMP Commission’s recommendations is no exception. Over the past decade, there has been an ongoing debate over whether the threat posed by an EMP is real. This debate heated up in 2015 when bipartisan support arose for a national commitment to address the EMP threat, by hardening the national infrastructure.

  There is little doubt that efforts by the United States to harden its utilities against EMP — and its ability to manage critical infrastructure manually in the event of an EMP attack — have been eroded in recent decades, as the Cold War ended and the threat of nuclear conflict with Russia lessened. This is also true of the U.S. militar
y, which has spent little time contemplating such scenarios in the years since the fall of the Soviet Union. The cost of remedying the situation, especially retrofitting older systems, is immense. As with any issue involving massive amounts of money, the debate over guarding against an EMP attack has become quite politicized in recent years.

  Gauging the Threat of an Electromagnetic Pulse Attack

  To determine whether the threat is real, we must discuss the tactical elements involved in an EMP attack and which nation-states are capable of launching such an attack. The following is our assessment of the likelihood of an EMP attack against the United States.

  The effects of an EMP have the potential to be quite significant, but they are also quite uncertain. Despite the meaningful amount of testing undertaken in the late 1950’s into the early 60’s, test data from high-altitude nuclear explosions is extremely limited. The U.S. and the Soviet Union conducted less than twenty atmospheric nuclear tests above twelve miles. The widespread effects of a high-altitude nuclear detonation above this height are unknown.

  In 1963, after the Partial Test Ban Treaty went into effect, prohibiting its signatories from conducting aboveground test detonations and ending atmospheric tests — scientists still questioned the effects of a high-altitude EMP. The Starfish Prime test of 1962 was not designed to study HEMP, and the effect on Hawaii, which was so far from ground zero, startled U.S. scientists. High-altitude nuclear testing effectively ended before the parameters and effects of HEMP were well understood. The limited body of knowledge that was gained from these tests remains highly classified in both the U.S. and Russia.

  Despite these uncertainties, the importance of the EMP threat should not be understated. There is no doubt that the impact of a HEMP attack would be significant. But any nation-state plotting such an attack would be dealing with immense uncertainties — not only about the ideal altitude at which to detonate the device, based on its design and yield to maximize its effect, but also about the nature of those effects and just how devastating they would be.

  Non-nuclear devices that create an EMP-like effect, such as high-power microwave devices, and radio frequency weapons, are now available to several countries, including the U.S. The most capable of these devices are portable and have significant tactical utility. The technology is still developing, and more powerful variants may be able to achieve greater effects on specific targets.

  But at present, non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse weapons do not appear to be able to create an EMP effect large enough to affect an entire city, much less a country. Because of this, we will confine our discussion of the EMP threat caused by a high-altitude nuclear detonation, which also happens to be the most prevalent scenario causing concern in Washington.

  Components of a Credible HEMP Threat

  For there to be a credible HEMP threat, five things are needed:

  · The delivery mechanism to reach the required altitude

  · A sophisticated nuclear warhead for the missile to deliver

  · A motive for conducting an EMP attack

  · A suitable target for maximum desired effect

  · The absence of a deterrent or responsive counter-attack

  The question then becomes: Who is capable of carrying out the threat?

  Plausible HEMP Attack Scenarios

  To have the best chance of causing the type of widespread EMP damage to the continental U.S., a nuclear weapon carrying a one megaton payload would need to be detonated approximately twenty miles above the Earth’s surface, somewhere over the central part of the country. Modern commercial aircraft normally cruise at a third of this altitude. To achieve the desired height, a nation-state would require both the requisite warhead design and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability, to conduct such an attack from their territory. The UK, France, Russia and China have all possessed this ability for decades. Although shorter range missiles can achieve this altitude, the center of the U.S. is still a thousand miles from the east or west coast. One of the biggest concerns of the Pentagon, is the use of a shorter range missile fired from a freighter that enters the Gulf of Mexico. In recent years, North Korea has passed several large commercial vessels, through the Panama Canal towards Cuba, virtually undetected with nuclear missiles in their hold. It is less than eight hundred miles from the Gulf of Mexico to St. Louis, Missouri—the heartland of America.

  The HEMP threat has existed since the early 1960s, when nuclear weapons were first paired with ballistic missiles, and necessarily grew to be an important component of the U.S. nuclear strategy. The doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction has prevented the use of HEMP in modern warfare.

  Despite the limited understanding of its effects, undoubtedly the U.S., China, and Russia, almost certainly included the use of weapons to create HEMPs in both defensive, and especially offensive scenarios.

  However, nuclear weapons have not been employed in an attack anywhere, since 1945. Some pundits believe that a HEMP attack might be considered less destructive, and therefore, less likely to provoke a devastating retaliatory response. Such an attack against the United States would inherently and conclusively represent a nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland, and the idea that the United States would not respond in kind is absurd. The United States continues to maintain the most credible and survivable nuclear deterrent in the world, and any country or terrorist group contemplating a HEMP attack, would have to assume that a reprisal would be full, swift, and devastating. The idea that Washington will interpret the use of a nuclear weapon to create a HEMP, as somehow less hostile than the utilization of a nuclear weapon to physically destroy an American city, is not something a country is likely to gamble on.

  Countries that build HEMP weapons invest vast amounts of capital in their nuclear programs. A successful nuclear weapons program is the product of decades of scientific research and development. U.S. nuclear weapons are maintained as a deterrent to an attack, not with the intention of using them offensively. Over the years, the U.S. has achieved an initial first-strike capability. The focus of the Department of Defense is to establish a survivable deterrent that can withstand first, a conventional, and then, a nuclear first strike. Under this policy, the nuclear arsenal can serve its primary purpose as a deterrent, and then a means of counter-attack.

  It is comforting to know that the countries capable of carrying out a HEMP attack, still govern themselves by the Mutually Assured Destruction doctrine. The principles of nuclear deterrence, and the threat of a full-scale retaliatory strike, continue to hold and govern post-Cold War.

  The Threat from Rogue Actors

  One of the scenarios that concern Washington is that the EMP threat stems from a rogue state or a terrorist group like ISIS that does not possess ICBMs, but who will use deception to accomplish its mission. A rogue state, like North Korea or Iran, or even a terrorist group, could load a nuclear warhead and missile launcher aboard a cargo ship or tanker. The missile could be launched from our coastal waters, placing the warhead in position for a targeted HEMP strike. This scenario, without leaving any fingerprints, would involve either a short-range ballistic missile to achieve a localized metropolitan strike or a longer-range—but not necessarily intercontinental—ballistic missile to reach the necessary position over the central U.S. to deliver a continental strike.

  This threat scenario faces the same obstacles as any other potential nuclear weapon employed in a terrorist attack. It is unlikely that a terrorist group like al Qaeda or Hezbollah can develop a nuclear weapons program. Their organizations do not have the requisite financial or personnel resources to do soit.

  It is also highly unlikely that a nation like Iran or North Korea, who have devoted significant resources to developing a nuclear weapon, would entrust such a weapon to an outside terrorist organization. There have been great strides made in the last decade in the field of nuclear forensics. The use of a nuclear weapon would be vigorously investigated, and the nation that produced the weapon would be identified.

&nbs
p; A group like ISIS, however, would likely use a nuclear device, if it could obtain one. The risk of a terrorist group acquiring a nuclear capability of any kind, crude or sophisticated is possible, but not likely. Here’s why:

  The development of a HEMP nuclear weapon requires significant financial resources, scientific talent, and time. An attack scenario from a rogue actor requires a sophisticated nuclear warhead capable of being mated with a ballistic missile. There are considerable technical barriers that separate a crude nuclear device from a sophisticated nuclear warhead.

  The engineering expertise required to construct such a warhead is far greater than that needed to build a radio frequency weapon, for example. A warhead must be far more compact than a simple device. It must also have a trigger mechanism and electronics capable of withstanding the force of an ICBM launch, the journey into the cold vacuum of space and the heat and force of re-entering the atmosphere — and still function as designed. Designing a functional warhead takes considerable advances in several fields of science, including physics, electronics, engineering, metallurgy, and explosives technology. Overseeing it all must be a high-end quality assurance capability.

  But even if a terrorist organization were able to obtain a functional warhead and compatible fissile core, the challenges of mating the warhead to a missile that it was not designed for, and then getting it to launch and detonate properly, would be far more daunting than it would appear at first glance. Additionally, the process of fueling a liquid-fueled ballistic missile at sea and then launching it from a ship, using an improvised launcher, would also be very challenging. Experts say that North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan all rely heavily on Scud technology, which uses highly volatile, corrosive, and toxic fuels.