Dieppe: Operation Jubilee - Channel Ports

by Tim Saunders

  One of the first US soldiers in action in Europe, Ranger Corporal Koons photographed at a medal presentation after the raid.

  However, it was not the battery’s main armament that was turned on the commandos, but the 20mm anti-aircraft guns and a mortar baseline located some way inland. ‘One could see streams of phosphorescent shells as they raked the edge of the wood and the noise as they exploded against tree trunks.’ There was little that the commandos could do about the mortars, whose bombs were now exploding all around them, but bringing forward the Boys Anti-tank Rifle Section they took on the anti-aircraft guns. ‘Gunner McDonald was firing the gun, with Private Davis as his No 2, and he operated against the flak tower with great effect... Then he devoted his attentions to the German machine guns, ably assisted by the Brens.’

  The commando’s diminutive 2-inch mortars were in action, but radio communication with the more effective 3-inch medium mortar in the valley by the gully had failed. After one 2-inch ranging shot, the third mortar bomb hit No. 1 Gun’s propellant charge bags, ‘which ignited with a stupendous crash, followed by shouts and yells of pain.’ Sergeant Major Dunning said ‘It was luck, nothing more than luck... probably the luckiest mortar shot of World War II.’ The COHQ report recorded that ‘the Battery never fired again; up to that moment, it had fired a few salvos which fell into the sea without doing any damage.’

  The view from Major Mills Roberts’s position at the edge of the wood looking due south towards Hesse battery. The gunpits are marked.

  The commandos continued to direct their fire at any German attemps to man the guns or to rescue the wounded. Meanwhile, the heavier weapons suppressed the enemy machine guns, which repeatedly attempted to come back into action. Against the odds, the commandos were winning the firefight, but were doing so at the cost of a steady stream of casualties, mainly due to enemy mortar fire.

  While the firefight was going on, the signallers were sending messages back to Major General Roberts on HMS Calpe and via the Phantom radio operators on Orange Beach I direct to Admiral Mountbatten at RAF Uxbridge. With a Situation Report transmitted, Mills-Roberts pondered the overall situation:

  ‘So far so good. But I was desperately anxious to know how Lovat’s main assault force was getting on in their wide detour round the flank. We had been unable to get them on the air and did not even know if they had got ashore all right. Otherwise it would be our task also to carry out the assault on the battery at 6.30 a.m. after the cannon fighters had raked it with their guns at 6.28 a.m.’

  However, probably as Group 2 came up out of the Saane Valley, Major Mills-Roberts ‘received a signal... confirming that they [Group 2] were now actually in their forming-up position behind the battery.’ Group 1 intensified its fire but it remained ‘accurate and well-controlled.’ Belatedly, communications back to the 3-inch mortar line were established, and they joined the action ‘with a heartening crash. At 6.25 a.m. we deluged the whole battery area with smoke and saw the cannon fighters roar in for their two-minute strike at 6.28 a.m. Then we saw the Verey-light signal for the assault by Group 2.’

  The Assault

  Lord Lovat led his men through the wire at the back of Orange Beach 2, into cover and out of the field of fire of the Germans’ cliff-top positions in the Quibberville area. They had achieved this in a matter of minutes, with minimal casualties from Spandau, rifle and mortar fire. Off shore, Lieutenant Peter Scott’s Grey Goose returned the fire with her three-inch gun. Even as late as 0849 hours, a German Fifteenth Army signal read that ‘Around Quiberville the situation is not clear and it has not yet been established whether Quiberville has been attacked or not.’ The speed of the move off the beach and Corporal Finney’s wire cutters had done their job and contributed to success.

  The view from Orange Beach II up the la Saane valley.

  The commandos of Group 2 ran a mile inland across rough country along the eastern flank of the Saane valley. Lovat noted:

  ‘Although we went through German infantry on both sides, we weren’t shot at once we had left the beach. We ran the whole dammed way, just stopping occasionally to regroup but nobody got out of breath and we didn’t have to wait for laggards.’

  Group 2 turned east up a valley towards the hamlet of Blancmesnl and on towards the battery, which was still over a mile away. At about 0530 hours, Lord Lovat was relieved to hear Group 1 firing on the battery, as he had not yet been able to contact Major Mills-Roberts on his 18 Set. As Group 2 approached, the two assault troops separated onto separate routes to the north and south of Blancmesnl Wood. F Troop, on the northern axis, came under fire and were forced to screen their movement as they closed in on the battery with smoke. In the confusion, a ‘blue on blue’ fire-fight broke out, where F Troop engaged Colonel Lovat’s HQ. However, as radio communication was now working well, the fire was checked before damage was done and was successfully redirected at the Germans, who were to be seen moving around, covered from Major Mills-Roberts’s Group to the north of the battery.

  COHQ reported in a public relations document that as F Troop cautiously closed in on the battery, they spotted a platoon of Germans debussing from a truck in a farmyard. In the confused situation, these troops, either the off-duty shift from the battery or a quick reaction force, were vulnerable and, as explained by Lord Lovat:

  ‘There is no finer target at point-blank range than troops in or out of lorries before they have shaken into any fighting formation. They were liquidated, and we moved on to take up our final position.’

  Meanwhile, B Troop was taking a less exposed route to the south of the wood, up a shallow valley that led to the battery’s perimeter fence. Both troops reported to Commando HQ that they were in their assault positions. White phosphorous smoke grenades were prepared to cover the final advance to the enemy’s wire, where Bangalore Torpedos were to be pushed under the pilled coils of dannert wire, to blow a route into the battery

  At 0628 hours, just as Lord Lovat was preparing to fire the three white Verey lights that were to initiate the attack, another pair of Spitfires dived onto the battery, despite the fact that they were being pursued by German Focke-Wulf fighters. The cannon fire smashed into the battery, and inevitably, because the commandos were so close, they received some of the Spitfire’s rounds. It is recorded by COHQ that two of Major Mills-Roberts’s US Rangers, who were sniping at the Germans, ‘were blown from the roof of a house, but were unhurt.’ However, under the cover of Group 1’s rapid small-arms fire and ten 3-inch mortar smoke rounds, the assault went in. Royal Artillery Officer Captain Porteous, with B Troop, recounted:

  ‘Luckily, we found a spot on the wire... where obviously the German soldiers had been coming home late from leave or something of the sort and had trampled a passage down through this bit of wire at the back. We managed to get in without any problem at all. . . So we then did a little bayonet charge into the gun pits themselves.’

  B Troop had benefited from a combination of luck, rare German carelessness, and the increasingly desperate break-in battle that F Troop were fighting just to their north. With about two hundred yards of open ground to cover, F Troop were under heavy fire from one of the 20mm flak guns and from riflemen deployed in the centre of the battery position, firing from hedgerows and buildings that had not been cleared from the site. The commandos of F Troop started to suffer casualties, but Lord Lovat’s men charged the second belt of wire, which ‘was crossed, in places, over the bodies of our dead and wounded.’ He went on to say, ‘It was a stupendous charge which went in, in many cases, over open ground swept by machine-gun fire.’

  Major Pat Porteous, according to his Victoria Cross citation was

  ‘In the initial assault . . . working with the smaller of the two detachments, was shot at close range through the hand, the bullet passing through his palm and entering his upper arm. Undaunted, Major Porteous closed with his assailant, succeeded in disarming him and killed him with his own bayonet, thereby saving the life of a British Sergeant on whom the German had t
urned his aim.’

  The officers of F Troop wearing their own parent regiment’s cap badges on their green berets.

  Once inside the battery’s perimeter, the sharp fight amongst the buildings and covered positions continued unabated. Sub-machine-gun fire and grenades were exchanged at close range as the commandos pushed on with determination. F Troop’s Sergeant Major Stockdale’s citation for the Distinguished Conduct Medal reads:

  ‘Sergeant Major Stockdale took command of the troop after all his officers had been killed or had become casualties. TSM Stockdale, while leading a bayonet charge had part of his foot blown away by an enemy stick-bomb [sic]. Although in great pain, TSM Stockdale continued to engage the enemy. He set a splendid example and was an inspiration to his men.’ Stockdale had the satisfaction of limping around a

  Captain Pat Porteous VC.

  building and felling the German grenadier with a burst from his Thompson sub-machine gun. Corporal Blunden received a well-deserved Military Medal for setting:

  ‘...a high standard of leadership, and showed a great example in house-to-house, and hand-to-hand fighting through the battery buildings. He was wounded but refused to receive medical attention and continued to destroy the enemy until there were no Germans left alive.’

  The ground across which the commandos attacked from the Blancmenil Wood to the centre of the battery.

  Two of the Hesse Battery command post bunkers, now in the garden of a modern home. The gun pits lay beyond.

  Such was the ferocity of the fighting against German troops, whose quality and morale had not yet been sapped by events on the Russian front, to the extent that they were to be in 1944. However, at the Hess Battery, Lord Lovat explained that there was ‘no pity for an enemy who knew no code and had no compassion’.

  Despite the suppressive fire from Group 1. German machine-gun positions on the eastern flank of the large battery perimeter were still in action. Lovat recorded in his after-action report:

  ‘Considerable numbers of Germans, who had hidden in underground tunnels containing stores and ammunition, in the battery office, under tables, in the cook house and out-buildings, were either bayoneted or shot at close range by sub-machine guns. Two officers including the military commander were also killed after a rousing chase from building to building.’

  Battery Commander Hauptmann Scholer was actually only wounded during the commando’s clearance of his gun position. Armed only with a pistol, he fought well in the buildings in the centre of the battery, before finally being left for dead. By 0630 hours, fifteen minutes after Group 2 assaulted it, the battery was in Lord Lovat’s hands.

  Meanwhile, as B Troop, under cover of white phosphorous smoke from No. 77 Grenades, were completing the clearance of the battery in detail. F Troop had cleared the gun pits with grenades, and the commando engineers were at work preparing to blow the guns. They packed the specially prepared charges that they had carried in their Bergen rucksacks into the breaches of the six 150mm guns. With a shell ready in the gun barrel, the massive charges burst the barrels and blew off the breach blocks. So thorough were the demolitions, they even destroyed the gun sights to prevent their salvage. The official report records that ‘at 0650 hours, five of the guns were blown up and shortly afterwards the sixth gun, which was a considerable distance away, was demolished alone by Lance Corporal Skerry.’ In some cases, the commandos were only tens of yards away when the demolition charges exploded. Meanwhile, according to Major Mills-Roberts, ‘a number of German snipers were now shooting up the battery area from outside.’

  While No. 4 Commando was still in occupation of the battery, ‘suddenly a squadron of Messerschmitts swept in low over the battery.’ Major Mills-Roberts described the considerable presence of mind of the commandos:

  ‘From the air, most troops looked alike, and so instead of taking cover, we waved genially to them, receiving in return a reassuring wave from the German Squadron Leader – their interference would have been an embarrassment. They were flying very low, but they did not tumble to the fact that we were not the rightful occupants of the battery.’

  The COHQ report recorded that with the guns destroyed and the battery searched for documents, ‘before leaving the battery, the bodies of those who had fallen in the action were collected and laid down upon the site, after which the Union Jack was run up over the British dead.’ With the Union flag flying, as a defiant calling-card on 813 Batterie’s own officers’ mess flagpole, No 4 Commando’s withdrawal began at about 0700 hours.

  The Withdrawal

  Lord Lovat always believed that the withdrawal was potentially the most difficult part of the operation, but he had carefully prepared for this phase. C Troop was holding a beachhead around Orange Beach 1, from which the whole Commando would be picked up by the waiting Royal Navy assault craft. He planned to avoid the more open Orange Beach 2, where he was certain that he would have been seen, in favour of the closer Orange 1. This was a sound plan as it later became apparent that German reinforcements had been waiting to ambush the commandos who they expected to return via Quiberville.

  Landing craft waiting off Orange Beach I for the return of the commandos. Note the partly effective smoke screen.

  Not least of the problems of the withdrawal was the evacuation of the men wounded during the taking of the Hess Battery. The commandos would not leave the wounded to the Germans. As planned, a medical detachment came forward from Group 1 into the battery, and with the help of four German prisoners of war, evacuated the wounded on ‘stretchers,’ back through the woods towards Orange Beach 1. At least one of the stretchers was a door taken from a nearby building. One German gunner apparently protested that a medical officer had excused him from marching because of frostbite that he suffered on the Eastern Front, and that he should not be bearing stretchers. Captain Porteous had eventually collapsed from loss of blood and was one of the wounded to be carried back to the beachhead by the four German prisoners. He recalled that ‘they needed a little encouragement with the bayonet and that the prisoners were also reluctant to approach the cliff top ‘because they had laid all the mines there and they weren’t quite sure where they were.’

  Meanwhile, A Troop, which had been split between Group 1 and Group 2, were providing fighting patrols designed to dominate the area around the beachhead and the gap between Orange 1 and Orange 2. Just before they were due to withdraw, they spotted two five-man German patrols coming from the hamlet of St Marguerite, and identifying their route, Lieutenant Veasey deployed his men in hasty ambush position in the hedgerows. The commandos opened fire when the leading enemy infantrymen were just fifteen yards away. Several Germans fell, and the remainder beat a hasty retreat. Taking advantage of the enemy’s confusion, Lieutenant Veasey led his section’s withdrawal back to Orange 1 ‘with all possible speed.’ An old French lady, who had witnessed the action, apparently gave an egg to each of the commandos as they passed.

  As Lord Lovat ordered the withdrawal from the battery, the volume of enemy small-arms and mortar fire increased, but it was inaccurate and sporadic. The longer the commandos remained at the battery, the more coordinated the German response would become. However, the Germans had now realised roughly where the commando’s re-embarkation would take place, and unobserved 81mm medium mortar fire targeted the area of the gully and Orange 1 Beach. In reply, the commandos’ own 3-inch medium mortar concentrated on keeping the German infantry at bay with high explosive rounds while the 2-inch Mortar Section fired smoke. With A Troop already climbing down the cliff and embarking, B Troop, followed by F Troop, passed through C Troop into the tight cliff-top beachhead.

  Once the assault force were within the perimeter of the beachhead and were scrambling down the gully, C Troop started what was potentially the most difficult part of the withdrawal. They had to finally break clean from the enemy and escape across the beach to the landing craft. At 0815 hours they began a manoeuvre that they had repeatedly practised during training, in which Bren guns, working in pairs, withdr
ew alternately behind the 2-inch mortar smoke screen. The fire and manoeuvre worked well, and smoke was used liberally to obscure the commandos, who were dashing from cover to cover.

  The gully and the landing craft waiting off Orange I Beach.

  The area of Orange used for the withdrawal of both Group 1 and 2.

  No. 4 Commando leaving behind the smoke shrouded Vasterville cliffs overlooking Orange I Beach.

  During the landing, each commando from Group 1 had carried two No. 18 Smoke Generators up the gully, and dumped them at the top of the gully for use during the final stages of the withdrawal. Similar devices shrouded the beach with billowing clouds, and to cover the waiting LCAs, the Royal Navy set off smoke floats, and the Germans fired blindly into the resulting grey clouds. The COHQ report described the re-embarkation of No. 4 Commando:

  ‘The re-embarkation began at 0730 hours, three extra LCAs being sent from the Boat Pool to assist. During the re-embarkation, shells burst about every half-minute on the beach, some 500 yards to the Westward, causing no casualties. The exceeding flatness of the beach and the fast-ebbing tide made re-embarkation difficult. The LCAs were taken in as far as was deemed practicable and the troops then waded out to them, sometimes up to their necks. Throughout this operation, the Goatley collapsible boat, which had been landed by the second flight, proved useful in ferrying the wounded. She was paddled by a short red-faced Commando Trooper clad solely in a “Mae West” and a woollen cap. The Boat Officers of the LCAs displayed sound seamanship in coping with their task. Smoke was extensively used, the Mark VI Smoke-floats being very effective.’