Dieppe: Operation Jubilee - Channel Ports

by Tim Saunders

  With the re-embarkation clearly not going well, the Hunt Class destroyers HMS Albrington and HMS Brockelsby, along with gunboats, came as close into the beach as they dared and gave covering fire to the Canadians. Under this cover, the Camerons and SSRs swam out to the LCAs and MGBs, whose crews were also suffering heavily from enemy fire. ‘Again the enemy machine guns fired on us and several were hit while swimming.’ Lieutenant Commander Hanson of HMS Albrington reported:

  ‘During the final withdrawal from Green Beach, men were seen lying under the sea wall and dashing down under fire to the sea. Permission to bombard flanks was obtained from HMS Calpe and the position of some enemy forces in houses to right of beach was established from soldiers who had been brought off. Smoke shell was also fired onto the high ground to right of beach. Afterwards, this ship picked up stragglers and survivors until the retirement was ordered. During the withdrawal [visual signalling] communication was difficult due to great quantities of smoke. Coastal and landing craft were making for the nearest destroyer asking for instructions, which were difficult to give.’

  HMS Albrighton recovered a total of 182 soldiers and landing craft crews, ‘as well as eight who died’ of their wounds.

  The Last Stand of the Saskatchewans

  Lieutenant Colonel Merrit had already repeatedly heroically led groups of his men across the bridge, but throughout the withdrawal to Green Beach, his per-sonal leadership, courage and example of selfless commitment was to inspire his men to the heights of sacrifice. He and other leaders of all ranks, includ-ing Lieutenant Commander Prior of the Royal Navy, elected to remain behind to mount a rear-guard action, even though they could have saved themselves from death, wounds or capture. The Saskatchewan’s Adjutant, Lieutenant Buchanan, recalled that his Commanding Officer was one of the few men in the battalion who was a strong swimmer and could easily have saved himself.

  ‘Major McRae said to him, “Come on, get the hell out of here.” But Merritt, he was a bulldog. These were his men. He was only a young fellow and this was such a disaster, he must have been torn to pieces inside. He started off, but then he said, “Oh God; my job is back there” and he swam back to the beach. So he stayed there...’

  If his earlier action at the bridge had not been enough to ensure he would be awarded a VC, Colonel Merritt, under heavy fire, ran across the beach to drag wounded men from the sea back into the cover of the seawall. Captain Runcie said of this and other acts of heroism, ‘It wasn’t human, what he did’. During this part of the battle, the Colonel, seemingly immune from enemy fire, was finally hit but he carried on despite his wound.

  With the last few craft coming in, and a rapidly diminishing number of unwounded Canadians waiting on the beach, Colonel Merritt, Major Claude Orme and a group of soldiers fought on in the casino, covering what was to be the final withdrawal, but hoping that more LCAs and support would come to their rescue. There was to be no further evacuation, and during the course of the afternoon, as ammunition ran out, the Germans cautiously advanced towards the casino on the sea front that had been Colonel Merritt’s last defence. All around, there were dead and wounded Canadians.

  Replacement buildings stand on the site of Colonel Merritt’s last stand.

  Canadian wounded being helped to safety.

  Safe aboard a ship but harrowed looks mark the faces of the men who were lucky enought to escape from the beaches.

  The Combined Operations report stated that ‘in spite of the extremely difficult conditions, a very considerable number of men were successfully withdrawn’. But the casualties on Green Beach and Pourville were high. Of the 523 SSR who set off to Dieppe, 84 were killed or died of wounds; 89 became prisoners of war; and of the 353 who returned to England, 167 were wounded. The Camerons, who embarked a total of 503 men at Newhaven, recovered only 268 men back to England, including 103 wounded. Sixty Camerons were killed and a further sixteen died in British or German hospitals, while 167 became PoWs. The troops landing at Green Beach had lost more than sixty-five per cent of their strength.

  One of the few prisoners of war taken back to England in the hands of a military policeman.

  Some time later, in a prisoner-of-war camp in Germany, Lieutenant Colonel Merritt received news from the German Camp Commandant that he had been awarded the Victoria Cross, Canada’s highest award for bravery. A fellow South Saskatchewan prisoner had just received a swatch of maroon material cut from the cloth used to cover his favourite couch back in Canada. With a medal ribbon made up with this swatch, the prisoners held what must be the most unusual and unofficial investiture ever.

  CHAPTER EIGHT

  DIEPPE – RED AND WHITE BEACHES

  The German response to the preliminary landings at 0445 hours, to east and west of Dieppe, was prompt, but there was the usual uncertainty, because some initial situation reports based on assumptions or scant information proved to be incorrect. Reports climbed the German chain of command, and a message from HQ LXXXI Korps to Fifteenth Army, timed 0605 hours, read ‘Bombs dropping on Dieppe, and enemy landing attempts at Berneval, Dieppe, Pourville and Quiberville.’ At 0630 hours, General-Feldmarschall von Rundstedt was at his desk in GHQ West, receiving a similar message.

  Initially, von Rundstedt was by no means clear how the action around Dieppe fitted into the overall picture. It was however, obvious to him from the outset that if this was just a raid, it was certainly the largest raid of the war so far, with coordinated landings on a frontage of about fifteen miles. Alternatively, these landings could be the first move in the major invasion that the Abwehr had so confidently predicted. Von Rundstedt waited for further detailed ‘Sitreps’ to arrive, but none came. At 0700 hours, without further confirmation of Allied intentions, he ordered Fifteenth Army to bring 10th Panzer Division and the SS Adolf Hitler Division to Alarm Scale Z. He also requested the Luftwaffe to be prepared to intercept the Allied air forces that were bound to be active over northern France. Finally, though it was promptly rejected, he requested the Kriegsmarine to mount U-boat attacks on the Allied amphibious force.

  Feldmarschall von Rundstedt.

  At 0732 hours, the Sitreps eventually started to arrive. Chief of Staff, HQ LXXXI Korps reported that ‘the landing attempt at Pourville had been repelled, but bombing continued on Dieppe.’ The situation at Quiberville was, however, ‘still unclear,’ and at 0740 hours, the Kriegesmarine reported that telephone lines to the port commandant at Dieppe were cut. This forced the Naval Signal Station at Dieppe to transmit a message by radio: ‘English continue to land at Dieppe. Destroyers laying smoke on coast. Up to now twelve tanks have landed. One is on fire’. Oberst Bartlet, commanding 571 Infanterie Regiment, realising that the attack was concentrated around Dieppe, had already ordered I Battalion his regimental reserve to advance on Pourville from the west and south-west at 0710 hours.

  General Kuntzen, commander LXXXI Korps, at his headquarters at Canteleu near Rouen, was convinced from an early stage that the enemy attack was purely a raid, and correctly assessed the enemy operation as lacking sufficient combat power to be a credible spearhead of a full invasion. He therefore ordered his reserve of four lorried infantry battalions to converge on Dieppe.

  Shortly afterwards at 0730 hours, the 10th Panzer Division joined Korps and 302nd Division’s reserves in marching towards Dieppe. The first reinforcements, an infantry Kampfgruppe based ten miles from the port, arrive in the Dieppe area in time to be in action at 0800 hours. It is this Kampfgruppe that the Camerons had clashed with near Petit Appeville. However, moving on pre-recced routes it was appreciated that it would take most of the reserves at least four hours to fully concentrate in the Dieppe area, and longer for them to recce enemy positions, routes and forming-up places, prior to coming into action.

  German Panzers on the march in France. 10th Panzer Division did not arrive until after the Canadian withdrawal.

  A map of the defences compiled after the raid.

  One of the postcards used to brief the Canadian troops. The view is look
ing east from the Western Headland along the main beach to the harbour entrance.

  The Defenders of Dieppe

  II Battalion 571 Infanterie Regiment held the town of Dieppe, as far east as the entrance to the port and the headland, and as far west as Pourville; in all, a frontage of 5,500 yards. To the east of the harbour, III Battalion held the Eastern Headland, and were strung out along the coastline as far east as the small port, le Treport. A part of I Battalion was deployed on the coast to the west of the port, with, as already noted, an infantry company as reserve further inland.

  The mile-long Esplanade was mainly held by the 150 men of 7 Kompanie, of whom many were Volksdeutsch from captured territories in the east, or simply foreigners who, finding themselves citizens of Greater Germany, had been conscripted into the Wehrmacht. Along with a number of Kriegsmarine anti-tank gunners, they occupied positions in pillboxes along the seawall, and also occupied strong points such as the Casino and the Old Castle (at the western end of what was to be White Beach). Their task was to fire onto the beach and to cover the sea wall and the wire obstacles along its top. The sea wall at this time varied in height from just a few feet to its full ten feet, according to how the sea had banked the shingle and how effectively the Germans had bulldozed it back again. The double barbed-wire fence, made up of multiple rolls of dannert wire, was some seven feet thick, with a fifteen-foot gap between the two entanglements. This combination of sea wall and the wire fences was a significant obstacle that would have to be breached before any force of infantry or tanks could get off the beach. Beyond the beach defences lay the open grass lawn of the Esplanade; 7 Kompanie’s killing area. Here, any force attempting to cross the sixty yards of open ground to attack them and press on into the town would be caught in a crossfire from strong points, supplemented by riflemen and Spandau gunners positioned in the large houses and hotels that backed the Esplanade. The defensive positions in the already substantial buildings had, according to the post-operational intelligence analysis, ‘been fortified by masonry and/or concrete blocks.’

  The Old Castle still stands overlooking the medieval gate and the site of the Casino.

  The view from across the Esplanade Boulevard Marechal Foch to the lawns and Boulevard de Verdun and the substantial buildings beyond.

  II/571 Infantry’s Deployment Around Dieppe.

  In defences around the port area were the naval ratings of 3rd Kompanie of the Experimental Battalion (Naval). The infantry of 8 Kompanie held positions on the dominating Western Headland, including Four Winds Farm, while 6 Kompanie and other Kriegsmarine troops held the town and port facilities. Finally, 5 Kompanie was guarding the inland approaches to the town, with the role of immediate reserve in the case of a frontal attack.

  To the infantry’s small-arms fire must be added that of the artillery positions on the cliffs to east and west, along with their mortar detachments located further inland. The Germans had even concreted into position a captured French R17-18 tank, with a 37mm gun, on the harbour wall at the eastern end of Red Beach. This gun and coaxial machine gun could fire down the entire length of the beach, and caused significant problems to the Canadians.

  In summary, Dieppe was a very strong defensive position, which Combined Operations had elected to assault in a frontal attack. However, there were not many Germans in the town, as some reports and commentators have indicated. German records, confirmed by interrogation of the handful of German prisoners taken back to England, are explicit: there was a single infantry battalion in the town. What did surprise the Allies was the speed with which Germans from the surrounding area were able to start concentrating on Dieppe.

  The Ground

  The Jubilee plans were based on an analysis of the beach and the immediate area inland, which was detailed in the COHQ report:

  ‘The beach stretches from the breakwater for 1,700 yards. The high-water line is backed by a seawall about ten feet high, from which numerous groynes run out into the sea. The beach itself is composed of shingle four inches in diameter, or less, sloping down to sand at the low-water line. For the first 130 yards, the gradient of the beach is 1 in 40, then it rises steeply (1 in 10) to the seawall. The average width of the beach is 130 yards, but at its western end, it is somewhat more than 300 yards. The seawall, built of masonry and concrete, is 1,500 yards long with a vertical face... Immediately behind this sea wall and running for its whole length, is the Boulevard Marechal Foch [and]... beyond it are lawns and flowerbeds 165 feet wide, interspersed by paths. On the landward side of these lawns runs the Boulevard de Verdun, a road wide enough for two or three lines of traffic. The shingle has, in places, been washed up against the seawall almost level with its top. It was thought that nowhere was the top of the sea wall more than two feet above the beach shingle except opposite the Casino and south-west towards the end of the promenade, where the height was about four feet. At five places along the seawall there were steps leading to the beach.’

  The western end of the beach was dominated by the large Casino building and the whole area, particularly to the west was overlooked by cliff’s and the Old Castle.

  Dieppe’s port area showing Red Beach, and the various basins beyond.

  The western end of the beach was dominated by the large Casino building, and the whole area, particularly to the west, was overlooked by cliffs and the Old Castle.

  The Assault Plan

  The initial assault was to be by two battalions of 4 Canadian Infantry Brigade, supported by the Calgary Regiment’s Churchill tanks. The Essex Scottish were to land on the left (Red Beach) and the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry (RHLI) were to land on White Beach to the right. The landing was timed for 0520 hours, with the first flight of the Calgary Regiment’s tanks touching down amongst the assault infantry. Their orders stressed ‘It is vital to the success of the operation as a whole that White and Red Beaches be in our hands with the minimum delay.’ The first wave of assault infantry were to establish a bridgehead, while supporting troops including military police would provide off-loading parties for the Royal Canadian Engineers’ assault detachments. The COHQ report recorded:

  ‘The latter would clear the necessary beach roadways and remove obstacles to enable the tanks to enter the town. The tanks, the order stated, would support the assault, and were to proceed to their objectives whether the beaches were cleared or not.’

  However, there was an agreement that some of the tanks of the Calgary Regiment would assist the Beach Assault Engineers in their additional task of clearing pillboxes on the seawall.

  The Essex Scottish, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Jasperson, code named ‘Fred,’ having crossed Red Beach and the Esplanade, were to dispatch a company to the Bassin du Canada. They were to seize the bridges to the north and south of the basin, clear the east bank of the harbour, capture three light anti-aircraft guns on the Le Pollet (eastern) cliffs and then link up with the Royal Regiment of Canada, who were landing at Blue Beach. Another company was to seize the German armed trawlers at the quayside, with the assistance of the tanks, HMS Locust and a flotilla of French Chasseur craft, who would enter the harbour. This company would then help to clear and hold the east bank of the harbour. The third company was to remain on the west side of the harbour and capture anti-aircraft and artillery positions in that area. Subsequently, this company would secure the Hippodrome on the southern sector of the perimeter, and then select and mark an emergency airfield for the Air Force. Meanwhile, engineer demolition parties would be at work in the docks.

  The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Labatt, code named ‘Bob,’ was according to Colonel Stacey to have:

  ‘...one company, moving west along the cliff-top from the Casino, to capture two Light AA guns near the edge of the cliff... and make contact with the South Saskatchewan Regiment [SSR] from Pourville. One troop of tanks was to cooperate. Subsequently this company would assist in the capture of the position at Les 4 Vents [Four Winds Farm].’

  Another company, operat
ing southward, was to capture the important battery position at a mile and a half inland and the three light anti-aircraft guns nearby. This company would also join the attack on Four Winds Farm. It will be recalled that in the event, without the support of the RHLI, the South Saskatchewan failed in their solitary attack from the west. The RHLI’s third company was to operate southwards along Rue Gambetta as far as the southern edge of the town. Having reached these positions, the RHLI would secure the south-western perimeter of Dieppe, while the remainder of the battalion would be in reserve near battalion headquarters at the St Remy church.

  The Calgary Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Andrews, code named ‘Johnny,’ were to land in four flights. Flight One, consisting of nine tanks, would land at 0520 hours as follows: headquarters of C Squadron and 13 Troop were to land simultaneously with the Essex Scottish on Red Beach, while 8 Troop of B Squadron would land on White Beach, in support of the RHLI. Further tanks landing at 0535 hours were to support the Hamilton’s part in the attack on Four Winds Farm, while the final flight of tanks would land at 0705 hours as a reserve and would ‘probably exploit to Arques.’