State of Failure

by Jonathan Schanzer

  By mid-May, a Palestinian official admitted that the Palestinians were preparing another bid at the United Nations.61 Shortly thereafter, Abbas again threatened that “we will go to the UN to extract a seat for Palestine as a non-member state”62 if no diplomatic progress was made.

  Meanwhile, reports in the Israeli media suggested that the Palestinians were planning to launch a campaign, along the lines of the UNESCO bid, to be recognized as an “observer state” at Rio+20, the UN Conference on Sustainable Development in Brazil. Israel, the United States, and Canada were reportedly working against the initiative.63 A few days before the beginning of the conference, Palestinian ambassador Ibrahim Alzeben said, “We expect full-status participation because we already have it in UNESCO and we have ties with Brazil (the host country which recognizes the Palestinian state) and with more than 130 countries.”64

  As it became increasingly apparent that the PLO was poised for another run at the United Nations, Washington reportedly began to push back against the leadership in Ramallah. In an interview with the Saudi Okaz newspaper, Saeb Erekat said the United States was threatening to suspend aid and close down the PLO mission in Washington, DC, if the Palestinians returned to the United Nations.65 The PLO representative to Washington, Maen Rashid Areikat, later denied reports that the United States was threatening to cease aid or close the PLO mission in response to the UN bid, but it was clear that US pressure was taking its toll.66 On July 23, Al-Hayat reported that Abbas preferred to postpone the UN bid until after the US elections in early November.67

  On August 2, the Associated Press reported, “The possibility of repercussions abroad has sparked a growing debate in [Abbas’s] inner circle over the timing of such a call, and whether it should be delayed until after the U.S. presidential election.”68 According to PLO official Hanan Ashrawi, “There are some who might want to wait until after November because of American pressure, but the Americans have done nothing but put pressure on the Palestinians, without delivering anything. . . . What we need is to move fast.”69

  On August 5, the Times of Israel reported that Israel was “offering incentives to the PA to drop the unilateral statehood gambit.”70 Maariv reported that “Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has offered to release 50 prisoners detained before the Oslo Accords if the Palestinian Authority cancels its proposed UN bid.”71 Mahmoud Abbas, however, stated that the Palestinians would continue toward the UN “even if this step conflicts with other parties’ interests.”72

  In mid-August, Ynet News reported that the Arab League was considering submitting the Palestinian bid on behalf of the leadership in Ramallah in an attempt to draw the fire from the Western states that sought to cut aid to the PA. Around this time, November 29 was floated as the date the Palestinians would return to New York. On that date in 1947, the United Nations first accepted an Arab and a Jewish state in the British Mandate of Palestine. That symbolic date has also since been marked by the United Nations as the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People.73

  But the Palestinian leadership continued to waver. Reports differed from day to day. Abbas and his inner circle remained in limbo about their maneuver, weighing whether it was worth angering the United States and potentially putting relations with Israel on a collision course. The Associated Press reported in late August that “the Palestinians are putting their quest for international recognition at the U.N. on hold for now.” The report also said that Abbas would “not apply at the General Assembly session next month, although he will informally appeal for recognition in a speech.”74 According to the Jerusalem Post, “threats and extortion” by the United States pressured the Palestinians to make the decision.75

  On September 5, in an about-face, Mahmoud Abbas said that the Palestinian leadership would proceed with the statehood bid at the end of the month. “I am going this month to the UN General Assembly in light of the latest decision in Doha, the Islamic summit and the Non-Aligned Movement summit,”76 Abbas said. The same day, however, Palestinian foreign minister Riyad al-Maliki said that no date had been set and that Arab states would lobby on behalf of the PLO throughout the fall.77

  The driving force behind the bid was the Fatah Central Committee. This powerful group “reiterated its support for President Mahmoud Abbas to seek upgraded status for Palestine at the United Nations this month,”78 according to Ma’an News Agency, in mid-September. By September 20, the New York Times reported that the Palestinians were pursuing a “subdued campaign” to gain nonmember state status. According to the report, “The delegation heading to New York this weekend is half the size of last year’s. And there are no concerts or street parties planned this time around President Mahmoud Abbas’s September 27 speech to the General Assembly.” Nonetheless, Saeb Erekat said that the Palestinians were expecting to garner between 150 and 170 votes for their resolution.79

  On September 24, the Washington Post reported that “it is far from clear that his [Abbas’s] words will be followed anytime soon with a draft resolution to change the Palestinians’ status at the U.N. from an ‘observer entity’ to a non-member ‘observer state.’” The report further noted that “Palestinian officials acknowledge that any such resolution is unlikely to be presented in the weeks leading up to the U.S. election [in November], so as not to antagonize President Obama at a politically sensitive moment.”80

  In his UN speech on September 27, Mahmoud Abbas stated, “We have begun intensive consultations with various regional organizations and Member States aimed at having the General Assembly adopt a resolution considering the State of Palestine as a non-Member State of the United Nations during this session.”81

  In the days and weeks that followed, the Palestinian issue was given relatively short shrift, thanks to the election cycle in the United States and the civil war in Syria. But it was increasingly clear that the November 29 date was the target. On October 1, Saeb Erekat revealed that the Palestinians had “started consultations with Arab countries and other geopolitical groups over phrasing a draft resolution to the UN General Assembly requesting acceptance of Palestine as a non-member state.”82 Erekat was similarly quoted as saying that “the Palestinian train toward membership in the UN has started to move and it will not be stopped by threats.”83

  While it openly did not issue threats, the United States remained adamantly opposed. On October 15, US ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice said that the Palestinian bid “would only jeopardize the peace process and complicate efforts to return the parties to direct negotiations.”84 The following day, Abbas sent a letter to President Obama stating that the Palestinians would return to negotiations “after obtaining international recognition.”85 Days later he told reporters, “We’re ready to go back to negotiations straightaway. Going to the U.N. is not a substitute for negotiations. We are in need of negotiations to solve the final status of issues that face us both.”86

  With a month to go before the November 29 bid, Reuters reported that the “Palestinians have launched a diplomatic blitz aimed at garnering a strong majority for a vote granting the non-member statehood at the United Nations slated for next month.” A PLO official said, “From the E.U. we will have a minimum of 12 votes and maybe up to 15, as some are not yet decided.”87 On October 31, Palestinian official Mohammad Shtayyeh left for Denmark, Sweden, and Finland to garner additional support for the upcoming bid.88 Additionally, “envoys were dispatched to Germany, Austria, [and] the United Kingdom,” according to the Associated Press.89 Writing in the Telegraph, Nabil Sha’ath said it would be “reprehensible” for British diplomats to discourage the Palestinian UN bid.90

  The Israelis, meanwhile, were apparently looking to launch a counter-offensive. On November 6, Haaretz reported that nine senior Israeli ministers prepared to meet to discuss the Palestinian UN bid and potential retaliatory measures.91 However, there was no discernible Israeli strategy.

  With the US elections over on November 7 and
a second Obama presidential term secured, Abbas congratulated the US president on his victory and “expressed hope that Obama will stand by the Palestinian decision to gain a non-member state status in the United Nations.”92 Reuters quoted Erekat as saying, “We did him [Obama] a favor [delaying the UN bid until after US elections] and we hope he will remember that.”93

  On November 8, the Palestinians began circulating a draft resolution calling for an upgrade in their status.94 The following day, an Arab League official revealed that 51 states were still undecided how they would vote.95 Over the three weeks that followed, the numbers fluctuated, but the prevarication had ended. The Palestinians were set to return to the United Nations. Only this time, they would not make the mistake of asking for full membership and risk a US veto at the Security Council. Instead, they planned to go directly to the General Assembly, where they had the numbers advantage and where the United States and Israel were only 2 of 193.

  While the lead-up to the vote on November 29, 2012, was filled with international intrigue and drama, the vote itself was rather uneventful. Everyone assembled in Turtle Bay that day knew the vote would redound overwhelmingly in Abbas’s favor. And it did; 138 countries voted in favor of the initiative. Only nine voted against—eight, not including Israel.

  France, expectedly, voted in favor of the bid. The surprises, though, were the abstentions by Germany and Great Britain because they had been among the countries initially opposed. Both countries viewed their vote as a means to contest Israeli settlement construction. Other countries that voted in favor indicated that they saw the bid as an important step to advance the Palestinian national project. However, prior to the vote, Western diplomats from around Europe also quietly conceded that they believed their vote would help the PLO counter Hamas’s growing influence, particularly after the Gaza-based terrorist group claimed victory in its mini war with Israel in November.96

  But supporting a bureaucratic maneuver at the United Nations, which merely granted Abbas a temporary boost in approval, was not a viable strategy for developing a functioning democratic state in the West Bank. The move, in fact, only exacerbated the challenges in the West Bank. It bolstered the current leadership without pushing for much-needed reform.

  14

  Righting the Ship

  In January 2013, just months after Mahmoud Abbas had successfully upgraded the PLO to nonmember observer status at the United Nations, the PA was in dire straits. The government was strapped for cash, and the United States, its largest donor, was withholding aid. Even Arab states were slow to provide the West Bank government with the funds it needed to function. The PA sought assurances of a safety net from the Arab League,1 but using the past as a guide, there were few signs that the Arab states intended to do more than merely pledge funds that would likely never be transferred to a PA account.2

  At the time, some Palestinian officials suggested that US pressure, as an expression of displeasure with the UN upgrade, was preventing Arab states from aiding the PA.3 True or not, the Palestinian leadership was forced to look for alternative financing. One of the solutions to the financial crisis presented to the Palestinian leadership was to take out loans from the Palestine Investment Fund (PIF). As Palestinian finance minister Nabil Qassis said, “We don’t like to do it, but our options are very limited.”4 The PIF stated that no such loans were made.5

  In the meantime, the PA government was not doing itself any favors. Reports suggested that poor administration continued to eat into the government’s coffers. The Ma’an News Agency reported that between January 2008 and January 2012 alone, the government had lost $43 million in border fees.6 Meanwhile, according to the Associated Press, one Palestinian watchdog group was investigating 20 claims that senior PA officials “stole public funds.”7

  Financial mismanagement was only part of the story. In February 2013, within a span of just a few days, a series of articles published in surprising places hammered the PA for its continued campaign to restrict press freedom. Left-leaning media watchdog commentator Jillian C. York lambasted the PA on the Al-Jazeera website.8 George Hale, an editor at the Ma’an News Agency, penned an academic survey for Global Information Society Watch.9 And the New York Times ran an op-ed slamming the PA’s authoritarian practices.10

  The very fact that the New York Times ran a piece on the topic was notable. Just weeks before in an uncharacteristic editorial, the newspaper made a plea to save the flailing government. The Times’ primary goal, it seemed, was to fundraise for the government as a means to save the remaining shreds of the Oslo Accords.11 After all, the PA was designed to be the caretaker government according to the agreement. Without that caretaker government, there would not be much left of the accords.

  But the Times may have already been too late. Within days of his UN victory, Abbas had requested that the United Nations begin referring to the PA government as the “State of Palestine.”12 In other words, the PLO had already potentially scuttled the PA, the interim government put in place by the Oslo Accords and the cornerstone of Palestinian–Israeli negotiations since 1994.

  Perhaps for these reasons, Shawan Jabarin, director of Al-Haq, a human rights organization in Ramallah, expressed concern about potential “legal and political complications” and a “lack of clarity that needs to be sorted out.”13

  And the complications didn’t end there. Abbas also issued a decree that all stamps, signs, and letterheads would be changed to reflect the new name.14 The move, according to one Palestinian official, was aimed at enhancing Palestinian “sovereignty on the ground” and was a step toward “real independence.”15

  The Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction, an aid institution more commonly known as PECDAR,

  was reportedly the first Palestinian institution to comply with Abbas’s decree.16 The Palestinian Ministry of Information followed suit,17 and other ministries followed after.

  But Abbas was not done making moves. The PLO’s official mouthpiece, Palestine News and Information Agency (WAFA), ran a piece on January 5, 2012, stating that “an earlier decision has been reached [by the PLO] to delegate to the [PLO] Central Council the duties of the Palestinian Authority’s government and parliament.”18

  In other words, Abbas appeared to be taking steps that would enable him to consolidate power by facilitating the transfer of key components of the PA into the hands of the PLO, which has never been subject to public scrutiny in the way that the PA has been since its inception in 1994. It was entirely unclear at the time whether Abbas was testing to see whether such a move was feasible or whether he was truly softening the ground for a big move.

  Abbas never framed it this way, of course. Instead, he declared that he was prepared to shut down the PA in the face of continued Israeli settlement construction. In fact, more than 25 times since assuming leadership in 2005, according to journalist Khaled Abu Toameh, Abbas has threatened to quit as the PA’s president or simply dismantle the PA.19 Partisans of the Palestinian cause have roundly supported him. They say that the Palestinians should not have to ask permission to do anything, not least from their occupiers. They support the notion that collapsing the PA would saddle the Israelis again with the full administrative burden of the West Bank. (Gaza, under the control of Hamas, is another kettle of fish.)

  But what Abbas’s supporters—both domestic and international—didn’t seem to realize was that by shutting the doors of the PA, the PLO could leverage its newfound status at the United Nations (not Abbas’s elected presidential authority, which expired in 2009) to consolidate power.

  And, as this book has explained, the last thing anyone needs is a more muscular PLO. The PA was created, in part, to curb the bloated PLO, which has earned a reputation over the years as being ossified and less than transparent.

  This was lost on the New York Times editorial writers. But they did get one thing right: “If there is ever to be a peace agreement be
tween Israel and the Palestinians, there has to be a competent government to run a Palestinian state and leaders with whom to make a deal.”20

  In March 2013, President Barack Obama traveled to the Middle East to jump-start the peace process and nudge the Palestinians and Israelis back toward President Bush’s roadmap. In July 2013, diplomacy resumed under Secretary of State John Kerry. But there is an inherent problem. One cannot talk about a roadmap when there is no clear road to take.

  For peace to be achieved, it would be great for the Palestinians and Israelis to see eye-to-eye on a host of issues. It would be wonderful for both sides to renounce their hatred. But, more basically, both sides need to be able to have functioning governments and viable economies. The Israelis have both. The Palestinians do not.

  Both sides need to have a legitimate public administration and an active civil society. The Israelis have both. The Palestinians do not.

  Salam Fayyad, in the wake of his resignation, made this abundantly clear when he slammed the Palestinian leadership in the pages of the New York Times. “Our story is a story of failed leadership,” he told columnist Roger Cohen, adding, “it is incredible that the fate of the Palestinian people has been in the hands of leaders so entirely casual, guided by spur-of-the-moment decisions, without seriousness.”21 Fayyad’s office later denied that the outgoing reformer had made these comments,22 but Cohen insisted that Fayyad’s quotes were genuine. “It happened. He spoke out,”23 he wrote via Twitter.

  Fayyad’s apparent frustration is understandable. Despite his best efforts, the Palestinians do not have the kinds of durable government institutions that will allow them to subsist side-by-side with Israel. In all likelihood, with the current infrastructure, Palestinian independence could actually mean collapse.