Siege of Khe Sanh

by Robert Pisor

  222 “days, weeks”: Herr, p. 109.

  222 Masters asked repeatedly: Nalty, p. 55.

  222 One of every ten: Wheeler, AP dispatch, A075-953A, Feb. 9, 1968.

  222 bunker materials: Shore, p. 55.

  223 “They worked nine to four”: Perry, “Dusty Agony.”

  223 “digging your own grave”: Lewis M. Simons’ AP dispatch, AP007-1228P, Feb. 10, 1968. See also “Marines Find Flaws,” New York Times, Feb. 22, 1968, p. 1, and Herr, p. 105.

  224 Nothing . . . could stop the . . . shells: Shore, p. 57.

  224 reconnaissance company: Wheeler, “Morale,” AP, dispatch A075-953A, Feb. 9, 1968, and especially Duncan, I Protest!, and Donnelly, “Draw Noose,” Newsweek.

  224 it was “The Eyes”: Herr, p. 87.

  225 Lownds: Wheeler, AP dispatch, A075-953A, Feb. 9, 1968.

  225 “Thanks to a small army”: Shore, p. 93.

  225 “utterly insensible”: Herr, p. 144.

  226 “The blade is . . . poised”; “The General’s Biggest Battle”: Time, Feb. 16, 1968, p. 19.

  226 “Can we hold this place”: Wheeler, AP dispatch, A034-634A, Feb. 5; and Simons, AP dispatch, A007-1228P, Feb. 10, 1968.

  226 “we’re here to stay”: Washington Post, Feb. 5, 1968, cited in Braestrup, p. 508.

  226 “That’s the way it is”: Simons, AP dispatch, 007-1228P.

  226 “they pick just the right . . . terrain”: Shaplen, Road, p. 117.

  226 “You don’t fight this fellow rifle to rifle”: Littauer, p. 52.

  227 Schweinfurt: Martin Caidin, Black Thursday (Ballantine Books, N.Y., 1960), p. 22.

  227 B-52: Nalty, p. 82, and USAF, p. 157.

  227 ten fighter bombers: USAF, p. 52 and 225; Shore, p. 94.

  227 bombers had been diverted: Nalty, pp. 61–62.

  228 150 targets a day: Pearson, p. 76; USAF, pp. 218–25, and Electronic Battlefield, p. 88.

  228 artillery: Shore, pp. 93–112.

  228 enemy shells: Comments reports that during Operation Scotland, the combat base and the hill outposts took 898 60mm mortar shells, 2,895 82mm mortar shells, 326 120mm mortar shells, 185 recoilless rifle shells, 1,743 artillery shells, 1,249 rockets (which differs very sharply from Captain Dabney’s estimate of 5,000 rockets from Hill 881 North alone), and 3,612 “unknown” shells, for a total of 10,908 enemy shells.

  229 Dienbienphu . . . 45,000 shells: Keegan, p. 89.

  229 Allied outpost . . . 14,000 rounds: “History Book Battle,” U.S. News and World Report, pp. 43–44.

  229 “barrage”: “Plight of Khe Sanh Called Not So Dire,” Washington Post, March 3, 1968, p. A20.

  229 “continuous roll of thunder”: Davis, Kenneth S., Experience of War (Doubleday and Company, Inc., Garden City, N.Y., 1965), p. 159.

  230 “dreary, dirty, miserable war”: Chaisson, Oral History, pp. 329–30.

  230 “I’ll know someone is lying”: Wheeler, AP dispatch, 002-108P, Feb. 12, 1968.

  230 “peck, peck, peck”: Simons, AP dispatch, 070-854A, Feb. 24, 1968.

  231 “This ain’t the Marine Corps I know”: Simons, 070-854A.

  231 On 881 South: Most of this account of life and death on the hilltops, especially on Hill 881 South, comes from Shore and from author’s interviews with William Dabney.

  232 Pineapple Chunk: Shore, p. 98.

  232 The dental patient: Shore, p. 82.

  233 “It’s now or never”: Wheeler, “Wound,” AP dispatch, 027-304P, Feb. 21, 1968.

  233 “pure hell”: Althoff, “Helicopter Operations,” pp. 47–49.

  234 “psychological breakdowns”: Dabney interview. See also Wheeler, “Hills,” AP dispatch, 011-157P, March 1, 1968.

  234 “If it wasn’t for the Gaggle”: Shore, p. 89.

  235 “we would never have surrendered”: Dabney interview.

  235 “prettiest waterfalls I’ve ever seen”: Shore, p. 89.

  235 flag ceremony: Shore, pp. 1–2.

  236 The enemy was hurting: Dabney interview.

  237 pet snipers . . . Luke the Gook: Shore, p. 116 and Herr, p. 125, and Perry, “Dusty Agony.”

  237 “I think those North Vietnamese are nervous”: from a Feb. 5, 1968 Washington Post article, cited in Braestrup, p. 308.

  237 “Let’s kill our seven each”: Arnett, Peter, “Khe Sanh,” AP 089-1047A, March 7, 1968.

  238 If the North Vietnamese had poisoned: Nalty, p. 105, and Thompson, No Exit, p. 69.

  238 “never, never . . . Never”: Tompkins, Oral History, p. 40.

  238 Westmoreland . . . surprised: Soldier, p. 347.

  238 February 23: Marines—1968, p. 301.

  238 expected . . . heavier: Nalty, p. 14, provides a list of the guns and rocket launchers that U.S. intelligence had expected to arrive at Khe Sanh.

  238 men from Bravo Company: Shore, pp. 122–123, Comments (especially Captain Pipes), and author’s interview with John A. Cicala Jr.

  239 “trolling along”: Tompkins, Oral History, p. 31.

  240 “Is anyone else alive?”: Wheeler, AP dispatch, 080-954A, Feb. 27, 1968.

  240 “immediate emergency”: Nalty, p. 62.

  240 seismographic equipment: Soldier, p. 346.

  241 The B-52s made their first: USAF, p. 157, and Nalty, pp. 83–86.

  241 Nalty, p. 86, says 492 B-52 missions, not 589 missions.

  241 “One hiccup”: Wheeler interview.

  241 “a string of volcanos”: Comments.

  241 “God . . . they don’t even care”: Arnett, AP dispatch, 089-1047A, March 7, 1968.

  242 “like long, thin arms”: Comments (Lt. Col. W.J. White).

  10. THE FALSE FINISH

  In addition to the Newspaper Files and Command Chronologies, the essential sources are Oberdorfer’s Tet!, especially “America the Vincible,” p. 237–77, and “The Shock Wave,” pp. 157–96, and Braestrup’s Big Story, particularly “Khe Sanh: Disaster in the Making?” pp. 256–34. I do not always agree with Braestrup’s conclusions, but his collection, organization, and analysis of all the important news accounts of the Tet period are awesome.

  PAGE

  243 The whole world was watching: Braestrup, p. 256.

  243 “near-Gettysburg proportions”: Jerry Greene, “Johnson Turns the Dotted Line Into a Hot Spot,” New York Daily News, Feb. 6, 1968.

  244 “No single battle of the Vietnam War”: “The General’s Biggest Battle,” Time, Feb. 16, 1968.

  244 “We do not doubt the outcome”: Oberdorfer, pp. 193–94.

  244 “That’s what we get paid for”: Perry, “Dusty Agony.”

  244 “What if those gooks . . . are really out there?”: Herr, pp. 113–14.

  245 the last day of February: Shore, pp. 124–25; Electronic Battlefield, p. 87; Pearson, p. 77. This small attack, staged by about three platoons of North Vietnamese soldiers (according to Comments, Associated Press, and Newsweek), slowly grew to a company-sized attack (according to Lownds in Electronic Battlefield, p. 87) to an enemy battalion (in Pearson, p. 77), to “at least a regiment” according to fire support officers in Comments, until finally, in the official Marine history, p. 124, it becomes “a heavy attack against the base, [possibly] the main prong of the Communist offensive.” The larger estimates are based on sensor reports and stories from the Bru, who were said to have seen piles of bodies along Route 9.

  246 “This was not their best effort”: Arnett, AP dispatch, 089-1047A, March 7, 1968.

  246 “just another probe”: “Waiting,” Newsweek, March 11, 1968, p. 58.

  246 C-123 Provider: U.S. Marines—1968, p. 303.

  246 fewer than a dozen trenches: Perry, “Dusty Agony,” and Swearengen, “Siege.” p. 28.

  247 anti-aircraft fire . . . “unsophisticated”: Guay, “The Khe Sanh Airlift.”

  247 “a vital link”: Comments.

  247 “Khe Sanh was a trap”: English, Oral History.

  248 “there must be, some good sound reason for being there”: Shoup, David M. Testimony to Committee
on Foreign Relations, 90th Congress, 2nd sesson, March 20, 1968.

  248 “Perhaps our generals prepared for the wrong battle”: “ABC Evening News,” Feb. 5, 1968.

  248 “Maybe Khe Sanh is just a feint”: Newsweek, Feb. 12, 1968. Palmer, Summons, pp. 175–76, argues persuasively that Khe Sanh was a diversion. On February 11, the North Vietnamese declared on Hanoi Radio that the buildup at Khe Sanh had been a feint (Visions, p. 53).

  248 “illogical”: my notes from a Feb. 14, 1968 briefing.

  248 the enemy had turned his attention: Roberts, Gene, “U.S. Command Sees Hue, not Khe Sanh, as Foe’s Main Goal,” New York Times, March 7, 1968, p. 1. The rising doubts about enemy intentions were also caught in “Khe Sanh: U.S. Girds for Red Blow,” U.S. News, Feb. 26, 1968, pp. 29–30.

  248 “between 6,000 and 8,000 men”: Johnson, p. 405.

  249 206,000 additional American soldiers: The impact of Westmoreland’s troop request is explored in many studies, especially Schandler and Braestrup, but it is measured best in Oberdorfer, pp. 269–73.

  249 “very heavy fighting”: Buckley, “Westmoreland Asserts.”

  249 “lost the cream of his army”: Report, p. 135. See also Oberdorfer, pp. 185–86, and Soldier, p. 321.

  250 “Nobody in Saigon”: Soldier, p. 321.

  250 “They got so damn hysterical”: Nalty, p. 104. Charleton, p. 128–30, also discusses the psychological impact of Tet.

  250 Military assessments: Chaisson had already described how close Saigon came to chaos in the first days of Tet; Palmer, Summons, p. 103, asserts Tet was an intelligence failure comparable to Pearl Harbor or the Battle of the Bulge.

  251 “we’d have had a catastrophe”: Johnson, p. 417.

  251 “The doors were left wide open”: Thompson, No Exit, p. 142.

  251 “even 525,000 American troops were not enough”: O’Neill, The Strategy of General Giap, p. 16.

  251 “would have required literally millions of men”: Soldier, p. 147.

  251 Ridgeway said: Halberstam, Brightest, p. 142; see also Ridgeway’s Memoirs, cited in U.S. News and World Report, Jan. 3, 1966.

  252 the war strained: Schandler, p. 53; and Thompson, No Exit, p. 58.

  252 The fear of Chinese intervention: Littauer, pp. 35–37 is especially good, but Johnson, Graff (p. 137) and Shoup also discuss it in detail.

  252 “to kill the tree by plucking leaves”: Palmer, Summons, pp. 94–95. See also Report, pp. 291–93.

  252 monthly average: Kinnard, pp. 94–95.

  253 threshold of pain: Oberdorfer is best, beginning at p. 238; see also Schandler, pp. 138–46.

  253 “The American people would never forgive me”: Johnson, p. 408.

  254 Westmoreland . . . brief to the Commander: Johnson, pp. 416–17.

  255 meticulously prepared: Nalty, p. 96, and Shore, pp. 132–34.

  255 “attempted repeat of Dienbienphu an abject failure”: Soldier, p. 347.

  256 Westmoreland felt betrayed: Soldier, p. 410.

  257 Tolson . . . knew it was a charade: Stubbe, p. 1239, says Tolson’s intelligence chief believed Khe Sanh was a diversion for the Tet attacks on Hue. See also Tompkins, Oral History, p. 80.

  257 “a life more similar to rats than human beings”: Comments.

  257 Marines . . . “not sufficiently prepared”: Touhy, William, “Marines’ Leaders Disappoint U.S. Command,” Washington Post, March 3, 1968.

  257 Westmoreland . . . considered resigning: Soldier, p. 262.

  258 “I want . . . no implication of a rescue”: Comments.

  258 Bravo grunts: Shore, pp. 128–30, and Comments.

  260 “a wasteland”: Comments.

  260 “red orange moonscape”: U.S. Marines—1968, p. 303.

  260 “absolutely denuded”: Tompkins, Oral History, p. 48.

  260 “The ville was all rubble”: Stubbe, p. 797.

  260 “the enemy threat had been squelched”: Shore, p. 137.

  260 Westmoreland . . . to Washington: Soldier, p. 347.

  261 “heroic defense”: Shore, pp. vi–viii.

  261 “premier logistical feat of the war”: Report, p. 172.

  261 “one of the heaviest . . . displays of firepower in the history of warfare”: Soldier, p. 339. (The numbers are from Shore, and Report, and Nalty, p. 105.)

  261 “The key to success”: Report, p. 171, and USAF, p. 157.

  261 evidence that the B-52 missions had been compromised: John S. Carrol, “Reds Claim Forewarning of B-52 Raids,” Baltimore Sun, March 20, 1968, p. 2. (See also footnotes below.)

  262 “surprise is completely lost”: Burchett, Vietnam North, p. 141.

  262 Hanoi Radio . . . poem: AP dispatch, A031, March 30, 1968, cited in Braestrup, p. 149.

  262 “frequent, timely, and accurate warnings”: Nalty, p. 88.

  (NOTE: In July of 1981, the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested a former U.S. Air Force warrant officer, George Helmich Jr., and charged him with espionage for the Soviet Union. Between 1963 and 1965, the FBI said, Helmich sold top secret decoding equipment to the Soviet Union—equipment capable of unlocking the electronic doors on the black boxes inside B-52s, unscrambling the codes, and identifying the targets. U.S. intelligence had worried about critical leaks in the B-52 bombing program, but believed security could be assured by cutting the South Vietnamese out of the selection and approval of specific targets. If the charges against Helmich are proved true, then his espionage may have helped enemy forces at Khe Sanh avoid the full power of the strategic bombers.)

  263 “his back was broken by . . . B-52s”: USAF, p. 157.

  263 “It was a battle won by you”: Nalty, p. 88.

  263 honors and medals: Shore, pp. 141, 145–46.

  11. ONE MORE TIME

  This account of the last Marine attack on Hill 881 North comes from the brief battlefield summaries called Situation Reports; from Shore, pp. 141–43; and from the battalion commander who supervised the assault: Lt. Col. John C. Studt, “Battalion on the Attack,” Marine Corps Gazette.

  PAGE

  265 Anha tried to tell the Marines: Carolyn Miller letter. See also Corson, Consequences, where Anha is elevated to “the hereditary king of the Bru,” a completely false title.

  265 “Why don’t they ask for guides?”: Miller letter.

  266 167 dead or wounded . . . of 185: Studt, “Battalion.”

  267 “Sir, I can’t stop them. . . .”: Shore, p. 142.

  267 “they were all grinning”: Studt, Battalion, p. 44.

  12. THE CURTAIN FALLS

  PAGE

  269 Westmoreland vetoed: Nalty, p. 100.

  269 The 26th . . . Regiment: Shore, p. 144.

  270 “like a little Los Angeles freeway”: Beverly Deepe, “U.S. Military Seeks Khe Sanh Offensive,” Christian Science Monitor, March 26, 1968.

  270 “U.S. airpower was almost completely zero”: Tompkins, Oral History, p. 24.

  270 “the crucial anchor of our defenses”: Asprey, p. 1281.

  270 “pour down Route 9”: Neil Sheehan, “5,000 U.S. Marines Face 20,000 of Foe,” New York Times, Feb. 23, 1968.

  270 “the most famous military engagement of the war”: Clayton Fritchey, “Khe Sanh: Like Waiting in the Electric Chair,” Washington Star, March 11, 1968.

  271 “an unwillingness to grant the enemy”: Sheehan, “5,000 Marines.”

  271 “a rather sticky problem”: Chaisson, Oral History, pp. 149–50.

  271 the White House: Shore, pp. 145–46.

  272 “the optimum time”: Shore, p.149.

  272 “buried . . . burned, or blown up”: U.S. Marines—1968, p. 311.

  273 John S. Carroll: “Report,” Atlantic Monthly, October, 1968, and author’s interview.

  273 “The high command pretends”: U.S. Marines—1968, pp. 311–12.

  274 “the operation of the base at Khe Sanh unnecessary”: Ibid.

  BODY COUNTS

  PAGE

  275 One hundred ninety-nine . . . Two hundred five: Electronic B
attlefield, p. 95.

  275 John Wheeler: author’s interview.

  276 441 dead Americans: Stubbe, beginning on p. 1440. Stubbe (pp. 798–800) also reports that thirteen American helicopter pilots, fourteen American helicopter crewmen, and seventy-four Vietnamese soldiers died in a landing zone ambush not far from Khe Sanh Village on January 21. The sole survivor was an Army major named Tommy Stiner who worked his way through enemy patrols for thirteen hours, stumbled into the Marines’ mine fields, and was shot by a Marine sentry before being rescued. The story appears nowhere else.

  277 Robert Ellison: the author was one of many news correspondents who tried to back track Ellison when he was reported missing.

  278 the Bru: Stubbe, p. 1222 and pp. 1084–87; and Shore, p. 127.

  278 “The amount of firepower . . . exceeded anything . . . in history”: USAF, p. 157.

  278 “sanctity and sacredness”: Chaisson, Oral History, p. 299.

  278 “the immediate situation dictated an attack”: Nalty, p. 66.

  278 Father Poncet: Miller letter.

  279 Pegasus: Shore, p. 143.

  279 “My staff estimated”: Soldier, p. 347.

  279 Colonel Lownds was convinced: Electronic Battlefield, p. 95.

  279 “most reasonable estimate”: Nalty, p. 103.

  280 “wiped out an entire regiment”: Swearengen, “Siege,” p. 27.

  280 the official body count . . . 1,602: Shore, p. 131, and Comments for the count of weapons.

  280 “a bunch of poop”: Tompkins, Oral History, p. 40.

  280 “pure, unadulterated bullshit”: Dabney interview.

  280 “ludicrous, absolutely ludicrous”: Tompkins, p. 40.

  280 “often inflated”: Kinnard, p. 72.

  281 “A long and devastating silence”: Halberstam, Brightest, p. 653.

  JUDGMENTS

  PAGE

  283 “U.S. airpower was almost completely zero”: Tompkins, Oral History, p. 24.

  283 By pinning down and by decimating two North Vietnamese divisions”: Stubbe, p. 1234.

  284 “Khe Sanh proved to be a superb diversion”: Thompson, No Exit, pp. 68–69.

  284 “General Giap was smugly satisfied”: Palmer, Summons, p. 172.

  284 “How could anyone legitimately question who was tying down whom?”: Soldier, p. 339.