Greek Historiography

by Thomas F Scanlon

  quickly, and effectively.

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  We note that Polybius differs from Herodotus and Thucydides in not

  naming himself or his city affiliation, yet he resembles them in offering an extensive introduction to his topic. His self‐erasure recalls Xenophon’s, though his ambiguous social identity, which bridges Greek and Roman

  allegiances, makes his motive for silence different. It is an oversimplification to connect the habit of self‐effacement with seeking to be closer to the clear (in our terms “objective”) truth: giving one’s name and state may as well be an effort at truthful transparency. Withholding one’s authorial name, as practised by some historians (for example Xenophon), is a perplexing habit for which there is no clear explanation, and indeed there may be differing reasons for each writer. Polybius seems to aim formally at subordinating his identity through a gesture of humility or avoidance of apologia (as the Roman Sallust later did), while his readers, both Greek and Roman, in fact knew who he was and (mostly) held him in high regard. Accordingly, an

  introductory chapter presents his thematic concern with how the historian must not consider partisanship ( eunoia, literally “goodwill”), and at times must speak well of enemies and criticize friends, as the context requires: “if you take truth [ ale ̄ theia] from history, what is left of it is an unprofitable narration [ die ̄ ge ̄ ma]” (Plb. 1.14). Yet he seems to distinguish telling the truth about valorous or vicious individuals from his firmly held and grander opinion that Roman hegemony was and is a good thing for the world.

  Polybius’ introduction begins with a discourse on how the topic of

  Rome’s greatness is exceptional, in view of the lesser achievements of earlier “empires” ( dunasteio ̄ n, Plb. 1.2): Persia never succeeded outside of Asia; after Athens’ rule fell, the Lacedaemonians held sway for barely

  twelve years; Macedonia’s empire went far, but never extended to Sicily, Sardinia, or Libya, as Rome’s did later. Polybius’ justification for his subject has resonance with Thucydides’ claim in his preface that the

  Peloponnesian War was the greatest and “most noteworthy” of all wars to date and hence a worthy topic, though the focus here on the Romans’

  extension of empire is a radical shift from the topic of one war, without extraordinary praise of either side.

  The Roman conquest, on the other hand, was not partial. Nearly the whole inhabited world was reduced by them to obedience: and they left behind

  them an empire not to be paralleled in the past or rivaled in the future.

  (Plb. 1.2.3, Shuckburgh)

  Thucydides’ narrative is a critique of the nature of power, while Polybius’

  admires the extension of Roman rule with few reservations.

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  Polybius’ starting point is the 140th Olympiad (220–217 bc), when

  events in the Mediterranean became more closely connected:

  But from this time forth History becomes a connected whole: the affairs of Italy and Libya are involved with those of Asia and Greece, and the tendency of all is to unity. This is why I have fixed upon this era as the starting‐point of my work. For it was their victory over the Carthaginians in this war, and their conviction that thereby the most difficult and most essential step towards universal empire had been taken, which encouraged the Romans

  for the first time to stretch out their hands upon the rest, and to cross with an army into Greece and Asia. (Plb. 1.3, Shuckburgh)

  Since “the majority of Greeks have no knowledge of the previous

  constitution, power, and achievements of Rome and Carthage,” the

  historian outlines them here and explains “the original intent and final success [of the Romans] in grasping universal empire and dominion.”

  The work thus explains and justifies the Roman path to dominion over

  regions that include that of the readers themselves: Greece. This leads to a discussion of the role of Fortune (Tyche) and the need to present a

  universal history in order to convey the comprehensive and interconnected sense of events over decades – to see the whole body, not just the limbs (Plb. 1.4).

  Finally there is a transition to the Romans’ first expedition outside of Italy, to Sicily, which ultimately led to the construction of a navy (Plb.

  1.5). Polybius’ beginning date, carefully fixed by references, is 387/6 bc (19 years after Aegospotami, 405 bc). The year 387/6 is that of the

  King’s Peace (or Peace of Antalcidas), just after the Gauls’ capture of Rome in 390 bc. The “martial valor” ( andreia) of the Romans is illustrated intensively in one sentence that notes their subjugation of the Latin peoples, Etruscans, Celts, and Samnites (Plb. 1.6.4). The wars with the Samnites and Celts are called “contests” ( ago ̄ nes), virtually games to whet the Romans’ skills (Plb. 1.6.6). These tests readied them to meet Pyrrhus of Epirus and ultimately expel him from Italy (274 bc). When some

  Mamertines of Messana appealed to Rome for help in their local dis-

  pute with Rhegium, Rome at first hesitated, in view of its ties with the other city, but ultimately helped the Mamertines, lest Carthage come to their aid in Sicily and “secure a bridgehead for an invasion of Italy.” By noting “the great gains that would clearly accrue to every individual

  citizen from the spoils of the war,” the consuls played on popular greed and passed the decree to help the Mamertines (Plb. 1.10–11). Motives of self‐interest are thus transferred from the Senate to the “people” ( polloi),

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  with preservation of the moral temperance and restraint of the elite at this time (Champion 2004: 109). Polybius traces the beginnings of Roman

  imperialism here, showing how, after becoming masters of Italy, the

  Romans set out to the “conquest of countries farther afield” (Plb. 1.12).

  The two‐month siege of Agrigentum (262 bc) then illustrates the Roman

  virtues of discipline and training: at first a few Romans kept to their guard posts and fended off the Carthaginian attack of men foraging for grain.

  The city fell and the Carthaginians were routed (Plb. 1.17–19). Polybius underscores the initiative and skill of the Romans, who were “filled with a desire to take to the sea and meet the Carthaginians there”; the building of their first quinqueremes, a serious naval force, demonstrated “extraordinary spirit and audacity of Romans’ decision” (Plb. 1.20). “This is the first occasion when [Polybius] refers clearly not only to Roman actions, but to intentions,” notes one scholar, adding:

  In several passages he treats the Hannibalic War as having been their first step to the acquisition of universal power [Plb. 1.3.6; 5.104.3; 9.10.11] …

  In any case it is clear that Polybius thought that desire for world conquest was the supreme aim of Rome’s external policy in the period after 202.

  (Harris 1979: 108)

  The Romans further innovate with a “raven device” ( corvus), a spike‐like weapon on a long wooden arm, which was lowered to be fixed onto an

  enemy ship and to force fighting on deck (Plb. 1.22); the device surprises the Carthaginians and results in the capture of thirty ships (1.23). Rome then plans a “D Day” type of invasion of Africa from Sicily, building two hundred or more ships; at the battle of Cape Ecnomus in Sicily (256 bc) Carthage meets it with an equally massive navy (Plb. 1.26–8). The

  Carthaginians lose about a half of their fleet and are heavily defeated. The Romans then land in Africa, lay siege to Aspis, and enjoy early successes, which cause the commander Regulus, unwisely, to demand harsh surrender terms for Carthage (Plb. 1.29–31). Carthage rejects this demand

  and commissions a Spartan mercenary, Xanthippus, to command its

  troops; and he, using elephants, soundly defeats Regulus, leaving only

  2,000 su
rvivors from the force of 15,000 (Plb. 1.32–4). Polybius again

  draws clear lessons about not relying on fortune, even after a first success; and he also credits the Carthaginian victory to the Greek mercenary

  (Plb. 1.35–6).

  Rome recovers from the defeat and builds more ships, with some pre-

  monitory fear about a land attack with elephants (Plb. 1.38). At Panormus in northwest Sicily, Romans defeat Hasdrubal and cause his land forces

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  with elephants to flee, exorcising the fear of those beasts (Plb. 1.40).

  There follows a long narrative of the siege of Lilybaeum, a crucial port in southwest Sicily (Plb. 1.41–8 and 52–6), notable for several thematic

  points: again, a Greek (an Achaean) saves the Carthaginians (Plb. 1.43) by reporting treason and conspiracy to them; and a certain Carthaginian Hannibal “the Rhodian” audaciously runs the Roman blockage of the

  harbor, pushes his luck, and is captured in the end, but not without

  Polybius fairly praising his courage (Plb. 1.47). Yet the Romans learned from his tactics and, since they took his unusually swift ship, they later copied its design to build a fleet like it (Plb. 1.59). Seesaw battles show one Roman commander, Pulcher, incautiously losing a naval battle off

  Cape Drepana; then Pullus, a consul, takes Mount Eryx north of

  Lilybaeum; and finally Hamilcar Barca takes Hercte near Panormus and

  Eryx, from which he raids the Southern coast of Italy (Plb. 1.50–6).

  Polybius again calls the battles “contests” ( ago ̄ nas) and compares the two sides in Sicily to evenly matched boxers, alike in courage and physical condition; in the event, “Fortune acted like a good umpire” and narrowed the struggle to more restricted confines (exactly as happened in

  ancient matches that lasted too long without a decision), shutting off the Carthaginians on Mount Eryx (Plb. 1.56–7; cf. 1.6.6). Once more the

  historian appreciates in fairness the courage and athletic endurance of both sides. At the battle of Aegusa, the improved Roman fleet sinks fifty ships and takes seventy more captive, with a total of almost 10,000 prisoners (Plb. 1.61). Hamilcar accepted the inevitable and negotiated for

  peace, ending the First Punic War (Plb. 1.62). In the aftermath, Carthage goes to war with the Libyans and, although depleted in the process,

  extends its rule over Libya.

  Book 2 moves broadly across fields of Roman conflict and concern,

  covering events in Illyria (Plb. 2.1–12), Cisalpine Gaul (Northern Italy; Plb. 2.14–35), and Greece (including the Achaean League and the

  Aetolians: Plb. 3.37–69), with ominous brief glances at the growing

  Carthaginian menace in Spain (Plb. 2.1, 13, 22, and 36). The Spanish

  thread unifies the larger work. Hamilcar is in Spain for a decade (238–

  229 bc) before Hasdrubal succeeds him (Plb. 2.1), and the Romans make

  a treaty with him in order to focus their attention more immediately on the Gauls (Plb. 2.13). Finally Hannibal succeeds Hasdrubal, as mistrust grows in Rome (Plb. 2.35). Meanwhile the narrative of the First Illyrian War (229–228 bc) and of the battle with the Gauls at Telamon (225 bc)

  centers on the characterization of Illyrians and Gauls as lawless and

  aggressive, yet militarily capable peoples (Champion 2004: 111–12).

  Two figures in particular portray the Illyrian national character. Agron of

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  Illyria had a strong navy and army when he was hired by Demetrius, king of Macedon, to help fend off a local threat to Medion from the Aetolians.

  Though victorious, the debauched Agron dies after an overly licentious

  celebratory party (Plb. 2.4). His queen, Teuta, starts her own piracy

  campaign on the west coast of Greece. Roman ambassadors meet with

  her, telling her that Rome will punish those who commit private wrongs

  and will help those who suffer them. Teuta responds “with womanish

  passion and unreasoned anger” ( gunaikothumo ̄ s kai alogisto ̄ s) and orders an ambassador assassinated on the way home, against the “agreed upon

  conventions of human rights” regarding the treatment of envoys (Plb.

  2.8). Aside from the issue of his ethnic bias and the typical ancient gender bias shown here, we note that Polybius deplores above all the queen’s

  moral and political arrogance. The Roman Senate dispatched an army

  under the two consuls who expelled Illyrian forces from Greek cities

  along the coasts, and established protection for them in future. Corcyra welcomes the Romans, whose allied faith contrasts with the Illyrians’

  aggression (Plb. 2.11). Teuta agrees to a treaty with Rome and is severely restricted in permission to sail armed vessels; Aetolians and Aeolians

  welcome the Romans, who are honored guests at the Isthmian Games

  (Plb. 2.12).

  Conflicts between Gauls and Romans are narrated next (Plb. 2.14–

  35), culminating in the battle near Faesulae, where the Romans have two consuls and a total of four legions, plus allies from the Sabines, Etruscans, and others – supposedly 700,000 infantry and 70,000 cavalry. The

  Romans are defeated, 6,000 being killed and the rest fleeing. A second

  confrontation, led by Aemilius Paulus in Etruria, ends up in a slaughter of the Gauls, who seem like noble savages, naked in the attack, horns and

  trumpets sounding all over: “they held their ground with unabated

  courage, in spite of the fact that man for man, as well as collectively, they were inferior to the Romans in point of arms” (Plb. 2.30). Some 40,000

  Gauls were reportedly slain in the battle, and the invasion is repelled. The character of the conflict is summed up: measured in “audacity and desperate courage” and numbers killed, the conflict is “unsurpassed by any war in history”; but, in terms of planning by generals, the standard of generalship was “beneath contempt.” The Gauls, who were “swayed by

  impulse rather than by calculation” (Plb. 2.35), had numbers and valor, while Rome had numbers and poor strategy. The victory, in Polybius’

  view, reflects a mixed picture of the participants.

  The historian then turns to the Achaeans (Plb. 2.37–71), with a refer-

  ence to his aim of writing a general history of the known peoples, not

  restricted to the Punic Wars. We point up a few themes as examples from

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  this section. First, constitutions are crucial to state success: the Achaeans are united by a constitutional system of equality and genuine freedom of speech, in other words democracy, which is the foundation of their

  prosperity (Plb. 2.38). Second, the growth or stability of national power relates directly to the skill of individual leadership: Achaeans were respected by most Greeks as fair arbitrators – not in view of their power ( dunamin),

  “which was nearly the least of the Greeks then,” but “because of their

  reputation for good faith [ pistis] and high principles [ kalokagathia]”; despite this respect, “there was no result or action leading to the increase of their own fortunes since they could not produce a leader equal to their character” (Plb. 2.39.9–12). Like earlier historians, Polybius values highly the need for the right leader, but here he interestingly fine‐tunes the scheme, namely by stipulating that the leader has to come up to the values of a well‐governed and trustworthy state in order to be allowed the

  power, presumably in material wealth, military might, and political

  influence. The bulk of the book deals with the so‐called Cleomenean War (229/8–222 bc): the war conducted by Achaeans under Aratus and by

  Macedonians under Antigonus Doson against an Aetolian and Spartan

  alliance
led by Cleomenes. The Achaean League’s general Philopoemen,

  with his cavalry, is outstanding in his fight for freedom, and in the end Cleomenes is defeated (Plb. 2.69).

  The introduction to Book 3 echoes the initial preface by recalling the

  main motif of how, when, and why the world was brought under Roman

  domination ( dunasteia), but then it outlines the contents of Books 3 (the Hannibalic War to Cannae), Books 4 and 5 (Greek affairs under Philip V

  of Macedon; Antiochus and Ptolemy Philopator fighting over Syria Coele; Rhodes against the Byzantines), and Book 6 (the Roman constitution) –

  and also later topics down to about 167 bc, where he places the fullest extent of Roman power (Plb. 3.1–4). He adds that he will take the work

  further, to 146 bc, mainly to put to scrutiny the situation of those presently under Roman subordination and decide

  whether they should shun or seek the rule of Rome; and future generations will be taught whether to praise and imitate, or to decry it … the object of this work shall be to ascertain exactly what the position of the several states was, after the universal conquest by which they fell under the power of Rome, until the commotion and upheaval which broke out at a later period

  [ epigenomene ̄ s tarache ̄ s kai kine ̄ seō s]. (Plb. 3.4.7,12) The mentioning of commotions and disturbances refers to the period

  after 152 bc (Books 35–9), whose events extend beyond the boundaries

  of the original narrative. The word for “upheaval” ( kine ̄ sis) resonates with

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  Thucydides’ use of the same term to designate the “turmoil” of his

  subject, while “commotion” echoes Xenophon’s characterization of the

  time after Mantinea (Th. 1.1.2; X. Hell. 7.5.27; see Marincola 2001: 119). While Polybius alludes to prior conflicts, his own theme is uniquely complex and challenges them in greatness, he implies. His concern is to understand both intentions and final results, not just to chronicle battles or other actions for their own sake. Such self‐conscious and sweeping