A Sense of the Enemy

by Shore, Zachary

  1. For more on the early history and uses of the telescope see Mario Biagioli, Galileo’s Instruments of Credit: Telescopes, Images, Secrecy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).

  2. For more on the telescope, see Geoff Andersen, The Telescope: Its History, Technology, and Future (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007) and Mario Biagioli, Galileo’s Instruments of Credit: Telescopes, Images, Secrecy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).

  3. Nate Silver, The Signal and the Noise: Why So Many Predictions Fail–But Some Don’t (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), p. 98.

  4. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The Predictioneer’s Game: Using the Logic of Brazen Self-Interest to See and Shape the Future (New York: Random House, 2010), p. 167.

  5. Abraham Rabinovich, The Yom Kippur War (New York: Schockin Books, 2004).

  6. Some of the information and quotations in this section stem from discussions between the author and Andrew Marshall, in person, by telephone, and through e-mail exchanges. Not all of Marshall’s assertions can be readily verified, as the details of some of these subjects remain classified. Marshall’s comments therefore must be viewed with this in mind.

  7. See Andrew W. Marshall and Herbert Goldhamer, Psychosis and Civilization: Two Studies in the Frequency of Mental Disease (New York: Free Press, 1953).

  8. Two useful studies of RAND in the 1950s are Alex Abella, Soldiers of Reason: The RAND Corporation and the Rise of the American Empire (Orlando, FL: Harcourt, 2008), and Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991).

  9. “Sources of Change in the Future Security Environment,” Paper by the Future Security Environment Working Group (Andrew Marshall and Charles Wolf, Chairmen). Submitted to the Commission on Integrating Long-term Strategy (Washington, DC: Pentagon, April 1988).

  10. Douglas McGray, “The Marshall Plan,” Wired Magazine, February 2003.

  11. See Mark Mazetti, “Obama Faults Spy Agencies’ Performance in Gauging Mideast Unrest, Officials Say,” The New York Times, February 4, 2011. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/05/world/middleeast/05cia.html. See also Paul R. Pillar, “Don’t Blame the Spies,” Foreign Policy, March 16, 2011.

  Afterword

  1. Philip Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).

  2. Daniel Gilbert, Stumbling on Happiness (New York: Knopf, 2006).

  3. Nassim Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (New York: Random House, 2007).

  4. Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions (New York: Harper, 2009).

  5. Silver, The Signal and the Noise.

  6. Michael Spence, “Job Market Signaling,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 87, no. 3. (1973), pp. 355–74.

  7. Diego Gambetta, Codes of the Underworld: How Criminals Communicate (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).

  8. For a classic work on signals and noise in international relations see Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967). Another valuable work on how states signal their intentions and how they might try to transmit deceptive signals is Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989).

  9. For more on Shannon, see James Gleich, The Information: A History, A Theory, A Flood (New York: Pantheon Books, 2011).

  10. Andrea D. Rosati, Eric D. Knowles, Charles W. Kalish, Alison Gopnik, Daniel R. Ames, and Michael W. Morris, “What Theory of Mind Can Teach Social Psychology? Traits as Intentional Terms,” Available at http://corundum.education.wisc.edu/papers/TomTraits.pdf.

  11. Ray Kurzweil, How To Create a Mind: The Secret of Human Thought Revealed (New York: Viking, 2012).

  12. Ariely, Predictably Irrational, p. 129.

  13. Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, p. 56.

  14. “World Giving Index 2011: A Global View of Giving Trends,” Charities Aid Foundation, 2011. Accessed on February 4, 2013, at https://www.cafonline.org/pdf/World_Giving_Index_2011_191211.pdf.

  15. Robert Frank, “The Biggest Gift in the World,” Wall Street Journal, October 28, 2011.

  16. See for example Gerd Gigerenzer, “Surrogates for Theories,” Theory and Psychology, vol. 8, no. 2 (1998), 195–204; Gerd Gigerenzer, “On Narrow Norms and Vague Heuristics: A Reply to Kahnemann and Tversky,” Psychological Review, vol. 103, no. 3 (1996), pp. 592–96; Gerd Gigerenzer, “Why the Distinction Between Single-Event Probabilities and Frequencies is Important for Psychology and Vice Versa,” in George Wright and Ayton, Peter, eds., Subjective Probability (New York: Wiley, 1994), pp. 129–61.

  17. Gerd Gigerenzer, “Out of the Frying Pan into the Fire: Behavioral Reactions to Terrorist Attacks,” Risk Analysis, vol. 26, no. 2 (2006).

  18. For a related challenge from within the field of psychology, see Joseph Simmons, Leif Nelson, and Uri Simonsohn, “False-Positive Psychology: Undisclosed Flexibility in Data Collection and Analysis Allows Presenting Anything as Significant,” Psychological Science, vol. 22, no. 11 (Nov. 2011), pp. 1359–66.

  19. Richard K. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).

  20. Robert Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons From the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010).

  21. Joshua Rovner, Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011). For a useful discussion of Rovner’s book, see the H-Diplo Roundtable reviews by prominent scholars of intelligence. ISSF Roundtable, vol. III, no. 17 (2012).

  22. Daryl Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

  23. Keren Yarhi-Milo, Knowing Thy Adversary: Assessments of Intentions in International Relations, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, Department of Political Science, 2009. See the more recent book version, Knowing the Adversary: Leaders, Intelligence Organizations, and Assessments of Intentions in International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013).

  24. Yarhi-Milo, Knowing the Adversary, p. 504.

  25. See for example Alexander George, Presidential Decision Making: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980).

  26. Ernest R. May, ed., Knowing One’s Enemies: Intelligence Assessments Before the Two World Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

  27. Ernest R. May and Richard E. Neustadt, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers (New York: Free Press, 1986), p. 166.

  28. Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (New York: HarperCollins, 1992), pp. 173–74.

  29. Marc Trachtenberg, The Cold War and After: History, Theory, and the Logic of International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), preface.

  Select Bibliography

  BECAUSE THIS STUDY COVERS such a wide range of conflicts, I have listed below only the secondary literature of greatest use to this book. The endnotes provide a more thorough account of primary sources used in each chapter, along with journal articles, newspaper accounts, and other relevant materials. For example, the chapters on German foreign policy include endnotes containing references to specific sections of Gustav Stresemann’s Nachlass, along with citation of the various American, British, and German archival records from collections such as Akten zur Deutschen Auswaertigen Politik, 1918–1945 (ADAP) Series A and B. More specific microfilm records are also noted there, such as the Military Intelligence Division reports on German–Soviet relations. I have, however, selected for this bibliography some of the memoirs, intelligence reports, and other firsthand accounts of events that informed this book, as these may assist the reader seeking further exploration of a particular subject.

  Abella, Alex. Soldiers
of Reason: The RAND Corporation and the Rise of the American Empire. Orlando, FL: Harcourt, 2008.

  Acheson, Dean. Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department. New York: W. W. Norton, 1969.

  Ahamed, Liaquat. Lords of Finance: The Bankers Who Broke the World. New York: Penguin, 2009.

  Angress, Werner. Stillborn Revolution: The Communist Bid for Power in Germany, 1921–1923. Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1972.

  Ariely, Dan. Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions. New York: Harper, 2009.

  Berman, Larry. Perfect Spy: The Incredible Double Life of Pham Xuan An, Time Magazine Reporter and Vietnamese Communist Agent. New York: Smithsonian Books, 2007.

  Betts, Richard K. Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.

  Boyle, Thomas E. “France, Great Britain, and German Disarmament.” Unpublished dissertation, State University of New York at Stony Brook, 1972. Available through University Microfilms of America Inc.

  Bretton, Henry L. Stresemann and the Revision of Versailles. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1953.

  Brown, Archie. The Rise and Fall of Communism. New York: Ecco, 2009.

  Brown, Judith M. Gandhi’s Rise to Power: Indian Politics, 1915–1922. London: Cambridge University Press, 1972.

  Brown, Judith M. The Cambridge Companion to Gandhi. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

  Brown, Judith M., ed. Mahatma Gandhi: The Essential Writings. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

  Browning, Christopher R. Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland. New York: HarperCollins, 1992.

  Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. The Predictioneer’s Game: Using the Logic of Brazen Self-Interest to See and Shape the Future. New York: Random House, 2010.

  Carsten, F. L. The Reichswehr and Politics, 1918–1933. New York: Clarendon Press, 1966.

  Catton, Philip E. Diem’s Final Failure: Prelude to America’s War in Vietnam. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2002.

  Central Intelligence Agency. “The Responsibilities of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam Intelligence and Security Services in the Exploitation of American Prisoners of War.” November 17, 1975. Available at http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=11270323004.

  Chabris, Christopher, and Daniel Simons. The Invisible Gorilla: and Other Ways Our Intuitions Deceive Us. New York: Crown, 2010.

  Chāruchandra, Guha (Khrishnadas). Seven Months With Mahatma Gandhi: Being an Inside View of the Non-Co-operation Movement. Madras, India: Ganesan, 1928.

  Cohrs, Patrick. The Unfinished Peace After World War I: America, Britain, and the Stabilisation of Europe, 1919–1932. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

  Collett, Nigel. The Butcher of Amritsar: General Reginald Dyer. London: Palgrave, 2005.

  Combat Operations Department, General Staff of the People’s Army of Vietnam. History of the Combat Operations Department 1945–2000. Hanoi, Vietnam: People’s Army Publishing House, 2005.

  Cowling, Maurice. The Impact of Labour, 1920–1924: The Beginning of Modern British Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1971.

  Dutton, David. Austen Chamberlain: Gentleman in Politics. Bolton, UK: Ross Anderson Publications, 1985.

  Fearon, James. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” International Organization, vol. 49, no. 3, 1995, pp. 379–414.

  Finkelstein, Norman G. What Gandhi Says About Violence, Resistance, and Courage. New York: OR Books, 2012.

  Fischer, Louis, ed. The Essential Gandhi: An Anthology of His Writings on His Life, Work, and Ideas. New York: Vintage Books, 2002.

  Freund, Gerald. Unholy Alliance: Russian–German Relations from the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to the Treaty of Berlin. London: Harcourt, Brace, 1957.

  Gaddis, John Lewis. The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

  Gaddis, John Lewis. George F. Kennan: An American Life. New York: Penguin, 2011.

  Gambetta, Diego. Codes of the Underworld: How Criminals Communicate. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009.

  Gandhi, Mahatma. An Autobiography or the Story of My Experiments with Truth. Ahmedabad, India: Navajivan Publishing House, 1927.

  Gandhi, Mohandas. Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1960–.

  Gatzke, Hans. Stresemann and the Rearmament of Germany. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1954.

  George, Alexander. “The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making.” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 13, no. 2, 1969, pp. 190–222.

  George, Alexander. Presidential Decision Making: The Effective Use of Information and Advice. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980.

  Gilbert, Daniel. Stumbling on Happiness. New York: Knopf, 2006.

  Gladwell, Malcolm. Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking. New York: Back Bay Books, 2007.

  Gleich, James. The Information: A History, A Theory, A Flood. New York: Pantheon Books, 2011.

  Gorodetsky, Gabriel. Stafford Cripps’ Mission to Moscow, 1940–1942. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

  Gorodetsky, Gabriel. Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999.

  Goscha, Christopher. “The Early Development of Vietnamese Intelligence Services.” In Exploring Intelligence Archives. Edited by R. G. Hughes, P. Jackson, and L. Scott. London: Routeledge, 2008.

  Goscha, Christopher E. Historical Dictionary of the Indochina War (1945–1954): An International and Interdisciplinary Approach. Copenhagen, Denmark: NIAS Press, Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2011.

  Grossheim, Martin. “Revisionism in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam: New Evidence from the East German Archives.” Cold War History, vol. 5, no. 4, 2005, pp. 451–77.

  Guanzhong, Luo. The Romance of Three Kingdoms. Translated by C. H. Brewitt-Taylor. Rockville, MD: Silk Pagoda, 2005.

  Guanzhong, Luo. San Kuo, or Romance of Three Kingdoms. Translated by C. H. Brewitt-Taylor. Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1925.

  Habeck, Mary. Storm of Steel: The Development of Armor Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union, 1919–1939. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003.

  Herman, Arthur. Gandhi and Churchill: The Rivalry That Destroyed An Empire and Forged Our Age. New York: Bantam Books, 2008.

  Hermann, Margaret. “Circumstances Under Which Leader Personality Will Affect Foreign Policy.” In Search of Global Patterns. Edited by James Rosenau. New York: Free Press, 1976.

  Hermann, Margaret. “Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders.” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 27, 1980, pp. 7–46.

  Hermann, Margaret, and Charles Kegley. “Rethinking Democracy and International Peace: Perspectives from Political Psychology.” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 39, 1995, 511–34.

  Hersh, Seymour M. “The Gray Zone: How a Secret Pentagon Program Came to Abu Ghraib.” The New Yorker, May 24, 2004. Available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/05/24/040524fa_fact.

  Hiep, Colonel General Dang Vu, with Senior Colonel Le Hai Trieu and Colonel Ngo Vinh Binh. Highland Memories. Part IV. Hanoi, Vietnam: People’s Army Publishing House, 2000.

  Hilger, Gustav, and Alfred Meyer. The Incompatible Allies: A Memoir-History of German–Soviet Relations, 1918–1941. New York: MacMillan, 1953.

  Historical Chronicle of the Cochin China Party Committee and the Central Office for South Vietnam, 1954–1975. Hanoi, Vietnam: National Political Publishing House, 2002.

  History of the COSVN Military Command, 1961–1976. Ministry of Defense and Military Region 7. Edited by Colonel Ho Son Dai. Hanoi, Vietnam: National Political Publishing House, 2004.

  History of the Resistance War in Saigon-Cho Lon-Gia Dinh (1945–1975) [Lich Su Saigon-Cho Lon-Gia
Dinh Khang Chien (1945–1975)]. Edited by War Recapitulation Committee, Ho Chi Minh City Party Committee; Tran Hai Phung and Luu Phuong Thanh. By Ho Son Dai and Tran Phan Chan. Ho Chi Minh City: Ho Chi Minh City Publishing House, 1994.

  History of the Sapper Branch Technical Service: People’s Army of Vietnam (Internal Distribution) [Lich Su Nganh Ky Thuat Dac Cong: Quan Doi Nhan Dan Viet Nam (Luu Hanh Noi Bo)]. By Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Quoc Minh. Hanoi, Vietnam: People’s Army Publishing House, 1997.

  History of the Sapper Forces. Vol. I [Lich Su Bo Doi Dac Cong, Tap Mot]. Edited by Headquarters and Party Current Affairs Committee, Sapper Command. By Nguyen Quoc Minh, Vu Doan Thanh, Pham Gia Khanh, and Nguyen Thanh Xuan. Hanoi, Vietnam: People’s Army Publishing House, 1987.

  Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1939.

  Holcombe, Alec. “The Complete Collection of Party Documents: Listening to the Party’s Official Internal Voice.” Journal of Vietnamese Studies, vol. 5, no. 2, 2010, pp. 225–42.

  Holsti, Ole. “Foreign Policy Viewed Cognitively.” In The Structure of Decision Edited by Robert Axelrod. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.

  Holsti, Ole. “The ‘Operational Code as an Approach to the Analysis of Belief Systems.” Final Report to the National Science Foundation, Grant NO. SOC 75–15368. Durham, NC: Duke University, 1977.

  Israel, Fred L. The War Diary of Breckinridge Long: Selections From the Years 1939–1944. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966.

  Jacobson, Jon. Locarno Diplomacy: Germany and the West. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971.