Hill 112_The Battle of the Odon

by Tim Saunders

  A German Wehrmacht lieutenant from an Assault Gun unit confers with men of Waffen SS unit during the fighting around Caen.

  Operation JUPITER – The Battle area showing dispositions of units of the 10 SS Panzer Division around Hill 112, southwest of Caen.

  Operation JUPITER – Objectives

  The man who commanded 43rd Wessex Division during its first offensive operation of the Normandy campaign was Major General Gwilym Ivo Thomas. He was renowned as an austere figure; respected rather than liked. Originally a Gunner officer, General Thomas had gained considerable experience during the First World War. In his three years at the front he took part in some of the hardest battles of the war. Rising to command a battery at twenty-three years of age, he won an MC and Bar, as well as a DSO. His experiences on the Western Front shaped his military philosophy and appreciation of the nature of war. In March 1942, following his appointment to command the almost exclusively Territorial Army 43rd Wessex Division, General Thomas completed its transformation from a coastal defensive formation into one of the best infantry divisions fighting in the North West European Campaign. He earned a reputation as a tough and innovative trainer of troops with very high standards. Little escaped his eye and he impressed on all those under his command, his intended tactical methods.

  Despite his unconventional battle dress, highly polished riding boots and breeches General Thomas ‘conceived warfare in terms of speed – speed of thought and decision – of rapid issue of orders and effective communication’. He was a tough and driving commander in battle. His aide-de-camp, Captain Pat Spencer-Moore, thought that ‘Many officers feared a confrontation with the GOC more than they did the enemy!’ Sharing a trait with many of history’s successful commanders, he had a brutal streak and was prepared to commit troops to potentially costly operations. However, in common with most British commanders who had fought in the previous war, he did not squander lives needlessly. His nickname, ‘Butcher Thomas’, predated the casualties incurred in his Division’s battles and had more to do with his character and the robust manner with which he dealt with those who displeased him. The words of Brigadier Carver, whose 4 Armoured Brigade came under his command during Operation JUPITER, summarize the views of many. General Thomas was:

  A Bren gun carrier of the 8/Middelsex Regiment crossing the Odon in ‘Death Valley’.

  ‘A small, fiery, very determined and grim gunner, without a spark of humour, he would bite the head off anyone who attempted to disagree with him or question his orders, as I was soon to find out.’

  Major General Thomas was given his orders almost a week before the attack on Hill 112. Operation JUPITER was effectively ‘on call’ as it was predicated on the capture of Carpiquet airfield and Caen, which the Canadians and 3rd Division eventually captured on 9 July 1944. In the battle that followed, 43rd Wessex Division, in the Hill 112 area, were to be VIII Corps’s ‘main effort’, with subsidiary attacks being mounted by 15th Scottish Division and the newly arrived 53rd Welsh Division. To the west, further limited attacks by XXX Corps were to be mounted by 50th, 49th and 59th Divisions.

  In pursuance of Montgomery’s objectives, 43rd Division’s mission was to seize a bridgehead across the River Orne. In doing so, they would provide the Second British Army with a springboard to advance across the enticingly open country that lay beyond the river. In order to achieve this, the Division would have to take the dominating and well-defended bulk of Hill 112. Major General Thomas’s plan was for 129 Brigade to clear Hill 112 and establish artillery observation posts on the crestline, before falling back to defensive positions along the line of the Caen – Evrecy road. Meanwhile, on 129 Brigade’s left, 130 Brigade, was to clear the low ground. Both of these brigades were to be supported by Churchill tanks of 31 Tank Brigade and Crocodiles (flame throwing variants of the Churchill) from 141/RAC Regiment of 79th Armoured Division. 4 Armoured Brigade’s Sherman tanks, with 214 Brigade mounted in Kangaroo armoured personnel carriers, were to secure the Orne crossings and form a bridgehead beyond. 46 Brigade (from 15th Scottish Division) were to attack eastwards towards the southern suburbs of Caen.

  Kangaroo personnel carrier.

  Field Marshal Montgomery with Major General Thomas and his staff.

  Operation JUPITER – The Plan – Phases 1 and 2.

  Operation JUPITER – The Plan – Phase 3.

  The operation was to be conducted in three phases.

  Phase 1. 130 Brigade, with 9/Royal Tank Regiment (RTR), were to clear a German salient in the area of les Duanes, which was held by a company of SS Panzer Grenadiers. Capture of Chateau de Fontaine, which was the location of battalion headquarters, 2/22 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment, would follow. To their right, 129 Brigade, supported by 7/RTR, were to take the high ground of the Hill 112 feature.

  Phase 2. 129 Brigade were to hold a defensive flank on Hill 112 facing south-west towards Evrecy on the northern slopes of the feature. 130 Brigade, supported by 9/RTR and Crocodiles, were to attack Eterville and Maltot. If possible, they were to follow up this success by advancing as far as the high ground to the south-east of Hill 112 in the direction of St Martin. Meanwhile, 46 Brigade and B Squadron 7/RTR were to provide left flank protection by taking over Verson and relieving 4/Dorsets in Eterville.

  Phase 3. 129 Brigade was to continue to hold its positions on Hill 112, while 130 Brigade was to establish defences on a line Eterville – Maltot, facing the open flank to the east. At this stage, 4 Armoured Brigade and 214 Brigade were to be launched between 129 and 130 Brigades, south to the River Orne and, if the crossings were intact, form a bridgehead on the southeastern bank. 46 Brigade, supported by B Squadron 7/RTR, were to clear the triangle of land on the left flank, between the Rivers Odon and Orne as far east as the suburbs of Caen.

  Whatever the outcome of the attack on the morning of 10 July 1944, it was guaranteed that the Germans could not ignore the threat of the British armour securing a bridgehead on the open land beyond the River Orne. They would be bound to react to 43rd Wessex Division’s attack with all means available.

  10thSS Frundsberg Panzer Division

  43rd Wessex InfantryDivision

  CHAPTER THREE

  OPERATION JUPITER

  Assault on Hill 112

  Pinning down exactly when various events happened on 10 July 1944 is difficult. Some primary sources, such as infantry war diaries, often written up some considerable time after the event, have all the inherent inaccuracies of recalled timings. However, more reliable are the diaries of the artillery, which were usually written in the relative safety of the gun position, some distance behind the frontline. These diaries are often supported by transcripts of the original signallers’ radio and telephone logs, which give a feel for the information or often ‘dissinformation’ that contributes to ‘the fog of war’ so typical of battle. Also, of good quality are the diaries of armoured regiments where radio operators, in virtually every tank, were able to record much detail, in often wobbly writing, as the tank made its way across the shell pocked battlefield. Sergeant Trevor Greenwood of 15 Troop 9/RTR records in a personal diary, written in the turret of a Churchill tank, that ‘time has no meaning during action: some time during the fight… The hours passed. Maybe two or three …’. It seems that even the evidence of contemporary documents has its limitations!

  Often it was radio operators who recorded the accounts of the actions in their logs.

  Some secondary sources, written after consulting British or German records, can add further confusion over timings of important events. For example the Germans were on Central European time, while the Allies were on Double British Summertime, which gives a time difference of two hours, not the normal one hour. Also, some commentators record attacks as taking place when they were ordered. This overlooks the fact that it takes considerable time for orders to be given and for infantry, moving at walking pace, to reach their Forming Up Places (FUP). This account of the battle attempts to reconcile the times and events from a whole range of sources
.

  The Bombardment

  Captain DIM Robbins of 4/Wilts recalls:

  ‘We were very well prepared for the battle. As I listened to the orders at 03.30 hours I thought that it was just like an exercise. We all knew exactly what to do. The orders were to cross the start line at 05.00 hours after a great barrage of artillery. We had a lot of guns by then from Corps and Army.’

  At dawn (04.45 hours) 10 July 1944, the British opened the battle with a barrage of incredible intensity and for the fifteen minutes before H Hour, when the attacking British would rise out of the tall wheat and advance on Hill 112, the flashes of 1,000 guns cut the dawn sky.

  Since 1941, the British Army had been increasing the strength of its artillery by raising new regiments and converting infantry battalions into gunner regiments. It was widely appreciated that the longer the campaign went on, the greater would be the demand for artillery support. In action on the Odon battlefield, the workhorse of the divisional artillery was the 25-pounder field gun. Mainly deployed in towed form, the gun was also mounted in self-propelled versions for use with armoured divisions. With a range of 13,400 yards, the 25-pounder was designed for close support to the fighting troops. Infantry divisions had an establishment of three artillery regiments. Each regiment was allocated to a brigade and each of the brigade’s infantry battalions was supported by one of the regiment’s three gun batteries. Every battalion, therefore, normally had eight guns allocated to its direct support. However, if the situation warranted they could ‘lose’ their guns to higher priority targets and it follows that fire from the rest of the regiment and, indeed, of the divisional artillery could be called on when needed. During Operation JUPITER the control of this flexible arrangement in 43rd Wessex Division, was via a shadow Royal Artillery command structure. At the lowest level a battery commander deployed with the infantry battalion’s commanding officer, while up a level, the artillery regiment’s commanding officer was closely linked to brigade headquarters. In overall control of the Division’s guns was the CRA or Commander Royal Artillery, Brigadier Heath, who worked at divisional headquarters. He planned the artillery battle and ensured that priority targets received the appropriate weight of fire. Lieutenant Douglas Goddard (Gun Position Officer) recorded, in 220 Battery’s war diary, the weight of fire available for divisional targets: ‘Uncle target engaged. 1,260 rounds per minute for 19 mins’. For Operation JUPITER Brigadier Heath had under command a total of two hundred and sixty-four 25-pounders, including his own guns from 43rd Wessex Division and those from 11th Armoured, 15th Scottish, 53rd Welsh Divisions.

  A 25 pounder in action in Normandy, July 1944.

  Lieutenant Douglas Goddard

  Also, committed to JUPITER, were the field, medium, heavy and super heavy guns of 3rd and 8th Army Groups Royal Artillery (AGRA). The AGRAs’ main weapon was the 5.5in gun, which could hurl an eighty-pound shell 18,100 yards and, consequently, from their positions around Cheux, they could engage targets on the divisional objective and beyond without having to move. The only problem was having an observer able to identify targets and correct fire so deep in the enemy position. Possession of Hill 112 would give Royal Artillery Forward Observation Officers just such a position and it was worth fighting for!

  At 22,000 yards from Sword Beach, the Royal Navy Bombardment Force could engage targets on Hill 112 with their guns, which ranged in calibre from 6 in to the massive 16 in guns mounted on HMS Rodney. Her nine guns fired shells weighing 2,641 pounds out to 38,000 yards with considerable accuracy but, carrying only a hundred rounds per gun, she could only be tasked to engage targets of the highest priority. However, the ‘throw weight’ of the naval bombardment force’s broadside, which included the cruisers HMS Roberts and Belfast, considerably enhanced the fire available on the morning of 10 July 1944.

  A 5.5 inch gun in action around dawn. Note the impressive pile of shells, most of which would be fired in support of a major attack.

  A paragraph from the divisional operation order summed up the artillery fire plan:

  Arty SP. The initial attack on the first objective is covered by a 3,500 yd barrage at a gun to 35 yds. This barrage overlaps the flanks by 500 yds. It is backed by heavy concentrations from AGRA on all known centres of enemy resistance, eg les Duanes 9664, and is superimposed on the air programme. Counter bty [battery] and counter mortar from ZERO minus 60 to ZERO…Very hy [heavy] 3" and 4.2" mortar concs [concentrations] are welded into the arty programme.

  From 220 Battery’s gun position near St Manvieu (7,000 yards from Hill 112), Lieutenant Douglas Goddard recorded in his Battery’s war diary the firing of the opening barrage:

  ‘The entire Corps Arty engaged at rates of up to 5 RPM [rounds not revolutions per minute] with the guns having to be cooled with water.’

  The weight of fire from the massed artillery stunned the Frundsberg’s Grenadiers, even in their well-prepared deep dugouts. Fire directed on the division’s initial objectives on Hill 112 and the low ground to the east, was extremely accurate. The effect of the artillery on targets in depth was, however, less dramatic, as unobserved fire missions, taken off the map, tended to be less accurate due to the inability to correct fall of shot directly onto the target. For most Germans, the weight of British artillery fire was remarkable and Gunter Balko, an infantryman from 21 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment, described the effect of shellfire on the individual:

  ‘At Tarnopol we endure[d] heavy Russian artillery fire but in Normandy we were hit again and again, day after day by British artillery that was so heavy the Frundsberg bled to death before our eyes. It was worst during an attack, theirs or ours, when we would be terribly blasted. I saw grenadiers struck dumb and unable to move and others made mad by the unceasing ‘drumfire’. Your artillery is my worst memory of Normandy.’

  View from 5/Dorset’s Forward Observation Post in Fontaine Etoupefour Church tower, 10 July 1944.

  Back in the Frundsberg’s divisional headquarters the Chief of Staff, SS-Hauptsturmführer Klapdor, recalls:

  ‘The telephone rang and a voice announced that “The enemy are firing smoke”. This message was soon confirmed and completed from other sectors. Suddenly all hell lets loose. The front rumbles and the earth trembles and vibrates. The radio operator who is now awake, tries to establish contact with the units in the front line. Very nervously, he announces “All communication with the front is cut”. We are all at once isolated. While we are thinking about what it is like at the front all of a sudden it was our turn. The enemy bombards the whole region, targeting woods, junctions and known positions. Hundreds of explosions tear the night.’

  At 05.00 hours, as the barrage reached its peak, four infantry battalions rose from the shelter of their shell scrapes and advanced up the slopes of Hill 112. They moved through the waist high wheat towards the clouds of dust thrown up by the exploding shells, that shrouded their objectives.

  Waffen SS Officers pictured during the fighting round Caen.

  5/Dorsets advance through fields of corn towards their objective.

  130 Brigade’s Attack

  On the extreme left of the tight Odon Bridgehead 5/Dorsets shook out into their assault formations. Their FUP was in the valley, out of sight of the enemy, just to the south of the village of Fontaine Etoupefour. Here Nebelwerfers, engaging all likely British positions in the valley below, inflicted the Dorset’s first casualties of the day.

  5/Dorsets were the leading troops of 130 Brigade’s attack into the depths of the German defences on the low ground to the east of Hill 112. Their first objective was a German salient centred on the les Duanes farm complex. 7 Company, 2/22 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment held the stoutly built stone farm-buildings, which they had developed into the central feature of a forward strong point. Little more than 400 metres from the Dorset’s start line, the farm received particular attention from the heavy artillery. C Company, with two troops of Churchills from B Squadron 9/RTR, were quickly on the enemy position and found the enemy stunned by the ferocity of th
e barrage. Just ten minutes after H Hour, the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Coad, waiting with the reserve sections,

  ‘…saw the green flare indicating success, rising from the smoke of the smouldering barns. It was with a feeling of relief that the battle had begun well for us, that I started to follow up with my reserve companies [A and B].’

  Meanwhile, C Company’s two erstwhile leading platoons sent sullen SS prisoners to the rear and prepared to follow the advance as company reserve. They formed up behind the two fresh platoons who had ‘leapfrogged’ through to take the lead. A Company arriving at the farm, cleared the captured buildings, enemy trenches and bunkers in detail.

  On 5/Dorset’s left, D Company, with a single troop of Churchills, had further to advance to reach their objective at ‘Horseshoe Wood’; so named because of its shape on the map. The battle here was to be considerably stiffer than at les Duanes, as the Germans had vital minutes to recover from the shock of the barrage and Horseshoe Wood was also a part of 2/22 SS Panzer Grenadier’s main defensive position, held by outposts of 5 Company. D Company’s momentum carried them onto the enemy trenches where the West Countrymen had their first experience of hand to hand fighting. Lieutenant Colonel Coad recalled that: