Blood of Spain

by Ronald Fraser

  The radicalization of Spain in the last months before the war was illustrated by the communist party’s rapid growth. Its claimed membership rose from 20,000 in October 1934, to 35,000 in February 1936, 102,000 in May and 117,000 on the eve of the war.80

  F. The army

  ON THE ADVENT of the republic, the Spanish army had one officer for every eleven soldiers, one active general for every 1,266 men.81 This top-heavy structure was nothing new. It stemmed from the first half of the nineteenth century when first guerrilla leaders of the anti-Napoleonic wars and later Carlist officers were allowed to join the army as career officers. Needless to say, it did not lead overall to an efficient fighting force.

  The army’s successes in the field in the late nineteenth and the first quarter of the twentieth centuries were limited. The loss of Cuba, the Philippines and all Spanish possessions in the Pacific in 1898 was followed by the long and costly ‘pacification’ of the Riff tribesmen in Spanish Morocco. Begun in 1908, this led to a disastrous defeat in 1921 at Annual where over 8,000 Spanish troops were slaughtered in a single battle. When pacification was finally achieved in 1925, it was as much due to French as to Spanish military might.

  Over-staffed, the army was under-equipped. Although in 1931 defence (army and navy) took 18 per cent of the national budget,82 the military had only 300 machine-guns that did not date from the Moroccan wars. The majority of its rifles were of an 1893 model; and the greater part of the artillery was inadequate.83 In short, the army was better suited to its role as domestic policeman than to fighting international or colonial wars.

  Several schemes for reducing the strength of the officer corps had been put forward in the past, but none had been implemented. The Alfonsine monarchy was close to the army. The army, however, having borne the onus of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship,84 was not prepared to support the burden of Alfonso XIII against the will of the urban vote in 1931. Its passivity permitted the bloodless proclamation of the republic.

  ‘The attitude of most of the military toward the new republic was passive and expectant,’ an historian of the Spanish army has written.85 This by no means meant that the army was ‘republican’. It was with the memory of the military’s long history of political interventionism that the liberal republicans – in particular Azaña – saw the army’s reform as an urgent task of an advanced bourgeois democracy. As war minister in the provisional republican government of 1931, Azaña set about the task without delay. Within a fortnight of the republic’s proclamation, he issued a decree which allowed virtually all officers to choose complete retirement on full pay. His plan was that the new army should consist of about 7,600 officers and 100,000 troops on the mainland, and 1,700 officers and 40,000 native and European troops in Morocco.

  Within a year, between 5,000 and 6,000 officers had chosen to retire.86 The figure was in itself eloquent testimony to the corps’ acceptance of this aspect of Azaña’s reforms.

  —It was the best possible solution to the problem, reflected the Marquess de MARCHELINA, a Carlist artillery officer who retired under the law. Azaña’s decree respected officers’ rights and political opinions. He realized that career officers who felt themselves monarchists could not serve the republic …

  The reduction in the size of the officer corps was not what mainly concerned many right-wing officers.

  —If the nation considered a smaller army necessary, then so be it. We officers had always been made to bear the burden, stressed Pedro SALAZAR, a monarchist infantry officer from Burgos. But what we really objected to was that the republic deprived us of our flag. I cried like a child when the republican flag was hoisted in place of the flag of Spain. We had to swear allegiance to the republic. Many of us had private reservations about that; but we took the oath …

  Azaña’s intention of creating a republican army by allowing the regime’s opponents to leave did not turn out the way he intended, the Marquess de MARCHELINA observed.

  —What happened, in fact, was that great numbers of republican army officers took advantage of the reform to leave the army! They felt that they would have greater possibilities in civilian life now that their regime was in power. At the same time they were assured of their officers’ pay … 87

  Azaña’s other reforms included reducing the number of mainland divisions from sixteen to eight; opening 60 per cent of the enrolment in military academies to outstanding NCOs; requiring that all candidates for academies had six months’ prior active service; and abolishing three military institutions: the Saragossa military academy, under Brigadier General Franco; accelerated promotion by combat merits; and separate military jurisdiction.

  The abolition of the first of these was a reform which even liberal officers believed might have been better achieved by sweeping changes of the academy’s staff, composed mainly of africanistas (as those who had served in Morocco were known). The second revived a long-standing dispute between the peninsular and African armies. The former, by and large, stood resolutely for promotion by strict seniority; the latter, which demanded compensation for active service, defended accelerated combat promotions.88 The third abolished a law which, since 1906, had given military courts the right to try all ‘crimes against the Fatherland and the army’.

  These moves aroused the suspicion of right-wing officers, especially the africanistas. Fatherland and army shared an identity. To attack one was to attack the other. ‘Where a government by its actions brought the nation to dishonour in the eyes of the world, either by proving itself unable to maintain order, or by placing it under the control however remote of a foreign power, then it was the bounden duty of the army officer to rise in defence of the country against the government: for however lawfully instituted, it had ceased to be lawful by its bringing dishonour to the nation.’ These words, by a biographer of Franco, discussing the nature of the officer corps’ training which Franco underwent, succinctly describe the attitudinal relationship of officers to Fatherland.89 The concept took precedence over an oath of loyalty to a particular regime.

  Suspicion was further aroused when Azaña, with his particular gift for presenting his enemies with phrases to use against the regime, spoke of ‘pulverizing’ the army.90

  —The republic wanted to crush the army. The regime was determined to build a new, stronger army, as does every communistic state, thought Lt Carlos BRAVO, an infantry officer who had joined the guardia civil in Morocco. For most of us, Azaña was a pervert, a moral disaster. If we hadn’t been Christians, we officers would have hanged him by a rope – a rope which would slowly have throttled him for a week …

  Right-wing officers, especially in Morocco where civilian rule had replaced military government, felt that the officer corps was being denigrated. But it was other issues – the very issues that began to arouse civilians of the same class origins – which focused their hostility to the new regime. These were law and order, ‘separatism’, and (to a lesser extent perhaps) attacks on the church. There was nothing surprising about this. The uneven development of Spain had its reflection in the officer corps which was manned not by personnel from the advanced industrial regions but by Castilians and Andalusians in the main. The latter came principally from the ‘provincial’ petty bourgeoisie (see section B) and shared most of its assumptions. Added to which was their particular sense of defending the nation’s honour.

  —We accepted the republic until disorder started, explained Lt BRAVO. I had some regrets for the monarchy, perhaps, but the change of regime was acceptable in itself. Would have been, I should say, if outrages hadn’t almost immediately got the upper hand …

  People had the right to demonstrate and demand what they considered their rights, he believed. But they must do so in a disciplined, orderly way. Instead, now the republic had come, they thought they were the ‘bosses’.

  ‘Disorder’, as Lt BRAVO envisaged it, broke out in Morocco almost as soon as the republic was declared. A major strike in Tetuán at the beginning of May 1931 was met by a declaration of martia
l law and the calling out of a company of regulares.91 Left-wing activity was discovered in several army bases. General Sanjurjo, then head of the guardia civil, was ordered to Morocco to restore order. Army officers, however, continued to be insulted in the streets, according to Lt BRAVO, who had decided to join the guardia civil because it was a corps which still enjoyed some respect.

  —I could see that sooner or later it was going to be necessary to restore order – and the armed forces would have to do it. Let me give you an example. I was walking down a street in Ceuta when some building workers sat down on the pavement in front of me so that I couldn’t pass. They expected me to step into the street or walk over them. Had I done so they would have protested that I had stepped on them. I wasn’t having any of this. I pulled out my pistol and said: ‘Clear the pavement.’ With their heads hanging, they did as I ordered …

  It was, of course, the guardia civil which was the bourgeois state’s first line of police defence. Founded in the mid-nineteenth century as a rural police force to combat banditry, it had soon become an efficient, well-armed para-military force for repressing ‘trouble’ in the countryside. Patrolling always in pairs, the guardia in their tricorne patent-leather hats became a symbol of oppression for the landless labourers of the south. If the need arose, the guardia civil could always be called into the major cities. Under the republic, the strength of the force was about 25,000 men; its officers came almost without exception (and its commander always) from the army officer corps.

  As a counterweight, the republic created the assault guards. This national republican police force was to be used for the suppression of demonstrations in the towns and to avoid the need for recourse to either the army or the guardia civil. It was, of course, also hoped that it would be a loyal republican force. Its fate in this respect has been seen in the pages devoted to the 1936 uprising in this book. After Sanjurjo’s abortive rising (see below), the size of the force was doubled to 10,000; and by July 1936, it stood at a nominal 18,000.92

  The army’s initial lack of willingness to rise against the republic was demonstrated in August 1932, when General Sanjurjo, who had made his name in Morocco, attempted a rising. Only 5 per cent of the officer corps directly backed the plot.93 The rising succeeded for a day in Seville where a general strike and the dispatch of loyal troops put Sanjurjo to flight. In Madrid, only one under-manned cavalry battalion supported the rising, of which the government was well-informed. The monarchist plotters had had to assure other conspirators that there would be no immediate attempt to restore the monarchy; and some units in Seville refused further support when the word spread that the rising was aimed at bringing back the king.

  Sanjurjo had a few months earlier clearly expressed the right-wing officer corps’ attitude to the republic. ‘We shall loyally serve the existing government; but if by chance the trend to the left should lead Spain to anarchy, we will rapidly assume full responsibility for the re-establishment of order. Our first duty is the maintenance of public order and we shall perform it at all costs. No revolutionary government shall be established in Madrid.’94

  In the opinion of the monarchist deputy, Pedro SAINZ RODRIGUEZ, who arranged a meeting between Sanjurjo and Franco prior to the rising, the latter was precipitated by the attempt to prevent the Catalan autonomy statute being approved by parliament.95

  —That was why the rising failed. It had to take place in August, rather than, say, the following January by which time it might have been well-prepared. Separatism was a burning issue in the army, as elsewhere. Franco told Sanjurjo clearly that he would not support the rising. I think he was well aware that it was poorly planned …

  Sanjurjo was condemned to death, but the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. About 300 other officers were purged. The ease with which the rising had been crushed led to an exaggerated sense of triumph among republicans, for which later they were to pay dearly.96 It led also to rapid parliamentary approval of the agrarian reform bill and the Catalan statute.

  While Azaña’s reforms reduced the army’s strength in numbers, it did little, in experts’ opinion, to increase its effective combat strength.

  Under the centre-right government of 1933–5, the army received satisfaction on a number of scores. Sanjurjo and those who had risen with him were amnestied. When Gil Robles became war minister in May 1935, he appointed Franco chief-of-staff, General Mola c-in-c Morocco, and General Goded to head a special army inspection under the war ministry. Promotions by merit were again authorized. Gil Robles and Franco carried out a purge of liberal republican officers, and a start was made to re-equipping the artillery and raising cartridge production.

  The Asturian rising of October 1934 was put down by Foreign Legion and Moroccan troops from the Army of Africa. Franco played a leading coordinating role in the operation. The rising also gave impetus to a clandestine right-wing organization within the army: UME (Unión Militar Española). This was composed in the main of middle-rank and junior officers, and after Asturias its leaders held talks with the Falange.

  In early November 1934, Calvo Sotelo, the monarchist leader, encouraged parliament to consider the army’s position.

  ‘It is necessary to affirm Spain’s need for a powerful army and to restore moral satisfaction and spiritual dignity to the leaders of that army,’ he said. ‘It is necessary, in a word, that the honour of the army be the very honour of Spain.’ Refuting Azaña’s statement that the army was the arm of the fatherland, he continued: ‘It is now obvious that the army is much more than the arm of the fatherland. I shall not say that it is its head, for it ought not to be that; but it is much more than the arm. It is the spinal column – and if it breaks, bends or cracks, it is Spain that is bent or broken.’

  At the other end of the political spectrum, the communist party fully understood the importance of organizing within the army. It had for several years published La Voz del Cuartel (Voice of the Barracks) as an outlet for soldiers’ views and complaints. After October 1934, Franco attempted to crush the left inside the army.97

  It was at this moment that Francisco ABAD, an Andalusian communist, joined the army as a regular. Having been thrown out of work as a barrel-maker in his native Almería, he hoped to be able to pursue his ambition of becoming a musician in the army. He joined the No. 6 infantry regiment in Madrid, where he found that the clandestine organization which had previously existed had been wound up. He set about recreating it. By March 1935, a clandestine newspaper called Soldado Rojo (Red Soldier) began to appear.

  —It was the organ of the soldiers’ and corporals’ organization, and was published by the communist party. Above all, it expressed the need to defend democratic liberties, the republic, and warned constantly of the necessity to be alert to the possibility of a military coup. By December 1935, about 175 soldiers and corporals from my regiment were members of the organization. Hardly any of them were members of the PCE, nor did they know that the organization was led by the communist party …

  In October 1935, his regiment took part in manoeuvres in the Guadarrama mountains. His organization issued a leaflet denouncing these as a ‘fascist tryout’ for the seizure of Madrid. The barracks committee which he had organized, and which controlled the soldiers’ and corporals’ organization, consisted of only two or three men. A soldier was detailed by the regiment’s Lt Colonel to keep a watch on ABAD. Unknown to the colonel, the man belonged to ABAD’S organization and was in charge of smuggling in propaganda. Unknown to his company captain, ABAD kept all propaganda hidden in the officer’s room.

  When, in December 1935, a new government was appointed to prepare for the 1936 general elections, Gil Robles, in one of his last acts as war minister, asked Generals Franco, Goded and Fanjul to sound out support in the army for a declaration of martial law. The response was not encouraging. Senior officers were unwilling to act against a constitutional government as long as it remained in the hands of moderates. After the Popular Front electoral victory, Gil Robles asked the prime minis
ter, and Franco requested the war minister, to declare a state of war (martial law); both turned down the request.

  The liberal republican government now posted the generals it most feared to what it considered geographically peripheral posts: Franco to the Canary Islands, Goded to the Balearic Islands, Mola to Pamplona. Before leaving, these and other generals met in Madrid. No precise plans were laid, but it was apparently agreed that all would act if any one of the following occurred: dissolution of the guardia civil, dismissal of army recruits, disbanding of the officer corps, armed rebellion by the left or a premature coup by a single garrison.98

  Most of the active army leadership, however, was not outright anti-republican, militarist or favourable to authoritarian solutions. Franco, with his habitual caution, was apparently willing to allow the liberal republican regime time to see if it could ‘contain’ the situation arising from the Popular Front victory. Some other generals, who for the most part had retired under Azaña’s reform, were less sanguine, and attempted to organize risings in April and May 1936. Neither got off the ground. It was after the first of these that Mola took over the planning of the definitive rising.

  It was not by chance that an africanista should be responsible for masterminding the operation. After years spent pacifying Riff tribesmen, officers of the Army of Africa tended to look on Spain itself ‘as a Moroccan problem of a new kind: infested by rebellious tribes masquerading as political parties and demanding an iron, if fatherly, hand’.99