Now on the previous day we had captured a French order, originating if I am not mistaken from General Gamelin himself, which contained the words: ‘The torrent of German tanks must finally be stopped!’ This order had strengthened me in my conviction that the attack must be pressed forward with all possible strength, since the defensive capabilities of the French was obviously causing their high command serious anxiety. This was no time for hesitancy, still less for calling a halt.
I sent for the troops by companies and read them the captured order, making plain its significance and the importance of continuing the attack at once. I thanked them for their achievements to date and told them that they must now strike with all their power to complete our victory. I then ordered them to return to their vehicles and to continue the advance.
The fog of war that had confused us soon lifted. We were in the open now, with results that were rapidly to be seen. In Poix-Terron I found the first general staff officer of the 2nd Panzer Division, told him what the position was and drove on to Novion-Porcien and from there to Montcornet. On this drive I passed an advancing column of the 1st Panzer Division. The men were wide awake now and aware that we had achieved a complete victory, a break-through. They cheered and shouted remarks which often could only be heard by the staff officers in the second car: ‘Well done, old boy,’ and ‘There’s our old man,’ and ‘Did you see him? That was hurrying Heinz,’ and so on. All this was indicative.
In the market-place of Montcornet I found General Kempff, the commander of the 6th Panzer Division of the Corps Reinhardt, whose troops, after crossing the Meuse, had arrived in this town at the same moment as my own. Now roads had to be allotted among the three panzer divisions—the 6th, 2nd and 1st—which were pouring through the town in their headlong drive towards the west. Since the Panzer Group had laid down no boundary between the two corps, we soon agreed on one among ourselves and ordered the advance to go on until the last drop of petrol was used up. My foremost units reached Marie and Dercy (over 40 miles from that morning’s starting-point, and 55 miles from Sedan).
Meanwhile I told the men who were with me to go through the houses on the market-place. Within a few minutes they had collected several hundred prisoners, Frenchmen from various units, whose amazement at our being there was plain to see on their faces. An enemy tank company, which tried to enter the town from the southwest, was taken prisoner. It belonged to General de Gaulle’s division, of whose presence in the area north of Laon we had already heard. We set up our corps headquarters in the little village of Soize, east of Montcornet. I was in contact with the staffs of the 1st and 2nd Panzer Divisions. The Panzer Group was informed by wireless of the day’s events and I announced my intention of continuing the pursuit on the 17th of May. (See Appendix IX and Sketch Map 3b.)
After our splendid success on the 16th of May and the simultaneous victory won by XLI Army Corps, it did not occur to me that my superiors could possibly still hold the same views as before, nor that they would now be satisfied with simply holding the bridgehead we had established across the Meuse while awaiting the arrival of the infantry corps. I was completely filled with the ideas that I had expressed during our conference with Hitler in March, that is to say to complete our break-through and not to stop until we had reached the English Channel. It certainly never occurred to me that Hitler himself, who had approved the boldest aspects of the Manstein plan and had not uttered a word against my proposals concerning exploitation of the break-through, would now be the one to be frightened by his own temerity and would order our advance to be stopped at once. Here I was making a great mistake, as I was to discover on the following morning.
Early on the 17th of May I received a message from the Panzer Group: the advance was to be halted at once and 1 was personally to report to General von Kleist, who would come to see me at my airstrip at 07.00 hrs. He was there punctually and, without even wishing me a good morning, began in very violent terms to berate me for having disobeyed orders. He did not see fit to waste a word of praise on the performance of the troops. When the first storm was passed, and he had stopped to draw breath, I asked that I might be relieved of my command. General von Kleist was momentarily taken aback, but then he nodded and ordered me to hand over my command to the most senior general of my corps. And that was the end of our conversation. I returned to my corps headquarters and asked General Veiel to come to see me, that I might hand over to him.
I then sent a message to Army Group von Rundstedt by wireless in which I said that after I had handed over my command at noon I would be flying to the Army Group headquarters to make a report on what had happened. I received an answer almost at once: I was to remain at my headquarters and await the arrival of Colonel-General List, who was in command of the Twelfth Army that was following behind us and who had been instructed to clear this matter up. Until the arrival of Colonel-General List all units were to be ordered to remain where they were. Major Wenck, who came to receive these orders, was shot at by a French tank while returning to his division and was wounded in the foot. General Veiel now appeared and I explained the situation to him. Early that afternoon Colonel-General List arrived and asked me at once what on earth was going on here. Acting on instructions from Colonel-General von Rundstedt he informed me that I would not resign my command and explained that the order to halt the advance came from the Army High Command (the OKH) and therefore must be obeyed. He quite understood my reasons, however, for wishing to go on with the advance and therefore, with the Army Group’s approval, he ordered: ‘ Reconnaissance in force to be carried out. Corps headquarters must in all circumstances remain where it is, so that it may be easily reached.’ This was at least something, and I was grateful to Colonel-General List for what he had done. I asked him to clear up the misunderstanding between General von Kleist and myself. Then I set the ‘reconnaissance in force’ in motion. Corps headquarters remained at its old location in Soize; a wire was laid from there to my advanced headquarters, so that I need not communicate with my staff by wireless and my orders could therefore not be monitored by the wireless intercept units of the OKH and the OKW.
Before receiving the order to halt early on the 17th, 1st Panzer Division had taken Ribémont on the Oise and Crécy on the Serre. The advanced units of 10th Panzer Division, released from the area south of Sedan, had reached Fraillicourt and Saulces-Monclin. On the evening of the 17th of May a bridgehead was satisfactorily established across the Oise near Moy (15 miles from Dercy and 70 miles from Sedan). (See Appendix X.)
At 09.00 hrs. on the 18th of May the 2nd Panzer Division reached St. Quentin. On its left the 1st Panzer Division was also across the Oise, advancing on Péronne. Early on the 19th the 1st Panzer Division succeeded in forcing a bridgehead across the Somme near this town. Several French staffs, who had arrived at Péronne in an attempt to find out what was happening, were captured. (See Appendixes XI and XII.)
Advanced corps headquarters moved to Villers-le-Sec.
On the 19th of May we crossed the old Somme battlefield of the First World War. Until now we had been advancing north of the Aisne, the Serre and the Somme, and those rivers had served to guard our open left flank, which was also covered by reconnaissance troops, anti-tank units and combat engineers. The danger from this flank was slight; we knew about the French 4th Armoured Division, a new formation under General de Gaulle, which had been reported on the 16th of May and had first appeared, as already stated, at Montcornet. During the next few days de Gaulle stayed with us and on the 19th a few of his tanks succeeded in penetrating to within a mile of my advanced headquarters in Holnon wood. The headquarters had only some 20 mm. anti-aircraft guns for protection, and I passed a few uncomfortable hours until at last the threatening visitors moved off in another direction. Also we were aware of the existence of a French reserve army, some eight infantry divisions strong, which was being set up in the Paris area. We did not imagine that General Frère would advance against us so long as we kept on moving ourselves. According to the bas
ic French formula, he would wait until he had exact information about his enemy’s position before doing anything. So we had to keep him guessing; this could best be done by continuing to push on.
By the evening of May 19th XIX Army Corps had reached the line Cambrai–Péronne–Ham. 10th Panzer Division took over the protection of our increasingly extended left flank, relieving the units of 1st Panzer Division, which had previously been engaged on this task. During the night of the 19–20th corps headquarters moved forward to Marleville. On this day the corps at last received its freedom of movement once again, with the authorisation to move on Amiens as from the 20th. 10th Panzer Division was now entrusted with the defence of our left flank as far as Corbie, to the east of Amiens. Its previous sector was taken over by the 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division. 1st Panzer Division was to advance towards Amiens and to establish a bridgehead on the south bank of the Somme with all speed. 2nd Panzer Division was ordered to move through Albert to Abbéville, there to seize another bridgehead across the Somme and to clean up any enemy troops between Abbéville and the sea. The boundary between the 2nd and 1st Panzer Division was fixed as Combles–Longueval–Pozières–Varennes–Puchevillers–Canaples–Flixécourt–the Somme.
Defensive sectors along the Somme were:
2nd Panzer Division: the mouth of the Somme to Flixécourt (exclusive),
1st Panzer Division: Flixécourt to the junction of the Avre and the Somme (east of Amiens),
10th Panzer Division: the Avre-Somme junction to Péronne.
I reckoned that the 1st Panzer Division should be in a position to attack Amiens at about 09.00 hrs. I therefore ordered my car for 05.00 hrs., since I wished to participate in this historic event. My officers maintained that this was too early and suggested a later start, but I stuck to my original schedule and was proved right. (See Appendixes XIII and XIV.)
When I reached the northern outskirts of Amiens at 08.45 hrs. on the 20th of May, 1st Panzer Division was just moving into the attack. On my way there I had visited Péronne to make sure that the 10th Panzer Division was in position and there heard, in very strong terms, how 1st Panzer Division had been relieved. It seems that the units of 1st Panzer Division which were holding the bridgehead had not waited for the relieving force to arrive before pulling out, because the officer in charge, Lieutenant-Colonel Balck, had feared that otherwise he would be late for the attack on Amiens, which he regarded as more important than the holding of the bridgehead. His successor, Colonel Landgraf, was extremely angry at such casual behaviour and even more infuriated by Balck’s answer to his remonstrances: ‘If we lose it you can always take it again. I had to capture it in the first place, didn’t I?’ Luckily the enemy allowed Landgraf sufficient time to re-occupy the empty ground without having to fight for it. I drove around Albert, which was still held by the enemy, and passed endless columns of refugees on my way to Amiens.
1st Panzer Division’s attack went well, and by about noon we had taken the city and forced a bridgehead to a depth of some 4 miles. I had a quick look over the ground we had seized and also the city with its beautiful cathedral, before hurrying back to Albert where I expected to find the 2nd Panzer Division. I met the columns of my advancing troops and had to drive through crowds of fleeing refugees. I also ran into a number of enemy vehicles which, thick with dust, had joined the German columns and hoped in this fashion to reach Paris and avoid being taken prisoner. I thus quickly captured some fifteen Englishmen. (See Appendix XV.)
In Albert I found General Veiel. The 2nd Panzer Division had captured an English artillery battery, drawn up on the barrack square and equipped only with training ammunition, since nobody had reckoned on our appearance that day. Prisoners of all nationalities filled the market-place and the adjoining streets. 2nd Panzer Division were almost out of fuel and were therefore proposing to stop where they were, but they were soon disillusioned.1 I ordered them to advance at once to Abbéville and by 19.00 hrs. they had reached this objective, passing through Doullens-Bernaville-Beaumetz-Saint Riquier. Once there, a bombing attack by a few enemy bombers caused them a certain discomfort. After visiting the nimble commander of the 2nd Panzer Brigade, Colonel von Prittwitz, to make sure he understood about advancing on Abbéville, I made my way to Querrieu, to the north-east of Amiens, which was the new location of my corps headquarters. Here we were attacked by our own aeroplanes. It was perhaps an unfriendly action on our part, but our flak opened fire and brought down one of the careless machines. The crew of two floated down by parachute and were unpleasantly surprised to find me waiting for them on the ground. When the more disagreeable part of our conversation was over, I fortified the two young men with a glass of champagne. Unfortunately the destroyed machine was a brand-new reconnaissance plane.
During that night the Spitta Battalion 2 of the 2nd Panzer Division passed through Noyelles and was thus the first German unit to reach the Atlantic coast.
On the evening of this remarkable day we did not know in what direction our advance should continue; nor had Panzer Group von Kleist received any instructions concerning the further prosecution of our offensive. So the 21st of May was wasted while we waited for orders. I spent the day visiting Abbéville and our crossings and bridgeheads over the Somme. On the way I asked my men how they had enjoyed the operations up to date. ‘Not bad,’ said an Austrian of the 2nd Panzer Division, ‘but we wasted two whole days.’ Unfortunately he was right.
The Capture of the Channel Ports
On the 21st of May I received orders to continue the advance in a northerly direction with the capture of the Channel ports as objective. I wanted the 10th Panzer Division to advance on Dunkirk by way of Hesdin and St. Omer, the 1st Panzer Division to move on Calais and the 2nd on Boulogne. But I had to abandon this plan since the 10th Panzer Division was withdrawn from my command by an order of the Panzer Group dated the 22nd of May, 06.00 hrs., and was held back as Panzer Group reserve. So when the advance began on the 22nd the only divisions I commanded were the 1st and 2nd Panzer. My request that I be allowed to continue in control of all three of my divisions in order quickly to capture the Channel ports was unfortunately refused. As a result the immediate move of the 10th Panzer Division on Dunkirk could not now be carried out. It was with a heavy heart that I changed my plan. 1st Panzer Division, together with Infantry Regiment ‘G.D.’, which had meanwhile arrived from Sedan, was to go by Samer–Desvres–Calais, while the 2nd Panzer Division moved along the coast to Boulogne.
On the 21st of May a noteworthy event occurred to the north of us: English tanks attempted to break through in the direction of Paris. At Arras they came up against the SS Division Totenkopf, which had not been in action before and which showed signs of panic. The English did not succeed in breaking through, but they did make a considerable impression on the staff of Panzer Group von Kleist, which suddenly became remarkably nervous. Subordinate units, however, were not infected by this. On the 21st of May the 8th Panzer Division of the XLI Army Corps reached Hesdin while the 6th Panzer Division of the same corps took Boisle.
Our new advance began early on the 22nd of May. At 08.00 hrs. the Authie was crossed in a northerly direction. Neither the 1st nor the 2nd Panzer Division could move in full strength since units of both divisions, and particularly of the 2nd, had to be left behind to secure our Somme bridgeheads until such time as they could be relieved by General von Wietersheim’s XIV Army Corps which was following after us in the same role as at Sedan. (See Appendixes XVI and XVII.)
In the afternoon of the 22nd there was fierce fighting at Desvres, Samer and to the south of Boulogne. Our opponents were mostly Frenchmen, but included a number of English and Belgian units and even an occasional Dutchman. Their resistance was broken. But the enemy air force was very active, bombing us and firing their guns at us too, while we saw little of our own Luftwaffe. The bases from which our planes were operating were now a long way away and apparently could not be moved forward with sufficient speed. All the same, we managed to force a way int
o Boulogne.
Sketch Map 5.
Battle for the Channel Ports. Situation 24.5,–28/29.5.40
Corps headquarters was moved to Recques.
The 10th Panzer Division was now once again placed under my command. I decided to move the 1st Panzer Division, which was already close to Calais, on to Dunkirk at once, while the 10th Panzer Division, advancing from Doullens through Samer, replaced it in front of Calais. There was no particular urgency about capturing this port. At midnight I sent my orders to the 1st Panzer Division by wireless: ‘Assemble north of the Canche by 07.00 hrs. 23rd May, as 10th Panzer Division is following up behind you. 2nd Panzer Division has fought its way into Boulogne. 1st Panzer Division to move at once to lineAudruicq–Ardres–Calais and then swing eastwards to advance east through Bourbourgville-Gravelines to Bergues and Dunkirk. 10th Panzer Division will be to the south. Carry out instructions on receipt of code-word “Eastwards advance.” Move off 10.00 hrs.’
Early on the 23rd I supplemented these instructions with a wireless order. ‘Eastwards advance 10.00 hrs. Attack south of Calais towards St. Pierre–Brouck and Gravelines.’
On the 23rd of May the 1st Panzer Division set off towards Grave-lines against strong resistance, while the 2nd Panzer Division was involved in heavy fighting in and around Boulogne. The attack on the town itself assumed a curious form, since for some time neither our tanks nor our guns managed to penetrate the old town walls. By the use of a ladder from the kitchen of a nearby house, and with the powerful assistance of an 88 mm. flak gun, a breach was at last made in the wall near the cathedral and an entry forced into the town itself. There was fighting in the harbour area, during the course of which a tank managed to sink one British motor torpedo boat and damage several others.
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