On the 24th of May the 1st Panzer Division reached the Aa Canal between Holque and the coast and secured bridgeheads across it at Holque, St. Pierre-Brouck, St. Nicholas and Bourbourgville; the 2nd Panzer Division cleared up Boulogne; the bulk of the 10th Panzer Division reached the line Desvres–Samer.
The SS Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler was now placed under my corps command. I ordered this division to advance on Watten, thus giving more power to 1st Panzer Division’s drive on Dunkirk. The 2nd Panzer Division was ordered to withdraw all the troops it could spare from Boulogne and to send them off too in the direction of Watten. The 10th Panzer Division encircled Calais and prepared to attack the old sea fortress. I visited the division during the afternoon and ordered it to advance carefully, so as to avoid casualties. On the 25th of May it was to be reinforced by the heavy artillery that was no longer needed at Boulogne.
Reinhardt’s XLI Army Corps had meanwhile secured a bridgehead over the Aa at St. Omer.
Hitler’s Momentous Order to Stop
On this day (the 24th) the Supreme Command intervened in the operations in progress, with results which were to have a most disastrous influence on the whole future course of the war. Hitler ordered the left wing to stop on the Aa. It was forbidden to cross that stream. We were not informed of the reasons for this. The order contained the words: ‘Dunkirk is to be left to the Luftwaffe. Should the capture of Calais prove difficult, this port too is to be left to the Luftwaffe.’ (I quote here from memory.) We were utterly speechless. But since we were not informed of the reasons for this order, it was difficult to argue against it. The panzer divisions were therefore instructed: ‘Hold the line of the canal. Make use of the period of rest for general recuperation.’ 1
Fierce enemy air activity met little opposition from our air force.
Early on the 25th of May I went to Watten to visit the Leibstandarte and to make sure that they were obeying the order to halt. When I arrived there I found the Leibstandarte engaged in crossing the Aa. On the far bank was Mont Watten, a height of only some 235 feet, but that was enough in this flat marshland to dominate the whole surrounding countryside. On top of the hillock, among the ruins of an old castle, I found the divisional commander, Sepp Dietrich. When I asked why he was disobeying orders, he replied that the enemy on Mont Watten could ‘look right down the throat’ of anybody on the far bank of the canal. Sepp Dietrich had therefore decided on the 24th of May to take it on his own initiative. The Leibstandarte and the Infantry Regiment ‘G.D.’ on its left were now continuing their advance in the direction of Wormhoudt and Bergues. In view of the success that they were having I approved the decision taken by the commander on the spot and made up my mind to order the 2nd Panzer Division to move up in their support.
On this day we completed the capture of Boulogne. 10th Panzer Division was fighting outside the Calais citadel. When a demand that he surrender was addressed to the English commandant, Brigadier Nicholson sent the laconic reply: ‘The answer is no, as it is the British Army’s duty to fight as well as it is the German’s.’1 So we had to take it by assault. (See Appendix XVIII.)
On the 26th of May the 10th Panzer Division captured Calais. At noon I was at the divisional headquarters and according to the orders I had received I asked Schaal whether he wanted to leave Calais to the Luftwaffe. He replied that he did not, since he did not believe that our bombs would be effective against the thick walls and earthworks of the old fortifications. Furthermore, if the Luftwaffe were to attack them it would mean that he would have to withdraw his troops from their advanced positions on the edge of the citadel, which would then have to be captured all over again. I was bound to agree with this. At 16.45 hrs. the English surrendered. We took 20,000 prisoners, including 3-4,000 British, the remainder being French, Belgian and Dutch, of whom the majority had not wanted to go on fighting and whom the English had therefore locked up in cellars.
In Calais, for the first time since the 17th of May, I met General von Kleist, who expressed his appreciation for the achievements of my troops.
On this day we attempted once again to attack towards Dunkirk and to close the ring about that sea fortress. But renewed orders to halt arrived. We were stopped within sight of Dunkirk! We watched the Luftwaffe attack. We also saw the armada of great and little ships by means of which the British were evacuating their forces.
General von Wietersheim appeared at my headquarters during the course of the day to discuss with me arrangements for the relief of XIX Army Corps by his XIV Army Corps. The advanced division of this corps, the 20th (Motorised) Infantry Division, was placed under my command. I put it in on the right of the Leibstandarte ‘Adolf Hitler.’ Before this discussion was over, a small incident occurred. The commander of the Leibstandarte, Sepp Dietrich, while driving from the front came under machine-gun fire from a party of Englishmen who were still holding out in a solitary house behind our lines. They set his car on fire and compelled him and his companions to take shelter in the ditch. Dietrich and his adjutant crawled into a large drain pipe, where the ditch ran under a cross road, and in order to protect himself from the burning petrol of his car covered his face and hands with damp mud. A wireless truck following his command car signalled for help and we were able to send part of the 3rd Panzer Regiment of the 2nd Panzer Division, whose sector this was, to get him out of his unpleasant predicament. He soon appeared at my headquarters covered from head to foot in mud and had to accept some very ribald comments on our part. (See Appendix XIX.)
It was not until the afternoon of May the 26th that Hitler gave permission for the advance on Dunkirk to be resumed. By then it was too late to achieve a great victory. (See Appendix XX.)
The corps was sent into the attack during the night of the 26-27th. The 20th (Motorised) Infantry Division, with the Leibstandarte ‘Adolf Hitler’ and the Infantry Regiment ‘G.D.’ under command and reinforced by heavy artillery, was given Wormhoudt as its objective. 1st Panzer Division on its left was ordered to push forward, with point of main effort its right wing, in accordance with the progress that that attack should make.
The Infantry Regiment ‘G.D.’ received useful support from the 4th Panzer Brigade of the 10th Panzer Division and secured its objective, the high ground Crochte-Pitgam. The Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion of the 1st Panzer Division took Brouckerque.
Heavy enemy movement of transport ships from Dunkirk was observed.
On the 28th of May we reached Wormhoudt and Bourgbourgville. On the 29th Gravelines fell to the 1st Panzer Division. But the capture of Dunkirk was after all completed without us. On the 29th of May XIX Army Corps was relieved by XIV Army Corps. (See Appendix XXI.)
The operation would have been completed very much more quickly if Supreme Headquarters had not kept ordering XIX Army Corps to stop and thus hindered its rapid and successful advance. What the future course of the war would have been if we had succeeded at that time in taking the British Expeditionary Force prisoner at Dunkirk, it is now impossible to guess. In any event a military victory on that scale would have offered a great chance to capable diplomats. Unfortunately the opportunity was wasted owing to Hitler’s nervousness. The reason he subsequently gave for holding back my corps—that the ground in Flanders with its many ditches and canals was not suited to tanks—was a poor one.
On May 26th I was anxious to express my gratitude to the brave troops under my command. This took the form of the following corps order:
Soldiers of the XIX Army Corps!
For seventeen days we have been fighting in Belgium and France. We have covered a good 400 miles since crossing the German border: we have reached the Channel Coast and the Atlantic Ocean. On the way here you have thrust through the Belgian fortifications, forced a passage of the Meuse, broken the Maginot Line extension in the memorable Battle of Sedan, captured the important heights at Stonne and then, without halt, fought your way through St. Quentin and Péronne to the lower Somme at Amiens and Abbéville. You have set the crown on your achievement
s by the capture of the Channel Coast and of the sea fortresses at Boulogne and Calais.
I asked you to go without sleep for 48 hours. You have gone for 17 days. I compelled you to accept risks to your flanks and rear. You never faltered.
With masterly self-confidence and believing in the fulfillment of your mission, you carried out every order with devotion.
Germany is proud of her Panzer Divisions and I am happy to be your commander.
We remember our fallen comrades with honour and respect, sure in the knowledge that their sacrifice was not in vain.
Now we shall arm ourselves for new deeds.
For Germany and for our leader, Adolf Hitler!
signed, GUDERIAN.
Winston Churchill, in his memoirs of the Second World War, says that some of the German generals suggested that by holding up his tanks outside Dunkirk Hitler was hoping either to give the English an opportunity to sue for peace or to increase Germany’s chances of negotiating a settlement. Neither then nor at any later period did I ever hear anything to substantiate this suggestion. Churchill’s guess that Rundstedt may have himself decided to hold up the armour is also wide of the mark. As the commander on the spot I am able, moreover, definitely to state that the heroic defence of Calais, although worthy of the highest praise, yet had no influence on the development of events outside Dunkirk. Churchill assumes, quite correctly, that Hitler and above all Goering believed German air supremacy to be strong enough to prevent the evacuation of the British forces by sea. This belief was a mistake pregnant with consequence, for only the capture of the British Expeditionary Force could have influenced the English towards making peace with Hitler or could have created the conditions necessary for a successful German invasion of Great Britain.
In Flanders I received news that my elder son had been wounded, though mercifully the wound was not mortal. My second son was decorated in France with the Iron Cross, both First and Second Class. Despite being in action with an armoured reconnaissance battalion, he had survived all his engagements unhurt.
The Break-through to the Swiss Border
On the 28th of May Hitler ordered that a Panzer Group be set up under my command. My corps headquarters moved to Signy-le-Petit, south-west of Charleville, to make preparations for the next phase of the campaign. It arrived there on the 1st of June. The assembly of ‘Panzer Group Guderian’ took place during the first days of June in the area south-west of Charleville. Its staff was formed from the staff of my old XIX Army Corps. The trusty Colonel Nehring remained Chief of Staff, the operations officer (I a) was Major Bayerlein, and the adjutant Lieutenant-Colonel Riebel. The Panzer Group consisted of:
Sketch Map 6
Break through the Weygand Line to the Plateau de Langres. Situation 11.6–15.6.40.
The XXXIX Army Corps (General Schmidt), with the 1st and 2nd Panzer Divisions and the 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division.
The XLI Army Corps (General Reinhardt), with the 6th and 8th Panzer Divisions and the 20th (Motorised) Infantry Division, and a number of formations under direct command of the Group.
The Panzer Group itself was subordinate to Colonel-General List’s Twelfth Army.
The march to our new assembly area was a considerable one, particularly for the 1st and 2nd Panzer Divisions coming from the Channel coast. The distance amounted to some 150 miles, but owing to detours necessitated by bridge demolitions some units had to cover a further 60 miles. Signs of extreme fatigue on the part of the troops and of wear to their vehicles began to be apparent. Fortunately the troops were enabled to have a few days for rest and maintenance, so that both they and, to a certain extent, their equipment were in better condition for the tasks ahead.
The success of the first phase of the Campaign in the West had resulted in the elimination of the enemy’s forces in Holland, Belgium and Northern France. Our rear was now clear for the prosecution of operations southwards. We had already succeeded in destroying the bulk of the enemy’s armoured and motorised strength. So the second phase of the campaign would simply involve the defeating of the remainder of the French Army—some 70 divisions, including two British—and making an advantageous peace. That at least is what we thought at the time.
Deployment for the renewal of the battle was completed more quickly by our right wing, along the Somme, than by our centre, along the Serre and the Aisne. Consequently Army Group von Bock could launch its attack on the 5th of June, while that of Army Group von Rundstedt did not start until June 9th.
In the sector of Army Group von Rundstedt, Twelfth Army had the task of crossing the Aisne and the Aisne Canal between Château-Porcien and Attigny and of then pushing on towards the south. The infantry corps were to be responsible for crossing the river and its accompanying canal at eight points. After the bridgeheads had been established and the bridges thrown across, the panzer divisions of my Group were to attack through the infantry, to fight their way into the open, and then—depending on the situation—advance either towards Paris or Langres or Verdun. Our first objective was to be the Plateau de Langres; there, at the latest, we were to receive further orders.
I asked the commander of the Twelfth Army to assign certain crossing-places to my divisions from the beginning and to let them capture those bridgeheads on the Aisne themselves. I did not care for the idea of attacking through the infantry divisions, since their numerous and large supply columns tended to block the roads and I was worried about possible command difficulties arising. However, the Army Commander wished to save the panzer divisions for the decisive break-through and therefore refused my request. The Panzer Group was consequently assembled behind the infantry corps and the four panzer divisions were ready to advance through the eight different bridgeheads as soon as those were established. The two motorised divisions were to follow behind the panzer divisions of their respective corps. In order that the plan should succeed it was of course essential that the infantry manage to cross the river and seize the bridgeheads.
The boundary between the XXXIX and the XLI Army Corps ran from Wasigny through Rethel–Juniville–Hauviné–Aubérive–Suippes–St. Rémy-Tilloy (all inclusive to XXXIX Army Corps)–Vanault–Sogny–Pargny (all inclusive to XLI Army Corps).
On the 8th of June the Panzer Group headquarters was moved to Bégny.
On the 9th of June, the first day of Twelfth Army’s attack, I went to an observation post north-east of Rethel so that I might personally watch the progress of the infantry attack and thus not miss the moment for the commitment of my forces. From 05.00 hrs. to 10.00 hrs. there was nothing to see. I therefore sent my orderly officer to the next point of attack in order to find out if the infantry were over the Aisne there. At 12.00 hrs. I received messages from the front on either side of Rethel that the Rethel attacks had failed. My observers from the other fronts reported that the infantry had only succeeded in establishing a single bridgehead, a small one a mile to a mile and a half deep, in the neighbourhood of Château-Porcien. I got into communication with the chief of staff of Twelfth Army, my friend General von Mackensen, and asked him to tell his commander that in view of this I suggested that the tanks be moved into the single bridgehead during the hours of darkness so that they might be in a position to break out of it the following morning. I then went to Château-Porcien, by way of the headquarters of General Haase’s III Army Corps, where I stopped briefly to find out what the situation was. After having a look at the bridgehead I went to see the commander of my XXXIX Army Corps, General Schmidt, who with General Kirchner was immediately to the north of that little town. I discussed with them the move forward of 1st Panzer Division and its commitment in the Château-Porcien bridgehead. The movement was to start at dusk.
Shortly afterwards I met the Army Commander, Colonel-General List, who had motored down from the north. On his way he had passed elements of the 1st Panzer Division and had noted with displeasure that a number of the tank men had taken off their jackets, while some were actually bathing in a nearby stream. He took me violently to
task and wanted to know why my troops were not already advancing through the bridgeheads. Having just examined the situation for myself 1 was able to tell him that it was plainly impossible to advance through bridgeheads that had either not yet been captured or were not sufficiently extended. Furthermore, I pointed out that the capture of the bridgeheads was not the responsibility of my panzer troops. It was typical of Colonel-General List’s chivalrous nature that he immediately offered me his hand and proceeded calmly to discuss the future development of the attack with me.
After spending a short time at my Group headquarters I returned to the Château-Porcien bridgehead in order to supervise the commitment of my tanks and to establish contact with the commander of the infantry division there engaged. I found General Loch, of the 17th Infantry Division, on the far bank and we were able to co-ordinate the measures we were taking. I remained at the front until 01.00 hrs., then visited the wounded from my tank and reconnaissance units who were waiting for transport back through the bridgehead, thanked them for their brave performance, and drove back to my headquarters at Bégny in order to issue my orders.
In the course of the afternoon two shallow bridgeheads had been formed to the west and east of Château-Porcien. These could be used for getting the 2nd Panzer Divisions over the river, together with further elements of the 1st.
The attack by my tanks was to start at 06.30 hrs. on the 10th of June. I was at the front by then and managed to get the 1st Rifle Brigade, which was too far back, moving forwards. I was surprised to be recognised by the front-line infantry, and when I asked how they knew my name, I discovered I was amongst the 55th Infantry Regiment, whose home station was Würzburg; the officers and men remembered me from the days when I commanded the 2nd Panzer Division in that once beautiful but now totally ruined city. We were delighted to see each other. The attack by the tanks and the infantry went in simultaneously and both arms had confidence in the other. The advance was rapid through Avançon and Tagnon to Neuflize on the Retourne. Once in the open the tanks met hardly any resistance, since the new French tactics concentrated on the defence of woods and villages, while the open ground was abandoned out of respect for our tanks. Consequently our infantry had to fight hard for the barricaded streets and houses of the villages, while the tanks, only slightly inconvenienced by the French artillery firing to the rear from the positions they still held on the Rethel front, broke straight through to the Retourne and crossed that swampy stream, which had been dammed, at Neuflize. 1st Panzer Division now pressed forward, attacking along both banks of the Retourne, with the 1st Panzer Brigade to the south and Balck’s riflemen to the north of the stream. Juniville was reached in the early afternoon, where the enemy counter-attacked with strong armoured forces. A tank battle developed to the south of Juniville, which lasted for some two hours before being eventually decided in our favour. In the course of the afternoon Juniville itself was taken. There Balck managed personally to capture the colours of a French regiment. The enemy withdrew to La Neuville. While the tank battle was in progress I attempted, in vain, to destroy a Char B with a captured 47 mm. anti-tank gun; all the shells I fired at it simply bounced harmlessly off its thick armour. Our 37 mm. and 20 mm. guns were equally ineffective against this adversary. As a result, we inevitably suffered sadly heavy casualties.
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