Panzer Leader

by Heinz Guderian

  Of XLVII Panzer Corps, 17th Panzer Division was fighting near Semzy, to the south of Pochep; 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division was guarding the Panzer Group’s left flank from Pochep to Shukovka. With the arrival of the infantry divisions of the XII and LIII Army Corps it assembled its units towards its right wing. Meanwhile, the leading elements of the 18th Panzer Division, moving down from the north, had passed through Roslavl.

  During this time infantry units were marching from west to east, at right angles to the line of advance of my Panzer Group, the 167th Infantry Division through Mglin, the 31st Infantry Division to the north of that town, the 34th Infantry Division through Kletnia, the 52nd Infantry Division through Perelasy, and the 267th and 252nd Infantry Divisions along the road Krichev–Cherikov–Propoisk. All these divisions belonged to Second Army. If only a fraction of this force had been sent southwards from the very beginning of the Kiev offensive, repeated crises on XXIV Panzer Corps’ right flank would have been avoided.

  On August 26th enemy resistance to Second Army stiffened along the Desna. In order to ensure a rapid victory I requested the despatch of XLVI Panzer Corps. My request was refused by the OKH.

  On August 29th strong enemy forces, with air support, attacked XXIV Panzer Corps from the south and west. The corps was compelled to discontinue its own attacks by 3rd Panzer and 10th (Motorised) Infantry Divisions. Its task of clearing the enemy from the west bank of the Sudost completed, 4th Panzer Division was moved up through Novgorod Severskie to support 3rd Panzer Division. On this day I visited XXIV Panzer Corps as well as the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions, and after studying the situation I decided to order XXIV Panzer Corps as follows: the threat to the corps’ right flank was to be neutralised on the 30th, and the southward advance resumed on the 31st. Meanwhile, XLVII Panzer Corps was to continue its attack along the eastern bank of the Sudost, and later of the Desna, in the direction of Novgorod Severskie. At 18.00 hrs. I flew back to my headquarters. This was the last time that I was accompanied by my first operations officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Bayerlein, who was to be transferred to Africa. His successor was Major Wolf.

  By August 31st the bridgehead over the Desna had been considerably widened and the 4th Panzer Division was moved across the river. The 10th (Motorised) Infantry Division succeeded in crossing the Desna, to the north of Korop, but was thrown back again to the west bank by heavy Russian counter-attacks, besides being attacked on its right flank by strong enemy forces. By sending in the very last men of the division, in this case the Field Bakery Company, a catastrophe to the right flank was just avoided. The Russians attacked the XLVII Panzer Corps, moving the 108th and, from September 1st, the 110th Tank Brigades west and north-west from Trubchevsk for this purpose; the valiant 17th Panzer Division had a hard time. The 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division was sent across the Novgorod Severskie bridge and then swung north to protect the northern flank of XXIV Panzer Corps’ bridgehead and to help 17th Panzer Division’s advance. The 18th Panzer Division had relieved the 4th Panzer Division in the Sudost sector between the junction of that river with the Desna and Pochep. Since the beginning of the operation on August 25th XXIV Panzer Corps had so far taken 7,500 prisoners, XLVII Panzer Corps 12,000.

  In view of the attacks on both flanks and heavy Russian pressure against the front, particularly against the 10th (Motorised) Infantry Division, it seemed to me doubtful whether the strength available was sufficient for a continuation of the attack. I therefore once again requested the Army Group to relinquish XLVI Panzer Corps. However, at first, only Infantry Regiment Gross-Deutschland was released, on August 30th; this was followed by the 1st Cavalry Division on September 1st and SS-Das Reich, from Smolensk, on the 2nd. A Russian penetration six miles deep, in the sector of the 23rd Infantry Division to the south of Elnya, had necessitated the employment there of 10th Panzer Division in a frontal counter attack. Infantry Regiment Gross-Deutschland was directed to Novgorod Severskie and SS-Das Reich to the right wing of XXIV Panzer Corps, where they arrived on the 2nd and 3rd of September, respectively.

  This drop-by-drop method of reinforcement led me, on September 1st, to hold a wireless conversation with Army Group in which I requested that I be sent the whole XLVI Panzer Corps, and also the 7th and 11th Panzer Divisions and the 14th (Motorised) Infantry Division, which I knew were not committed at the time. With so adequate a mass of force I believed I could soon bring the Kiev offensive to a speedy and successful conclusion. The immediate consequence of the wireless conversation was the release of SS-Das Reich. But over and above that an intercept station of the OKH had listened in to what was said and this resulted in a positive uproar. The first echo came from the OKH liaison officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Nagel: a conference with Hitler ensued: and finally the OKW took steps which had most unfortunate results as far as I was concerned. But of all this, more later.

  On September 2nd Field-Marshal Kesselring, who commanded an Air Fleet, appeared at my Panzer Group Headquarters. He brought the news that Army Group South was apparently making progress and had secured several bridgeheads across the Dnieper. As for future operations, obscurity reigned; opinions varied between Kharkov and Kiev.

  On this day Generals Model and Ritter von Thoma were both slightly wounded.

  On September 3rd I drove past the rear elements of the 10th (Motorised) Infantry Division and the fighting men of the field bakery to the motor-cyclists of SS-Das Reich, near Avdeievka. The enemy was to the west of this place and the SS Reconnaissance Battalion was advancing towards him. To begin with there was a certain amount of confusion, but the clear-headed divisional commander, General Hausser, soon put this to rights. I found this officer in Avdeievka and told him to be prepared to attack Sosnitza on the 4th: The 5th Machine-gun Battalion, which had just arrived from Roslavl, was placed under his command.

  At noon I visited the 10th (Motorised) Infantry Division which had been heavily engaged during the last few days and had suffered tragically high casualties. The division enjoyed a certain relief from the arrival of the 4th Panzer Division along the southern bank of the Desna. As a result the Russians had discontinued their preparations, already referred to above, for a crossing of the river. During these last few days the 10th (Motorised) Infantry Division had been opposed by the 10th Russian Tank Brigade and the 293rd, 24th, 143rd, and 42nd Divisions, that is to say by an enormously superior enemy. I briefed the divisional commander, General von Loeper, on the situation and on the intentions of his neighbour, SS-Das Reich, and arranged that the right wing of his division should co-operate with the attack by the SS on the next day. I then visited a bridgehead to the south of the Desna held by the II Battalion of Infantry Regiment 20, whose troops made a good impression; I went on to see the I Battalion of the same regiment which had been forced back in its bridgehead a few days before but had soon made full amends for this misfortune. This battalion also made a good impression and I was able to express my conviction that in future it, too, would do its duty.

  I learned from my staff by wireless that the 1st Cavalry Division was once again under command of the Panzer Group and was being brought up on the right of SS-Das Reich. I visited the commander of the SS division once again, to ensure that SS-Das Reich was covering the supply lines of the 10th (Motorised) Infantry Division, and then returned to my headquarters. I there learned that Borsna and Konotop, which lay in the lines of our advance, remained our next objectives. Corps headquarters of XLVI Panzer Corps, together with half the corps troops, were once again placed under the Panzer Group’s command. Both the corps at the front reported the capture of 2,500 prisoners each, while an ad hoc formation, commanded by the Engineer-General Bacher and intended to protect our rear, had taken a further 1,200. XXIV Panzer Corps was insistent about the growing threat to its ever-lengthening southern flank and the increasing weakness of its spearhead. Krolevetz was captured.

  On this day the liaison officer of the OKH, Lieutenant-Colonel Nagel, took part in a conference at Army Group headquarters, Borissov, at which th
e Commander-in-Chief of the Army was present. Nagel took this opportunity to express my views on the situation; he was, therefore, described as a ‘loudspeaker and propagandist’ and immediately relieved of his appointment. I was very sorry that this clear-sighted officer, who incidentally had a first-class knowledge of the Russian language, should have been punished for doing his duty, which was simply to express the views prevalent at the front.

  But that was not all. That evening it began to rain and the roads were soon turned into mire. Two-thirds of SS-Das Reich, which was moving forward, was stuck fast.

  I spent September 4th at the front with the 4th Panzer Division where I also found General von Geyr. It took me four and a half hours to cover 45 miles, so softened were the roads by the brief fall of rain. The 4th Panzer Division was engaged in attacking towards Korop–Krasnopolie. The enemy here had up to now resisted stubbornly, even against our tanks. But after the dive bombers had gone in his main resistance seemed to be broken. From captured documents General von Geyr had reached the conclusion that a continuation of the attack towards Sosnitza would be particularly profitable, since this would be along the boundary between the Russian Thirteenth and Twenty-first Armies. It was even possible that a gap might there be found. The 3rd Panzer Division reported progress. I looked for this division and found it advancing towards the River Seim, through Mutino and Spasskoie. General Model, too, had the impression that he had found a weak spot, if not an actual gap, in the enemy’s defences. I told Model to push on to the Konotop–Bielopolie railway as soon as he was over the Seim, and to cut that line. While driving back I gave the orders for the next day to my staff by wireless. I learned in return that we might expect Hitler to interfere in the operations of the Panzer Group.

  Sketch Map 18

  The Battle of Kiev. Situation 4.9-14.9.41

  A telephone message from the Army Group had informed us that the OKW was dissatisfied with the operations of the Panzer Group and particularly with the employment of XLVII Panzer Corps on the eastern bank of the Desna. A report on my situation and intentions was demanded. That night an order came from the OKH in which it was stated that the attack by XLVII Panzer Corps was to be discontinued and the corps transferred back to the west bank of the Desna. These orders were cast in an uncouth language which offended me. The effect of the order on XLVII Panzer Corps was crushing. Both the corps headquarters and the divisions believed themselves to be on the brink of victory. The withdrawal of the corps and its re-deployment on the west bank would require more time than was needed for the completion of the attack. This corps alone had, since August 25th, captured 155 guns, 120 tanks, and 17,000 prisoners, while in the same period XXIV Panzer Corps had taken a further 13,000 prisoners, but for this no word of recognition was forthcoming.

  On September 5th the 1st Cavalry Division was ordered to Pogar and placed under command of Fourth Army. We would have preferred to see the division used as a mobile flank guard to XLVII Panzer Corps on our left wing. Now its powers of mobility were to be wasted since it was to be employed as a static flank guard along the Sudost.

  On this day SS-Das Reich captured Sosnitza.

  Fourth Army was ordered to evacuate the Elnya salient. By now the casualties, which I had sought to avoid by a timely withdrawal in August, had been suffered to occur.

  I spent September 6th again with SS-Das Reich. It was engaged in attacking the railway bridge over the Desna, near Makoshino. I went to some trouble to provide air support for this. As a result of the bad roads the whole division was not yet assembled. On the way there I passed a number of its units, some on the march, others resting in the woods. The excellent discipline of the troops made a first-class impression and they loudly expressed their satisfaction at once again forming part of the Panzer Group. The bridge was captured during the afternoon and a further crossing-place over the Desna thus secured. My staff convoy was compelled on several occasions to drive through hostile artillery fire, but suffered no casualties or damage. On the way back we met elements of the 1st Cavalry Division and SS units moving up on foot because of the bad condition of the road. At the divisional headquarters I gave orders that the Desna bridgehead be sufficiently enlarged so that the division might attack from the bridgehead towards the west bank of the Seim and thus help XXIV Panzer Corps to cross that river.

  On September 7th the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions succeeded in establishing bridgeheads on the south bank of the Seim. On this day the Army Group ordered an advance to the line Neshin–Monastirshtchino, with point of main effort towards Neshin. The order was modified at 05.25 hrs. on the 8th by the signal: ‘New direction of advance Borsna–Romny, point of main effort right.’ On the same day I had a conversation at Second Army, in Gomel, with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army concerning the operations planned for early October with objective Moscow. Apart from this Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch referred again to XLVII Panzer Corps’ battles towards Trubchevsk; he objected to my request for reinforcement which I had made by radio on the 1st of September, on the grounds that it might have been overheard by the OKW; and he expressed his opinion that at that period the Panzer Group had unnecessarily widened its operational front. I justified my actions by pointing out that the strong enemy forces on my left flank could not simply be ignored and had to be defeated. Up to now we had taken 40,000 prisoners and captured 250 guns. Our spearheads were nearing the Bachmach–Konotop railroad.

  On this day Second Army took Chernigov. It was ordered to advance Neshin–Borsna.

  Also on this day Lieutenant-Colonel Nagel left us and his successor, Major von Kahlden, arrived to take his place. He performed his mission with the same tact and understanding as Nagel and, in his time, Below before him.

  In Army Group North, Panzer Group 4 and the Eighteenth Army were preparing for an assault on the outer defences of Leningrad. This attack was to be launched on September 9th.

  On September 9th XXIV Panzer Corps crossed the Seim. I was with the 4th Panzer Division during this battle and watched units of Rifle Regiments 33 and 12 advance on Gorodishtche. Dive bombers gave effective support to the spearheads of the rifle regiments and of Panzer Regiment 35. But the limited combat strength of all units showed how badly they needed rest and recuperation after two and a half months of exhausting fighting and heavy casualties. Unfortunately there could be no question of that for the time being. In the late afternoon, at the headquarters of XXIV Panzer Corps, General Freiherr von Geyr told me that the SS were also attacking and the 3rd Panzer Division intended to push on towards Konotop. Prisoners had stated that the Fortieth Russian Army had been put in between the Thirteenth and Twenty-first. The ammunition situation was tolerable but fuel supplies were running low.

  In the evening I flew back to my headquarters at Krolevetz. There I found that Army Group had sent us a message during the day: the 1st Cavalry Division was not to remain along the Sudost, but was to be moved farther north. As a result the 18th Panzer Division could not now be moved up behind the Panzer Group and fresh troops were needed to exploit our success on the Seim. In the evening we received heartening news: XXIV Panzer Corps had in fact found the enemy’s weak spot, between Baturin and Konotop, and advance elements of 3rd Panzer Division were driving on Romny, our objective. The division was thus behind the enemy’s lines. The problem now was how to make the most of this success as quickly as possible; in view of our limited strength, the bad roads and, above all, our 145 miles long south-east flank, this was no easy task. Since I had no reserves available, all I could do to add the necessary punch to 3rd Panzer Division’s advance was to go with the division myself. I therefore decided to drive to the front again on the 10th of September.

  When I arrived at Ksendovka General Freiherr von Geyr informed me that the 3rd Panzer Division had captured Romny and seized a bridgehead across the River Romen. The 3rd Panzer Division had bypassed Konotop without capturing the town. The 4th Panzer Division was advancing on Bachmach, and SS-Das Reich on Borsna. Prisoners’ statements revealed that the Ru
ssian forces fighting in the Ukraine were still strong enough to defend themselves but were no longer capable of launching an attack. General Freiherr von Geyr was instructed to ensure the rapid occupation of the important railway station at Konotop, through which our supplies would have to come; 4th Panzer Division was to continue southward from Bachmach and SS-Das Reich was to move on to Kustovzy from Borsna. This last division was to be responsible for maintaining contact with Second Army. I then drove on to the 3rd Panzer Division.

  On the Seim bridge we were attacked by Russian bombers, on the road we were shelled by Russian artillery. As a result of rain the condition of the road had still further deteriorated and it was dotted with vehicles hopelessly stuck in the mud. It was impossible for the columns to observe their customary march discipline and they were badly straggled out. The machines for towing the guns had, moreover, to tow the lorries.

  At Chmeliov I arranged for accommodation for the night with 3rd Panzer Division’s headquarters, since there could be no question of my driving back to my headquarters that day. I then went on to Romny. To the north of that town the Romen provided a strong defensive line, which the Russians had further improved by means of anti-tank ditches and wire entanglements. The fact that the Russians had been unable to hold this strong position was proof that the 3rd Panzer Division had taken them completely by surprise and that with one more push our break-through would be complete. Immediately outside Romny I found General Model, who briefed me on the details of his operation. The town was in his hands, but enemy stragglers were still at large in the gardens and it was therefore impossible to drive through except in armoured vehicles. The mopping up was to start at 17.00 hrs. In the northern part of the town I came upon a group of staff officers receiving orders from Colonel Kleemann. They were particularly worried by Russian air attacks, since our air force was incapable of offering adequate fighter cover; the reason for this was that the Russian airfields were located in a fair-weather zone, while our fields were in a bad-weather zone and the rain had made them unusable. We were at that moment attacked by three Russian machines firing their machine-guns; the bombs fell elsewhere.