From Romny I sent a wireless signal to my staff, giving my instructions for the next day. XLVI Panzer Corps, with the 17th Panzer Division and Infantry Regiment Gross-Deutschland, was to advance on Putivl and Shilovka (ten miles to the south of Putivl). I requested strong fighter cover for Model.
On this day Bachmach was captured. Infantry Regiment Gross-Deutschland reached Putivl. Army Group instructed us to make preparations to attack towards the River Udai on either side of Priluki.
Army Group South was preparing a crossing of the Dnieper, near Kremenchug. From here they were to advance north and meet us near Romny.
During the whole night it poured with rain. My drive back on the 11th, therefore, proved very difficult. The first to fall out were the motor-cyclists. It was heavy going even for my cross-country vehicle with a four-wheel drive. Our command tanks and a towing vehicle borrowed from the artillery finally got us going again. At an average speed of 6 miles per hour we drove through the mud to Girovka, where I found the regimental headquarters of Lieutenant-Colonel Audörsch; the telephone lines were broken and it was in vain that I attempted to find out what the situation was. I finally learned from the motorcyclists of 3rd Panzer Division that we had captured Konotop. 4 miles to the north of Girovka I came across the Reconnaissance Battalion of the 10th (Motorised) Infantry Division. At 14.00 hrs. I found General von Loeper in Konotop and told him what had happened at Romny, and at 15.30 hrs. I arrived at XXIV Panzer Corps’ headquarters. I there heard that SS-Das Reich had taken Borsna. The corps was ordered to advance with its right wing through Monastirishtche and with its left through Piriatin to Romny. The XLVI Panzer Corps was told to push on southwards through Putivl.
At 18.30 hrs. I arrived back at my headquarters. On the 10th I had covered 100 miles in 10 hours, on the 11th 80 miles in 10½ hours. The boggy roads made any faster progress impossible. These time-wasting drives gave me sufficient insight into the difficulties that lay ahead of us. Only a man who has personally experienced what life on those canals of mud we called roads was like can form any picture of what the troops and their equipment had to put up with and can truly judge the situation at the front and the consequent effect on our operations. The fact that our military leaders made no attempt to see these conditions for themselves and, initially at least, refused to believe the reports of those who did, was to lead to bitter results, unspeakable suffering and many avoidable misfortunes.
Army Group informed us that evening that Colonel-General von Kleist’s Panzer Group 1 had been unable to reach its objective on account of the mud. This was hardly surprising to anyone who knew the condition of the roads as described above.
17th Panzer Division reached Voronesh-Gluchov, and on the 11th of September Gluchov.
During the course of September 12th Panzer Group 1 advanced through Semenovko to Lubny; the 3rd Panzer Division was pushed forward to Lochvitsa and captured the bridge over the Ssula to the north of that town. The Second Army, held up by bad weather, was approaching Neshin.
Army Group North believed that they had made a decisive penetration of the defensive front before Leningrad.
On September 13th we requested Army Group Centre that the 18th Panzer Division, which was still guarding the Sudost sector of our deep left flank, be relieved by infantry; this request was refused, with the comment that it came too late to make any difference to the ultimate decision. No consideration was given to the confused situation on our eastern flank or to the potential dangers that threatened from that quarter and which made the creation of at least a weak reserve a matter of urgency.
Panzer Group 1 took Lubny.
On September 14th my Panzer Group headquarters was moved to Konotop. The bad weather continued. Air reconnaissance was impossible. Ground reconnaissance was stuck in the mud. The units of the XLVI and XLVII Panzer Corps detailed to protect the flank were almost immobilised. The uncertainty along the protracted southeastern flank increased from day to day. In order at least to ensure contact with Panzer Group Kleist I decided to drive to XXIV Panzer Corps despite the existing difficulties. My road ran through Krolovetz–Baturin–Konotop–Romny to Lochvitsa. I met General Freiherr von Geyr in Michenki (4 miles to the south of Baturin) and he informed me that there appeared to be enemy forces in the Lochvitsa area and that it was therefore important that the gap between our forces and Kleist’s be filled. He had, in consequence, ordered his divisions to advance to the Ssula and close it. A strong Russian concentration was known to exist near Ssencha, 7 miles to the south of Lochvitsa. I drove on through Romny, where I saw crowds of people in their Sunday best going peaceably about their business. After Pochep and Konotop, Romny was the best-preserved Russian town that we had yet seen. I reached Model’s headquarters, at Lochvitsa, just as darkness was falling. Up to then he had only managed to bring one of his regiments this far forward; the rest of his men were struggling along in the mud far to the rear. He informed me that the strong Russian concentration consisted primarily of supply troops. Only some of the units in question were equipped for combat. The Russian tanks that had been seen had probably been withdrawn from maintenance depots to cover the retreat. Inside the vast Kiev pocket there were presumably elements of five Russian armies, the Twenty-first, Fifth, Thirty-seventh, Twenty-sixth, and Thirty-eighth.
Sketch Map 19
Crisis at Romny—Putivl. Situation 18.9.41.
Enemy attacks on our south-eastern flank, in the area of Yampol, to the south of Putivl, were beaten off.
Busing, Kahlden, and I spent the night in the Lochvitsa schoolhouse. I spoke to Liebenstein by wireless and ordered that the 10th (Motorised) Infantry Division be brought up with all speed to Romny and the rear elements of 3rd Panzer Division be freed to move to Lochvitsa. The schoolhouse was a solid building and well appointed for its purpose; indeed, almost all the schools in Soviet Russia were in good condition. A great deal was done there in the way of schools, hospitals, nurseries, and sports buildings. Institutions of this sort were in general kept clean and neat; the occasional exception—as in other matters—proved the rule.
Early on the 15th of September I visited the advance guard of the 3rd Panzer Division, which was commanded by Major Frank; during the previous day it had advanced southwards from Lochvitsa and thrown back the Russians to the west; and in the night it had overrun fifteen Russian lorries full of riflemen, some of whom had been killed and the rest made prisoner. From Frank’s O.P., near Lubny, a fine view could be obtained over the countryside and Russian supply columns were to be seen marching from west to east. These movements were stopped. I found Model with the II Battalion of Rifle Regiment 3 and he gave me his opinion of the situation. I next visited a number of units of the 3rd Panzer Division and spoke with Lieutenant-Colonel Munzel, the commander of Panzer Regiment 6. On this day Munzel had at his disposal only one Panzer IV, three Panzer III’s and six Panzer II’s, that it to say ten tanks were all that was left of a whole regiment. These figures give a vivid picture of how badly the troops needed a rest and a period for maintenance. They show that these brave men had given of their last in order to reach the objectives assigned them.
I radioed Liebenstein to instruct XXIV Panzer Corps that SS-Das Reich be sent south to the River Udai, between Kustovzy and Perevolochnoie, and thence be directed on Ssrebnoie–Beresovka in conjunction with 4th Panzer Division. 10th (Motorised) Infantry Division was to advance on Glinsk, to the west of Romny. I then boarded a plane to the south of Romny and flew back to my Panzer Group headquarters.
On this day 17th Panzer Division began to move towards Putivl.
In the evening I found Liebenstein in Konotop. He had flown to Army Group during the day and had there been given our instructions for the next phase of the campaign, the advance on Moscow. The purpose of these new operations was to be ‘the destruction of the final remnants of Army Group Timoshenko.’ Three-quarters of the German Army was to be committed for this purpose. Liebenstein’s renewed request for the release of 18th Panzer Division had been turned do
wn; Field-Marshal von Bock had remarked that he had asked Colonel-General Haider which were the more important, the business in the south or the preparations for the new undertaking, and Haider had replied ‘the latter.’
On September 16th we moved our advanced headquarters to Romny. The encirclement of the Russians was progressing. On this day we made contact with Panzer Group Kleist (which formed the southern arm of the pincer-move). SS-Das Reich took Priluki. Second Army was withdrawn from the front for the new operation. Before the Battle of Poltava, in December 1708, Romny had been for a few days the headquarters of King Charles XII of Sweden.
I spent September 17th visiting the 4th Panzer Division in Ssrebnoie. Since no firm contact had been established between this division and SS-Das Reich, to its right, I decided to go on to the latter. The road led through no-man’s-land. In the woods to either side there was ample evidence of recent Russian encampments. Immediately outside Perevolochnoie I saw two gun barrels pointed ominously in our direction; we passed a few anxious moments before I established that the gun crews had fled, leaving their horses behind a nearby haystack. In the middle of the village I came upon the motor-cyclists of the SS division who were engaged in fighting for the Udai crossing. From here I went on to Kustovzy, also on the Udai, where other SS troops were engaged. Colonel Bittrich briefed me on the course of the battle. I then drove back for 60 miles through no-man’s-land, Ivaniza and Yaroshevka to Romny. The road was so appalling that I only arrived back at my Group headquarters towards dawn.
On the 17th of September we arranged with Panzer Group Kleist that the 25th (Motorised) Infantry Division relieve the 3rd Panzer Division. Thus this brave division would at last have a chance to repair its vehicles.
On this day the Russians made appreciable efforts to take the offensive against our eastern flank. The 10th (Motorised) Infantry Division and Infantry Regiment Gross-Deutschland had to fight fiercely in the area of Konotop. There was an increase of enemy strength opposite our Desna bridgehead near Novgorod Severskie. It is true that the Russian railroads from the east towards Kiev had been repeatedly cut by our bombers; but the Russians displayed great skill in repairing them again, so that the appearance of fresh forces along our excessively protracted flank must be anticipated in the near future.
In the area of Army Group North, Dietskoie Selo, the former Tsarkoie Selo, had been captured and the attack against Leningrad itself was begun. The mass of the panzer divisions which had been employed here were placed at the disposal of Army Group Centre and began to move south: these were the staff of Panzer Group 4, the staffs of XLI, LVI, and LVII Corps, the 3rd (Motorised) Infantry Division, and the 6th, 20th and, later, 1st Panzer Divisions.
On September 18th we found ourselves in the midst of a crisis in the Romny area. Since early morning the sounds of fighting were audible from the left flank and these increased in intensity as the morning went on. A fresh enemy—the 9th Russian Cavalry Division and another division with tanks—was driving on Romny from the east in three columns, and managed to penetrate to within half a mile of the edge of the town. From one of the high watchtowers of the prison, on the outskirts of Romny, I had an uninterrupted view of the enemy attack. XXIV Panzer Corps was made responsible for the defence. Available were two battalions of the 10th (Motorised) Infantry Division and a few anti-aircraft batteries. Our air reconnaissance was suffering from enemy local air superiority. Lieutenant-Colonel von Barsewisch flew a sortie himself, in the course of which he only just escaped being shot down by Russian fighters. There was a heavy bomber raid on Romny. Finally, however, we succeeded in holding the town and our advanced headquarters. All the same Russian reinforcements were moving up on the line Kharkov-Sumy and were being unloaded at Sumy and Shuravka. As defence against this new threat XXIV Panzer Corps was instructed to withdraw part of SS-Das Reich and of the 4th Panzer Division from the encirclement front and send them off towards Konotop and Putivl. The threat to Romny led us, on September 19th, to move the Group headquarters back to Konotop. General von Geyr did his best to make this move easier by sending a wireless signal: ‘The troops will not regard it as cowardice if the Panzer Group withdraws its headquarters from Romny.’ In any case we were better located in Konotop in view of the operations towards Orel and Bryansk that lay ahead. XXIV Panzer Corps wanted to postpone the attack on this fresh enemy from the east until the corps was in a position to strike with all its force. I sympathised with this view, but could not approve the plan since the availability of SS-Das Reich for this operation might not last for more than a few days; it was destined to form part of XLVI Panzer Corps, together with Infantry Regiment Gross-Deutschland, and to return to the Roslavl area. Besides, recent unloadings near Seredina Buda and more transports moving through Sumy to the north were strong incentives to hurry.
Sketch Map 20
Developments 19.9-22.9.41.
On this day Kiev fell. XLVIII Panzer Corps, of Panzer Group 1, captured Gorodishtche and Belusovka.
September 20th was a day of limited successes against the enemy to the east, but fighting went on against the encircled Russians, both in the sector of 3rd Panzer Division, which found itself opposed by the staff of the Russian Fifth Army, and farther to the south, in the sector of the 25th (Motorised) Infantry Division, where part of the enemy’s forces seemed to have broken out.
Since the 13th of September we had taken 30,000 prisoners.
On the 20th I visited XLVI Panzer Corps. General von Vietinghoff described the difficulties his corps had had while fighting their way southwards from Gluchov during the past few days. The students from the Russian War School at Kharkov had put up a particularly brave fight under the command of their instructors. Mine fields and bad weather had held up the advance. Heavy battles were still going on in the neighbourhood of Putivl, Shilovka, and Bielopolie. I went to find Infantry Regiment Gross-Deutschland, which was doing well under the command of Colonel Hörnlein, to the east of Shilovka. Bielopolie was taken.
Sketch Map 21
Situation on 23.9.41.
On September 21st enemy pressure in the Gluchov area increased. Russian concentrations were reported to the north of that town. We launched an attack towards Nedrigailov.
Panzer Group 1 reported 43,000 prisoners, and Sixth Army 63,000 captured since the beginning of the Battle of Kiev.
On September 22nd I once again drove to the front, through Putivl towards Rylsk, in order to inspect the defensive measures that were being taken in this threatened sector. In Viasenka I found the staff of the 17th Panzer Division, now led once again by General von Arnim who had recovered from the wound received at Stolpce and had relieved General Ritter von Thoma a few days earlier. The enemy was attacking Gluchov and Cholopkovo from the north and north-east and had partially encircled the defending troops. Two new Russian divisions had been identified on the 17th Panzer Division’s front. While driving back to XLVI Panzer Corps’ headquarters we had to pass through a belt of concentrated Russian fire, but luckily we did so without suffering any harm. I there said good-bye with heartfelt thanks to General von Vietinghoff who was departing for his new assignment with Panzer Group 4. I placed 17th Panzer Division under direct command of my Panzer Group and subordinated Infantry Regiment Gross-Deutschland to that division. 17th Panzer Division received orders to defeat the enemy in the Gluchov area. These orders were carried out.
The number of prisoners captured around Kiev reached the total of 290,000.
As from September 23rd regrouping for the new operation began. For this purpose the main concentration area of Panzer Group 2 was around and to the north of Gluchov.
Attacks by the 4th Panzer Division and SS-Das Reich drove the enemy back eastwards from Kamlicha. Heavy traffic along the Bryansk-Lgov railway pointed to the bringing up of fresh Russian reinforcements.
On September 24th I flew to the headquarters of Army Group Centre at Smolensk, for a final conference on the new offensive. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the Chief of the Army General Staff were bo
th present. At this conference it was decided that the main offensive by the Army Group would be launched on October 2nd, but that my Panzer Group 2 on the extreme right wing would start its attack on September 30th. This was done at my request. In the area across which Panzer Group 2 would now be attacking there were no metalled roads available and I wished to make full use of the limited period of fine weather which we might still expect in order to reach the good roads around Orel before the mud set in and to secure the transverse Orel–Bryansk road so that I might have a decent supply route. Another consideration that influenced my decision was the fact that I could only expect strong air support if I could arrange for the bomber missions to be flown two days before the attacks by the other armies of Army Group Centre were due to start.
FIG.14. Crossing the Dnieper near Kopys.
FIG.15. With General Marras on the banks of the Dnieper near Kopys.
The next few days were devoted to eliminating the enemy pocket near Kiev and re-deploying my corps for their new task; equally important was arranging that they rest after their exhausting marches and battles of the past months and that their equipment receive the necessary maintenance. However, only three days could be allotted to the gallant troops for this purpose and even this short period for rehabilitation was not vouchsafed to all units.
What were clearly fresh enemy formations1 were now heavily attacking to the east of Gluchov and against the Novgorod Severskie bridgehead. These kept us occupied during the next few days. On September 25th the enemy attacked Bielopolie, Gluchov and Yampol, but was beaten off. Great numbers of prisoners fell into our hands.
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