On this day Army Group North reported to the OKH that it could not continue the assault on Leningrad with the forces at its disposal.
On September 26th the Battle of Kiev was brought to a successful conclusion. The Russians surrendered. 665,000 men were taken prisoner. The Commander-in-Chief South-west Front and his chief of staff fell in the last phase of the battle while attempting to break out. The Commander of the Fifth Army was among the prisoners captured. I had an interesting conversation with this officer, to whom I put a number of questions:
1. When did you learn that my tanks had penetrated behind you? Answer:‘About the 8th of September.’
2. Why did you not evacuate Kiev at once? Answer:‘We had received orders from the Army Group to evacuate the area and withdraw eastwards and had already begun to do so, when we received contrary orders to turn about and to defend Kiev in all circumstances.’
The carrying out of this second order resulted in the destruction of the Kiev Army Group. The enemy was never to make the same mistake again. Unfortunately, though, we were to suffer the direst calamities as a result of just such interference from higher levels.
The Battle of Kiev was undoubtedly a great tactical victory. But whether great strategic advantages were to be garnered from this tactical success remained questionable. It all depended on this: would the German Army, before the onset of winter and, indeed, before the autumnal mud set in, still be capable of achieving decisive results? It is true that the planned assault on Leningrad had already had to be abandoned in favour of a tight investment. But the OKH believed that the enemy was no longer capable of creating a firm defensive front or of offering serious resistance in the area of Army Group South. The OKH wanted this Army Group to capture the Donetz Basin and reach the River Don before winter.
But the main blow was to be dealt by the reinforced Army Group Centre, with objective Moscow. Was there still sufficient time for this to succeed?
The Battles of Orel and Bryansk
For the offensive towards Orel and Bryansk—a necessary preliminary to the attack on Moscow—Panzer Group 2 was reorganised as follows:
XLVI Panzer Corps, with SS-Das Reich and Infantry Regiment Gross-Deutschland, was handed over to Panzer Group 4 in the Roslavl area.
The 1st Cavalry Division was once more subordinated to Panzer Group 2. In addition, Panzer Group 2 was given command of:
XLVIII Panzer Corps, under General of Panzer Troops Kempff, with the 9th Panzer Division and the 16th and 25th (Motorised) Infantry Divisions.
XXXIV Army Corps, under General Metz, with the 45th and 134th Infantry Divisions, and
XXXV Army Corps, under General Kempfe, with the 293rd, 262nd, 296th, and 95th Infantry Divisions.
I decided to attack with point of main effort through Gluchov towards Orel and therefore put the XXIV Panzer Corps in the centre of my line. On XXIV Panzer Corps’ right I placed the XLVIII Panzer Corps at Putivl, and on its left the XLVII Panzer Corps at Shostka. XXXIV Army Corps was to guard the right flank and XXV Army Corps and the 1st Cavalry Division the left; the infantry corps were to advance echeloned in depth on both wings of the panzer corps.
Before assembling at Putivl the XLVIII Panzer Corps was to advance through Sumy and Nedrigailov and attack the enemy in those areas. By this manœuvre I intended to secure my right flank before the major operation began. It was a bold scheme, but I had underestimated the powers of resistance of the Russians who had not been engaged in the Kiev battle XLVIII Panzer Corps—as will be shown—did not succeed in throwing back the enemy opposite it, but had to break off the battle and march to its assembly area behind Infantry Regiment Gross-Deutschland’s front. The 25th (Motorised) Infantry Division had a hard time in shaking off the enemy and unfortunately lost a number of its vehicles in the process. I should have done better to have followed Liebenstein’s advice and have marched them up from the beginning behind the front. In any event this was a case where the early arrival of XXXIV Army Corps’ infantry would have been welcome. But this could not be expected for another five days.
We had at last been given 100 tanks as replacements for our panzer divisions. Unfortunately 50 of these were misdirected to Orsha and therefore arrived too late. Nor did we receive adequate supplies of fuel.
The heaviest concentration of strength for the operation took place in the Roslavl area. At the start of the offensive the 1st Panzer Division, SS-Das Reich, 3rd (Motorised) Infantry Division and Infantry Regiment Gross-Deutschland were assembled behind the front line in that sector. There, too, the 2nd and 5th Panzer Divisions, previously held in reserve, were also committed. It is questionable whether this massing of armoured strength at the centre of the attack was correct. My opinion was that it would have been wiser to leave the XLVI Panzer Corps with Panzer Group 2. The two well-rested panzer divisions would also have been better employed in a flanking movement than in a frontal assault.
On September 27th I visited XLVIII Panzer Corps in order to form a personal impression of its condition. After a short conversation at the corps headquarters in Romny I went to the 9th Panzer Division, at Krasnaia, six miles to the south of Nedrigailov. This division was commanded by General Hubitzki. I then drove back through Nedrigailov.
On September 28th and 29th it became clear to me that XLVIII Panzer Corps’ attempt to advance straight to Putivl had failed. The attack in this area was, therefore, broken off. As deception, this operation in the Shtepovka area was probably successful, for the enemy seems to have been uncertain where our main thrust was going to come in. Under cover of the Infantry Regiment Gross-Deutschland, which was still holding its old sector, XLVIII Panzer Corps was moved across to the north.
Our attack began on the 30th as follows:
XLVIII Panzer Corps from the area Gadiach–Shtepovka through Nedrigailov towards Putivl, with 9th Panzer Division leading. 25th and 16th (Motorised) Infantry Divisions were to follow as soon as they had been relieved by the infantry of XXXIV Army Corps.
XXIV Panzer Corps, with the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions leading and the 10th (Motorised) Infantry Division following behind, from Gluchov along the line of, and to the south-east of, the road to Sevsk and Orel.
XLVII Panzer Corps, with the 18th and 17th Panzer Divisions in front, from Yampol with its right wing directed on Sevsk. The 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division, on the left and to the rear, was to make for Seredina Buda.
The infantry corps which were to provide flank protection were marching up, partially through Kostobobr and partially through Romny. The 1st Cavalry Division was on the west bank of the Sudost, on either side of Pogar.
Our attack took the enemy by surprise. The XXIV Panzer Corps made particularly good progress, reaching the Chinel heights. The XLVII Panzer Corps took Shuravka and pushed on in a north-easterly direction.
Early on the morning of the 30th I went to Gluchov where We set up our new headquarters. From there I informed General Kempff of the need to have forces ready very soon in the Putivl area for the protection of XXIV Panzer Corps’ east flank. Kempff reported in reply that in the fighting around Shtepovka the Russians had taken two battalions of Infantry Regiment 119 by surprise and captured their vehicles. It seems that the enemy had attacked with heavy tanks. This was an unpleasant loss. Elements of the 9th Panzer Division had now to be turned about in order to put the situation to rights again. General Freiherr von Geyr informed me that owing to bad weather the dive bombers had been unable to take off. Furthermore, he imagined that he was being opposed only by the enemy’s rearguards, while General Lemelsen reported that the enemy had been completely taken by surprise.
Army Group was informed that the withdrawal of Infantry Regiment Gross-Deutschland must be postponed since Kempff’s corps was under attack from strong enemy forces and advance units of XXXIV Army Corps would not be available to relieve him until the evening of October 1st. It would be another four days before the mass of the infantry could be expected to arrive.
The population of Gluchov asked our permissio
n to use their church as a place of worship once again. We willingly handed it over to them.
On October 1st XXIV Panzer Corps took Sevsk. We had succeeded in breaking through the enemy front. The advance was energetically pursued, so far as the fuel situation would permit. I drove from Gluchov, through Essman, to 4th Panzer Division at Sevsk. On the side of the road lay shot-up Russian vehicles of all sorts, a further proof that the enemy had been surprised by our attack. On a hill surmounted by a windmill, just off the road of the advance, I saw Generals Freiherr von Geyr and Freiherr von Langermann. Considerable elements of the 4th Panzer Division had already reached Sevsk. The countryside showed traces of fierce fighting. There were dead and wounded Russians to be seen, and during the short walk to the windmill I and my companions found fourteen unwounded Russians hiding in the long grass, whom we made prisoners; among them was an officer who was still engaged in talking to someone in Sevsk on a telephone. Two miles to the north of Sevsk, which we had already captured, I found Colonel Eberbach, the gallant commander of the panzer brigade of 4th Panzer Division. When I asked him whether the advance could be pursued as far as Dmitrovsk, he replied that it could. In consequence I ordered that the divisions go on, even though the generals had previously informed me, incorrectly as it turned out, that the advance could not be continued owing to lack of fuel. While I was talking to Eberbach a number of Russian bombs fell on the road of our advance and in Sevsk. I then drove on to the foremost of the victorious tanks and thanked the men and their commander, Major von Jungenfeldt, for their brave performance. On my way back I told the corps commander of my order that the advance be continued. On this day the spearhead of XXIV Panzer Corps covered a distance of 85 miles.
Sketch Map 22
Situation on 30.9.41.
The advance units of our right-hand neighbour, Sixth Army, went over to the attack in the Gadiach area. Other units advanced on Mirgorod, in order to close the gap between us and the Seventeenth Army.
On October 2nd the attack was resumed with violence. A complete break-through was achieved and the Russian Thirteenth Army was thrown back to the north-east. I visited the 10th (Motorised) Infantry Division and its Infantry Regiment 41, commanded by Colonel Traut. Our casualties during these days were happily light. But if the figures for total casualties since the start of the campaign were examined it was a grave and tragic total. The troops had received a number of replacements, but although these were keen and eager men they yet lacked the combat experience and toughness of the older men.
4th Panzer Division took Kromy and thus reached the metalled road that led to Orel.
The whole of Army Group Centre had been attacking successfully along its entire front since early morning and was much helped by the good weather. Our left-hand neighbour, Second Army, broke through the Sudost–Desna position despite stubborn enemy resistance.
On October 3rd the 4th Panzer Division arrived at Orel. We had thus reached a good road and captured an important rail and road centre which would serve as a base for our future operations. Our seizure of the town took the enemy so completely by surprise that the electric trams were still running as our tanks drove in. The evacuation of industrial installations, carefully prepared by the Russians, could not be carried out. Along the streets leading from the factories to the station lay dismantled machines and crates filled with tools and raw materials.
Sketch Map 23
Orel. Situation on 5.10.41.
XLVII Panzer Corps was instructed to head for Bryansk.
To our south Sixth Army was set in motion, with its right wing towards Kharkov and its left through Sumy towards Bielgorod. This move was important for the safety of our right flank. Panzer Group 4 had broken through the enemy and was advancing on Mosalsk–Spas Demiansk in order to surround the enemy forces to the west of Viasma. Panzer Group 3 captured a bridgehead over the Dnieper near Cholm.
On October 4th advance elements of XXIV Panzer Corps took Moin on the road to Tula. The 3rd and 18th Panzer Divisions were driving on Karachev. The 17th Panzer Division was engaged in building a bridgehead across the Nerussa and thus making possible a further advance northwards.
Our left-hand neighbour crossed the Bolva. The railway Suchinitch–Elnya was reached. Panzer Group 3 took Bieloi. In the rear area of the Army Group partisan activity now became noticeable for the first time.
Since on the next day I intended visiting XLVII Panzer Corps I sent my command vehicles forward to Dmitrovsk with instructions to await me at the landing strip outside that town. I was thus spared a long drive over bad roads and I reached General Lemelsen’s headquarters at 10.30 hrs. on October 5th. The 18th Panzer Division was sent across the Orel-Bryansk road in a northerly direction while 17th Panzer Division was ordered to capture Bryansk by a coup de main. From Lemelsen’s headquarters at Lobanovo I flew back in my little liaison plane to the headquarters of XXIV Panzer Corps at Dmitrovsk. General Freiherr von Geyr complained about the poor state of our fuel supply; the future extent of our movements was ultimately dependent on this. Unfortunately captured stocks were small. But as we had occupied Orel airfield I sent an urgent request to the commander of Air Fleet 2 that he fly us in the needed quantity, approximately 100,000 gallons, to that field. On this day, as it happened, I gained a vivid impression of the liveliness of the Russian air force. Immediately after I had landed on Sevsk airfield, where twenty German fighters had also just come in, the Russians bombed it; this was followed by an air attack on the corps headquarters which sent the glass in the windows flying about our ears. I drove at once along the road of advance of 3rd Panzer Division. Here too we were subjected to a series of bombing attacks by small groups of from three to six Russian bombers; but they flew high and their aim was consequently pretty inaccurate. The Air Fleet promised us stronger fighter cover for the 6th, so we could reckon on an improvement of the situation.
On this day my Panzer Group 2 was renamed Second Panzer Army.
The 25th (Motorised) Infantry Division was moved forward to Sevsk and placed at the disposal of my Army. XLVIII Panzer Corps took Rylsk; XXIV Panzer Corps enlarged its bridgeheads over the Susha to the north of Orel; XLVII Panzer Corps captured Karachev.
Our right-hand neighbour hoped to reach Psiol and a line that would secure our right flank during the course of October 6th. To our left the XXXIII and XIII Army Corps were advancing on Suchinitchi. Yuchnov was captured.
On October 6th our headquarters was moved forward to Sevsk. 4th Panzer Division was attacked by Russian tanks to the south of Mzensk and went through some bad hours. This was the first occasion on which the vast superiority of the Russian T34 to our tanks became plainly apparent. The division suffered grievous casualties. The rapid advance on Tula which we had planned had therefore to be abandoned for the moment.
On the other hand we had good news from the 17th Panzer Division which had succeeded in capturing Bryansk and its bridges over the Desna, and had thereby ensured our maintaining good contact with Second Army which was advancing to the west of the Desna. Our supply arrangements were to a great extent dependent on the establishment of the road and rail connections Orel–Bryansk. The encirclement of the enemy forces fighting in the area between the Desna and the Sudost was drawing closer. A bridgehead was established across the Navlia, to the north of Borshtchev.
Another encouraging factor was the quietness up to date on our open flank, where Kempff’s corps was struggling through the mud towards Dmitriev, while General Metz’s XXXIV Army Corps was moving up to Rylsk.
First Panzer Army (Kleist), of Army Group South, was directed to move on the Sea of Azov. Our right-hand neighbour intended to advance towards Shtepovka. Elements of the 25th (Motorised) Infantry Division, which had been held down in this area, were thus freed to follow Kempff’s Corps to Putivl. Our left-hand neighbour took Shisdra and was ordered to move towards Bryansk and to co-operate with Second Panzer Army.
During the night of October 6th-7th the first snow of the winter fell. It did not lie for long and,
as usual, the roads rapidly became nothing but canals of bottomless mud, along which our vehicles could only advance at snail’s pace and with great wear to the engines. We asked for winter clothing—we had already done this once before—but were informed that we would receive it in due course and were instructed not to make further unnecessary requests of this type. Nevertheless I repeated my demands on several occasions, but the clothing did not reach the front during the course of that year.
XLVIII Panzer Corps was advancing on foot through the mire towards Dmitriev. Russian counter-attacks against Bryansk were repulsed. The 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division reached the mouth of the Revna.
Our right-hand neighbour was approaching Shtepovka, and on our left LIII Army Corps was nearing Bryansk from the west. We hoped thus to ease the situation of XLVII Panzer Corps and free the supply route Roslavl-Bryansk-Orel. Farther to the north Second Army captured Suchinitchi and Meshtchevsk. In the Viasma area Fourth and Ninth Armies succeeded in enveloping some forty-five Russian formations.
The OKH was of the opinion that these satisfactory developments now made possible the further prosecution of the offensive for Moscow. The intention was to prevent the Russians from establishing fresh defensive positions to the west of Moscow. The OKH proposed that Second Panzer Army should continue to advance through Tula and seize the Oka crossings between Kolomna and Serpuchov—undoubtedly a very large objective. This was to correspond to a similar move by Panzer Group 3 to the north of Moscow. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army found Army Group Centre to be in full agreement with this plan of his.
On October 8th I flew along the line of our ‘road’ from Sevsk over Dmitrovsk to Orel, where I found my command vehicles which I had previously sent on ahead. The state of the traffic along the ‘road’ as far as Kromy was appalling; from there on we had a metalled road as far as Orel, though already this consisted largely of one bomb crater after the next. General Freiherr von Geyr informed me that the enemy opposite 4th Panzer Division had been reinforced; a tank brigade and an infantry division had been recently identified. The 3rd Panzer Division was marching northwards, with orders to capture Bolchov. The 4th Panzer Division’s task for the 9th of October was to take Mzensk. Descriptions of the quality and, above all, of the new tactical handling of the Russian tanks were very worrying. Our defensive weapons available at that period were only successful against the T34 when the conditions were unusually favourable. The short-barrelled 75 mm. gun of the Panzer IV was only effective if the T34 were attacked from the rear; even then a hit had to be scored on the grating above the engine to knock it out. It required very great skill to manœuvre into a position from which such a shot was possible. The Russians attacked us frontally with infantry, while they sent their tanks in, in mass formation, against our flanks. They were learning. The bitterness of the fighting was gradually telling on both our officers and our men. General Freiherr von Geyr brought up once again the urgent need for winter clothing of all sorts. In particular there was a serious shortage of boots, shirts and socks. This was obviously a very serious business. I decided to visit the 4th Panzer Division at once and find out for myself what the situation was. On the battlefields that had been fought over during the 6th and 7th of October the commander of the battle-group that had been there engaged himself described the course of the fighting to me. The tanks knocked out on either side were still in position. The damage suffered by the Russians was considerably less than that to our own tanks.
Panzer Leader Page 29
