Back in Orel I found Colonel Eberbach, who also told me the story of the recent battles, and then I talked again to General Freiherr von Geyr and to the commander of the 4th Panzer Division, Freiherr von Langermann. For the first time during this exacting campaign Colonel Eberbach gave the impression of being exhausted, and the exhaustion that was now noticeable was less physical than spiritual. It was indeed startling to see how deeply our best officers had been affected by the latest battles.
What a contrast to the high spirits in evidence at the OKH and at Army Group Centre! Here was a radical difference of attitude which as time went on grew wider until it could scarcely be bridged; though at this time Second Panzer Army was unaware that its superiors were drunk with the scent of victory.
That evening XXXV Army Corps signalled increased enemy pressure in the area north of Sisemka and west of Sevsk. From this it could be assumed that the Russian forces trapped to the south of Bryansk were attempting to break out to the east. I got into communication with the 1st Cavalry Division, which was still stationed along the west bank of the Sudost, and asked whether any change had been noticed in the behaviour of the enemy along that sector. The reply was negative, but nonetheless I ordered the division to launch an attack against the east bank of the river. This would show whether the enemy was still holding his positions or was withdrawing. 1st Cavalry Division immediately secured a bridgehead.
In the evening Army Group telephoned me and suggested that it would make the problems of our left flank much simpler if XXXV Army Corps were subordinated to Second Army. I replied that it would be better if the sector along the southern flank of the Trubchevsk encirclement were controlled from a single headquarters. Army Group next pointed out that our worries about our right flank would be decreased if XXXIV Army Corps were placed under command of Sixth Army which could then use the corps for the capture of Kursk. This idea, which seems to have emanated from the OKH or the OKW, was not practicable at the time, since it would have deprived us of our flank protection to the right. It is true that Dmitriev was captured on this day, but the bad weather was holding up the rear elements of XLVIII Panzer Corps and the crisis continued.
On October 9th the Russian attempt to break out near Sisemka, which had threatened on the previous day, succeeded. The right wing of the 293rd Infantry Division was heavily attacked and forced back through Sisemka and Shilinka. Since the 25th (Motorised) Infantry Division, the Panzer Army’s reserve, had not yet arrived in position, Infantry Regiment 41 of the 10th (Motorised) Infantry Division had to be put in at once to close the gap between the 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division and the 293rd Infantry Division. The XLVIII Panzer Corps, which had been instructed by Army Group Centre to advance on Kursk and Livny, was now ordered to withdraw all available forces to Sevsk. At 12.00 hrs. the commander of the 25th (Motorised) Infantry Division arrived in Sevsk and took over command of all troops fighting between the 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division and the 293rd Infantry Division. While a violent battle raged here, 1st Cavalry Division had moved the bulk of its forces across the Sudost without meeting serious opposition and was advancing on Trubchevsk. The division had allowed itself to be deceived by the enemy and was now eager to make good its mistake. There was heavy enemy pressure throughout the day along the line of the roads Trubchevsk–Sevsk, Trubchevsk–Orel and Trubchevsk–Karachev, but only a small number of Russians succeeded in breaking free across the Seredina Buda–Sevsk road. Those who did unfortunately seem to have included the staff of the Russian Thirteenth Army.
The headquarters of the Panzer Army was moved to Dmitrovsk during a heavy snowstorm. Owing to the weather the roads grew consistently worse. Countless vehicles were stuck.
Despite all this, Bolchov was captured. The 18th Panzer Division, working closely with XLIII Army Corps of the Second Army, managed to encircle the Russians in the area to the north of Bryansk.
While these events were taking place, the southern wing of our Eastern Front was preparing to advance on Taganrog and Rostov. Advanced elements of our neighbour, Sixth Army, were approaching Achtyrka and Sumy.
To our left the Urga was crossed in the direction of Moscow and Gshatsk taken.
On October 10th fresh instructions arrived from the Army Group. These included: the capture of Kursk, the elimination of the Trubchevsk pocket, the complete sealing of the encirclement that was taking place north-west of Bryansk, and the advance on Tula—all, of course, to be carried out immediately. Liebenstein naturally inquired what priority was to be assigned to these various orders which, apparently, emanated from some higher headquarters. We received no answer.
The next few weeks were dominated by the mud. Wheeled vehicles could only advance with the help of tracked vehicles. These latter, having to perform tasks for which they were not intended, rapidly wore out. Since chains and couplings for the towing of vehicles were lacking, bundles of rope were dropped from aeroplanes to the immobilised vehicles. The supplying of hundreds of such vehicles and their crews had now to be done by the air force, and that for weeks on end. Preparations made for the winter were utterly inadequate. For weeks we had been requesting anti-freeze for the water coolers of our engines; we saw as little of this as we did of winter clothing for the troops. This lack of warm clothes, was, in the difficult months ahead, to provide the greatest problem and cause the greatest suffering to our soldiers—and it would have been the easiest to avoid of all our difficulties.
The enemy continued his attempts to break out through the 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division and the 293rd Infantry Division. The 4th Panzer Division managed to fight its way into Mzensk.
To our right Sixth Army took Sumy; to our left XIII Army Corps crossed the Ugra to the west of Kaluga. Here too a deterioration of the weather began to make itself felt.
On October 11th the Russians attempted to break out of the Trubchevsk encirclement along either bank of the Navlia. Between the 29th and 25th (Motorised) Infantry Divisions there was severe fighting and the enemy succeeded in creating a gap in our defences which was only sealed by the timely arrival of the 5th Machine-gun Battalion. At the same time heavy street fighting took place in XXIV Panzer Corps’ area in Mzensk, to the north-east of Orel, into which town the 4th Panzer Division had fought its way; the division could not receive support quickly enough on account of the mud. Numerous Russian T34’s went into action and inflicted heavy losses on the German tanks. Up to this time we had enjoyed tank superiority, but from now on the situation was reversed. The prospect of rapid, decisive victories was fading in consequence. I made a report on this situation, which for us was a new one, and sent it to the Army Group; in this report I described in plain terms the marked superiority of the T34 to our Panzer IV and drew the relevant conclusions as they must affect our future tank production. I concluded by urging that a commission be sent immediately to my sector of the front, and that it consist of representatives of the Army Ordnance Office, the Armaments Ministry, the tank designers and the firms which built the tanks. If this commission were on the spot it could not only examine the destroyed tanks on the battlefield but could also be advised by the men who had to use them what should be included in the designs for our new tanks. I also requested the rapid production of a heavy anti-tank gun with sufficient penetrating power to knock out the T34. The commission appeared at Second Panzer Army’s front on November 20th.
On October 11th my Army was informed that on Hitler’s orders Infantry Regiment Gross-Deutschland was being placed under command and that it was to be used to strengthen the relatively weak line now held by the 18th Panzer Division to the north-east of Bryansk along the Karachev–Chvastovitchi road. We were further informed that a reorganisation was envisaged whereby Second Army would be moved to our right flank and would assume command of the XXXIV and XXXV Army Corps while we, in return, would take over some of the units which at present formed part of Second Army. From this it was clear that a further advance in a north-easterly direction was contemplated.
The battles for th
e reduction of the pockets continued.
At the southern end of the front the battle for the Sea of Azov was brought to a victorious conclusion; 100,000 prisoners were taken and 212 tanks and 672 guns captured. The Supreme Command reckoned that the Sixth, Twelfth, Ninth and Eighteenth Russian Armies had been destroyed and believed that conditions were now suitable for a continuation of the advance to the Lower Don. The SS-Leibstandarte ‘Adolf Hitler’ was 12 miles to the north-west of Taganrog. The progress of the Seventeenth Army, south of Kharkov, and the Sixth Army, in the Sumy area, was slower. Here fresh Russian forces with tanks occasionally forced our people to go over to the defensive. This had a disadvantageous effect on the operations of my right wing. Since Eleventh Army had now been turned south to capture the Crimea the thrust by Army Group South was fanning out.
In the northern area of Army Group Centre all movement was slowed up by falls of snow. Panzer Group 3 reached the Upper Volga near Pogoreloie.
The snow continued on October 12th. We were still sitting tight in our little town of Dmitrovsk, with the appalling mud swamps outside the door, awaiting instructions from the OKH concerning reorganisation. The large encirclement south of Bryansk and the smaller one to the north of the town had both been completed, but our troops were stuck in the mud and immobilised, including the XLVIII Panzer Corps which at the beginning of the operation would so willingly have driven along hard roads through Sumy and which was now struggling forward through the mire towards Fatesh. In the Mzensk area the battles against the freshly arrived enemy went on. The infantry of XXXV Army Corps were needed to mop up in the forests of the Trubchevsk pocket and were therefore moved across to that area.
Not only we but also Army Group South, with the exception of First Panzer Army, were now bogged down. Sixth Army succeeded in capturing Bogoduchov, to the north-west of Kharkov. To our north XIII Army Corps took Kaluga. Panzer Group 3 seized Stariza and went on towards Kalinin.
The OKH issued instructions for the encirclement of Moscow but these never reached us.
On October 13th the Russians continued their attempts to break out between the Navlia and Borchevo. The XLVII Panzer Corps had to be reinforced by elements of the 3rd Panzer and 10th (Motorised) Infantry Divisions of the XXIV Panzer Corps. Despite this, and thanks to the immobility of our units, a group of about 5,000 Russians succeeded in fighting their way through our lines as far as Dmitrovsk, where they were finally checked.
Panzer Group 3 fought its way into Kalinin. Ninth Army reached the western edge of Rzhev.
On October 14th we moved our headquarters to Orel where we found good quarters in the House of the Soviets. During the next few days activity on either side was limited. With great difficulty XXIV Panzer Corps moved the 4th and 3rd Panzer Divisions to the area north-west of Mzensk and prepared them for an attack across the Susha; meanwhile XLVII Panzer Corps, the encirclement battle completed, was being assembled and deployed along the Orel–Karachev–Bryansk road. Infantry Regiment Gross-Deutschland was placed under command of XXIV Panzer Corps and brought forward to Mzensk. XLVIII Panzer Corps attacked towards Fatesh and prepared to attack Kursk from the north-west, while XXXIV Army Corps was to advance on that city from due west; the intention was to defeat the strong Russian forces, under General Yefremov, which were in the Kursk area and thus get rid of the continual threat to our right flank.
Despite fierce Russian resistance Sixth Army succeeded in capturing Achtyrka. The rest of Army Group South was bogged down.
Army Group Centre’s attack was also held up by the weather. Borovsk, 50 miles west of Moscow, was occupied by LVII Army Corps.
On October 15th Sixth Army took Krasnopolie, to the east of Sumy.
In preparation for the advance through Mzensk I visited the 4th Panzer Division on October 16th.
On this day the Rumanians captured Odessa. XLVI Panzer Corps was nearing Moshaisk.
On October 17th the Russians encircled to the north of Bryansk surrendered. Together with Second Army we captured 50,000 prisoners and 400 guns, thus destroying the bulk of the Fiftieth Russian Army. There were enemy counter-attacks in the Fatesh area.
On October 18th Eleventh Army began its attack on the Crimea. First Panzer Army, after capturing Taganrog, drove towards Stalino. Sixth Army took Graivoron.
To the north of Second Panzer Army the 19th Panzer Division occupied Maloyaroslavets. Moshaisk was captured.
On October 19th First Panzer Army began to prepare for its advance on Rostov. It fought its way into Stalino. Seventeenth and Sixth Armies continued to move successfully towards Kharkov and Bielgorod. Bad weather, however, held up their advance. This applied also to Army Group Centre. XLIII Army Corps took Lichvin. For twenty-four hours this corps was subordinated to Second Panzer Army.
On October 20th the Russians encircled near Trubchevsk surrendered. The whole Army Group was bogged down.
First Panzer Army was fighting in Stalino. Sixth Army was approaching Kharkov. By the 21st it had fought its way through the mud to the western outskirts of that city.
On October 22nd the attack by XXIV Panzer Corps through Mzensk failed owing to insufficiently close co-operation between the artillery and the tanks. A second attempt was made in the area of the 3rd Panzer Division to the north-west of Mzensk, with all the available armour, and on this occasion succeeded. In pursuit of the beaten enemy Chern was captured on the 24th of October. I had taken part in both these attacks and was fully conscious of the difficulties imposed on our troops by the damp ground and by the extensive Russian minefields.
On October 22nd the 18th Panzer Division, which had moved down along the good road through Kromy, had taken Fatesh.
Sketch Map 24
Situation on 14.10.41.
On October 24th Sixth Army occupied Kharkov and Bielgorod, both of which the enemy had previously evacuated. On our left XLIII Army Corps captured Bielev on the Oka.
On October 25th I watched the advance of Infantry Regiment Gross-Deutschland on Chern and also the battle fought by Battle Group Eberbach to the north of that village.
By October the 25th the battles around Bryansk might be regarded as over. On this day the reorganisation of the armies on the right wing of Army Group Centre, already mentioned above, took effect. The XXXIV and XXXV Army Corps, together with the XLVIII Panzer Corps less the 25th (Motorised) Infantry Division, were surrendered by Second Panzer Army to Second Army. The 1st Cavalry Division returned to its home station in East Prussia where it was to be re-equipped and retrained as the 24th Panzer Division. In exchange Second Panzer Army received General Heinrici’s XLIII Army Corps, with the 31st and 131st Infantry Divisions, and General Weisenberger’s LIII Army Corps, with the 112th and 167th Infantry Divisions. Later the 296th Infantry Division was also placed under my Army’s command. The 25th (Motorised) Infantry Division remained with Second Panzer Army.
The task of Second Panzer Army was now to advance on Tula, while the new Second Army was to head eastwards: that is to say we were once again going in divergent directions.
With the victorious end of the twin battles of Bryansk and Viasma Army Group Centre had undoubtedly won a great tactical success. Whether it still possessed sufficient strength to launch a further attack and thus operationally to exploit its tactical victory was the most serious question which had so far confronted the Supreme Command in this war.
The Advance to Tula and Moscow
Second Panzer Army was now ready to advance on Tula. The single road that was available for this purpose, the one from Orel to Tula, was certainly not intended to carry heavy vehicles and tanks and began to disintegrate after a few days’ use. Furthermore the Russians, experts at demolition, had blown all the bridges along the line of their withdrawal and had laid extensive minefields on either side of the road in all suitable localities. Corduroy roads had to be laboriously laid for miles on end in order to ensure that the troops received even the limited supplies available. The strength of the advancing units was dependent less on the number of men th
an on the amount of petrol on hand to keep them going. As a result of this the bulk of the tanks still at the disposal of XXIV Panzer Corps was massed together under command of Colonel Eberbach and, together with Infantry Regiment Gross-Deutschland, formed the advance guard which was now set in motion towards Tula. On October 26th LIII Army Corps reached the Oka and XLIII Army Corps widened the 31st Infantry Division’s bridgehead over that river near Bielev. Our right-hand neighbour swung his XLVIII Panzer Corps on Kursk. To our left Fourth Army was forced on to the defensive by Russian counter-attacks.
Panzer Leader Page 30
