To the left of Second Panzer Army Fourth Army was to attack across the Oka, to the north of Aleksin, in the direction of Serpuchov. This army contained some thirty-six divisions.
Second Panzer Army, on the other hand, controlled only twelve-and-a-half divisions. The infantry was still without winter clothing and was almost incapable of movement. The distance it was capable of covering per day was 3, or at the most 6, miles. It seemed to me questionable whether my Army was capable of carrying out the task assigned it.
With the help of effective air support XLVII Panzer Corps succeeded in capturing Yepifan and XXIV Panzer Corps Dedilovo on the 18th of November; the next day the latter corps reached Bolochovo. On the 21st of November LIII Army Corps secured Uslovaia and on the 24th XXIV Panzer Corps took Venev, destroying 50 Russian tanks while doing so. XLIII Army Corps was marching slowly towards the Upa. While these movements were being completed a strong new enemy force appeared: this was the Fiftieth Russian Army with the 108th Tank Brigade, the 299th Rifle Division, the 31st Cavalry Division and other units under command, and it proceeded to attack the leading troops of XLVII Panzer Corps. The situation became critical once more.
After a hard struggle through mud and ice First Panzer Army on November 19th reached the northern edge of Rostov on Don where a fierce battle developed. Rostov was finally captured on November 21st. The Russians had blown the bridges across the Don. The Panzer Army reckoned on early counter-attacks and went over to the defensive. On November 20th the XLVIII Panzer Corps of Second Army took Tim where it was counter-attacked on the 23rd.
On the 21st of November I wrote as follows:
The icy cold, the lack of shelter, the shortage of clothing, the heavy losses of men and equipment, the wretched state of our fuel supplies, all this makes the duties of a commander a misery and the longer it goes on the more I am crushed by the enormous responsibility which I have to bear, a responsibility which no one, even with the best will in the world, can share.
I have been at the front three days running in order to form a clear picture of the conditions there. If the state of the battle allows I intend to go to Army Group on Sunday in order to find out what are the intentions for the immediate future, concerning which we have so far heard nothing. What those people are planning I cannot guess, nor how we shall succeed in getting straight again before next spring….
During the afternoon of November 23rd I decided personally to visit the commander of Army Group Centre and to request that the orders I had received be changed since I could see no way of carrying them out. I explained to Field-Marshal von Bock the gravity of Second Panzer Army’s situation, described the exhausted condition of the troops and above all of the infantry, the lack of winter clothing, the breakdown of the supply system, the shortage of tanks and guns, and spoke of the threat to our long and insufficiently guarded right flank that had arisen from the arrival of new, Far Eastern units in the Riasan–Kolomna area. Field-Marshal von Bock replied that he had already informed the OKH verbally of the contents of my earlier reports and that the OKH were thoroughly aware of the true nature of the conditions at the front. He then spoke on the telephone to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and handed me an ear-piece so that I might listen in to the conversation. After repeating what I had said concerning the situation he requested the Commander-in-Chief of the Army to change my task, to cancel the order for the attack and to allow my Army to go over to the defensive in suitable winter positions.
The Commander-in-Chief of the Army was, plainly, not allowed to make a decision. In his answer he ignored the actual difficulties, refused to agree to my proposals and ordered that the attack continue. After repeated requests that at least I be assigned an objective that I could hope to reach and that I could transform into a defensible line, he finally gave me the line Michailov–Zaraisk and declared that the thorough destruction of the railroad Riasan–Kolomna was essential.
The results of my flying visit to Army Group headquarters were unsatisfactory. On the same day I had sent the OKH’s liaison officer at my headquarters, Lieutenant-Colonel von Kahlden, to tell the Chief of the Army General Staff about our situation. He was at the same time to attempt to arrange that the attack be cancelled. His visit also achieved nothing. In view of the manner in which the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the Chief of the Army General Staff refused my requests, it must be assumed that not only Hitler but also they were in favour of a continuation of the offensive. In any case the military persons in authority now knew of the highly insecure situation in which my Army was placed, and at that time I had to assume that Hitler, too, was being kept fully informed.
Sketch Map 26
The Battle for Moscow.
On November 24th the 10th (Motorised) Infantry Division took Michailov. The 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division, moving through Yepifan to the north, covered over 25 miles. On November 25th the advanced battle group of the 17th Panzer Division was approaching Kashira. Our right-hand neighbour captured Livny.
On November 26th LIII Army Corps reached the Don, crossed it with the 167th Infantry Division near Ivanozero, and driving to the north-east of that town attacked the Siberians near Danskoie. The brave division captured 42 guns and a number of vehicles besides taking 4,000 prisoners. The 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division of XLVII Panzer Corps attacked the same enemy from the east and succeeded in encircling him.
I spent this day with LIII Army Corps and decided to go on the 27th of November to XLVII Panzer Corps and the 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division. In the morning I learned from General Lemelsen, in Yepifan, that a crisis had arisen in the 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division during the course of the night. The mass of the 239th Siberian Rifle Division, abandoning their guns and vehicles, had succeeded in breaking out eastwards. The thinly spread 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division had failed to prevent this and had suffered heavy casualties while attempting to do so. I went by way of the divisional headquarters to the hardest hit of the regiments, Infantry Regiment 71. At first I was of the opinion that a failure of reconnaissance and security arrangements had been the cause of the misfortune. Reports by the battalion and company commanders, however, made it quite clear that the troops had done their duty and had been simply overwhelmed by numerical superiority. The great number of dead, all in full uniform and with their weapons in their hand, were grim proof of the truth of what I had heard. I did my best to encourage the badly shaken soldiers and to help them get over their misfortune. The Siberians—though without their heavy weapons and vehicles—had slipped away because we had just not had the strength to stop them. This was the most disturbing single factor of the day. The motor-cyclists of the 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division set off at once in their pursuit, but in vain.
I drove on to the Reconnaissance Battalion and then to Rifle Regiment 33 of the 4th Panzer Division and spent the night at XXIV Panzer Corps headquarters. Only he who saw the endless expanse of Russian snow during this winter of our misery and felt the icy wind that blew across it, burying in snow every object in its path: who drove for hour after hour through that no-man’s-land only at last to find too thin shelter with insufficiently clothed, half–Starved men: and who also saw by contrast the well-fed, warmly clad and fresh Siberians, fully equipped for winter fighting: only a man who knew all that can truly judge the events which now occurred.
Colonel Balck, who was then with the department of the OKH that handled Panzer Troops, accompanied me on this drive. I asked him to describe what he had seen to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
Our most urgent task was now the capture of Tula. Until we were in possession of this communications centre and its airfield we had no hope of continuing to advance either northwards or eastwards. I had visited the corps commanders in order to help in preparing for the assault, an operation concerning the difficulties of which I cherished no illusions. We wished to capture the town by a double envelopment, by XXIV Panzer Corps from the north and east and XLIII Army Corps from the west. During the course of the operation LIII Army
Corps was to cover the northern flank against Moscow and XLVII Panzer Corps the extended eastern one against the troops arriving from Siberia. The 10th (Motorised) Infantry Division, after reaching Michailov on the 27th of November, had, as ordered, sent demolition parties to blow up the Riasan–Kolomna railway, but these had unfortunately been unable to reach their objective; the Russian defences were too strong for them. Due to the cold the greater part of the 18th Panzer Division’s artillery fell out during the march to Yefremov. Already on November 29th overwhelming enemy pressure was beginning to be felt against the 10th (Motorised) Infantry Division. Skopin had to be evacuated.
The ability of the troops, even of XXIV Panzer Corps, to attack had suffered heavily as a result of the months of fighting. The corps artillery could now muster only eleven pieces.
At the southern end of the Eastern Front Russians in superior strength began to attack Rostov on November 27th. The enemy opposite Second Army, to our right, had been reinforced. On the left wing of my Army XLIII Army Corps reached the Tula–Aleksin road. There it met strong enemy forces which immediately counter-attacked.
In Fourth Army the 2nd Panzer Division reached Krasnaya Polyana, 14 miles north-west of Moscow.
On November 28th the Russians began to re-enter Rostov. First Panzer Army was faced with the problem of evacuating the town.
Our progress in XLIII Army Corps’ sector remained slight. On this day Army Group gave up all idea of the long-range objectives laid down by the OKH and OKW and simply ordered: ‘Successful completion of the battle of Tula.’
On November 30th the OKW expressed its doubts as to whether my forces were sufficiently concentrated for the attack on Tula. They could only have been strengthened by the withdrawal of troops from XLVII Panzer Corps, which would have lessened the protection to our flank. In view of the ever-growing threat from the east this seemed to me too dangerous a step to take. On the same day, however, an event occurred on the extreme southern flank of our front which suddenly cast a brilliantly clear light on our whole situation: Army Group South evacuated Rostov. On the next day the Army Group commander, Field-Marshal von Rundstedt, was relieved of his command and replaced by Field-Marshal von Reichenau. This was the first ominous sign. But neither Hitler and the OKW, nor the OKH, heeded the warning.
Total casualties on the Eastern Front since June 22nd, 1941, had now reached the total of 743,000 men; this was 23 per cent of our average total strength of three-and-a-half million men.
On this same 30th of November the enemy opposite my northern flank, near Kashira, was reinforced. It seemed that he had withdrawn troops from the centre of his front, to the west of Moscow, and moved them to what he regarded as his threatened flank.
I heard of the death of Colonel Mölders, my comrade-in-arms of the previous summer, and was deeply grieved by this sad loss of one of our finest soldiers.
An intensification of guerilla warfare in the Balkans necessitated the commitment of ever-Stronger forces in that area.
The evacuation of Rostov and the withdrawal of First Panzer Army behind the line of the Mius was unavoidable according to the new commander of Army Group South, Field-Marshal von Reichenau. The dismissal of Rundstedt was thus shown to have been pointless within twenty-four hours after it had occurred.
Meanwhile preparations for the attack by my Army were made in such a way that it might be synchronised with the advance that Fourth Army had planned for December 2nd. But on December 1st we learned that Fourth Army would not be ready until December 4th. I should willingly have postponed my attack to wait for theirs, particularly as this would have allowed time for the 296th Infantry Division to arrive. But XXIV Panzer Corps did not believe that it could remain any longer in its narrowly constricted assault area. I therefore decided to launch my attack with this corps on December 2nd.
We had set up our advanced headquarters at Yasnaya Polyana, the estate of Count Tolstoi, and I visited it on December 2nd. Yasnaya Polyano was located immediately behind the headquarters of Infantry Regiment Gross-Deutschland, 4 miles to the south of Tula. There were two dwelling-houses on the estate, the ‘Castle’ and the ‘Museum,’ both preserved in the style of late nineteenth-century country houses; there was also a number of farm buildings. I ordered that the ‘Castle’ be left for the exclusive use of the Tolstoi family. We took up our quarters in the ‘Museum.’ All furniture and books belonging to the Tolstois were collected in two rooms, the doors of which were then locked. We contented ourselves with simple furniture which we built ourselves from rough planks. The house was heated by means of wood which we obtained from the nearby woods. No stick of furniture was burned, no book or manuscript touched. Any post-war statements by the Russians to the contrary belong in the realm of fantasy. I myself visited Tolstoi’s grave. It had been well looked after. No German soldier disturbed it. It remained in that condition until we evacuated the estate. Unfortunately the Russian propagandists, in the years of hatred since the war, have not hesitated to tell the grossest lies in order to prove our alleged barbarity. But there are still enough witnesses alive to prove the truth of what I here have said. It is, however, true that the Russians had laid mines about the grave of their greatest writer.
FIG.16. Before the attack.
FIG.17. An anti-tank ditch in the Stalin line.
FIG.18. Near Roslavl, August 5, 1941.
FIG.19. Panzer Regiment 35 advancing before the Battle of Gorodishtche.
On December 2nd the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions and Infantry Regiment Gross-Deutschland succeeded in breaking through the most advanced enemy positions. The attack took the Russians by surprise. It was continued on December 3rd in a blizzard. The roads became icy and movement was more difficult than ever. 4th Panzer Division crossed the Moscow–Tula railroad and captured six guns: the division finally reached the Tula–Serpuchov road. By then the strength of the troops was exhausted, as was their supply of fuel. The enemy withdrew to the north and the situation remained critical.
Reconnaissance on December 4th reported enemy spearheads preparing to attack in strength both north and south of the Tula–Serpuchov road. In the 3rd Panzer Division’s area heavy battles were developing in the wooded country to the east of Tula. Only limited progress was made on this day.
But the decisive factors affecting the whole Tula operation were, first, whether XLIII Army Corps still possessed sufficient attacking strength to close the ring about the city and establish contact with 4th Panzer Division to the north of the town, and secondly, whether Fourth Army’s attack could exert sufficient pressure on the enemy to prevent him from reinforcing the Tula front with troops withdrawn from his central sector.
On December 3rd I had visited XLIII Army Corps at Griasnovo in order to form a personal impression of the combat ability of the troops. Early on December 4th I drove to the headquarters of the 31st Infantry Division and thence to its 17th Infantry Regiment and to that regiment’s III (Jaeger) Battalion; this was my old Goslar Jaeger unit, where I had started my military career and whose 11th Company I had commanded in 1920–22. In lengthy conversation with the company commanders I raised the serious question of whether the troops still possessed enough offensive strength for the task that lay ahead of them. The officers did not attempt to hide their anxieties, but in answer to my question whether the troops could attack successfully they replied that they could. ‘We can knock the enemy out of his positions once more.’ Whether the other units of XLIII Army Corps were as energetic as my old Goslar Jaegers remained unknown. But in any event the impressions I gained from this battalion decided me to try the attack once again.
The drive back was endless and, on account of the drifting snow and icy inclines, dangerous as well. Finally, my armoured command tank drove into an abyss, one of those well-known chasms that the autumn rains cut deep into the clay soil. There was no hope of extricating the vehicle in the darkness. Luckily, on the far side of the gorge I came upon a signals truck from my headquarters which took me to Yasnaya Polyana, where I arrived durin
g the course of the night.
During December 4th XLIII Army Corps had made its preparations to attack and the 296th Infantry Division, under General Stemmermann, had continued its difficult march towards Tula. But there was no attack by these units on that day. Meanwhile the thermometer dropped to — 31 degrees Fahrenheit. Air reconnaissance reported strong enemy forces moving south from Kashira. Intensive Russian fighter activity prevented more detailed observation.
On December 5th XLIII Army Corps attempted to attack but could make no progress beyond certain initial successes by the 31st Infantry Division. The 296th Infantry Division only reached Upa after dark and in a state of exhaustion. I had myself personally visited one of its regiments. On the 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division’s sector the Russians attacked with tanks to the north-east of Venev. The threat to our flanks and rear in the area north of Tula, together with the fact that XXIV Panzer Corps had been almost immobilised by the frost, which was now — 68 degrees, raised the question of whether it would be right to continue the attack. It could only be so if Fourth Army were attacking at the same time—and successfully. But unfortunately this was not the case. Rather, the contrary happened. Co-operation by Fourth Army was limited to an action by a fighting patrol two companies strong which, after completion of its mission, returned to its previous position. This episode had no effect on the enemy opposite XLIII Army Corps. Fourth Army had gone over to the defensive.
On account of the threats to our flanks and rear and of the immobility of our troops due to the abnormal cold, I made the decision during the night of the 5th–6th December to break off this unsupported attack, and to withdraw my foremost units into defensive positions along the general line Upper Don–Shat–Upa. This was the first time during the war that I had had to take a decision of this sort, and none was more difficult. The fact that my chief of staff, Liebenstein, and my senior corps commander, General Freiherr von Geyr, were in complete agreement did not make it any easier for me.
Panzer Leader Page 32
