During the course of the night I informed Field-Marshal von Bock of what I had decided. His first question was: ‘Where actually is your headquarters?’ He imagined that I was in Orel and too far away from the fighting front. But that was one mistake which no panzer general ever made. I was close enough to the battle and to my soldiers to be able to form a clear judgment of both.
It was not only my Second Panzer Army which was in so grave a situation. In this same night of December 5th–6th, Hoeppner’s Fourth Panzer Army and Reinhardt’s Third, which had reached a point only 20 miles north of the Kremlin, were forced to abandon their attacks because they lacked the necessary strength to seize the great prize that now lay so near. In Ninth Army’s sector the Russians even went over to the offensive on either side of Kalinin.
Our attack on Moscow had broken down. All the sacrifices and endurance of our brave troops had been in vain. We had suffered a grievous defeat which was to be seriously aggravated during the next few weeks thanks to the rigidity of our Supreme Command: despite all our reports those men, far away in East Prussia, could form no true concept of the real conditions of the winter war in which their soldiers were now engaged. This ignorance led to repeatedly exorbitant demands being made on the fighting troops.
A prompt and extensive withdrawal to a line where the terrain was suitable to the defence, and where there were already prepared positions, seemed the best and most economical way of rectifying the situation; once there we could have remained where we were until spring came. For Second Panzer Army the obvious choice was the Susha–Oka position, which had been partially fortified in October. But this was exactly what Hitler refused to allow. I have no way of knowing whether the international situation, as well as Hitler’s obstinacy, was exerting a decisive influence during these days; but I assume this to be the case since Japan joined in the war on December 8th and this was followed by Hitler’s declaration of war on the United States on December 11th.
The soldiers wondered at the time why, when Hitler declared war on America, Japan did not do likewise against the Soviet Union. A direct consequence of this was that the Russian forces in the Far East remained available for use against the Germans. These forces were being moved at an unprecedented speed and in great numbers to our front. The result of this policy of Hitler’s was not an alleviation of our difficulties but an additional burden of almost incalculable weight. It was the soldiers who had to carry it.
The war was now really ‘total’ enough for anyone. The economic and military potential of the greater part of the globe was united against Germany and Germany’s feeble allies.
But to return to Tula. In the next few days the withdrawal of XXIV Panzer Corps proceeded according to plan, while heavy enemy pressure continued to be exerted against LIII Army Corps from the Kashira area; during the night of the 7th–8th December Michailov, in the XLVII Panzer Area, fell to the Russians and heavy casualties were inflicted on the 10th (Motorised) Infantry Division. To our right Second Army lost Yeletz at this time; the enemy was driving on Livny while building up his strength before Yefremov.
My point of view at that time can be seen from a letter which I wrote on December 8th:
We are faced with the sad fact that the Supreme Command has overreached itself by refusing to believe our reports of the increasing weakness of the troops and by making ever new demands on them, by having made no preparations for the cruel winter weather and by being surprised when the Russian cold reached — 32°. The troops were no longer strong enough to capture Moscow and I therefore decided with a heavy heart, on the evening of December 5th, to break off our fruitless attack and to withdraw to a previously selected and relatively short line which I hope that I shall be able to hold with what is left of my forces. The Russians are pursuing us closely and we must expect misfortunes to occur. Our casualties, particularly from sickness and frostbite, have been bad, and though it is to be hoped that at least a proportion will be able to rejoin their units after rest and treatment, for the moment there is nothing that can be done. The loss of vehicles and guns owing to frost has been far greater than was feared. We are making what use we can of sleds, but these are naturally not very much help. Fortunately we have so far been able to keep our fine tanks in running order. The gods alone can tell how much longer we shall be able to use them in this cold.
Our misfortunes began with Rostov; that was the writing on the wall. When I flew to Army Group on November 23rd I neither found comprehension nor managed to achieve any results; the same old business went on as before. Then my northern neighbour broke down; my southern one was already very weak, and so I was left no alternative but to break off my attack, since I could hardly roll up the whole Eastern front by myself, let alone at a temperature of —32°.
I asked Balck to give the Commander-in-Chief of the Army my views on the situation, but I do not know if he managed to do so.
Yesterday Richthofen visited me. [Field-Marshal Richthofen of the Luftwaffe.] We had a long conversation alone together and discovered that we agree on the general situation. I also talked to General Schmidt, who is in the same position as myself and who commands the army on my right. He too shares my views. So I am not alone in my opinions, but that makes no difference since nobody is interested …
I would never have believed that a really brilliant military position could be so b …. d up in two months. If a decision had been taken at the proper time to break off and settle down for the winter in a habitable line suitable for the defence, we would have been in no danger. For months past now it has all been one great question mark…. I am not thinking about myself but rather about our Germany, and that is why I am frightened.
On December 9th the enemy exploited his success in the Livny area and succeeded in encircling part of the 95th Infantry Division. On my front I ordered XLVII Panzer Corps to begin to withdraw south-west; XXIV Panzer Corps beat off Russian attacks from Tula.
On December 10th I sent written reports to Schmundt, Hitler’s chief adjutant, and to the younger Keitel, head of the Army Personnel Office, in which I described our situation; I wished that there be no more illusions cherished in those quarters. On the same day I wrote to my wife:
I hope that these letters of mine [the two referred to above] will reach their proper destination since even now, with clear thinking and firm determination, a great deal can still be saved. The enemy, the size of the country and the foulness of the weather were all grossly underestimated, and we are suffering for that now … The only good thing is the fact that at least I decided on my own responsiblity to break off the attack on the 5th of December; had I not done so a catastrophe could not have been avoided.
On December 10th Russian troops were observed unloading in the Kastornaia and Yeletz area. On Second Army’s front the enemy widened his penetration and crossed the Livny–Chernova road. On my front the 10th (Motorised) Infantry Division was defending Yepifan. LIII Army Corps and XXIV Panzer Corps reached the Don–Shat–Upa line.
During the course of the day an uncomfortable gap occurred between the 296th and the 31st Infantry Divisions.
On December 11th the corps of our-right hand neighbour continued to withdraw westwards. Yefremov was threatened and had to be evacuated on December 12th.
In order to close the gap in XLIII Army Corps sector Fourth Army was told to send me the 137th Infantry Division. But in view of the great distance that it had to cover and the bad weather, this division could not be expected to arrive for some time. On December 12th all the available mobile forces of my Army had to be sent to the support of my right-hand neighbour, who was in trouble.
On December 13th Second Army continued to withdraw. In these circumstances Second Panzer Army’s intention to hold a line Stalinogorsk–Shat–Upa became impracticable, particularly as the 112th Infantry Division was no longer strong enough to resist the attack of fresh Russian forces. The withdrawal had to be resumed to a line behind the River Plava. Neither the Fourth Army on our left nor the Fourth and Third Panzer
Groups could hold their positions.
On December 14th I met the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch, in Roslavl. Field-Marshal von Kluge was also present. To attend this meeting I had had to drive for twenty-two hours through a blizzard. I described in detail to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army the condition of my troops, and I asked for and received his permission to withdraw my Army to the line of the Susha and Oka; during the battles of the previous October this had constituted our front line at one period and consequently had been fortified to a certain extent. The question was also raised of how the gap between XXIV Panzer Corps and XLIII Army Corps, now some 25 miles wide, might best be closed. Fourth Army was supposed to hand over the 137th Infantry Division to Second Panzer Army for this purpose. But Field-Marshal von Kluge had so far sent off only four battalions and the divisional commander. I described this force as totally inadequate and asked that the remaining half of the division be sent me at once. While fighting to re-establish contact the brave divisional commander, General Bergmann, lost his life. The vital gap could not be closed.
The result of the Roslavl conference was the following order: ‘Second Army is placed under command of the commander, Second Panzer Army. Both armies will hold a line in front of Kursk—in front of Orel–Plavskoie–Aleksin, withdrawing in case of necessity to the Oka.’ I could rightly assume that the Commander-in-Chief of the Army would inform Hitler of this decision; but subsequent events make it at least doubtful whether he did, in fact, ever do so.
On this day a Russian penetration in Second Army’s front, which had begun on December 13th, was deepened through Livny towards Orel; as a result the 45th Infantry Division was encircled and partially destroyed. Icy surfaces made all movement difficult. Frostbite was costing us more casualties than was the enemy. XLVII Panzer Corps had to be pulled back since its right-hand neighbour, the 293rd Infantry Division of Second Army, was withdrawing from Yefremov.
On December 16th, at my urgent request, Schmundt, who was in our neighbourhood, came to meet me at Orel airfield, where we had half an hour’s conversation. I described the situation to him in the gravest terms and asked him to repeat what I had said to the Führer. I expected Hitler to telephone me during the night and to answer the proposals that I had made via Schmundt. It was during this conversation that I learned of the approaching changes in the Army High Command and the imminent departure of Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch. During that night I wrote:
I frequently cannot sleep at night and my brain goes round and round while I try to think what more I can do to help my poor soldiers who are out there without shelter in this abominable cold. It is frightful, unimaginable. The people at the OKH and OKW, who have never seen the front, have no idea what the conditions here are like. They keep on sending us orders which we cannot possibly carry out and they ignore all our requests and suggestions.
During that night I received the telephone call from Hitler that I had been expecting. He commanded that we hold fast, forbade further withdrawals and promised that we should receive replacements—to the number, I think, of 500 men—by air. It was a very bad line and Hitler repeated his orders. As for our withdrawals, these had already begun as a result of my conversation with Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch in Roslavl and could not now be halted.
On December 17th I visited the commanders of the XXIV and XLVII Panzer Corps and of the LIII Army Corps in order to learn once again what the state of our troops was like and to discuss the situation. The three generals were all agreed that it was impossible, with the strength at our disposal, to organise a defensive line east of the Oka. The problem was how to keep up the combat strength of the troops until the arrival of fresh formations should permit the construction of a defence which could hold fast. They reported that the troops were beginning to doubt the ability of a Supreme Headquarters which had ordered the last, desperate attack against an enemy whom they had so grossly underestimated. ‘If only we were mobile and had our old combat strength, then it would be child’s play. The Russian is trained and equipped for winter warfare and we are not.’
On this day Second Army became nervous lest the enemy break through to Novosil.
In view of the general situation I decided, with Army Group’s approval, to fly to the Führer’s headquarters and personally to describe to Hitler what the position was in my Army, since neither telephonic nor written communications had produced any results. The conference was arranged for December 20th. By that date Field-Marshal von Bock had reported himself sick and had been replaced as Commander of Army Group Centre by Field-Marshal von Kluge.
On December 18th Second Army was ordered to hold a line Tim–Livny–Verchoie and to withdraw in the course of the next few days, in conjunction with the right wing of Second Panzer Army, to the line Bolshaia Reka–Susha. Second Panzer Army was to occupy the line Mogilki–Vershoie Plavy–Ssorochenka–Chunina–Kosmina.
XLIII Army Corps was placed under command of Fourth Army.
On December 19th XLVII Panzer Corps and LIII Army Corps withdrew to the line of the Plava. I decided to bring XLVII Panzer Corps back to a line from Oserki to the north-west of Podissiniovke and to assemble XXIV Panzer Corps in the Orel area as army reserve so as to give the units of that corps a short rest and to create an operational, mobile force at my disposal.
Fourth Army was strongly attacked on its right wing and partially thrown back.
My First Dismissal
‘Little monk, little monk, you are taking a hard road!’ These words of Frundsberg to Dr. Martin Luther before the Diet of Worms of 1521, were quoted to me by my comrades when they learned of my decision to fly to Hitler’s headquarters. They were applicable enough. I was perfectly well aware that it would not be easy for me to bring Hitler over to my way of thinking. At that time, however, I still believed that our Supreme Command would listen to sensible propositions when they were laid before it by a general who knew the front. This belief I retained while making the long flight from the ice-bound battle area north of Orel to the well-appointed and well-heated Supreme Headquarters far away in East Prussia.
At 15.30 hrs. on December 20th I landed at Rastenburg airfield. I was to confer with Hitler for five hours, with only two breaks of half an hour each, one for the evening meal and one for the general weekly briefing which Hitler always attended personally.
I was received by Hitler at about 18.00 hrs. Keitel, Schmundt and other officers of Hitler’s entourage were also there. Neither the Chief of Army General Staff nor any other representative of the OKH was present, though Hitler had appointed himself Commander-in-Chief of the Army after the dismissal of Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch. And so, as on the 23rd of August, 1941, I stood in lonely opposition to the ranks of the OKW. As Hitler came forward to greet me I saw to my surprise, for the first time, a hard unfriendly expression in his eyes, and this convinced me that some opponent of mine must have turned him against me. The dim lighting of the room served to increase this unpleasant impression.
The conference began with my description of the state of Second Panzer Army and Second Army. I then spoke of my intention of withdrawing both armies bit by bit to the Susha–Oka position, an intention which, as already stated, I had expressed to Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch on December 14th, in Roslavl, and which he had approved. I was convinced that Hitler must have been informed of this. I was, therefore, all the more taken aback when he shouted: ‘No! I forbid that!’ I informed him that the withdrawal was already in progress and that there was no intermediate line at which it could be halted for any length of time before the rivers were reached. If he regarded it as important to preserve the lives of the troops and to hold a position throughout the winter he had no choice but to permit the withdrawal to be completed.
HITLER: ‘If that is the case they must dig into the ground where they are and hold every square yard of land!’
I: ‘Digging into the ground is no longer feasible in most places, since it is frozen to a depth of five feet and our wretched entrench
ing tools won’t go through it.’
HITLER: ‘In that case they must blast craters with the heavy howitzers. We had to do that in the First World War in Flanders.’
I: ‘In the First World War our divisions in Flanders held, on the average, sectors 2 to 3 miles wide and were supported in the defence by two or three battalions of heavy howitzers per division with proportionately abundant supplies of ammunition. My divisions have to defend fronts of 25 to 35 miles and in each of my divisions there are 4 heavy howitzers with approximately 50 shells per gun. If I use those shells to make craters I shall have 50 hollows in the ground, each about the width and depth of a wash tub with a large black circle around it. I shall not have a crater position. In Flanders there was never such cold as we are now experiencing. And apart from that I need my ammunition to fire at the Russians. We can’t even drive stakes into the ground for carrying our telephone wires; to make a hole for the stake we have to use high explosives. When are we to get sufficient explosives to blast out defensive positions on the scale you have in mind?’
But Hitler insisted on his order, that we remain where we were, being carried out.
I: ‘Then this means taking up positional warfare in an unsuitable terrain, as happened on the Western Front during the First World War. In this case we shall have the same battles of material and the same enormous casualties as then without any hope of winning a decisive victory. If such tactics are adopted we shall, during the course of this coming winter, sacrifice the lives of our officers, our non-commissioned officers and of the men suitable to replace them, and this sacrifice will have been not only useless but also irreparable.’
Panzer Leader Page 33
