But at first there was no question of this. My bad heart took a turn for the worse during the autumn of 1942. At the end of November I suffered a complete collapse, was almost totally unconscious for several days and could take no nourishment; I only recovered slowly, thanks to the excellent medical treatment I received from Professor von Domarus, one of Berlin’s leading specialists. By Christmas I was able to leave my bed for a few hours at a time; during January I continued to make slow progress; and by the end of February I was well enough to set off in search of a house in the Warthegau where I might start my new civilian career as a landowner. But this was not to be.
During 1942 the German Army had once again launched an offensive —from June 28th to the end of August—which had been successful in that the southern wing (Kleist) had reached the Caucasian mountains while Paulus’ Sixth Army to the north had advanced as far as Stalingrad on the Volga. Those operations were once again based on an eccentric plan. The objectives assigned were beyond the power of the troops, weakened as they were by the hardships of the 1941-42 winter campaign. As in August of 1941, Hitler was driving for objectives of economic and ideological significance without first ensuring that the enemy’s military strength was broken. The capture of the Caspian oilfields, the cutting of the Volga as a maritime artery, and the neutralisation of the industrial centre of Stalingrad, such were the motives that led him to undertake operations which, from a military point of view, were nonsensical.
I could only follow these developments through the Press and wireless, though occasionally a friend would supply me with more detailed information. But this was enough to make me realise how markedly our situation had deteriorated; after the disaster of Stalingrad, in January 1943, and even before the intervention by the Western powers, we were already in grave peril. And the English trial landing at Dieppe, on August 19th, 1942, foreshadowed the opening of a second front in France.
In November 1942 the Allies landed in North Africa. The situation of our troops fighting in that theatre thus became perilous.
On September 25th Hitler had dismissed the Chief of the Army General Staff, Colonel-General Halder, and had appointed General Zeitzler to succeed him. At the same time responsibility for the employment of General Staff Corps personnel was taken away from the Chief of the General Staff and was given to the Army Personnel Office, which was directly subordinate to Hitler. By this act the Chief of the General Staff was deprived of one of his last means of controlling the General Staff Corps. Zeitzler protested in vain. With the dismissal of Halder, Hitler had completed the re-allocation of military power which he had not felt strong enough to carry out during the autumn of 1939, though even then he had nursed a deep and irreconcilable distrust for the leading figures of the Army. For three years now men had been working together along lines that went against their deepest convictions, men whose opinions were at variance and who felt a profound lack of trust in one another. Would this now all be changed? Would Hitler display more confidence in Zeitzler than he had shown for Brauchitsch and Halder? Would he now pay attention to the advice of his specialists? The destiny of Germany was dependent on the answer to these questions.
In any case, the new man set to work with the greatest energy. He did not hesitate to give Hitler his opinions and he fought hard for his point of view. Five times he offered to resign his post and five times his offer was refused, until at last Hitler’s distrust of him grew so great that he finally let him go. He did not succeed in persuading Hitler to change his attitude.
The course of events on the Eastern Front during Zeitzler’s tenure of office is shown on maps 27 and 28.
8. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMOURED FORCE, JANUARY 1942 TO FEBRUARY 1943
After assuming the functions of Commander-in-Chief of the Army, in December 1941, Hitler began to be increasingly preoccupied with the technical development of military weapons. He devoted his attention especially to the armoured force. The data given below comes mainly from the records of the former Chief Assistant (Hauptdienstleiter) Saur, who worked with Albert Speer, the Minister for Armaments and War Production. Those records show Hitler’s eagerness to promote progress in weapon development; they also cast a light on his erratic character and are thus interesting documents.
As already stated, a group of responsible designers, industrialists, and officers of the Army Ordnance Office visited my Panzer Army in November 1941, with the object of studying at first hand our recent combat experience when fighting the superior Russian tank, the T34, and of deciding what measures should be taken to help us regain technical supremacy over the Russians. The officers at the front were of the opinion that the T34 should simply be copied, since this would be the quickest way of putting to rights the most unhappy situation of the German panzer troops: but the designers could not agree to this. This was not primarily because of the designers’ natural pride in their own inventions, but rather because it would not be possible to mass-produce essential elements of the T34—in particular the aluminium diesel engines—with the necessary speed. Also, so far as steel alloys went, we were at a disadvantage compared to the Russians owing to our shortage of raw materials. It was, therefore, decided that the following solution be adopted: the construction of the Tiger Tank, a tank of some 60 tons, which had recently been started would continue: meanwhile, a light tank, called the Panther, weighing between 35 and 45 tons, was to be designed. On January 23rd, 1942, the design for this tank was submitted to Hitler. It was at this conference that Hitler ordered that German tank production be increased to a capacity of 600 units per month. In May of 1940 our capacity, inclusive of all types, had been 125 units. So it can be seen that the increase in productivity of an industry making one of the most vital weapons of war had been extraordinarily small during this period of almost two years of war; this surely provides proof that neither Hitler nor the General Staff correctly estimated the importance of the tank to our war effort. Even the great tank victories of 1939-41 had not sufficed to change this.
During this conference, on January 23rd, 1942, Hitler expressed an opinion which was to be a continual source of confusion to him in his understanding both of the technical development and of the tactical and operational employment of tanks. He believed that the hollow-charge shell, which was about to be issued to the artillery, and which showed increased power of armour penetration, would lead to a considerable decrease in the future effectiveness of tanks. He believed that if this new development should, in fact, fulfil its promise, the answer was to have much more self-propelled artillery and he therefore wished to divert tank chassis to the artillery for this purpose. On this 23rd of January, 1942, he requested that measures be taken along the lines indicated.
On February 8th, 1942, the Minister for Armaments and War Production, Dr. Todt, was killed in an aeroplane accident. He was succeeded by Speer.
In March the Krupp Company and Professor Porsche were instructed to prepare designs for a tank that was to weigh 100 tons. Work on this tank was to be so hastened that the experimental model could be produced by the spring of 1943. In order to hurry the development of tanks more designers were required: to acquire them the peacetime activity of the automobile factories was discontinued. On March 19th, 1942, Speer informed the Führer that by October, 1942, there would be 60 Porsche Tigers and 25 Henschel Tigers available, and that by March, 1943, a further 135 would be produced, bringing the total by that time to 220—assuming that they were all employable.
In April Hitler ordered the design of tank shells for the 80 mm. and 75 mm. guns that were to be installed in the Tiger and Panther tanks. The first experimental Tigers were produced by the Henschel and Porsche companies.
In this same month Hitler was talking about an expedition against Malta, for which he required 12 Panzer IV’s with 80 mm. of frontal armour in order to attack the island fortress. But nothing more was heard about this very necessary operation.
In May 1942 Hitler approved the design of the Panther that was submitted by the MAN Company and also o
rdered the construction of flats capable of transporting super-heavy tanks. The production of assault guns was to be increased to 100, that of Panzer III’s to 190 per month.
In June of 1942 Hitler was concerned as to whether the armour of the tanks was sufficiently thick. He ordered that the frontal armour of the Panzer IV and of the assault guns be increased to 80 mm., and he expressed doubts whether 80 mm. would be enough frontal armour for the Panthers by the spring of 1943. He therefore ordered that an investigation be carried out to determine whether it was possible to increase the armour of that tank to 100 mm. At the same time he ordered that in any event all the vertical surfaces of the tank were to be at least 100 mm. thick. He also ordered that attempts be made to increase the frontal armour of the Tiger to 120 mm.
At a conference held on June 23rd, 1942, the following production figures for May, 1943, were estimated:
Armoured Reconnaissance Vehicles, built on the chassis of the old Panzer II 131
Panther Tanks 250
Tiger Tanks 285
Hitler was entirely satisfied with this programme. He wanted the rapid development of an air-cooled diesel engine for tanks, a desire that General Lutz had expressed as early as 1932, but that had only been fulfilled in the case of the little Panzer I which the Krupp Company had built. Hitler examined in detail the basic problems of tank construction and agreed to the fundamental priorities on which the experts had decided: these were, first, the strongest possible armament, secondly, great speed, and thirdly, heavy armour. But he was a paradoxical man and he continued to insist that heavy armour was also a primary requirement. Then his fantasy led him into the realms of the gigantic. The engineers Grote and Hacker were ordered to design a monster tank weighing 1,000 tons. 100 mm. belly armour was ordered for the Porsche Tiger that was in process of construction and the armament was to consist either of a 150 mm. L37 cannon or a 100 mm. L70. Professor Porsche promised delivery of the first model by May 12th, 1943. On July 8th, 1942, he ordered that the first Tiger Companies were to be made ready with all speed for operations against Leningrad. By July 23rd, that is to say fifteen days later, Hitler had changed his mind; he now demanded that the Tigers be ready for operations in France by September at the latest. It would thus appear that he was already expecting a large-scale Allied landing.
In order to improve the old Panzer III, Hitler ordered that it be re-equipped with the 75 mm. L24 cannon. He was very anxious that there should be a great increase in tank production. But at the same conference the question of mounting self-propelled guns on tank chassis was again seriously discussed, even though the production of such weapons must inevitably result in a decrease in the number of tanks produced.
In August, 1942, Hitler ordered an inquiry to be made as to how quickly the 88 mm. cannon could be installed in the Tiger tank. This gun was constructed to be capable of firing a shell that would penetrate 200 mm. of armour. He also ordered that all Panzer IV’s sent to the factories for repair be re-equipped with long-barrelled guns, so that the power of those tanks’ armament might be increased.
In September of 1942 a new construction programme was introduced, according to which the production figures for the spring of 1944 were to be as follows:
Leopard (light reconnaissance tank) 150
Panther 600
Tiger 50
Total tank production 800
Assault guns 300
Light self-propelled guns 150
Heavy self-propelled guns 130
Super-heavy self-propelled guns 20
Total artillery pieces on tank chassis 600
In order to do as little damage as possible to tank production, it was ordered that the self-propelled guns be armoured with unhardened steel. All the same it was plain to see that the principal preoccupation now was the production of guns rather than of tanks, that is to say of defensive and not offensive weapons; furthermore these defensive weapons were unsatisfactory, for the troops were already beginning to complain that a self-propelled gun on a Panzer II or Czech T38 chassis was not a sufficiently effective weapon.
During the discussion on the subject of the Porsche Tiger, Hitler expressed his opinion that this tank, being electrically powered and air cooled, would be particularly suitable for employment in the African theatre, but that its operational range of only 30 miles was quite unsatisfactory and must be increased to 90 miles. This was undoubtedly correct; only it should have been stated when the first designs were submitted.
The discussions that took place in September already show the influence of the heavy fighting in and around Stalingrad. Among other matters, it was decided that the assault guns must be improved. They were to be equipped with the long 75 mm. L70 gun and given 100 mm. of frontal armour. Heavy infantry guns were to be mounted on assault gun chassis or built into Panzer IV’s. Some of the Porsche Tigers then in construction were to be changed into assault guns by having the revolving turret removed and being equipped with a long 88 mm. cannon and 200 mm. of frontal armour. The installation of a 210 mm. mortar in this tank was discussed. There can be no doubt that the tanks available to us at that time were not suitable for street fighting; on the other hand the correct solution for the problem was not this constant modification to the design of tanks actually in production, with the resultant creation of countless variations to the original type, each of which would need innumerable different spare parts. The repair of tanks in the field was being made almost impossible.
In September of 1942 the first Tigers went into action. A lesson learned from the First World War had taught us that it is necessary to be patient about committing new weapons and that they must be held back until they are being produced in such quantities as to allow their employment in mass. In the First World War the French and British used their tanks prematurely, in small numbers, and thereby failed to win the great victory which they were entitled to expect. Military experts had long ago established this criticism as valid. I myself had often spoken and written on the subject. Hitler was well aware of the facts. But he was consumed by his desire to try his new weapon. He therefore ordered that the Tigers be committed in a quite secondary operation, in a limited attack carried out in terrain that was utterly unsuitable; for in the swampy forests near Leningrad heavy tanks could only move in single file along the forest tracks, which, of course, was exactly where the enemy anti-tank guns were posted, waiting for them. The results were not only heavy, unnecessary casualties, but also the loss of secrecy and of the element of surprise for future operations. Disappointment was all the greater since the attack bogged down in the unsuitable terrain.
In October tank production suffered further in favour of the production of assault guns: Panzer IV’s were diverted to carrying the 75 mm. L70 cannon and Panthers the long 88 mm. L71. Furthermore, 40 to 60 heavy infantry guns were to be built on to Panzer IV bodies. Hitler also talked of mounting mortars on Panzer IV’s; these were to have extra short barrels and be used as mine-throwers. Interesting as all these new designs were, the actual result was simply a decrease in the production of the only useful combat tank available to us at that time, the Panzer IV; and furthermore it was only in this month that the production figures for that tank reached the really very modest total of 100. Nor was that all. The Armament Ministry proposed that reconnaissance Panthers be produced in addition to the Leopards which had already been planned. Luckily nothing came of this project.
In the field of tank production the wrong line was thus taken. On the other hand Hitler insisted quite correctly that the Tiger be armed with the long 88 mm. flat trajectory gun, preferring this weapon to one of heavier calibre but lesser muzzle-velocity. The primary purpose of the tank gun must be to fight enemy tanks, and to this all other considerations must be made subordinate.
In November Hitler successfully demanded that the production of Tigers be increased from 13 to 25 per month. This figure was attained during the course of that same month. The production of assault guns now reached 100.
At the beginning
of December there were renewed discussions concerning the correct employment of tanks. It was then pointed out to Hitler that the commitment of the Tigers piecemeal was highly disadvantageous. He now expressed the opinion that commitment in detail was suitable to the requirements of the Eastern theatre, but that in Africa employment in mass would be more rewarding. Unfortunately I do not know on what grounds this incomprehensible statement was based.
The construction of the Panzer III was now entirely discontinued, the industrial capacity thus freed being given over to the building of assault guns. The production figure for assault guns was to reach 220 per month by June 1943, of which 24 were to be armed with light field howitzers. This gun, with its low muzzle velocity and its very high trajectory, was undoubtedly well suited to the requirements of the infantry, but its production resulted in a fresh weakening of our defensive power against hostile tanks.
Panzer Leader Page 35
