During a conference with the engineers Porsche and Dr. Müller (from Krupps) Hitler said that he expected a specimen model of the Mäuschen or Mouse, the 100-ton tank, to be ready by the summer of 1943: he would then require the Krupp Company to produce 5 of these tanks per month.
Reports began to come in of difficulties that were arising in the replacement of spare parts as a result of the multiplication of the many types caused by the constant alterations to the designs.
In January 1943 there were further discussions concerning armour, tank guns and the mammoth tank. It was ordered that the vertical surfaces of the old Panzer IV be 100 mm. armour plate, and the frontal armour of the Panther was also to be 100 mm. Production of the light reconnaissance tank, the Leopard, was cancelled before it was ever started, since ‘neither the armour nor the armament envisaged for this model is suitable for the conditions that are anticipated to prevail in 1944.’
It was ordered that the Tiger be equipped with a long 88 mm. gun, with frontal armour of 150 mm. and side armour of 80 mm. Porsche’s Mouse was to go into production and the figure raised to 10 per month. This gigantic offspring of the fantasy of Hitler and his advisers did not at the time even exist in the form of a wooden model. All the same it was decided that mass production was to begin at the end of 1943, that it was to be armed with a 128 mm. gun and the eventual installation of a 150 mm. gun was to be studied.
For street fighting Hitler ordered the construction of three Ram-Tigers,1 to be constructed on Porsche’s chassis. This ‘knightly’ weapon seems to have been based on the tactical fantasies of armchair strategists. In order that this street-fighting monster might be supplied with the necessary petrol, the construction of fuel-carrying auxiliary vehicles and of reserve containers was ordered. Hitler also ordered the construction of multiple smoke mortars for tanks and declared that the helicopter was the ideal aircraft for artillery observation and for co-operation with tanks.
Hitler’s appeal, ‘To all those engaged in Tank Production,’ on January 22nd, 1943, and his delegation of full powers to Minister Speer for increasing such production, indicate the growing anxiety concerning the declining power of the German armoured forces in relationship to that of the enemy, who was steadily continuing the mass production of his outstanding model, the T34.
Despite the recognition of this fact, early in February Hitler ordered the construction of the so-called Hummel or Lobster (a heavy field howitzer) and of the Hornisse or Hornet (an 88 mm. gun) as self-propelled guns on a Panzer IV chassis. He ordered that the total productive capacity of the old Panzer II and of the Czech T38 tank be devoted to making carriages for self-propelled guns—the former to mount a light field howitzer, the latter a 1940 model, 75 mm. antitank gun. He ordered that 90 Porsche Tiger Ferdinands be made ready with all speed. To protect the Panzer IV, the Panther and the assault guns against the effect of the Russian infantry’s tank-destroying weapon, the equipment of these models with a so-called Schürze or ‘apron’ was ordered: this consisted of sheets of armour plating to be hung on the outside of tanks to cover vertical surfaces and the wheels and tracks.
Finally, the General Staff took a hand in the tank situation which was becoming ever more confused and unsatisfactory; the General Staff requested the abandonment of all tank construction programmes with the exception of the Tiger and of the Panther, which latter was not yet in mass-production. Hitler readily accepted this proposal, and the Armaments Ministry was also pleased by the greater simplicity in production which would result. This new plan contained only one major weakness; with the abandonment of the Panzer IV Germany would, until further notice, be limited to the production of 25 Tigers per month. This would certainly have led to the defeat of the German Army in the very near future. The Russians would have won the war even without the help of their Western allies and would have occupied the whole of Europe. No power on earth could have stopped them. The problems of Europe would thus have been greatly simplified and we should all have learned what real ‘democracy’ is like!
The dangers that now threatened us were so enormous that officers of the armoured force itself and the few men of insight in Hitler’s military entourage began to look around for someone who might be capable, even at this late hour, of staving off the chaos that threatened us all. My pre-war writings were placed on Hitler’s desk and they managed to persuade him to read them. It was then proposed to him that he send for me. Finally, they succeeded in overcoming Hitler’s distrust of my person to the extent that he agreed to listen to me at least once. And so on February 17th, 1943, to my very great surprise, I was telephoned by the Army Personnel Office and ordered to report at Supreme Headquarters in Vinnitsa for a conference with Hitler.
9. INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF ARMOURED TROOPS
Appointment and First Actions
When I was called to the telephone on February 17th, 1943, to speak to the Army Personnel Office I had no idea of what lay ahead of me. Only a week before, having recovered from my heart complaint, I had been to see General Bodewin Keitel,1 the head of the Personnel Office, to find out about the general situation and one or two individuals. Judging by what he had then said to me there could be no question of my re-employment: rather, the contrary. Now General Linnarz, Keitel’s assistant, informed me that I was to report directly to the Fiihrer at Vinnitsa. He could not give me a reason for this summons. But it was plain to me that only the direst necessity would have driven Hitler to take such a step. Stalingrad, the unheard-of surrender of a whole army on the field of battle, the heavy casualties that resulted from this national catastrophe, the cruel defeats suffered by our allies who had not proved capable of holding their fronts on either side of the destroyed Sixth Army with the limited means at their disposal, all this had led to a grave crisis. Morale had reached a low point both in the Army and the country.
External and internal political blows now aggravated the situation.
After landing in North Africa the Western Powers had made rapid progress. The growing importance of this theatre of war was underlined by the meeting of Roosevelt and Churchill at Casablanca from January 14th-23rd, 1943; for us the most important result of this conference was the insistence that the Axis Powers surrender unconditionally. The effect of this brutal formula on the German nation and, above all, on the Army was great. The soldiers, at least, were convinced from now on that our enemies had decided on the utter destruction of Germany, that they were no longer fighting—as Allied propaganda at the time alleged—against Hitler and so-called Nazism, but against their efficient, and therefore dangerous, rivals for the trade of the world.
For some time the architects of the destructive dogma of Casablanca boasted of what they had done. On February 11th, 1943, Winston Churchill said in the House of Commons:
‘It was only after full and cold, sober and mature consideration of these facts, on which our lives and liberties certainly depend, that the President, with my full concurrence as agent of the War Cabinet, decided that the note of the Casablanca Conference should be the unconditional surrender of all our foes. Our inflexible insistence upon unconditional surrender does not mean that we shall stain our victorious arms by any cruel treatment of whole populations.’
Less than two years after making this speech—on December 15th, 1944, to be exact—Winston Churchill promised the Poles East Prussia (with the exception of Königsberg, which was to go to the Russians), Danzig and 200 miles of the Baltic coast, adding that they were free ‘to extend their territory at the expense of Germany to the west.’ He then declared:
‘The transference of several millions of people would have to be effected from the east to the west or north, and the expulsion of the Germans, because that is what is proposed—the total expulsion of the Germans—from the area to be acquired by Poland in the west or north…. There will be no mixture of populations….’
Was it not atrocious so to treat the population of Eastern Germany? Was it not unjust? The House of Commons was obviously not unanimous in its approval
of Churchill’s policy, for he felt compelled to justify himself once again on February 24th, 1945, saying:
‘What, for instance, should be our attitude towards the terrible foe with whom we are grappling? Should it be unconditional surrender, or should we make some accommodation with them for a negotiated peace, leaving them free to regather their strength for a renewal of the struggle after a few uneasy years? The principle of unconditional surrender was proclaimed by the President of the United States at Casablanca and I endorsed it there and then on behalf of this country. I am sure it was right at the time it was used, when many things hung in the balance against us which are decided in our favour now. Should we then modify this declaration, which was made in the days of our comparative weakness and lack of success, now that we have reached a period of mastery and power? I am clear that nothing should induce us to abandon the principle of unconditional surrender and enter into any form of negotiation with Germany or Japan, under whatever guise such suggestions may present themselves, until the act of unconditional surrender has been formally executed….’
Winston Churchill is no longer so certain that his actions at that time were wise. Both he and Bevin have clearly modified the policy then adopted. Today many British statesmen no doubt wish that the decisions taken at the Yalta conference of February, 1945, had been other than what they were. It was there stated:
‘It is not our purpose to destroy the people of Germany, but only when Nazism and militarism have been extirpated will there be hope for a decent life for Germans and a place for them in the comity of nations.’
Does such a hope now exist?
It cannot be denied that in neutral countries the probable future development of European affairs was better understood at the time of which I am writing—February 1943—than it was in the Cabinet offices of the Western Powers. On February 21st, 1943, the Spanish Foreign Minister, Jordana, handed a note to the British ambassador, Sir Samuel Hoare, in which it was stated:
‘If events develop in the future as they have up to now, it would be Russia which will penetrate deeply into German territory. And we ask the question: if this should occur, which is the greater danger not only for the Continent but for England herself, a Germany not totally defeated but with sufficient strength to serve as a rampart against Communism, a Germany hated by all her neighbours, which would deprive her of authority though sne remained intact, or a Sovietized Germany which would certainly furnish Russia with the added strength of her war preparations, her engineers, her specialised workmen and technicians, which would enable Russia to extend herself with an empire without precedent from the Atlantic to the Pacific? …
‘And we ask a second question: is there anybody in the centre of Europe, in that mosaic of countries without consistency or unity, bled moreover by war and foreign domination, who could contain the ambitions of Stalin? There is certainly no one…. We may be sure that after the German domination, the only domination which could live in the countries is Communism. For this reason we consider the situation as extremely grave and think that people in England should reflect calmly on the matter, since should Russia succeed in conquering Germany, there will be no one who can contain her….
‘If Germany did not exist Europeans would have to invent her and it would be ridiculous to think that her place could be taken by a confederation of Lithuanians, Poles, Czechs and Rumanians which would rapidly be converted into so many more states of the Soviet confederation….’1
Sir Samuel Hoare replied on February 25th, 1943, presumably on the authority and with the approval of his Government, in the following terms:
‘The Minister says that the great danger to Europe is Communism and that a Russian victory will make all Europe Communist…. The British view is very different…. Will any single country be able to dominate Europe at the end of this war? Russia, at least, will need a long period of reconstruction and recovery in which she will depend greatly upon the British Empire and the United States of America for economic help…. Whilst giving full credit and admiration to the Russian army, we are convinced that the final victory will not be the victory of any single Ally but of all the Allies…. There will then (after the war) undoubtedly be great British and American armies on the Continent…. They will be composed of fresh, front-line troops, whose ranks will not have been previously decimated by years of exhausting war on the Russian front….
‘As for ourselves, I make the confident prophecy that at that moment Great Britain will be the strongest European power…. British influence, it seems to me, will be stronger in Europe than at any time since the fall of Napoleon…. We shall not shirk our responsibilities to European civilisation or throw away our great strength by premature or unilateral disarmament. Having, with our Allies, won the war, we intend to maintain our full influence in Europe, and to take our full share in its reconstruction….’1
Such are the words of Sir Samuel, England’s spokesman in Franco’s neutral Spain. They sound very self-assured. Hitler, refusing instinctively to attempt diplomatic negotiations, was well aware that he could not possibly reach any agreement with the Western Powers. His fate—which, however, was also the fate of the German nation—was balanced on the edge of the sword.
The dismissal of Raeder and Schacht had caused a noticeable increase in Germany’s internal tension. The creaking of the timbers was becoming audible.
It was under the shadow of these events that, accompanied by Lieutenant Becke, I set off by train for Rastenburg in East Prussia, whence I was to go on by aeroplane. In the train I found General Kempff, my old comrade-in-arms, from whom I learned a great deal about the course of operations during the previous year. At Rastenburg I was met by Keitel’s adjutant, Major Weiss, but he could give me no precise information concerning the reasons for my journey. Accompanied by Kempff and my old colleague from the Inspectorate of Motorised Troops and the peacetime 2nd Panzer Division, Chales de Beaulieu, I flew on to Vinnitsa. We arrived there in the afternoon of the 19th and were assigned quarters in the army hostel called the Jagerhöhe.
During the morning of the 20th General Schmundt, Hitler’s principal adjutant, came to see me. We had a detailed conversation concerning Hitler’s intentions and the prospects of translating them into facts. Schmundt explained to me how the German armoured force, as a result of the increasing supremacy of the Russians, had reached a state in which the need for its renovation could no longer be ignored. The General Staff and the Armaments Ministry were at loggerheads; more important than this, the panzer troops themselves had lost confidence in the High Command and were asking with insistence that control of their arm of the Service be vested in someone who had practical knowledge and experience of the armoured forces. Hitler had therefore decided to entrust me with this responsibility. Schmundt asked me if I had any suggestions to make concerning the carrying out of this request. I replied that in view of the needs of my country and of my arm of the Service, I was prepared to accept Hitler’s offer. But I could only be of use in this position if certain prior conditions were fulfilled, all the more so since I had only just recovered from a serious illness and did not wish to waste my strength in such fruitless struggles for authority as those in which I had always previously been involved when holding similar appointments. I must therefore insist that I be subordinated neither to the Chief of the Army General Staff nor to the Commander of the Training Army but directly to Hitler. Furthermore, I must be in a position to influence the development of our armoured equipment both with the Army Ordnance Office and with the Armaments Ministry, for otherwise the re-establishment of the combat effectiveness of this arm of the Service would be impossible. Finally, I must be able to exert the same influence over the organisation and training of tank units in the Waffen-SS and the Luftwaffe as in the Army. It went without saying that I must also control the tank units of the Training Army and of the schools.
I requested Schmundt that these conditions of acceptance be submitted to Hitler and that I only be summoned to see him in the event
of his agreeing to them. If he did not, then it would be better to let me return to Berlin and to give up all idea of re-employing me. This conversation with Schmundt lasted for two hours.
Shortly after Schmundt’s return to Supreme Headquarters I was sent a message summoning me to a conference with Hitler at 15.15 hrs. that afternoon. I was received punctually at that hour; to begin with Schmundt was present, but later Hitler and I withdrew to his study where we were alone together. I had not seen Hitler since the black day of December 20th, 1941. In the intervening fourteen months he had aged greatly. His manner was less assured than it had been and his speech was hesitant; his left hand trembled. On his desk lay my books. He began the conversation with the words: ‘Since 1941 our ways have parted: there were numerous misunderstandings at that time which I much regret. I need you.’ I replied that I was willing, provided he could ensure me the necessary circumstances in which to do useful work. Hitler now told me that it was his intention to appoint me Inspector-General of Armoured Troops. Schmundt had explained to him my attitude towards the problem. He agreed with it and asked me accordingly to prepare a draft of the assignment of duties for that post and to submit this to him. He mentioned that he had re-read my pre-war writings on armoured troops and had noticed that I had even then correctly prophesied the course of future developments. I was now to put my theories into practice.
FIG.20. The outskirts of Orel on the Oka: a typical Russian town.
FIG.21. Dmitrovsk: early winter.
FIG.22. Night battle before Moscow, 1941.
Panzer Leader Page 36
