Panzer Leader

by Heinz Guderian

  I then flew on to Poltava, where General Kempff’s army command (Armee-Abteilung) was located, and from there went to visit the Gross-Deutschland Division on March 30th and the SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte ‘Adolf Hitler’ and General von Knobelsdorff’s corps headquarters on the 31st. At all these headquarters my primary purpose was to study our recent experience with the Tigers, so that I might form a clear picture of that tank’s tactical and technical capabilities and thus be able to deduce how best Tiger units might be organised for the future. A final visit to Manstein at Zaporozhe ended my first trip to the front as Inspector-General.

  These journeys resulted in a conference with Speer concerning an increase in the production of Tigers and Panthers; in the same connection I went to see Hitler on April 11th at Berchtesgaden, on the Obersalzberg, my first visit to this place. A remarkable feature of the Führer’s villa, the Berghof, was that—at least in the part accessible to us—there were no connecting doors between any of the rooms. Only the great conference hall was impressive: it had large windows commanding a magnificent view, a number of valuable hangings and pictures, including a wonderful Feuerbach, and a raised area by the fireplace, where Hitler, after the so-called evening briefing, was in the habit of spending a few hours in the company of his more intimate circle, his military and party adjutants and his female secretaries. I was never included in this circle.

  On the same date I called on Himmler, with the purpose of arranging that the armoured formations of the Waffen-SS be organised in accordance with the establishments laid down for the Army. My efforts met with only partial success. In particular Himmler would not agree to my urgent request that the setting up of new units be abandoned. It is true that Hitler had approved my views on this subject during our conference of March 9th, when I pointed out the disadvantages of new formations; but so far as the Waffen-SS was concerned, he and Himmler had reached certain conclusions which they did not impart to any of the soldiers. Hitler’s idea was to make himself independent of the Army, whose leaders he never trusted, by forming this private army in which he believed that he could place implicit confidence; it would thus be a Praetorian guard that would be ready for anything, should the Army ever refuse to follow him on account of its Prussian-German traditions. This policy of Hitler’s and Himmler’s was to put the Waffen-SS in a very unpleasant position after the war, since the Waffen-SS was blamed for the misdeeds of the rest of the SS and particularly of the operational commanders of the SD or Sicherheitsdienst. 1 But even during the war the preferential treatment received by the Waffen-SS in the quality and quantity of its replacements, as well as of arms and equipment, led to a certain amount of understandable ill-feeling on the part of the less-favoured army formations. If such ill-feeling disappeared in the comradeship of the front, this is simply an indication of the German soldier’s selfless nature, regardless of the colour of the uniform he wore.

  I spent April 12th visiting the Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, Colonel-General Jeschonnek. I found a tired man whose mood was one of outspoken discouragement. I did not manage to have a frank discussion with him about matters of concern to both our arms—the air and the armoured forces—nor, indeed, did I succeed in establishing any human contact with him. Shortly afterwards, in August 1943, grieved by Hitler’s and Goering’s reproaches concerning the failure of the air force, Jeschonnek took his own life. In so doing he was following in the footsteps of his comrade, Udet; the latter had felt himself forced to make the same desperate decision in November 1941, since he could see no other way out of his dilemma—a dilemma consisting, on the one hand, of what he recognised as the needs of the war and, on the other, of Goering’s incompetence and idleness. My request that I might be received by the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force came to nothing; that gentleman was too preoccupied with his non-military activities to spare me the necessary time.

  Back in Berlin I had a long conversation with Schmundt on April 13th. The situation in Africa had become hopeless, and I asked Schmundt to help me arrange that the many superfluous tank crews—particularly the irreplaceable commanders and technicians with years of experience behind them—be now flown out. Either I failed to convince Schmundt or else he did not press my arguments with sufficient energy to Hitler, for when I next saw the Führer and personally mentioned the matter I met with no success. The question of prestige—as so often—proved more powerful than common sense. A great number of machines which were returning empty to Italy could have carried out those valuable men; this would have made the reforming and rehabilitation of units both at home and at the front an easier undertaking. This conference, again on the Obersalzberg, took place on April 29th; on the same day I discussed questions of organisation and equipment with Buhle, Keitel, and Speer.

  Units were still being sent over to Africa and there ‘committed to the flames,’ among others our newest Tiger battalion. All argument against such a policy was quite ineffective; later the same thing was to happen in the defence of Sicily. On this occasion, when I urged that the Tigers be withdrawn to the mainland, Goering joined in the argument with the remark: ‘But Tigers can’t pole-vault across the Straits of Messina. You must realise that, Colonel-General Guderian!’ I replied: ‘If you have really won air supremacy over the Straits of Messina the Tigers can come back from Sicily the same way they went out.’ The air expert then fell silent; the Tigers remained in Sicily.

  On April 30th I flew from Berchtesgaden to Paris in order to introduce myself in my new capacity to the Commander-in-Chief West, Field-Marshal von Rundstedt, and to visit the armoured units in his area; I also wished to examine the potentialities of the Atlantic Wall as a defence against tank landings. At Rouen, the headquarters of LXXXI Army Corps, I had a discussion with my old colleague from the French campaign of ‘40, General Kuntzen, concerning coast defence, and at Yvetot I visited Panzer Regiment 100, which was equipped with captured French tanks. I got no farther, for a telegram arrived from Hitler summoning me to a conference at Munich.

  Sketch Map 27

  Developments in the East, 22.2.43–4.3.44.

  I arrived there on May 2nd. The first session was on May 3rd, and a second took place on May 4th, by which time my chief of staff, General Thomale, had come down from Berlin with new material. Those present included the OKW, the Chief of the Army General Staff with his principal advisers, the commanders of Army Groups South, von Manstein, and Centre, von Kluge, the commander of the Ninth Army, Model, Minister Speer, and others; the problem under discussion was the extremely important one of whether Army Groups Centre and South would be in a position to launch an offensive on the Eastern Front in the foreseeable future—that is to say, during the coming summer of 1943. This had arisen as a result of a proposed operation by the Chief of the Army General Staff, General Zeitzler, which envisaged a double enveloping attack against the big Russian salient west of Kursk; such an operation, if successful, would destroy a large number of Russian divisions, would decisively weaken the offensive strength of the Russian Army, and would place the German High Command in a more favourable position for continuing the war in the east. This question had already been eagerly discussed in April; but in view of the heavy blow suffered so recently at Stalingrad and of the consequent defeat to the whole southern flank of the German front in the East, large-scale offensive operations seemed scarcely possible at this time. But now the Chief of the General Staff believed that by employing the new Tigers and Panthers, from which he expected decisive successes, he could regain the initiative.

  Hitler opened the conference with a speech lasting three-quarters of an hour; he described factually the situation on the Eastern Front and then went on to outline the Chief of the General Staff’s proposals and the arguments that General Model had raised against them. Model had produced information, based largely on air photography, which showed that the Russians were preparing deep and very strong defensive positions in exactly those areas where the attack by the two army groups was to go in. The Russians had already wi
thdrawn the mass of their mobile formations from the forward area of their salient; in anticipation of a pincer attack, as proposed in this plan of ours, they had strengthened the localities of our possible break-throughs with unusually strong artillery and anti-tank forces. Model drew the correct deduction from this, namely, that the enemy was counting on our launching this attack and that in order to achieve success we must adopt a fresh tactical approach; the alternative was to abandon the whole idea. The manner in which Hitler expressed these opinions of Model’s made it plain that he was impressed by them, and that he had by no means decided to order an attack on the lines proposed by Zeitzler. He now asked Field-Marshal von Manstein to be the first to express his opinion on Zeitzler’s plan. Manstein, as often when face to face with Hitler, was not at his best. His opinion was that the attack would have had a good chance of succeeding if it had been launched in April; now its success was doubtful and he would need a further two full–Strength infantry divisions in order to be in a position to carry it out. Hitler replied that two such divisions were not available and that Manstein must make do with what he already had; he then repeated his question, but unfortunately received no very clear answer. He next turned to Field-Marshal von Kluge, who spoke unambiguously in favour of Zeitzler’s plan. I asked permission to express my views and declared that the attack was pointless; we had only just completed the reorganisation and re-equipment of our Eastern Front; if we attacked according to the plan of the Chief of the General Staff we were certain to suffer heavy tank casualties, which we would not be in a position to replace in 1943; on the contrary, we ought to be devoting our new tank production to the Western Front so as to have mobile reserves available for use against the Allied landing which could be expected with certainty to take place in 1944. Furthermore, I pointed out that the Panthers, on whose performance the Chief of the Army General Staff was relying so heavily, were still suffering from the many teething troubles inherent in all new equipment and it seemed unlikely that these could all be put right in time for the launching of the attack. Speer supported these arguments of mine from the standpoint of arms production. But we were the only men present at this session who were prepared bluntly to oppose Zeitzler’s plan. Hitler, still not fully convinced by the arguments advanced in its favour, did not reach any definite decision on this day.

  Apart from the military matters that were discussed, I had an important personal experience that day in Munich in that this was the first occasion on which I had seen Field-Marshal von Kluge since the events of December 1941. The unfriendly way in which he greeted me reopened all the old wounds. I was very cool towards him. After the conference Herr von Kluge invited me to have a word with him in another room and asked me to explain my distant manner. I had no choice but to tell him what I felt very deeply, in particular the fact that he had never given me satisfaction for his behaviour in December 1941, despite the subsequent clarification of the real situation as it had been at that time. We parted without anything having been achieved.

  Some time later Schmundt came to see me in Berlin and showed me a letter which Field-Marshal von Kluge had addressed to Hitler and in which he challenged me to a duel. Herr von Kluge knew perfectly well that duelling was prohibited and that Hitler would never have countenanced two of his generals fighting one another in war-time. All the same he requested Hitler to act as his second.

  Schmundt informed me on behalf of Hitler that the Führer did not wish a duel to take place; he further desired that the whole affair be suitably cleared up once and for all. In obedience to Hitler’s wish I wrote a letter to Field-Marshal von Kluge in which I said that I was sorry if my behaviour at Munich had offended him, but that in view of the grave and so far unrighted injury that he had done me in 1941 I had no alternative but to behave the way I did.

  In the tank production field it was decided during April, in accordance with my suggestion, that the Panzer IV should continue to be built until such time as a high-level of mass-production was absolutely assured for the Panthers. The monthly figure for new tanks was raised to 1,955. A strengthening of the anti-aircraft defences around the principal tank-production centres—Cassel, Friedrichshafen and Schweinfurt—was ordered. During the course of the conference at Munich on May 4th, I had also requested that alternative accommodation be assigned to the tank factories, but this suggestion was opposed by Speer’s principal assistant, Herr Saur; he maintained that the enemy was concentrating on the destruction of the Luftwaffe’s production centres: he did not believe that they would attack the tank factories even if, at some future date, they should regard the destruction of the aircraft industry as completed.

  Hitler was in Berlin on May 10th and I was summoned to the Chancellery for a discussion on Panther production, since the industry did not think that it could complete its programme according to the original schedule. By way of compensation, the industry promised that instead of 250 tanks it would deliver the handsome total of 324 by May 31st. After the conference I seized Hitler’s hand and asked him if I might be allowed to speak frankly to him. He said I might and I urged him earnestly to give up the plan for an attack on the Eastern Front; he could already see the difficulties that confronted us; the great commitment would certainly not bring us equivalent gains; our defensive preparations in the West were sure to suffer considerably. I ended with the question: ‘Why do you want to attack in the East at all this year?’ Here Keitel joined in, with the words: ‘We must attack for political reasons.’ I replied: ‘How many people do you think even know where Kursk is? It’s a matter of profound indifference to the world whether we hold Kursk or not. I repeat my question: Why do we want to attack in the East at all this year?’ Hitler’s reply was: ‘You’re quite right. Whenever I think of this attack my stomach turns over.’ I answered: ‘In that case your reaction to the problem is the correct one. Leave it alone!’ Hitler assured me that he had as yet by no means committed himself and with that the conversation was over. Apart from Field-Marshal Keitel, who is no longer among the living, my chief of staff, Thomale, and Herr Saur of the Armaments Ministry were witnesses to this scene.

  On the next day I took the train to Lötzen, where my staff was temporarily located, and had a look at our accommodation there. On the 13th of May I saw Speer once more and in the afternoon attended a further conference with Hitler. On May 1st Hitler had inspected the wooden model of a ‘Mouse,’ a tank designed by Professor Porsche and the Krupp Company which was to be armed with a 150 mm. cannon. It’s total weight was supposed to be 175 tons; it must therefore be assumed that, after Hitler had ordered his usual supplementary changes to the initial design, it would weigh nearer 200 tons. But the model displayed carried no machine-guns for close-range fighting. For this reason I had to turn it down. This was the same mistake that Porsche had made in designing his Ferdinand Tiger and which had rendered the Ferdinand useless at close quarters; ultimately no tank can avoid fighting at close range, particularly if it is to co-operate with infantry. Our discussion grew heated, since everyone present except me regarded the Mouse as a very handsome tank. It did, indeed, promise to be ‘gigantic.’

  After this demonstration I flew to Berlin.

  I spent May 24th and 25th visiting Panzer Battalion 654 at Bruck an der Leitha. This battalion was equipped with the Porsche Tigers already mentioned above. I also visited the Nibelungen works at Linz which were producing Panthers and anti-tank guns and flew from there to Paris on May 26th in order to visit the armoured force battalion commander’s school. On May 27th I visited Panzer Battalion 216 at Amiens, and on the 28th a company commanders’ course at Versailles as well as the commanders of the 14th and 16th Panzer Divisions at Nantes. Finally, I visited the fortress of St. Nazaire on the 29th in order to form an idea of the defensive capabilities of the Atlantic Wall. The impressions I gained of the fortifications in no way corresponded to my expectations which were based on the vociferous propaganda I had read and heard. Then I flew on the 30th to Berlin and on the 31st to Inns- bruck to meet Speer. On
June 1st I went to Grafenwöhr and inspected both Panther Battalions 51 and 52 and on the same day returned to Berlin.

  Meanwhile the OKW had had the bizarre idea of sending the 1st Panzer Division to Greece, where it was to guard against possible English landings in the Peloponnese. This division had just been brought up to full strength and equipped with the first completed Panther battalion. It provided our strongest reserve. Now it was to be wasted in this extraordinary fashion. When I protested irritably I became involved in an utterly grotesque argument with General Keitel. I maintained that a mountain division would be far more suitable for Greece; he replied that it would be impossible to supply such a division with the necessary amount of fodder as this would require too much transport. Against such arguments there was nothing more that I could say: but I did, on my own initiative, prevent the Panthers being sent down there. One of the tank officers who had been sent to Greece by air to reconnoitre reported to me at once that the narrow mountain tracks and bridges were not wide enough to take Panthers. This argument won me Hitler’s belated approval for my action. We were soon bitterly to miss the 1st Panzer Division in Russia.

  I spent June 15th worrying about our problem child, the Panther; the track suspension and drive were not right and the optics were also not yet satisfactory. On the next day I told Hitler of my reasons for not wishing to see the Panthers sent into action in the East. They were simply not yet ready to go to the front.