Panzer Leader

by Heinz Guderian

  ‘Believe me! I am the greatest builder of fortifications of all time. I built the West Wall; I built the Atlantic Wall. I have used so and so many tons of concrete. I know what the building of fortifications involves. On the Eastern Front we are short of labour, materials and transport. Even now the railways cannot carry enough supplies to satisfy the demands of the front. Therefore I cannot send trains to the East full of building materials.’ He had the figures at his fingertips and, as usual, bluffed by reeling off exact statistics which his listener was not for the moment in a position to contradict. All the same, I disagreed strongly. I knew that the railway bottle-neck only began beyond Brest-Litovsk and I tried to make clear to him that the building I had in mind would not affect transports travelling to the front, but only those going to the line of the Bug and the Niemen: that the railways were quite capable of shouldering this burden: that there could scarcely be a shortage of local building materials and local labour: and finally that it was only possible to wage war on two fronts with success if at least temporary inactivity could be assured on one front while the other was being stabilised. Since he had made such excellent preparations for the West there was no reason why he should not do likewise for the East. Thus cornered Hitler proceeded to bring out his much-repeated thesis, namely, that our generals in the East would think of nothing save withdrawal if he permitted the building of defensive positions or fortifications in their rear. He had made up his mind on this point and nothing could bring him to change it.

  The conversation then turned on the generals and the Supreme Command. Since my indirect attempts to effect a concentration of the military command and a limitation to Hitler’s immediate influence had failed, I now felt it my duty to propose directly to him that a general he trusted be appointed Chief of the Armed Services General Staff; by this act he could get rid of the obscure confusion of command functions that now reigned among the Armed Forces Command Staff, the OKH, the Luftwaffe, the Navy and the Waffen-SS, and could ensure a more successful control of our combined forces than had existed up to date. But this attempt on my part was a total failure. Hitler refused to part with Field-Marshal Keitel. So distrustful was he that he immediately recognised my suggestion as an attempt to limit his powers. I achieved nothing. Besides, was there any general whom Hitler trusted? After this conversation I was bound to admit to myself that there was none.

  So nothing was altered. Every square yard of ground continued to be fought for. Never once was a situation which had become hopeless put right by a timely withdrawal. But many, many times Hitler was to say to me, dully: ‘I can’t understand why everything has gone wrong for the past two years.’ My reply was always the same and was always ignored: ‘Change your methods.’

  The Year of Decision

  Nineteen forty-four began on the Eastern Front with fierce Russian attacks in mid-January. In the Kirovgorod area these were initially held. On January 24th and 26th a pincer attack was launched against the German salient west of Cherkassy, and on January 30th another salient east of Krivoirog was also attacked. Both these operations were successful. Russian superiority in strength was considerable. The following forces were employed:

  Against Army Group South Ukraine 34 rifle formations,

  11 tank formations.

  Against Army Group North Ukraine 67 rifle formations,

  52 tank formations.

  During the second half of February the front was relatively quiet, but on March 3rd, 4th and 5th the Russians attacked again and threw the Germans back to, and over, the line of the Bug.

  Army Group Centre managed generally to retain control along their sector of the front until the end of March.

  In April the Crimean peninsula, exclusive of Sebastopol, was lost. The enemy crossed the Bug as well as the upper reaches of the rivers Pruth and Sereth. The Russians entered Czernowitz. A final Russian large-scale attack was held and after the loss of Sebastopol the front became settled until August.

  The enemy had also attacked on Army Group North’s front in January. At first he only achieved limited successes in the areas north of Lake Ilmen and south-west of Leningrad. But beginning on January 21st he threw in powerful forces which forced the German front back across the Luga and, in February, across the Narva. By March the Germans had withdrawn behind the Velikaia and Lakes Pleskau and Peipus. Here they managed to hold.

  The Eastern Front was given only a short breathing-space, until June 22nd. Our expenditure of force during the winter campaign had been heavy. There were no reserves available. Everything that could be spared had to be stationed behind the Atlantic Wall, which was not in fact a wall at all, but a system of fortifications intended to frighten the enemy.

  I was at this time entrusted by Hitler with a distasteful special assignment. As usual, he was asking for scapegoats to carry the blame for the various withdrawals and surrenders of the previous winter. One of these was Colonel-General Jänicke, whom he made responsible for the loss of the Crimea. Remarks by high Party functionaries served to increase his suspicions. I was instructed to investigate the case of Jänicke, and was simultaneously informed that somebody would have to be punished for what had happened in the Crimea. In view of Hitler’s frame of mind at the time, only delaying tactics offered the possibility of a successful outcome to the inquiry. I therefore went very thoroughly to work, interviewing all persons in any way connected with the events and in particular the Party functionaries. Jänicke finally complained about the slowness of my methods. But I am certain that I did more for him by thus ensuring his ultimate acquittal than could have been achieved by a rapid inquiry and a report submitted at an unfavourable time.

  As already mentioned, I had begun to study the problem of defending the Western Front in 1943. With the new year this problem assumed increasing importance. In February I went to France for a tour of inspection and for conversations with Field-Marshal von Rundstedt and General von Geyr. We were in complete agreement that enemy sea and air superiority made our task more difficult. Allied air supremacy must in particular affect our ability to move our forces. It seemed likely that in order to achieve sufficient speed and concentration we should have to move only by night. Our opinion was that it all depended on our making ready adequate reserves of panzer and panzergrenadier divisions: these must be stationed far enough inland from the so-called Atlantic Wall, so that they could be switched easily to the main invasion front once it had been recognised: these moves must be facilitated by repairs to the French road network and by the construction of alternative river-crossings, underwater bridges or bridges of boats.

  When visiting the troops I realised how great the enemy’s air superiority already was. Whole formations of hostile aircraft manæuvred above our troops in training, and there was no telling when the bomb bays might open to discharge their loads on the training area beneath.

  Back at Supreme Headquarters I studied the instructions issued by the OKW for the forthcoming battle on the Western Front, together with the reserves that were being made available. I thus discovered that the panzer divisions, which were the principal reserve, were to be stationed very near the coast. Disposed thus, they could not be withdrawn and committed elsewhere with sufficient rapidity should the enemy land at any other point than that at which he was expected. I pointed out this error during a conference with Hitler and proposed a different arrangement of our motorised forces. Hitler replied: ‘The present arrangement is the one suggested by Field-Marshal Rommel. I don’t like to give contrary orders over the head of the responsible field-marshal on the spot without having first heard his opinion. Go to France again and discuss the matter once more with Rommel.’

  In April I paid another visit to France. The enemy air forces were becoming ever more active and were already beginning to attack operational targets. Thus our tank depot at Camp de Mailly was completely destroyed a few days after I had visited it. It was thanks to General von Geyr’s foresight that the troops and their equipment —much against the men’s will—had been scattered
throughout neighbouring villages and woods and thus suffered no damage worth mentioning.

  After fresh conversations with Field-Marshal von Rundstedt and the General Staff Corps officers of his staff concerning the disposition of reserves, I went as instructed, and accompanied by General von Geyr, to see Rommel at La Roche Guyon. I had known Rommel since before the war. He had at one time commanded the Goslar Jaeger Battalion which had been my original unit and with which I had always maintained friendly contact. Then we had met during the Polish Campaign —on the occasion of Hitler’s visit to my corps in September 1939, after the Battle of the Corridor. Rommel was then military commander of the Führer’s headquarters. He had later transferred to the armoured force, and had proved an outstanding commander, first of the 7th Panzer Division in France in 1940 and later of the Africa Corps and of Panzer Army Africa, where he had established his reputation as a general. Rommel was not only an open, upright man and a brave soldier; he was also a highly gifted commander. He possessed energy and subtlety of appreciation; he always found an answer to the most difficult problems; he had great understanding of his men and, in fact, thoroughly deserved the reputation that he had won for himself. In September 1942, when sickness had compelled Rommel to leave Africa, he had asked Hitler to appoint me his deputy during his absence, although he knew that I was on bad terms with Hitler. This request had been curtly refused. No doubt this was a piece of luck for me, since the defeat at El Alamein took place shortly afterwards, and I should probably have been as unable to avoid it as was Stumme and Stumme’s successor, Rommel himself.

  Rommel’s sad experiences in Africa had so convinced him of the overwhelming nature of Allied air supremacy that he believed there could be no question of ever moving large formations of troops again. He did not even think that it would be possible to transfer panzer or panzergrenadier divisions by night. His views on this subject had been further strengthened by his experiences in Italy in 1943. So when General von Geyr had proposed the grouping of our motorised reserves back from the Atlantic defensive front he had immediately come up against opposition on Rommel’s part, since what Geyr wanted was that these reserves be employed in a mobile role and organised accordingly. I had been informed of the negative results of this conversation. I was therefore not surprised by Rommel’s highly temperamental and strongly expressed refusal when I suggested that our armour be withdrawn from the coastal areas. He turned down my suggestion at once, pointing out that as a man from the Eastern Front I lacked his experiences of Africa and Italy; that he knew, in fact, far more about the matter in hand than I did and that he was fully convinced that his system was right. In view of this attitude of his, an argument with Rommel concerning the distribution of our motorised reserves promised to be quite fruitless. I therefore decided not to make any further attempts to alter his opinions and made up my mind once more to submit my contrary views to Rundstedt and to Hitler. Also it was quite plain that no more panzer and panzergrenadier divisions could be sent to the Western Front beyond those already there. Only two SS divisions, the 9th and 10th, which had been ‘lent’ to the Eastern Front during the spring, were to come back to the West as soon as the invasion began. So I could make Rommel no promises on this score. General command in the Western theatre as exercised by the Commander-in-Chief West could only be made easier if the OKW reserves were freed for this theatre and if the Commander-in-Chief were given complete command authority over Army Group Rommel. Neither happened.

  Since taking over command of Army Group B in France Rommel had done a great deal to increase the defensive strength of the Atlantic Wall in his area. In accordance with his theory that the coast must be the main line of defence he had arranged for forward defences in front of the coast in the form of underwater obstacles. Behind the coastal fortifications he had built obstacles to airborne landings in all the terrain that seemed to him suitable for such operations. These were generally stakes, the so-called ‘Rommel’s asparagus.’ Extensive minefields were laid. All troops of his command had to devote any time not actually spent in training to the digging of defences. Army Group B was kept very busy indeed. No matter how one may admire the great exertions made, it is nevertheless a matter of considerable regret that Rommel failed to understand the need for possessing mobile reserves. A large-scale land operation—which in view of our hopeless inferiority on the sea and in the air offered us the only chance of success—he held to be impossible and he therefore neither wanted nor tried to organise one. Furthermore, at least at the time of my visit, Rommel had made up his mind where the Allies would land. He assured me several times that the English and American landings would take place in the coastal area north of the mouth of the Somme; he ruled out all alternative landing-places with the argument that for such a difficult and large-scale sea crossing the enemy, for supply reasons alone, must seize a beachhead as close as possible to his principal ports of embarkation. A further reason was the greater air-support that the enemy could give to a landing north of the Somme. On this subject, too, he was at that time quite impervious to argument.

  On all these points Rommel’s views coincided with those of Hitler, though based on different grounds. Hitler had remained a man of the 1914-1918 trench-warfare epoch and had never understood the principles of mobile operations. Rommel believed such operations to be no longer possible as a result of the enemy’s air supremacy. So it is little wonder that both the Commander-in-Chief West and I found that Hitler turned down our proposals for the re-distribution of our motorised formations, on the grounds that Rommel possessed more recent experiences of battle than did either of us.

  On June 6th, 1944, the following forces were stationed in France:

  48 infantry divisions, of which 38 were located along, and 10 behind, the coast: of these latter, 5 were between the Scheldt and the Somme, 2 between the Somme and the Seine and 3 in Brittany.

  10 panzer and panzergrenadier divisions, located as follows:

  1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte ‘Adolf Hitler,’ at Beverloo, Belgium;

  2nd Panzer Division in the area Amiens-Abbéville;

  116th Panzer Division to the east of Rouen (north of the Seine) ;

  12th SS Panzer Division Hitler Jugend in the Lisieux area (south of the Seine);

  21st Panzer Division in the Caen area;

  Panzer-Lehr Division in the area Le Mans-Orléans-Chartres;

  17th SS Panzergrenadier Division in the area Saumur-Niort-Poitiers;

  11th Panzer Division in the Bordeaux area;

  2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich in the area Montauban-Tolouse;

  9th Panzer Division in the area Avignon-Nîmes-Arles,

  All hopes of successful defence were based on these ten panzer and panzergrenadier divisions. With considerable effort it had proved possible to rest them and, to a certain extent, to build up their strength.

  Four of these divisions were under Rommel’s command, the 2nd, 116th, 21st and 12th SS. The 1st SS, Panzer-Lehr and 17th SS Panzer-grenadier were in OKW reserve. The 9th, 11th and 2nd SS were located in Southern France to be used against a landing that was anticipated on the Mediterranean coast.

  This dispersal of strength ruled out all possibility of a great defensive victory. But apart from that, events took the most unsatisfactory course imaginable. To begin with, on the day of the landings Rommel was in Germany, on his way to a conference with Hitler. The latter, as was his custom, had gone late to bed and could not be disturbed when the first reports of the invasion began to arrive early on June 6th. Jodl, who was responsible for controlling operations in Hitler’s absence, could not make up his mind to free the OKW reserve at once—a reserve, after all, of three panzer divisions—since he was by no means certain that the landings in Normandy constituted the main operation and were not merely a feint. Since the OKW was also incapable of making up its collective mind on the question of a Mediterranean landing, neither were the panzer divisions in Southern France immediately switched north. The 21st Panzer Division, which was on the spot,
had received orders, contrary to General Freiherr von Geyr’s training instructions, which forbade it to launch its counter-attack before receiving Rommel’s permission to do so: thus the best opportunity for attacking the British airborne forces was lost. Then Rommel moved the 116th Panzer Division to a point even nearer the coast at Dieppe and left it there until mid-July.

  Many higher commanders displayed ignorance in the employment of armoured forces. Divisions, in particular the Panzer-Lehr Division, received direct orders to move up in daylight despite the enemy’s air supremacy: frontal counter-attacks were ordered in the area controlled by the enemy’s naval guns: and thus Germany’s sole possible military force for defeating the invasion was prematurely ground down. The panzer units suffered enormous casualties. And these could not now be made good, since after June 22nd the whole Eastern Front threatened to collapse and all available replacements had to go there instead of to the previously favoured Western Front.