Panzer Leader

by Heinz Guderian

  Of course one question will always be asked: what would have happened had the assassination succeeded? Nobody can answer this. Only one fact seems beyond dispute: at that time the great proportion of the German people still believed in Adolf Hitler and would have been convinced that with his death the assassin had removed the only man who might still have been able to bring the war to a favourable conclusion. The odium thus created by his death would have been attached primarily to the corps of officers, the generals and the general staff, and would have lasted not only during but also after the war. The people’s hatred and contempt would have turned against the soldiers who, in the midst of a national struggle for existence, had broken their oath, murdered the head of the government and left the storm-wracked ship of state without a captain at the helm. It also seems unlikely that our enemies would have treated us any better in consequence than they actually did after the collapse.

  The next question is: what should have happened? To this I can only reply: a very great deal has been spoken and written about resistance to the Hitler regime. But of those men who are still alive, the speakers and the writers, who had access to Hitler, which of them did, in fact, even once, offer any resistance to his will? Which of them dared, even once, to express opinions in Hitler’s presence that were contrary to the dictator’s and to argue with him to his face? That is what should have happened. During the months in which I attended Hitler’s briefings and the countless conferences on military, technical and political subjects at which he was present, only very few men ever dared to contradict him, and of those few even fewer are still alive today. For I cannot call those men ‘resistance fighters’ who only whispered their disapproval in corridors and only urged others on to act. This is a matter of profoundly differing attitudes. If a man disagreed with Hitler, then it was his duty to tell him so whenever he had an opportunity to do so. This was true particularly and primarily during the period when such expressed disagreement might have had an effect, that is to say in the period before the outbreak of war. Any man who was quite sure that Hitler’s policy was bound to lead to war, that war must be prevented, and that a war would inevitably bring our nation to disaster, such a man was duty bound to seek and find occasions, before the war started, to say so without ambiguity both to Hitler and to the German people; if he could not do this from inside Germany, then he should have done so from abroad. Did the responsible men at the time in fact do this?

  11. CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF

  Let us return to the grave military situation.

  After the General Staff of the OKH had been put in working order once again, we could still only function in a very cumbersome and slow fashion, since Hitler insisted on approving every detail and refused to allow the Chief of the General Staff the most limited powers of decision. I therefore requested that I be given the right to issue instructions to the Eastern army groups on all matters that were not of fundamental importance. I also asked that I be permitted to give directions to all General Staff Corps officers of the Army on such subjects as concerned the General Staff as a whole. Both requests were refused by Hitler. Keitel and Jodl were in agreement with him. Keitel approved Hitler’s decision in his own handwriting, while Jodl countered my remonstrances with the remark: ‘The General Staff Corps ought actually to be disbanded!’ If the most prominent members of that corps were prepared themselves to saw through the bough on which they sat, obviously there was no hope for the institution as a whole. The first results of Hitler’s refusal to agree to my request were soon apparent in a number of gross breaches of discipline; these necessitated my transferring the officers responsible to the staff of the OKH, since there at least I did retain certain limited disciplinary powers. There I allowed the very self-confident young gentlemen in question to cool their heels for several weeks and to consider their manners. I had occasion to inform Hitler of this expedient of mine. He gazed at me in astonishment, but said nothing.

  During the early days of my new appointment I asked Hitler if I might have a private conversation with him. He asked: ‘Do you wish to discuss Service matters or is it something personal?’ Of course it was a Service matter and one that could only be discussed between himself and myself alone if the necessary degree of frankness were to be achieved. Any third party would have been a hindrance to the conversation I had in mind. Hitler was perfectly well aware of this. That was why he refused my request, adding that on the occasions when he discussed Service matters with me Field-Marshal Keitel and two stenographers were always to be present. As a result of this regulation I only rarely had the opportunity of talking to the Supreme Commander with that bluntness which, without damaging his authority, was only possible in private conversations. Keitel was also partly responsible for this very disadvantageous regulation; he was afraid that he might not learn about important facts quickly enough and might thus be gradually pushed aside. I was compelled to carry out my duties in the same restrictive circumstances from which my predecessors had suffered. This did not make it easy to improve the general atmosphere or settle disagreements more calmly.

  When I was compelled to assume the duties of Chief of the General Staff, on July 21st, 1944, the situation on the Eastern Front was far from satisfactory.

  Our strongest force seemed to be Army Group South Ukraine, which consisted of the Sixth and Eighth Armies as well as Rumanian troops and a portion of the Hungarian Army. Its front ran from the mouth of the Dnieper on the Black Sea coast—along that river to a point south of Kichinev—north of Jassy—south of Falticeni—across the rivers Pruth and Sereth—and finally north-west to the Sereth’s catchment area. During the spring battles in March and April, this army group had succeeded in defeating enemy attacks north of Jassy and had finally managed to withdraw a number of divisions into reserve. It was at this time commanded by General Schörner, who enjoyed Hitler’s special confidence.

  To the north of Army Group South Ukraine was Army Group North Ukraine. Up to July 12th, 1944, this army group had been conducting a fairly successful defence along a front that ran from the area of Radautz on the upper Sereth—east through Buczacz to Delatyn—Tarnopol—Jezierna—to Beresteczko in the area south of Kovel. On July 13th the Russians had attacked, had broken through the army group’s front at three points, and by July 21st had captured Lvov, the San bend north of Przemysl, Tomaszov, Cholm and Lublin, while their spearheads had reached a line running roughly from Pulavy on the Vistula to Brest-Litovsk on the Bug.

  If the picture here was bad, the situation on Army Group Centre’s front had become catastrophic since June 22nd and, indeed, could scarcely have been worse. The Russians attacking between the Beresina and the Pripet had succeeded, during the period June 22nd to July 3rd, in breaking through the German front in the areas Rogachev, Chaussy, north of Orsha and on both sides of Vitebsk; after totally destroying twenty-five German divisions they had forced the army group back to a line Davidgrodek–Baranowicze–Molodeczno–Koziany–the Dvina north of Polotsk. During the course of the next few days the Russians forcefully exploited their surprisingly great success, captured Pinsk and reached a line Pruzana–Volkovisk–the Niemen east of Grodno–Kovno–the Dvina east of Dünaburg–Idriza. Thus not only Army Group Centre but also Army Group North was involved in the general collapse. By July 21st the Russians had advanced in what seemed irresistible strength to the line of the Vistula, from Sandomir to Warsaw–Siedlce–Bielsk Podlaski–Bialystock–Grodno–Kovno and, what was particularly unpleasant, through Ponievisch to Schaulen and Mitau. North of Mitau they reached the coast of the Gulf of Riga and thus cut off Army Group North from the rest of the front.

  Sketch Map 29

  Developments in the Baltic States. Situation 23.7–4.10.44.

  Army Group North, whose right wing had been north of Polotsk, held a front running from there-Idriza-Ostroff-Pleskau-Lake Peipus-Narva-the coast of the Gulf of Finland. As a result of the disaster to Army Group Centre, by July 21st its right wing had had to be withdrawn to a line Mitau–Dünaburg�
�Pleskau. But this was obviously not the end of its withdrawals.

  My predecessor left me not only a disorganised staff but also a completely disintegrating front. There were no reserves available to the OKH. The only forces immediately to hand were those in Rumania behind Army Group South Ukraine. A glance at a railway map will show that it was bound to take a considerable time to move them up. The limited forces that could be produced by the Training Army were already on their way to the generally beaten Army Group Centre.

  In agreement with the commander of Army Group South Ukraine, whose chief of staff, General Wenck, now became my principal operational assistant and who knew the situation in Rumania well, I proposed to Hitler that all divisions that could be made available in Rumania be moved away from there and be used to plug the gap between Army Groups Centre and North. This was agreed at once. Hitler also ordered that the commanders of Army Groups South Ukraine (Schörner) and North (Friessner) exchange posts. Instructions were issued to the new commander of Army Group South Ukraine which, for Hitler, allowed that officer unusual latitude of decision. These energetic measures succeeded in bringing the Russian offensive to a halt in the area Doblen–Tuckum–Mitau. My intention was not only to re-establish contact between the two army groups but also, by means of evacuating the Baltic States, radically to shorten the whole front. Such an evacuation was essential in order to avoid risking the total destruction of Army Group North in its present precarious position. General Schörner was ordered to draw up a plan for the evacuation. He reported that it could be completed in three to four weeks. This was too slow. We would have to act more quickly if we were to anticipate the enemy and have the formations in position and in a fit state to defend East Prussia. I therefore ordered that the evacuation of Esthonia and Latvia be completed within seven days, that a bridgehead be captured in the Riga area, and that all panzer and motorised formations be assembled at once in the area west of Schaulen. It was there that I expected the Russians to launch their next attack. This would have to be defeated if contact were to be re-established between Army Group North in Courland and Army Group Centre.

  The German attack, which lasted from September 16th to September 26th, 1944, succeeded in re-establishing contact between the two army groups. That it was successful is due to the brave actions of Colonel Graf Strachwitz and his improvised panzer division. The essential was now immediately to make the most of the favourable situation. This Army Group North refused to do. Schörner believed that the Russians would not attack again west of Schaulen but at Mitau. He therefore retained his armour—in disobedience to his instructions signed by Hitler—in the Mitau area. My requests that he carry out his orders were ignored. I do not know whether Schörner had received approval for this behind my back. He was in direct communication with Hitler. In any case, as a result the thin German front west of Schaulen was once again broken through in October. The Russians reached the Baltic between Memel and Libau. A fresh attempt to re-establish contact with Army Group North by attacking along the coast failed; it remained cut off from the rest of the front and from now on could only be supplied by sea.

  I now became involved in a long and bitter argument with Hitler concerning the withdrawal of those valuable troops which were essential for the defence of Germany. The sole result of this argument was further to poison the atmosphere.

  While these important developments and heavy battles were taking place on the left wing of the long front, and while Field-Marshal Model by means of his own courageous example was re-establishing Army Group Centre’s front east of Warsaw, the Poles inside Warsaw revolted; this uprising, led by General Bor-Komorowski, took place immediately behind our front line and constituted a major danger to that front. Communications with General von Vormann’s Ninth Army were broken. The possibility of immediate co-operation between the Poles who had risen and the Russians could not be ignored. I requested that Warsaw be included forthwith in the military zone of operations; but the ambitions of Governor-General Frank and the SS national leader Himmler prevailed with Hitler, with the result that Warsaw—though lying immediately behind, and later actually in, the front line—was not incorporated in the Army’s zone of operations but remained under the jurisdiction of the Governor-General. The national leader of the SS was made responsible for crushing the uprising, and for this purpose he employed the SS Group-Leader von dem Bach-Zelewski with a number of SS and police formations under his command. The battle, which lasted for weeks, was fought with great brutality. Some of the SS units involved—which, incidentally, were not drawn from the Waffen-SS— failed to preserve their discipline. The Kaminski Brigade was composed of former prisoners of war, mostly Russians who were ill-disposed towards the Poles; the Dirlewanger Brigade was formed from German convicts on probation. These doubtful units were now committed to desperate street battles where each house had to be captured and where the defendants were fighting for their lives; as a result they abandoned all moral standards. Von dem Bach himself told me, during the course of a conversation on equipment problems, of the atrocities committed by his men whom he was no longer able to control. What I learned from him was so appalling that I felt myself bound to inform Hitler about it that same evening and to demand the removal of the two brigades from the Eastern Front. To begin with Hitler was not inclined to listen to this demand of mine. But Himmler’s liaison officer, the SS Brigade-Leader Fegelein, was himself forced to admit: ‘It is true, my Führer, those men are real scoundrels!’ As a result he had no choice but to do as I wished. Von dem Bach took the precaution of having Kaminski shot and thus disposed of a possibly dangerous witness.

  The uprising did not finally collapse until October 2nd. When the Poles began to show an inclination to surrender I urged Hitler to announce that they would be granted the full rights of prisoners of war as guaranteed by international law. This I hoped would shorten the senseless struggle. Hitler accepted my advice. Colonel-General Reinhardt, who had succeeded Model as commander of Army Group Centre on August 15th, received instructions accordingly. It was on these instructions that the army based its conduct.

  It is always difficult in an uprising to distinguish the organised fighting man from innocent civilians. General Bor-Komorowski has himself written on this subject:1

  During the battles our commanders could hardly tell the soldiers from the civilians. Our people had no uniforms and we could not prevent the civilians from wearing white and red arm-bands. They, like the soldiers of the home army, used German weapons, which increased the problems of our scarce ammunition. For the civilians would waste a hail of bullets and hand grenades on a single German soldier. Every one of the early reports I received complained about the great waste of ammunition.

  Since the Poles were also wearing German uniforms from captured stores, the feeling of insecurity among the Germans increased and with it a tendency towards greater brutality. It is little wonder that Hitler, who was regularly briefed on the events in Warsaw by Fegelein or by Himmler himself, lost his temper and issued very harsh orders for the prosecution of the fighting and for the treatment of Warsaw. His anger found expression in a directive, dated the 11th of October, 1944, and sent from the ‘Signal office of the Higher SS and Police Commander East’ to Governor-General Frank at Cracow, and which ran as follows:

  Sketch Map 30

  The Cutting-off of Army Group North. Situation 5.10–25.10.44.

  Subject: New policy with regards to Poles.

  Senior-Group-Leader von dem Bach has been entrusted with the task of pacifying Warsaw, that is to say he will raze Warsaw to the ground while the war is still going on and in so far as this is not contrary to military plans for the construction of strongpoints. Before it is destroyed, all raw materials, all textiles, and all furniture will be removed from Warsaw. The responsibility for this is assigned to the civil administration.1

  Of this order, which went through SS channels, I had at the time no knowledge. I first read it when I was in prison in Nuremberg in 1946. Nevertheless I had heard
rumours that were circulating at headquarters concerning the intended total destruction of Warsaw, and I had also been present when Hitler had had an outburst of rage on the subject. I therefore felt it my duty to speak of the need for preserving that city, which Hitler had declared a fortress and which as a result was needed to shelter German soldiers. The preservation of the buildings was all the more important since the Vistula was now our front line, and the Vistula ran through the centre of the city.

  The repeated uprisings of 1943 and 1944 had in any case led to great destruction, and the battles from the autumn of 1944 until the Russians attacked in January 1945 gave the tragic city its death-blow.

  When the men who had revolted surrendered they were handed over to the SS. Bor-Komorowski was an old acquaintance of Fegelein’s whom he had frequently met at international sporting events before the war. Fegelein took charge of him.

  The question has frequently been asked why the Russians, who knew all about the Warsaw uprising, did not do more to help it and indeed stopped their offensive along the line of the Vistula. There can be no doubt that the Poles who had risen regarded themselves as owing allegiance to their Government in Exile, which was located in London, and it was from there that they received their instructions. They exemplified those elements in Poland which were conservative and which looked towards the West. It may be assumed that the Soviet Union had no interest in seeing these elements strengthened by a successful uprising and by the capture of their capital. The Soviets doubtless wanted the credit for such actions to go to their dependent Poles in the Lublin camp. But this is a matter for the former Allies to sort out among themselves. All that concerned us was that the Russians did not then advance beyond the Vistula and we were consequently granted a short breathing spell.