The Russian Offensive
On January 12th, 1945, the Russian assaulting force in the Baranov bridgehead launched its well-prepared attack. Already on the 11th we had had direct evidence that the opening of the offensive was imminent. Prisoners stated that during the night of the 10th-11th billets had had to be handed over to tank crews. An intercepted wireless message read: ‘Everything ready. Reinforcements arrived.’ Since December 17th, 1944, the number of guns in the Baranov bridgehead had increased by 719, of mortars by 268. Prisoners captured from the Pulavy bridgehead stated: ‘Attack imminent. First wave to be composed of punishment units. Attack to be supported by 40 tanks. Thirty to forty tanks located in a wood 1-2 miles behind the main line of defence. Minefields cleared during the night of January 8th.’ Air reconnaissance reported enemy movements towards the Vistula bridgeheads. In the Magnuszev bridgehead 60 new gun positions were established.
Intelligence from the Narev front, in the areas north of Warsaw, around Ostenburg and in East Prussia was similar in content. It seemed here that the enemy’s point of main effort would be in the sector Ebenrode–Lake Willuhn and east of Schlossberg.
Only in Hungary—on account of our New Year attack—and in Courland did our intelligence indicate that there would not be an attack within the next few days. But this meant only a breathing-space for those fronts.
So on January 12th the first blow fell at Baranov. Fourteen rifle divisions, two independent tank corps and elements of another army were committed. The mass of the Russian tanks assembled in this area was apparently held back during the first day, since the enemy wished to decide, according to the results of the initial attack, in which direction he could best advance. The Russians had a superabundance of equipment and could afford such tactics.
The enemy’s attack succeeded and he penetrated far into the German defences.
On this day a great convergence of Russian offensive force was observed moving into the bridgeheads over the Vistula farther to the north at Pulavy and Magnuszev. Thousands of vehicles were counted. Here, too, the attack was obviously about to start. It was the same story to the north of Warsaw and in East Prussia. Here it was established that the Russians had cleared paths through the minefields and tanks were observed immediately behind the enemy’s front.
Army Group A had sent in its reserves for a counter-thrust. A direct order from Hitler had resulted in these forces being stationed closer to the front than Colonel-General Harpe had originally intended. The result of this interference was that they were shelled by the strong Russian artillery and suffered heavy casualties before ever they reached the battle area. The Russians succeeded in partially encircling these armoured forces. Now, under command of General Nehring, they had to be withdrawn westwards, fighting their way back and out of the Russian’s mobile encirclement as they did so; this most difficult manœuvre was successfully carried out thanks to the stalwart behaviour of the troops, a highly creditable performance. A number of infantry formations became involved in this mobile encirclement battle and slowed down our armoured forces. But despite this hindrance, and thanks to the comradely assistance that was so freely given by all involved, the battle reached a successful conclusion.
On January 13th the Russian forces that had broken through west of Baranov advanced towards Kielce and from there swung northwards. The Russian Third and Fourth Guards Tank Armies now made their appearance. The total enemy force committed in this sector amounted by this time to 32 rifle divisions and 8 tank corps. This was the greatest concentration of force in the narrowest area that had been seen since the beginning of the war.
South of the Vistula there were indications that an attack would soon be launched in the Jaslo area. At Pulavy and Magnuszev the enemy’s preparations were complete and the mine-fields were being lifted.
In East Prussia the major attack began, as expected, in the sector Ebenrode–Schlossberg. From twelve to fifteen rifle divisions with a proportionate number of tank units moved forward. Here too the enemy succeeded in penetrating our defences.
On this day Hitler’s offensive in Alsace finally broke down.
On January 14th it became clear that the Russian intention was to thrust forward into the industrial area of Upper Silesia: this did not surprise us. Further strong forces were moving out of the Baranov bridgehead in a north-westerly or northerly direction, with the obvious purpose of establishing contact with other enemy columns pushing out from the Pulavy and Magnuszev bridgeheads. The German defence had indeed succeeded in throwing back the first Russian attacks from these bridgeheads; nevertheless the general situation made it unlikely that this sector of the front could be held.
Sketch Map 33
The Catastrophe in January 1945. Situation 12.1–25.1.45.
Russian preparations on the Rominten Heath and near Goldap pointed to a probable extension of the attack in East Prussia.
On January 15th it became clear that the enemy forces in the Cracow area were making their main thrust towards a line Czestochowa–Kattowice. Another strong force was heading for Kielce. It was to be assumed that from there they would continue towards Piotrkow–Tomaszow in order to join with the forces coming from the Pulavy bridgehead. These latter seemed to consist of two rifle armies and one tank army. The attack from the Magnuszev bridgehead was clearly aimed at Warsaw.
South of Cracow the Russian attack in the Jaslo area began.
In Army Group Centre’s sector the enemy made deep penetrations in the Vistula–Bug triangle and on either side of Ostenburg. These attacks were aimed at Nasielsk and, westwards, towards Zichenau–Praschnitz. The situation opposite the Russians’ Narev bridgeheads and in East Prussia grew more critical.
In Army Group South-East’s sector it was confirmed that the Thirty-seventh Russian Army, south of the Danube, had been relieved by Bulgarian forces. The transfer of these Russian troops to Army Group South’s front with an offensive purpose must now be reckoned on.
Needless to say, from the beginning of the great Russian offensive I had kept Hitler fully and frankly informed by telephone of the grave developments taking place, and had urgently requested that he return at once to Berlin and thus at least demonstrate that our main defensive effort was now in the East. His replies during the first few days consisted merely of a constant repetition of the instructions he had given me on January 9th: ‘The Eastern Front must make do with what it’s got. What’s more, you must yourself see that the troops transferred from the West arrived too late.’ The roundabout channel of communication and command from Zossen to Ziegenberg repeatedly held up the taking of necessary measures at a time when the greatest possible expedition was vitally necessary. On January 15th Hitler interfered for the first time in the defensive battle, by issuing an order, despite my protests, for the transfer of the Gross-Deutschland Corps from East Prussia to Kielce where it was to block the break-through that the Russians were threatening to make towards Posen. It is obvious that this move could not have been made in time to stop the Russians and would have involved a weakening of East Prussia at the very moment when the enemy’s attack there was about to become highly dangerous. If the corps was taken away the same disastrous situation must develop in East Prussia that already existed along the Vistula. So this powerful striking force—consisting of the Panzergrenadier Division Gross-Deutschland and the Luftwaffe Panzer Parachute Division Hermann Goering, commanded by the Panzer Corps Gross-Deutschland, and led by the trusted General von Saucken—sat in railway sidings while its destination was the subject of argument. My refusal to carry out this order infuriated Hitler. He would not rescind it and now finally decided to leave his camp in the forests of Hesse and his skirmishes in the Vosges and to return to Berlin and the decisive front. Now at least I should be face to face with him and should be able to tell him those things which he had to be told but which could only partially be said over the telephone. And this was clearly not a question of a pleasant conversation. Hitler was well aware of this, which was why he postponed seeing me for
as long as he possibly could.
Saucken’s Corps had to unload in an area that was being shelled by the Russians. It fought a hard battle and finally succeeded in establishing contact with General Nehring’s XXIV Panzer Corps.
Hitler appeared in Berlin on January 16th. On that same day I had a conference with him in the already partly bombed Chancellery, which was where he now established his Supreme Headquarters.
Hitler had finally decided that the Western Front must go over to the defensive so that forces could be made available for transfer to the East. As soon as I entered I learned of this apparently highly satisfactory, if very belated, decision. I had prepared a plan for the use of the forces that would thus become available; this involved their immediate transfer to, or if time allowed across, the Oder with the purpose of attacking the flanks of the Russian spearhead and thus decreasing its offensive momentum. When I now asked Jodl what Hitler had ordered he informed me that the Führer had issued instructions for the transfer of the mass of the forces being made available, that is to say the Sixth Panzer Army, to Hungary. On hearing this I lost my self-control and expressed my disgust to Jodl in very plain terms, but could get no reaction from him whatever beyond a shrug of the shoulders. I have never discovered whether he had advised or otherwise encouraged Hitler to take this decision. During the ensuing conference with Hitler I expressed my views and my disagreement with the proposed course of action. Hitler could not accept my opinions and reaffirmed his intention to attack in Hungary, to throw the Russians back across the Danube and to relieve Budapest. An argument that was to last for several days now began on the subject of this ill-begotten plan. After I had disposed of the military reasons that he advanced he produced economic ones: since the bombing of the German synthetic oil plants, our retention of the Hungarian oilfields and refineries became essential to us and assumed a decisive importance for the outcome of the war. ‘If you don’t get any more fuel your tanks won’t be able to move and the aeroplanes won’t be able to fly. You must see that. But my generals know nothing about the economic aspects of the war.’ He was completely infatuated with this idea and it was impossible to persuade him that it was incorrect.
So the troops we were to receive from the West were to be split up into two groups. When I tried to revert to this point at the conference that now took place, he interrupted me: ‘I know what you’re going to say about how I should strike one hard blow and not fiddle around, but you must understand that …’ and so on and so forth as above.
The transport of the troops to Hungary took far longer, on account of the limited capacity of the railways to the south-east, than did the transports to the Berlin area, where many stretches of double track road were available and where in case of the unavoidable destruction caused by the enemy air forces numerous alternative by-passes had been built.
Once this stormy scene was over other problems arose. Disagreement was violent. First of all there was the matter of the major defensive line and its idiotic siting; it was now that he was forced to admit, by the stenographer’s record, that he was himself to blame for this. Next came the question of the location of reserves, which he thought to have been too far back from the front, while the generals held exactly contrary views and blamed Hitler for having insisted that they be too far forward. We then discussed Harpe’s leadership, which in my opinion could not have been better. But, since a scapegoat had to be found, Hitler insisted, despite my liveliest remonstrances, on Harpe’s dismissal and his replacement by Colonel-General Schörner, who was therefore summoned from Courland where there were no more laurels to be won. Schörner began his new job by dismissing the brave, capable, and upright commander of the Ninth Army, General Freiherr Smilo von Lüttwitz. This command was now given to General Busse. Schörner also had a violent argument with the outstanding General von Saucken which necessitated the latter’s rapid transfer to another sector. Saucken was given command of an army. I also arranged matters so that Harpe was given command of an army in the West a few weeks later: I had similarly arranged for the re-employment of Balck when that officer had been the victim of an intrigue by Himmler in the West.
This argumentative day did produce one positive result in that my opinions concerning operations in the West were finally, if very belatedly, accepted: the pointless offensives were to be discontinued and all forces that could possibly be spared transferred to the East. The matter of Courland and the evacuation of the troops there engaged was discussed yet again, but once more no clear decision was taken. It was, however, agreed that the 4th Panzer Division be withdrawn.
The military situation called more than ever for immediate energetic action. To the south-east of Sarajevo the Yugoslav partisan divisions were exercising increased pressure on Army Group E. The enemy was being reinforced between Lake Balaton and the Danube. The Russian bridgehead across the Gran was growing stronger. They were pursuing the retiring Army Group A with uncommon speed. The Russians had crossed a line Slomniki–Miechow in a westerly direction and part of this force was turning towards Cracow. Farther north they were attacking towards Czestochowa–Radomsko–Piotrokow–Tomaszow. A continuation of their attack towards Lodz–Lowicz–Sochaczew must be reckoned on. Strong reserve forces were following up behind the groups that had broken through; part of these reserves had come from the Carelian and Finnish fronts. We were now reaping the disadvantages of our allies’ defections. In Army Group Centre’s sector the threatened deterioration of the situation took place. Some thirty to forty Russian rifle divisions attacked towards Przasnysz–Szczytno–Plonen, while other forces were moving up behind them through Bialystock and Ostrov. It was the same story in the Rominten Heath sector and in the areas of Schlossberg and Gumbinnen.
Despite all these ominous portents Hitler refused to allow the transfer of troops from the Western Front to northern Germany or the evacuation of Courland.
By January 17th fifteen Russian tank corps had been identified opposite Army Group A and their intended main axis of advance established beyond a doubt. A further eight tank corps were engaged against Army Group South and three more against Army Group Centre. The main Russian forces were now advancing westwards towards a line running Cracow–Wartenau–Czestochowa–Radomsko. In the Kielce area they were still being resisted by General Nehring’s XXIV Panzer Corps. Strong enemy forces were advancing on Warsaw, while others were pouring through Lowicz and Sochaczew towards the Vistula with the intention of preventing XLVI Panzer Corps, which was withdrawing from the Warsaw area, from crossing that river. This corps was supposed to move to a position south of the Vistula where it could block an immediate Russian break-through to Posen by way of Hohensalza–Gnesen; such a break-through would mean the cutting off of East and West Prussia from the rest of Germany. Unfortunately the corps, in spite of its orders, allowed itself to be thrown across to the north bank by heavy enemy pressure. The enemy forces now poured westwards against no opposition, towards the German frontier.
On Army Group Centre’s front the speed and weight of the Russian attack towards Szczytno–Przasnysz was intensified while there was evidence that the battle was about to be joined along the hitherto quiet Narev front.
In the late afternoon officers of the Operations Department informed me of the constantly deteriorating situation on the Warsaw front and proposed the establishment of a new defensive line on the premise that Warsaw was already in enemy hands. When I asked the reason for this, the head of that department, Colonel von Bonin, told me that according to the latest information received the loss of Warsaw was inevitable if it had not, indeed, already taken place. Signal communications with the fortress were broken. In view of this I approved the suggestion made and, since the rapid issue of the necessary orders was of prime importance, gave instructions that the army group be immediately informed accordingly. I then went to confer with Hitler at the Chancellery in Berlin. While briefing him on the situation and the orders that I had given for its stabilisation, a wireless message was brought in. This was from the comman
dant of the Warsaw fortress and stated that the city was still in German hands but would have to be evacuated in the course of the coming night. I informed Hitler of these facts, and he at once lost his temper and ordered that Warsaw be held at all costs. He insisted on the immediate despatch of orders to that effect and angrily refused to listen to my belief that they would come too late. The garrison of Warsaw, which according to my original intentions should have been a fortress division, now consisted—owing to the previously mentioned transfers to the Western Front—of only four fortress infantry battalions, of limited combat ability, and a few artillery and engineer units. They could not possibly have held the city and would certainly have been taken prisoner if the commandant had obeyed Hitler’s orders. He therefore decided to withdraw his weak garrison, even though he received those orders before beginning to do so. Now Hitler’s rage knew no bounds. He completely lost all comprehension of, and interest in, the frightful general situation and thought of nothing save the misfortune of losing Warsaw, which after all was in fact only of comparatively minor importance. The next few days he devoted to studying the loss of Warsaw and to punishing the General Staff for what he regarded as its failure.
On January 18th the German troops in Hungary attacked between Lake Balaton and the Bakony forest, the wooded and mountainous terrain west of Budapest, in a renewed attempt to relieve that city. They were initially successful and reached the bank of the Danube. But on the same day the Russians fought their way into the unfortunate town, whose fate was therefore now sealed. The efforts made in Hungary would have proved considerably more effective if carried out on Polish territory or in East Prussia, but this Hitler refused to see. In Poland the Russians were fighting in the Czestochowa-Radomsk area, and at Piotrkow, Lodz and Kutno. A weaker force was attacking the German bridgehead over the Vistula at Hohenburg. North of the Vistula the enemy was advancing on Leslau-Soldau and attacking towards Ortelsburg-Neidenburg. On the Narev front there were increased indications that a major offensive was about to be launched. As usual Hitler refused to permit the withdrawal of the troops now isolated in this sector, even though the Russian attack farther north had by this time reached the Inster west of Schlossberg.
Panzer Leader Page 50
