The whole of our briefing conference on this day was devoted to the Warsaw business mentioned above, despite the fact that the violent developments at the front had made this of merely academic interest. During our afternoon meeting Hitler told me to arrange that the General Staff Corps officers responsible for issuing the reports and signals connected with the withdrawal from Warsaw be held for interrogation. I made it quite clear to him that I alone was responsible for the events of the previous day and therefore it was I whom he must arrest and have interrogated, and not my subordinates. He replied: ‘No. It’s not you I'm after but the General Staff. It is intolerable to me that a group of intellectuals should presume to press their views on their superiors. But such is the General Staff system and that system I intend to smash.’ A long and angry argument ensued between us in which I was all the more outspoken since for once I was alone with him. It was useless. That night I sent General Wenck to the ‘evening briefing,’ with instructions to point out to Hitler once again that he was about to commit an injustice, that I was prepared to be arrested myself, but that I would not allow my subordinates to be interfered with. Wenck did as I asked him. However, that same night Colonel von Bonin and Lieutenant-Colonels von dem Knesebeck and von Christen were arrested. General Meisel, of the Army Personnel Office, performed this task under cover of machine pistols. I was not even informed and therefore unfortunately could not intervene. The next day I was simply confronted with a fait accompli. I therefore went alone to see Hitler and in the strongest words at my disposal protested against the arrest of my utterly guiltless colleagues; I also pointed out that in consequence of this action the work of the most vital section of the OKH must be interrupted at a highly critical stage of the war. Completely inexperienced young officers must now suddenly be put in to replace the arrested men and must be entrusted with preparing the groundwork for the most important decisions, and with drawing up the most complicated orders that had perhaps ever fallen to the lot of German officers. I requested than an inquiry into my own behaviour be ordered, and this request was granted. During these tense and fateful days I was interrogated for hours on end by Messrs. Kaltenbrunner and Müller, who have already been mentioned in connection with the trials after July 20th: these interrogations squandered not only my time but also my nervous energy and my ability to work, and meanwhile on the Eastern Front a battle for life or death was being fought involving our very homeland and the existence of our German nation. The interrogation by Kaltenbrunner had at least one positive result in that it involved the release, after a few weeks, of Knesebeck and Christen, though not of Bonin. But they were not to return to General Staff duties, being instead given the command of regiments at the front. On the third day of his new assignment the brave, clever, and amiable Knesebeck was killed at his headquarters—after having attempted once again to intervene on behalf of his friend and superior, Bonin. Christen luckily did not lose his life. Bonin, for no reason and for no offence, was shipped from one concentration camp to another until at last, in the general collapse, he was privileged to exchange Hitlerian for American captivity. We met again in prison.
While I was both angered and hurt by the insults offered me on January 19th, and while my time was being wasted in interrogations by Kaltenbrunner and Müller, the bitter battles for Eastern Germany went on without pause. The Russians in Hungary were rapidly assembling mobile troops for the purpose of counter-attacking our force that was attempting to relieve Budapest. An intercepted Russian wireless signal from that front read: ‘With such means he will achieve nothing. A mass of all arms and a wall of troops is waiting for him.’ So we must be ready for strong enemy counter-measures. North of the Carpathians the Russians continued to push forward towards Breslau and the industrial area of Upper Silesia. In view of the weakness of our defence developments were likely to be very rapid there. Farther to the north the enemy was moving on Kalisz, Posen and Bromberg. Lodz fell. The enemy was now faced with almost no opposition. Only the XXIV Panzer Corps and the Panzer Corps Gross-Deutschland, engaged in mobile encirclement battles, continued steadfastly and valiantly to fight their way westwards, picking up numerous smaller units on the way. Generals Nehring and von Saucken performed feats of military virtuosity during these days that only the pen of a new Xenophon could adequately describe.
In the Mielau–Soldau district the Russians began to advance on Deutsch–Eylau. Farther south they were approaching Thorn–Graudenz. To the north-east they were attacking the Neidenburg–Willenberg line. South of Memel yet another critical situation was developing. Army Group North, in Courland, reported enemy movements; this report did not give any clear indication of what the Russians’ intentions in this sector were likely to be. The only certainty was that our forces in Courland would not be available for the defence of the homeland against the coming assault, and that the enemy formations which were tied up in the north in no way compensated for the absence of our own troops from the principal front. Hardly a conference went by without my urging Hitler that he at last agree to a speedy withdrawal of Army Group North: it was always in vain.
On January 20th the enemy set foot on German soil. This was the beginning of the last act. Early that morning I learned that the Russians had reached the German frontier at a point east of Hohensalza. My wife left Deipenhof in the Warthegau a half-hour before the first shells began to fall. She had had to stay until the last possible moment since her earlier departure would have been the signal for the civilian population to flee. She was under constant supervision by the Party. She had finally to leave behind such of our possessions as had escaped destruction when our Berlin home was bombed in September 1943. Now, like so many millions of other Germans, we were exiles, banished from our homes, and we are proud to have shared their fate. We shall know how to bear our lot. As she left Deipenhof the workers on the estate stood in tears beside her car and many would willingly have accompanied her. My wife had won the affections of those people and for her, too, the departure was hard. On January 21st she arrived at Zossen, where for lack of other accommodation she shared my quarters; henceforth she was also to share my difficult destiny, and to be at all times my help and my support.
On January 20th the battles west of Budapest had continued indecisively. Vörös, the former Chief of the Hungarian General Staff, was with the Russians. In Silesia the enemy crossed the frontier and continued his rapid advance towards Breslau. In the Posen area, as already stated, the frontier was also crossed. North of the Vistula powerful enemy forces were attacking the Thorn–Graudenz line. Very strong reserves were moving up behind the enemy troops along the main line of advance; these were dispositions of which we had never again been capable since the French campaign of 1940. South of Memel the enemy reached a line Wehlau–Labiau and continued in the general direction of Koenigsberg. Army Group Centre was in danger of being doubly encircled by two huge pincers, of which the southern one was moving north towards Koenigsberg, while the other, following the course of the Memel, was approaching the East Prussian capital from the east. On the Narev, opposite Fourth Army, the Russians were prepared to wait quietly, in the certainty of success on the fronts where they had broken through.
January 21st was marked by extensive enemy penetrations into the industrial area of Upper Silesia, advances towards Gnesen–Posen and Bromberg–Thorn, while forward elements reached Schneidemühl, and others attacked towards Riesenburg–Allenstein. When Hitler once again refused Reinhardt’s urgent request that Fourth Army be withdrawn from the Narev salient, both Reinhardt and Fourth Army’s commander, General Hossbach, were understandably in despair. The latter general, in view of the threatening encirclement of his whole army, took a correspondingly desperate decision on January 22nd. He ordered his army to turn about and to attack in a westerly direction, with the intention of breaking through to West Prussia and the Vistula. There he hoped to establish contact with Colonel-General Weiss’s Second Army.
Hossbach did not inform his army group of this independent decision of
his until the initial moves had begun on January 23rd. The OKH and Hitler were simply not told at all. The first we heard was that the fortress of Lötzen, the strongest of the bulwarks covering East Prussia, had been lost without a fight. It is little wonder that this news of the loss of our best armed, best built and best garrisoned fortress was like a bombshell to us and that Hitler completely lost all self-control. This happened on January 24th. Simultaneously the Russians broke through on the Masuren Canal, farther to the north, and attacked the north flank of Hossbach’s army with the result that his disengaging movement could not now be carried out according to plan. On January 26th Hitler realised that in Army Group Centre’s area something was going on of which he not only did not approve but of which he had not even been informed. He decided that he had been deceived and he reacted accordingly. He burst out in uncontrollable rage against Reinhardt and Hossbach: ‘They’re both in the same racket with Seydlitz! This is treason! They deserve to be court-martialled. They are to be dismissed immediately, along with their staffs, because the staff officers knew what was going on and failed to report it.’ I attempted to calm the infuriated man, who had lost all pretence at self-control, saying: ‘As far as Colonel-General Reinhardt is concerned I'm prepared to offer my right arm as surety for him. He has frequently enough told you personally what the situation of his army group was. I also regard it as unthinkable that Hossbach should have any contact with the enemy. The contrary is clearly the case.’ But at that time any attempt to excuse or to explain was merely pouring oil on the flames. The fire continued to rage and was not damped down until Hitler and Burgdorf had decided who were to succeed the two generals. Colonel-General Rendulic was appointed to command the army group; he had only recently been sent to Courland as Schörner’s successor there, and was an Austrian, clever and subtle, who knew how to handle Hitler. Hitler had such faith in him that he now entrusted him with the desperate task of defending East Prussia. General Friedrich-Wilhelm Müller was appointed to succeed Hossbach; he had proved himself a most capable officer at the front but had never previously held a higher command.
Reinhardt himself had been seriously wounded in the head on January 25th. On January 29th we met and discussed recent events. I did not at that time receive a clear explanation of Hossbach’s actions.
So events continued to run their tragic course in East Prussia where our defensive forces were facing total collapse, while Hitler’s distrust of his generals, already profound, was further deepened. Meanwhile on the rest of the Eastern Front the retreat continued amidst heavy fighting.
On the Budapest front the Germans recaptured Stuhlweissenburg, but we knew that our forces were insufficient to win a decisive victory there, and unfortunately the Russians knew this too. In Upper Silesia the enemy was advancing on Tarnowitz. He was pressing on towards the line Cosel–Oppeln–Brieg, with the intention of cutting off the industrial area and winning bridgeheads over the Oder. Strong forces were moving on Breslau and on the Oder between that town and Glogau. He made further progress towards Posen and in East Prussia; his pincer movements to cut off that province continued. The Russians were making their main effort through the line Deutsch-Eylau–Allenstein, in the direction of Koenigsberg. In Courland all was still quiet.
On January 23rd there was fighting between Peiskretscham and Grossstrehlitz; the enemy’s intention to cross the Oder between Oppeln and Ohlau now became plain. There were attacks on Ostrow and Krotoszyn and hostile tanks reached Ravica. The area Gnesen–Posen–Nakel was in enemy hands. There was fighting around Posen. In East Prussia the Russians continued to advance towards Bartenstein. By order of Reinhardt the Tannenberg Memorial was blown up after the removal of the sarcophagi containing the remains of Hindenburg and of his wife.
In Courland the Russians attacked Libau.
On January 23rd the new liaison man from the Foreign Ministry, Ambassador Dr. Paul Barandon, came to see me. Despite repeated requests on my part, his predecessor had never once called on me since I had taken up my post in July 1944. He apparently had not thought it necessary that the Foreign Ministry be kept informed of the situation at the front. I described that situation now to Dr. Barandon in undisguised terms. We discussed together the possibility of the Foreign Ministry coming somehow to our assistance, for we were agreed that the time was ripe for such a move. We wished that the very limited diplomatic relations still possessed by the Foreign Ministry be employed to arrange an armistice, at least on one front. We hoped that our Western adversaries might perhaps realise the dangers inherent in a rapid Russian advance into, or even through, Germany, and might therefore be willing either to sign an armistice or at least to make an unofficial agreement which would enable us to defend Eastern Germany with what remained of our forces in exchange for our surrender of Western Germany. It is true that this was a very slender hope. But a drowning man will clutch at any straw. We wished to leave no course untried which might stop the bloodshed and save Germany and all Western Europe from the terrible fate which threatened us all. We therefore agreed that Dr. Barandon should arrange that I have a private interview with the Foreign Minister, von Ribbentrop. He was the Führer’s principal political adviser and I therefore wished to describe the situation to him as frankly and as fully as I had just done to Barandon; I intended then to propose to him that we approach Hitler together for the purpose of arranging the complete employment of the slender diplomatic resources still available to a now isolated Germany. That these resources were neither promising nor likely to be particularly effective we well knew, but that did not lessen our determination to do our duty, and our duty was to take all possible steps to bring the war to an end. Dr. Barandon immediately went to see Herr von Ribbentrop and arranged that I should meet him on January 25th.
The disasters on the Eastern Front continued to spread. In Hungary the enemy’s measures for attacking our penetration began to be felt. In Silesia he reached Gleiwitz. Between Cosel and Brieg, as between Dyherrnfurth and Glogau, he was clearly making ready to cross the Oder. Breslau was attacked frontally, but the fortress held out, as did Glogau and Posen. In East Prussia the Russians were striving to break through to Elbing.
On January 25th Russian preparations for a counter-attack south of Lake Velencze became increasingly evident. North of the Danube as well, it was plain that they were about to launch an attack against General Kreysing’s Eighth Army in the Leva–Ipolysac–Blauenstein area. In Upper Silesia preparations for an assault on the industrial area continued. The enemy reached the Oder.
After encircling Posen the Russians by-passed that fortress and headed for the Oder–Warthe bend, which was supposed to be covered by a defensive line; but this line, carefully built before the war, had been robbed of its installations, which had been sent west to the Atlantic Wall, so that now it was only the shell of a fortified line. The Russians were massing in the area Schneidemühl–Bromberg, with the intention of advancing north along the west bank of the Vistula and thus rolling up the troops defending that river line from the rear.
In order to anticipate this danger I had requested Hitler that a new army group be formed to control the area between the old Army Group A (which had been re-designated Army Group Centre on January 25th) and the old Army Group Centre (now called Army Group North). This new army group would take control and reorganise the defence on this sector of the front. I spoke to Colonel-General Jodl concerning the choice of a general and staff to command this new army group, which would be occupying the most vital sector of all. I proposed that one of the two army group staffs in the Balkans be given this assignment and expressed my preference for that of Field-Marshal Freiherr von Weichs. I knew that gentleman very well, and had a high opinion of him both as a man and as a soldier. He was as clever as he was upstanding and valiant and he was the man to master so difficult a situation if anyone could still do so. Jodl agreed to support my proposal during the conference with Hitler. So I felt that the matter was decided. When, on January 24th, I made the suggestion to Hitler, he r
eplied: ‘Field-Marshal von Weichs seems to me to be a tired man. I doubt if he’s still capable of performing such a task.’ I defended my choice in a most lively manner, adding that Jodl was of my opinion. But I was to be disappointed, for Jodl unfortunately dropped a sneering remark about the Field-Marshal’s deep and genuine religious sense, with the result that Hitler immediately refused to sanction his appointment. Instead, he ordered that Himmler be given command of the new army group. This preposterous suggestion appalled me and I used such argumentative powers as I possessed in an attempt to stop such an idiocy being perpetrated on the unfortunate Eastern Front. It was all in vain. Hitler maintained that Himmler had given a very good account of himself on the Upper Rhine. He also controlled the Training Army and therefore had a source of reinforcements immediately to hand, so that he, more than anyone else, was in a position to find both men and material for recreating a front. Even my modest attempt at least to provide the National SS Leader with the experienced staff of Army Group von Weichs was a failure. On the contrary, Hitler ordered that Himmler assemble his own staff. He chose the very brave SS Brigade-Leader Lammerding as his chief of staff; this man, who had previously commanded a panzer division, was totally ignorant of the very considerable general staff duties that his post as chief of an unformed army group staff involved. The limited help I was able to give, by assigning General Staff Corps officers to the new headquarters, was far from sufficient to compensate for the basic lack of knowledge of the commander and his chief. For organising the defence Himmler now picked a number of SS leaders who for the most part were uniformly incapable of performing their allotted tasks. Only after very bitter experiences, damaging to our cause as a whole, did the arrogant Himmler finally agree to listen to me.
Panzer Leader Page 51
