Hanoi's Road to the Vietnam War, 1954-1965

by Asselin, Pierre

  VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONALISM

  On a more general level, this series of diplomatic initiatives reflected Hanoi’s views of its stake in the shifting currents of international relations in the early 1960s. The Cold War had created two implacable blocs and made the situation in South Vietnam a major expression of that implacability. Recognizing that fact, DRVN leaders convinced themselves that success in their revolution could tip the worldwide balance of power in favor of the socialist bloc. This conviction, combined with the fact that they had to conduct their diplomacy from a position of military weakness, made those leaders accomplished practitioners of international politics. So, too, did the totality of their commitment to Marxism-Leninism—however they interpreted it—and thus to anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism. Whatever side of the ideological divide they stood on, whether they were committed moderates or ardent militants, DRVN leaders never, even during the crisis years of the early 1960s, thought strictly in terms of their own interests narrowly defined. “No, no, and no, we are not isolationists,” Pham Van Dong emphatically stated in an interview with a reporter who suggested Hanoi was not attuned to the attitudes of the international community because of its preoccupation with domestic affairs.80

  Over the years DRVN leaders had repeatedly iterated this commitment to socialist internationalism and world revolution, and just as often emphasized the central role they assigned to their own revolution in the latter. To be sure, the Cold War, to say nothing of the Sino-Soviet dispute, created myriad challenges for Hanoi, but the contemporaneous process of decolonization in the Third World also created countless opportunities. Specifically, the Vietnamese, who had gained international notoriety for their contributions to decolonization through their war against France, and specifically their dramatic triumph at Dien Bien Phu, were now well positioned to lead the charge against American imperialism and its “reactionary” allies and to inspire others to do the same. Back in 1958, Truong Chinh had spoken to the VFF Central Committee about the DRVN’s international obligations as a socialist state, even as it endeavored to liberate the South. In Truong Chinh’s formulation, that meant contributing to world peace by “opposing all war-kindling schemes of the imperialist aggressors and their agents,” strengthening “friendly solidarity and the fraternal cooperation with the USSR, China, and [other] people’s democracies,” and “support[ing] national liberation movements in the world.” A year later, the VWP Central Committee expressed confidence that “the victory of the Vietnamese Revolution” would have “an enthusiastic effect on the movement of popular liberation in Asia, Africa, [and] Latin America” and precipitate “the disintegration of colonialism throughout the world.”81

  The peoples of Africa and Latin America “clearly grasp that the people of Vietnam are loyal friends and reliable friends in their struggle against colonialism and imperialism,” a member of the DRVN National Assembly said, echoing these positions. They “turn to us not only to understand the experiences of revolutionary struggle, but also to understand the experiences of building the economy [and] culture of our country.”82 As Vietnam fought for its own national liberation, other assessments noted, it “vigorously supported national liberation movements in Africa,” particularly in French North Africa, and it “quickly recognized newly independent countries.”83 That support sometimes took concrete forms, reportedly including sending “several North Vietnamese military instructors” based in the United Arab Republic to train insurgents to fight in the Algerian war of independence.84 “The element that we must grasp is that our struggle against the U.S.-Diem clique is not solitary,” another member of the National Assembly stated; it was in fact “part of a worldwide struggle” against “American lackeys, especially in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.”85

  In Hanoi’s thinking, then, the prospects for the future of Vietnam and its revolution were linked to the prospects of the rest of the noncapitalist world. “The struggle to maintain peace” and “achieve national reunification of our homeland not only suits the vital interests of the people, our nation,” as the VWP Central Committee put it, “but also suits the general interests of the movement for democratic peace in the world.” The success of revolutionary efforts in both the North and the South hinged on defeating capitalist and reactionary enemies to create “a solid outpost of the socialist camp in Southeast Asia.”86 The liberation of South Vietnam, Pham Van Dong repeated in September 1960, was an integral part of “the national independence movements that agitated the entire world.”87 As “the banner of the movement for popular liberation, the center of big contradictions in the world,” Vietnam had become in Washington’s eyes the “ideal area” for implementing its “counterrevolutionary strategy.”88 In Hanoi’s eyes, that made Vietnam the ideal place to explode that strategy. “Our struggle for national reunification has reached a new plateau: the international political plateau,” a member of the National Assembly affirmed.89 To foreign observers, by 1961 Hanoi was clearly acting as if it had a “unique calling” in the world.90

  LINGERING EFFECTS OF THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

  The world revolution clearly mattered to DRVN leaders, but even they understood that it would never triumph as long as Beijing and Moscow bickered. Interestingly, by the middle of the year DRVN authorities were acting in public as if the Sino-Soviet dispute “hardly existed” at all and dismissed questions about its possibly complicating consequences by insisting on Hanoi’s neutrality.91 The French Foreign Ministry believed at this time that Hanoi’s primary consideration was maintaining “a certain degree of independence” vis-à-vis the disputing parties, as well as a balance between them to avoid aggravating the situation.92 An exasperated Soviet diplomat told a western counterpart in April that North Vietnamese leaders were just “too nationalistically minded for us to try to put pressure on them.”93 “While consulting their allies at every step, and being influenced by the advice they may receive,” British diplomats observed, “they will reserve the right to make the final assessment themselves, and keep the final decisions in their own hands.”94

  Despite this practice of sitting “fairly firmly on the fence, trying always to play off one side against the other, and where possible to mediate between them,” Hanoi’s revolutionary strategy in 1961 remained generally consonant with Soviet aspirations.95 It continued to adhere to “the great lines of Soviet foreign policy,” the French Embassy in Moscow reckoned, “whether it be peaceful coexistence, general and complete [nuclear] disarmament, or the [unilateral] signing of a peace treaty with the two German states.”96 That was the result of Soviet influence in Hanoi, as well as the ideological and personal inclinations of key Politburo members, Ho and Giap specifically, who held the Soviet Union in high esteem and drew inspiration from its example and historic achievements as leader of the socialist bloc. The appointment of Ung Van Khiem, a man known for “his moderate sentiments and his desire to maintain and develop close contacts with the West and with France in particular,” as foreign minister attested to the continued prevalence of moderate views in Hanoi. In the estimate of French diplomats, Khiem’s appointment had represented “a sparkling victory for the moderate tendency in the DRVN.”97 The same tendency was visible in the promotions of two new Vietnamese generals, Song Hao and Hoang Van Thai, who were friends and close collaborators of Vo Nguyen Giap and, like Giap, harbored moderate, pro-Soviet and anti-Chinese sentiments.98

  That Hanoi still held the Soviet Union in the highest esteem and valued Soviet aid more than that of the Chinese was evidenced by the growing number of Soviet technicians then in the DRVN, as well as the wider availability of Russian-language books and the higher opinions Vietnamese technicians had of Soviet over Chinese machinery.99 The Soviet Union was the model and inspiration for the DRVN’s socialist modernization; many of the hopes and dreams of Vietnamese communist leaders rested on continued moral and material support from Moscow. Without Soviet aid, Hanoi would never be able to execute its five-year plan of economic and industrial development.100 It
was as true for the DRVN as it was for North Korea and other socialist states at this time that only Soviet technology could help them develop heavy industry, since the PRC remained deficient in that field.101 Hanoi “could hardly afford to get far out of line with the Soviet Union” at that time, the British Consulate reckoned; in 1961 the economic aid it received from the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries remained greater than that received from China and more necessary to meet certain pressing goals. Besides, Hanoi may have sensed that Soviet influence could be “a useful counterweight to their uncomfortably large neighbor,” the consulate added.102

  Though the Soviet Union made massive contributions to the DRVN’s development, growing numbers of VWP members were disenchanted with Moscow. Its continued insistence on peaceful coexistence and the fact that it did not respect the right of “fraternal” parties to deviate from that line irked dogmatic militants and others who were nationalistically inclined. Equally vexing to these groups was the fact that Khrushchev never delivered on his January pledge to provide greater assistance to national liberation movements. There was no change in Moscow’s endeavors to restrain the use of violence in liberation movements, just as there was no assistance to advance Vietnam’s liberation struggle.103 That was a big disappointment for party militants, whose affinity for China and apathy toward moderate views only grew as a result.

  Despite their vociferous public rhetoric in support of violent national liberation, Chinese leaders continued to privately counsel caution in South Vietnam because it suited their own practical interests at this time. Still reeling from the disastrous Great Leap Forward, Beijing wanted to avoid an actual war in Indochina, which was likely to produce American occupation of South Vietnam and perhaps even invasion of the DRVN.104 In the former case maybe and in the latter case surely, China would have to intervene militarily, as it had to do in Korea, if not to rescue an ally or honor a commitment to wars of national liberation, then to protect its own national security.105 Lacking nuclear weapons and estranged from Moscow, Beijing’s capacity to deter American aggression in Indochina was limited.106 “An apparent division of opinion within the Chinese Party on how far it would be wise to flout Moscow” under these circumstances may have accounted for Beijing’s reticence to support a widening military struggle in South Vietnam.107 Beijing in fact sought rapprochement with Moscow during 1961 and the first half of 1962.108

  Just as it appeared that unity of the socialist camp might be restored, new cleavages emerged, to Hanoi’s great dismay. Having had enough of Albania’s Enver Hoxha’s diatribes against him and against peaceful coexistence, Khrushchev openly attacked the leadership of the small communist state during the CPSU’s Twenty-Second Congress in late October. Moscow in fact broke diplomatic relations with Tirana, forcing other communist parties to decide whether to follow its lead.109 After the congress, which they attended, Ho Chi Minh and Le Duan discussed the matter with Mao, who refused to break off relations with Albania and actually praised its boldness.110 Citing its unbreakable commitment to socialist unity, and perhaps with the encouragement of Beijing, Hanoi too refused to sever diplomatic relations with Albania.111 According to Hungarian diplomats, the VWP was genuinely disheartened by Khrushchev’s attacks on the Albanians, but ordered members to be silent on the issue and not to discuss the recent CPSU congress until the leadership had formed an official opinion on the matter.112 A month later, Ho returned to Moscow and then visited Beijing to defuse this latest crisis, evidently with no positive results in either place.113 Shortly thereafter, the VWP on its own initiative contacted “fraternal parties” around the world to express its concerns and propose still another meeting to resolve the dispute.114 These initiatives came to nothing, but the effort earned the Vietnamese more acclaim in the socialist world and attenuated Moscow’s vexation at Hanoi’s decision to not break ties with Albania.115

  NEW CHALLENGES IN THE SOUTH

  While such distractions diverted northern attention from the South, southerners came increasingly to rely on their own resources and resourcefulness to combat the Diem regime, as decreed during the recent VWP congress. According to a western intelligence estimate, by the end of 1961 the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the sea infiltration routes that had been opened earlier to supply the southern insurgency were no longer “vital” because the southern insurgency was learning to “feed itself.”116 Such resourcefulness reflected the growing efficiency and discipline of certain segments of southern revolutionary forces, as did a series of small military victories over Diem’s army in 1961.117 In fact, for a brief period the insurgents turned the Mekong Delta into “the most insecure part of the country,” with “many of the provincial seats [of the Saigon government] resembling islands in a sea of hostile territory.”118 During the first half of the year alone, insurgents killed approximately 1,500 enemy troops and assassinated or kidnapped more than two thousand officials and other civilian supporters of the Saigon regime.119 Meanwhile, in official reckoning, the NLF was enjoying increased popular support, and the PLAF, “though not yet strong,” was gaining strength.120

  These successes, while heartening, were variously ephemeral, limited, or overshadowed by concomitant setbacks. The NLF and the revolutionary movement in general developed hardly at all in the cities and in parts of the countryside.121 A NLF assessment of this period noted that Hanoi’s continued emphasis on “long-range revolutionary warfare,” that is, on political struggle and preparation for war, turned “the weaknesses of the enemy” into “his strengths” while creating “severe difficulties for us.”122 By Hanoi’s own admission, progress in the South had stalled after mid-1960 because Saigon and its allies still used “every method” and “every reactionary force” to “destroy the revolutionary movement very criminally.”123 Between 1956 and 1961, DRVN authorities estimated, American assistance to Saigon had grown tenfold, from $41 million to $400 million a year.124 In November, U.S. military assistance to the South began to exceed the level allowed in the Geneva accords, a fact recognized by the ICSC.125 If this were not alarming enough, during a public appearance with Diem in Saigon in May, U.S. vice president Lyndon Johnson not only referred to the South Vietnamese president as the “Winston Churchill of Asia” but pledged Washington’s help in increasing the size and effectiveness of Diem’s armed forces. Hanoi considered Johnson’s public pledges to signal the onset of a “new aggression” against the people of Vietnam.126

  The growth, modernization, and increasing effectiveness of Diem’s forces were indeed a problem. According to historian Mark Moyar, even before the assistance Johnson proffered began arriving, ARVN forces were demonstrating “modest improvements in aggressiveness and military competence,” which enabled them to score several “major victories” over insurgents.127 In addition to his regular forces, Diem’s Republican Youth Movement enlisted thousands of rural youths and trained them to “assist in community development projects, provide a fresh infusion of rural leadership,” and “help protect villages” against enemies. In conjunction with a land reform program financed by the United States, this “community-based approach to security” enabled Saigon to extend its influence in rural districts while eroding popular support for the communist-led revolution.128

  Equally troublesome for revolutionary forces was the strategic hamlet program Saigon initiated in mid-1961. By the end of the year, the program had established more than five hundred such hamlets, and a year later four thousand.129 Unlike the previous effort to create fortified, autarkic agrovilles—which had proved a clear failure by this time—this latest program involved no forced relocation of peasants. Most importantly for its success, it assigned protective duties to trained and motivated self-defense forces, including members of the Republican Youth Movement, and governing duties to officials loyal to Diem’s brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, rather than often corrupt regional administrations or government ministries.130

  The success of the program gave the Diem regime unprecedented access to and influence over rural communities
. It also isolated a large segment of the rural population from the NLF, hindering the latter’s access to new recruits and supplies. “The scale of the regime’s effort,” historian Philip Catton has written of this program, served to “beef up Saigon’s physical presence in rural areas and so threaten the guerrillas’ access to the peasantry.” In the Central Highlands, where the fortunes of the southern revolutionary movement had been improving, the creation of strategic hamlets and of militias loyal to Saigon soon resulted in shortages of food and medicine among insurgents, which in turn precluded expansion of the PLAF and demoralized NLF members. Strategic hamlets, in other words, erected “physical and psychological barriers” between southern revolutionaries and peasants, which the former for the time being could not breach.131 A survey based on captured NLF documents concluded that in parts of the South the program hurt the Front “badly in many ways”: “Young men were defecting to their native villages, intelligence agents were being arrested, tax collections were falling off,” and “travel from base area to base area was becoming more difficult and dangerous.” In Kien Hoa Province, this survey reported, the strategic hamlet program “came close to meeting the requirements for defeating a Communist war of national liberation and achieving the political stabilization which would allow economic and social development to proceed in a well-ordered manner.” There and in other areas where the “basic problems” of land, justice, and “truly responsive government” were effectively handled by local RVN officials, the people readily submitted to the authority of the Saigon regime.132