Hanoi's Road to the Vietnam War, 1954-1965
Page 45
135. David W. P. Elliott, The Vietnamese War: Revolution and Social Change in the Mekong Delta, 1930–1975, concise ed. (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2007), 430. See also the comments by Nguyen Khac Huynh, a senior researcher at the Institute of International Relations in Hanoi, in McNamara, Blight, and Brigham, Argument without End, 92.
136. King C. Chen, “Hanoi’s Three Decisions and the Escalation of the Vietnam War,” Political Science Quarterly 90, no. 2 (Summer 1975): 251.
137. Quoted in Grossheim, “‘Revisionism’ in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,” 457.
138. McNamara, Blight, and Brigham, Argument without End, 201.
139. Lien-Hang T. Nguyen and Martin Grossheim offered that date, though it remains unknown precisely when the meeting opened or concluded. See Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, “The War Politburo: North Vietnam’s Diplomatic and Political Road to the Tet Offensive,” Journal of Vietnamese Studies 1, nos. 1–2 (February/August 2006): 16; and Grossheim, “‘Revisionism’ in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,” 457. The fact that after more than forty years Hanoi has never disclosed the dates of the plenum, either when it convened or when it adjourned, suggests that much more than meets the eye was at stake then. While some foreign scholars claim that the plenum may have extended into the new year (Ang Cheng Guan, “The Vietnam War, 1962–64: The Vietnamese Communist Perspective,” Journal of Contemporary History 35, no. 4 [October 2000]: 616), a reproduction of the final resolution of the plenum released recently by the VWP is dated December 1963. See “Nghi quyet cua Hoi nghi lan thu chin Ban Chap hanh Trung uong Dang Lao dong Viet Nam: Ve tinh hinh the gio va nhiem vu quoc te cua Dang ta, thang 12 nam 1963” [Resolution of the Ninth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Workers’ Party: On the World Situation and the International Tasks of Our Party, December 1963], in VKD: 1963, 716.
140. William S. Turley, The Second Indochina War: A Concise Political and Military History, 2nd ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 82; Dommen, Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans, 573.
141. William J. Duiker, Ho Chi Minh: A Life (New York: Theia, 2000), 537; Grossheim, “‘Revisionism’ in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,” 458; and Brocheux, Ho Chi Minh, 246.
142. Duiker, Ho Chi Minh, 537.
143. Mari Olsen, Soviet-Vietnam Relations and the Role of China, 1949–64: Changing Alliances (New York: Routledge, 2006), 129–30.
144. The full text of the speech is reproduced in Le Duan, Some Questions concerning the International Tasks of Our Party: Speech at the Ninth Plenum of the Third Central Committee of the Viet Nam Workers’ Party (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1964).
145. Hoang Van Hoan, A Drop in the Ocean: Hoang Van Hoan’s Revolutionary Reminiscences (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1988), 318.
146. Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, Hanoi’s War, 66.
147. “Nghi quyet cua Hoi nghi lan thu chin Ban Chap hanh Trung uong Dang Lao dong Viet Nam: Ve tinh hinh the gio va nhiem vu quoc te cua Dang ta, thang 12 nam 1963,” 716–800.
148. “Nghi quyet cua Hoi nghi lan thu chin Ban Chap hanh Trung uong Dang Lao dong Viet Nam: Ra suc phan dau, tien len gianh nhung thang loi moi o mien Nam, thang 12 nam 1963” [Resolution of the Ninth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Workers’ Party: Strive to Struggle, Rush Forward to Win New Victories in the South, December 1963], in VKD: 1963, 811–62.
149. “Hoi nghi Ban Chap hanh Trung uong Dang lan thu chin (Thang 12—1963)” [Ninth Plenum of the Central Committee, December 1963], in Nguyen Trong Phuc, ed., Tim hieu lich su Dang Cong san Viet Nam: Qua cac Dai hoi va Hoi nghi Trung uong, 1930–2002 [Understanding the History of the Vietnamese Communist Party: Congresses and Central Committee Plenums, 1930–2002] (Hanoi: Nha xuat ban Lao dong, 2003), 530–38.
150. “Nghi quyet cua Hoi nghi lan thu chin Ban Chap hanh Trung uong Dang Lao dong Viet Nam: Ra suc phan dau, tien len gianh nhung thang loi moi o mien Nam, thang 12 nam 1963,” 860 (emphasis in original).
151. Military Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 125–26.
152. Ang Cheng Guan, The Vietnam War from the Other Side: The Vietnamese Communists’ Perspective (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 75. According to historian Georges Boudarel, the plenum marked the decision to fully commit the North to the violent liberation of the South, to “intervene militarily . . . in support of the National Liberation Front.” See Georges Boudarel, Cent fleurs éclosent dans la nuit du Viêt Nam [One hundred Flowers Blooming in the Night of Vietnam] (Paris: Jacques Bertoin, 1991), 258.
153. Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, “Between the Storms: An International History of the Second Indochina War, 1968–1973” (PhD diss., Yale University, 2008), 31.
154. Sophie Quinn-Judge, “The Ideological Debate in the DRV and the Significance of the Anti-Party Affair, 1967–68,” Cold War History 5, no. 4 (November–December 2005): 483.
155. Nguyen Chi Thanh, “Let Us Improve Our Proletarian Stand and Ideology,” 5.
156. Duiker, Ho Chi Minh, 505; Bui Tin, Following Ho Chi Minh: Memoirs of a North Vietnamese Colonel (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999), 32. For a more comprehensive yet partisan assessment of Le Duc Tho, see Nho ve Anh Le Duc Tho [Remembering Le Duc Tho] (Hanoi: Nha xuat ban Chinh tri quoc gia, 2001).
157. The VWP announced the launching of the “rectification campaign” in Nhan dan on 3 and 4 February 1964.
158. Le Duc Tho, “Let Us Strengthen the Ideological Struggle to Consolidate the Party,” 19, 23.
159. Bui Tin, Following Ho Chi Minh, 46, 53, 55–56. Hoang Minh Chinh later admitted that Truong Chinh in fact “coaxed and cajoled” him into preparing the materials in question (Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, “War Politburo,” 45n68).
160. Grossheim, “‘Revisionism’ in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,” 454–58; Franchini, Guerres d’Indochine, 271; Bui Tin, Following Ho Chi Minh, 54–55. Other notable individuals affected by these events included Quan doi Nhan dan editor Hoang The Dung, head of military operations Do Duc Kien, director of military intelligence Nguyen Minh Nghia, secretary to the defense minister Le Minh Nghia, and Su that publishing house deputy head Nguyen Kien Giang.
161. Turley, Second Indochina War, 82–83. Shortly after the plenum, Quoc requested and was granted a transfer to the Soviet Union and served in the armed forces there until his retirement.
162. Grossheim, “‘Revisionism’ in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,” 459–60.
163. Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, “War Politburo,” 45n66. See also Judy Stowe, “Révisionnisme au Vietnam” in Communisme, nos. 65–66 (2001): 233–49. Some dissidence, of course, remained. In fact, the VWP would conduct a second round of purges in 1967, just before launching the Tet Offensive, during which several of the individuals who had been ostracized and demoted immediately after the Ninth Plenum were arrested and committed to lengthy prison terms. On that episode see Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, “War Politburo,” 45; and Quinn-Judge, “Ideological Debate,” 479–500.
164. The death of Duong Bach Mai shortly after the plenum (April 1964) led to speculations that foul play was involved. The East German Foreign Ministry in fact considered Mai a casualty of the leftists’ power play whose “elimination” was “deliberate” (Grossheim, “‘Revisionism’ in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,” 460).
165. Turley, Second Indochina War, 82.
166. BCGH to SEAD, 29 September 1964, FO 371/175486, NAUK, 1; Grossheim, “‘Revisionism’ in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,” 464–66.
167. BCGH to SEAD, 1 August 1964, FO 371/175481, NAUK, 1.
168. Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, “War Politburo,” 18.
169. Brocheux, Ho Chi Minh, 204.
170. Ibid., 184; Vu Thu Hien, Dem giua ban ngay: Hoi ky chinh tri cua mot nguoi khong lam chinh tri [Day Turns into Night: Political Memoirs of a Non-Politician] (Stanton, Calif.: Van Nghe, 1997), 230; Turley, Second Indochina War, 81.
171. Grossheim, “‘Revisionism’ in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,” 454–55.
172. BCGH to SEAD, 4 J
anuary 1963, FO 371/170097, NAUK, 1.
173. William J. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), 412n13.
174. Phnom Penh to Ottawa, 9 September 1967, 20-VIET N-6, Vol. 9167 [Part 1], RG 25, LAC, 1.
175. Ho went on to “play a crucial diplomatic role that helped North Vietnam to manage a policy of equilibrium between China and the Soviet Union,” historian Lien-Hang T. Nguyen has written. See Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, “Cold War Contradictions: Toward an International History of the Second Indochina War, 1969–1973,” in Mark Philip Bradley and Marilyn B. Young, eds., Making Sense of the Vietnam Wars: Local, National, and Transnational Perspectives (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 230; and Ang Cheng Guan, Vietnam War from the Other Side, 142. Ho’s particularly good relationship with Mao Zedong was—in conjunction with other factors—instrumental in securing Chinese support for the Vietnamese struggle in the South, first against the French and then against the Americans. Ho, David Marr writes, “was eminently qualified simultaneously to charm the Chinese and to assert party independence.” See David G. Marr, “Sino-Vietnamese Relations,” Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 6 (July 1981): 53.
176. Duiker, Ho Chi Minh, 508.
177. Saigon (from Hanoi) to Ottawa, 22 June 1964, 29-39-1-2-A, Vol. 3092 [Part 1], RG 25, LAC, 2.
178. According to historian Martin Grossheim, Giap was placed under house arrest as early as mid-1963 (Grossheim, “‘Revisionism’ in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,” 454).
179. BCGH to British Embassy, Saigon, 8 November 1963, FO 371/170099, NAUK, 1.
180. Turley, Second Indochina War, 103. Historian Christopher Goscha characterized Le Duan and Le Duc Tho as the two most powerful party leaders during the Vietnam War. See Christopher E. Goscha, Historical Dictionary of the Indochina War (1945–1954): An International and Interdisciplinary Approach (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Press, 2011), 261.
181. Turley, Second Indochina War, 103.
182. On the consolidation of Le Duan’s authority at this time, see Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, “Between the Storms,” 23–36. By Le Duc Tho’s own admission, a number of party members believed that the new circumstances and new leaders’ “prejudices” restricted their “freedom of thought” (Le Duc Tho, “Let Us Strengthen the Ideological Struggle to Consolidate the Party,” 20).
183. “Le Duan, First Secretary of the Lao Dong Central Committee,” 11 March 1973, 20-VIET N-6, Vol. 9167 [Part 1], RG 25, LAC, 1.
184. “The launching of the Tet Offensive,” Nguyen writes, “signified the end of a bitter, decade-long debate” over strategy within the VWP (Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, “War Politburo,” 6).
7. WAGING WAR, 1964
1. David W. P. Elliott, “Hanoi’s Strategy in the Second Indochina War,” in Jayne S. Werner and Luu Doan Huynh, eds., The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and American Perspectives (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), 69.
2. Military Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975, trans. Merle L. Pribbenow (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 122.
3. Quoted in King C. Chen, “Hanoi’s Three Decisions and the Escalation of the Vietnam War,” Political Science Quarterly 90, no. 2 (Summer 1975): 253–54.
4. Military Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 126.
5. Saigon to Ottawa, 18 April 1964, 20-22-VIET S-1, 9385 [Part 1], Record Group [hereafter RG] 25, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa [hereafter LAC], 1–2.
6. British Embassy, Saigon [hereafter BES], to Foreign Office, London [hereafter FO], 1 January 1965, FO 371/180511, National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew [hereafter NAUK], 1; “North Viet-Nam: Annual Review for 1964,” 13 February 1965, FO 371/180511, NAUK, 4.
7. “Record of Conversation: Visit of Messrs Sullivan and Cooper to the Department,” 3 June 1964, 29-39-1-2-A, Vol. 3092 [Part 1], RG 25, LAC, 2.
8. “Summary Record of Conversation between the Minister and Mr. Sullivan, May 29, 1964,” 3 June 1964, 29-39-1-2-A, Vol. 3092 [Part 1], RG 25, LAC, 1; and “Record of Conversation: Visit of Messrs Sullivan and Cooper to the Department,” 3 June 1964, 2.
9. “Du thao de cuong gio thieu ve tinh hinh va duong loi cach mang mien Nam, so 226 T/TM” [Draft Program Introducing the Situation and Direction of the Southern Revolution, no. 226 T/TM], undated (1964), Ho so 252: Du thao de cuong ve tinh hinh va duong loi cach mang Mien Nam, 1962–, Phong Uy ban Thong nhat Chinh phu, Vietnamese National Archives Center 3, Hanoi [hereafter VNAC3], 36, 49–50.
10. Military Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 124–25.
11. William J. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), 250. That estimate is reasonable, though Vietnamese sources mention no specific deadline. An official party history states that the deadline was “a few years” (mot vai nam). See Vien nghien cuu chu nghia Mac-Lenin va tu tuong Ho Chi Minh, Lich su Dang Cong san Viet Nam, Tap 2: 1954–1975 [History of the Communist Party of Vietnam, Volume 2: 1954–1975] (Hanoi: Nha xuat ban Chinh tri quoc gia, 1995), 267.
12. “Du thao de cuong gio thieu ve tinh hinh ve duong loi cach mang mien Nam,” 44.
13. “Report of International Commission Activities, February 1964,” 21-13-VIET-ICSC-8, Vol. 10125 [FP 2.2], RG 25, LAC, 1.
14. “Note: La situation politique au Sud-Vietnam et la politique américaine” [Note: The Political Situation in South Vietnam and American Policy], 26 February 1964, #313, Asie-Océanie [hereafter AO]: Vietnam Conflit [hereafter VC], Archives Diplomatiques de France, La Courneuve [hereafter ADF], 1.
15. Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Wellington, New Zealand, to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada, “SEATO Council Meeting, Manila, 13–15 April 1964: Recent Developments Affecting the Situation in the Treaty Area,” 14 April 1964, 20-22-VIET S-1 [Part 1], Vol. 9385, RG 25, LAC, 3.
16. French Embassy, Saigon, to MFA, 23 February 1964, #131, AO: VC, ADF, 1.
17. “Report on the Activities of the International Commission in Vietnam for the Month of May, 1964,” 21-13-VIET-ICSC-6 [FP.1], Vol. 10125, RG 25, LAC, 2.
18. “Note: Situation au Vietnam,” 4 February 1964, #313, AO: VC, ADF, 2.
19. “Report from the Executive Director–Comptroller of Central Intelligence (Kirkpatrick) and the Station Chief in Saigon (de Silva) to the Director of Central Intelligence (McCone),” 10 February 1964, in United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Vol. 1: Vietnam, 1964 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992) [hereafter FRUS: I, VN, 1964], 65.
20. Canadian Embassy, Saigon (from Hanoi), to Ottawa, undated (1964), 20-Viet-N-1-4, Vol. 9001, RG 25, LAC, 3.
21. Tran Quoc Tu, “Peace and Revolution,” Hoc tap, no. 1 (January 1964). Reproduced and translated in Folder 03,Box 25, Douglas Pike Collection [hereafter DPC]: Unit 06—Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Vietnam Archive at Texas Tech University [hereafter VATTU], 8a.
22. Gareth Porter, “Hanoi’s Strategic Perspective and the Sino-Vietnamese Conflict,” Pacific Affairs 57, no. 1 (Spring 1984): 13.
23. Military Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 137. The use of the term Vietnam War (chien tranh Viet Nam) in this context, in this source and others, indicates that to Vietnamese military historians a state of actual war existed in Vietnam by 1964, before the introduction of U.S. combat forces.
24. Tran Quoc Tu, “Peace and Revolution,” 24.
25. “Balance of Forces and the Strategy of Offense,” Hoc tap, no. 1 (January 1964). Reproduced and translated in Folder 03, Box 25, DPC: Unit 06—Democratic Republic of Vietnam, VATTU, 20.
26. King C. Chen, “Hanoi vs. Peking: Policies and Relations—A Survey,” Asian Survey 12, no. 9 (September 1972): 808.
27. Tran Quoc Tu, “Peace and Revolution,” 8, 9, 27.
28. Ang Cheng Guan, “The Vietnam War, 1962–64: The Vietnamese Communist Perspective,” Journal of Contempo
rary History 35, no. 4 (October 2000): 618.
29. “Du thao de cuong gio thieu ve tinh hinh ve duong loi cach mang mien Nam,” 34.
30. Ibid., 56.
31. According to William Duiker, Hanoi remained reluctant to go all out and deploy PAVN units “out of fear that such actions could trigger an escalation of the U.S. role in the war” on the one hand, and because it had promised Moscow and Beijing that “even if the United States should intervene directly in the South, the DRVN would restrain Washington from extending the war to North Vietnam” on the other. See William Duiker, “Waging Revolutionary War: The Evolution of Hanoi’s Strategy in the South, 1959–1965,” in Werner and Huynh, eds., Vietnam War, 31.
32. “Chi thi cua Bo Chinh tri, so 81-CT/TW, ngay 7 thang 8 nam 1964: Ve tang cuong san sang chien dau chong moi am muu cua dich khieu khich va pha hoai mien Bac” [Politburo Instruction, no. 81-CT/TW, 7 August 1964: On Increasing Preparation to Struggle against the Enemy’s Plan to Sabotage and Destroy the North], in Dang Cong san Viet Nam, Van kien Dang—Toan Tap, Tap 25: 1964 [Party Documents—Complete Series, Vol. 25: 1964] (Hanoi: Nha xuat ban Chinh tri quoc gia, 2003) [hereafter VKD: 1964], 189.
33. “Du thao de cuong gio thieu ve tinh hinh ve duong loi cach mang mien Nam, 33.
34. According to western estimates, by 1964 the PAVN disposed of sixteen regular divisions (280,000 men), several militias (180,000 men), and a public security/border force (20,000 men). In addition to these effectives, Hanoi could “immediately mobilize” a reserve militia force numbering an additional 400,000 (“Note: a/s de l’Armée Nord-Vietnamienne” [Note: On the North Vietnamese Army], 23 May 1964, #19, AO: Vietnam Nord [hereafter VN], ADF, 1.
35. FGDH to MFA, 2 June 1964, #76, AO: VN, ADF, C3.
36. Department of State—Bureau of Intelligence and Research, “Hanoi Foresees Victory in South Vietnam—But Only after Long Guerrilla War,” 15 February 1964, 20-22-VIET S-1 [Part 1], Vol. 9385, RG 25, LAC, 5.
37. Fredrik Logevall, Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam (New York: Random House, 2012), 711.