Zumwalt

by Larry Berman

114. Letter, Dec. 11, 1986. Bud asked Do to advise Elmo not to take so many risks. “Captain Kiem, talk to him, he might listen to you.” ZPP.

  115. Stillwell, Reminiscences of Admiral Zumwalt, Jr., 523.

  116. Confidential message, COMNAVFORV to CTF 115, 116, 117, Jan. 17, 1969 [Task Force].

  117. Stillwell, Reminiscences of Admiral Zumwalt, Jr., 524.

  118. “Vietnam,” ZTT 24, side A.

  119. Stillwell, Reminiscences of Admiral Zumwalt, Jr., 500.

  120. These are synthetic chemical compounds developed to kill weeds in order to increase crop yield. In Vietnam, the military cooked a fifty-fifty mixture of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T at higher temperatures than the normal process and named it Agent Orange. Dioxin is a highly toxic by-product of military-grade 2,4,5-T. As Zierler documents in his pathbreaking book, cooking it at higher temperatures made the dioxin levels even more deadly. See David Zierler, The Invention of Ecocide: Agent Orange, Vietnam, and the Scientists Who Changed the Way We Think about the Environment (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2011).

  121. Zumwalt and Zumwalt, My Father, My Son, 94.

  122. Kirkwood wrote, “I later found out this chemical was a carcinogen. . . . I believe I died up there on that deck and I didn’t even know it.” Ron Kirkwood, “Fear of Living (Vietnam),” manuscript excerpt sent to Zumwalt, ZFC, online at http://parker5nc.tripod.com/story/fear.html.

  123. They became close friends, and Wages later served as personal aide to Zumwalt in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations.

  124. Wages’s river patrol group was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation by President Nixon for extraordinary heroism.

  125. Letter to clan, Nov. 30, 1969, ZPP.

  126. Letter, Feb. 10, 1970, ZPP.

  127. July 30, 1969, letter to clan, ZPP.

  128. Letter to Nitze, Feb. 10, 1970, ZPP.

  129. He retired eight years later, on Nov. 1, 1974, at the age of fifty-four.

  130. ”He was a traditional Buddhist, very devout Buddhist—a man of very high ethical and moral principles. He lived very poorly, and not very many of the flag and general officers on the Vietnamese side did,” recalled Bud to Paul Stillwell. Stillwell, Reminiscences of Admiral Zumwalt, Jr., 512.

  131. Letter, “Dear Clan,” July 30, 1969, ZPP.

  132. Ibid.

  133. Letter, Nov. 30, 1969, ZPP.

  134. All quotes are from Bud’s letters home to Saralee and the “Clan,” ZPP.

  135. Schreadley, From the Rivers to the Sea, 367.

  136. Stillwell, interview with Rectanus, 81.

  137. A letter, “Dear Zumwalts,” Jan. 12, 1970, provides Bud’s review of their family Christmas, the first time in eighteen months that the entire family was together. Elmo left the boat in the southern tip of Ca Mau Peninsula, Jim flew in from the University of North Carolina and went fifteen pounds over his wrestling weight, Kathy, their future daughter-in-law, flew in from Manila, and they all went to Baguio, the Philippines. ZPP.

  138. Sept. 30, 1970, ZPC and NHHC.

  139. Chafee interview, ZTT 5, side A, transcript, 6.

  140. Bud told Paul Stillwell, “I went down and in 15 minutes briefed Laird on our operations and on the turnover proposal. . . . Mel Laird . . . seemed both intrigued and pleased by the briefing, asked a couple of questions. . . . And that was all that was heard from Mel Laird. I had the sensation that he was pleased.” Stillwell, Reminiscences of Admiral Zumwalt, Jr.

  141. Bud briefed Laird on the evolution of naval power against the North Vietnamese. Their logistical system had been kept to trawlers, and the communists had been forced to develop the trail, and this, combined with what they were able to bring into Sihanoukville and across the sanctuary of Cambodia to the borders of South Vietnam represented their principal logistical lines. The application of sea power had been accomplished by the use of air and surface elements of the Seventh Fleet supplemented from 1966 to 1970 with a hundred Swift Boats (PCFs) and about two hundred river patrol boats (PBRs), plus about a hundred armored amphibious boats. The Swifts were used for inshore coastal patrol to prevent infiltration of small craft and to provide Coast Guard–type functions. The PBRs patrolled the major branches of the Mekong in the delta, and the armored boats were married to the U.S. Ninth Division to form the mobile riverine flotilla bringing support to the cities of the delta. ZTT 5, side A.

  142. Telephone conversation, Laird and Kissinger, Mar. 10, 1970.

  143. Telephone conversation, Laird and Kissinger, Mar. 13, 1970.

  CHAPTER 9: THE WATCH BEGINS

  1. Letter on the occasion of Bud’s retirement, June 25, 1974, 00. (These double-zero files refer to Zumwalt’s CNO papers, “00” being his designation. When cited, they are from NHHC.)

  2. Zumwalt, On Watch, 44.

  3. Ibid.; “The Summons,” ZTT.

  4. Ibid.

  5. Ibid.

  6. “Jerome H. King Jr.,” Arlington National Cemetery, www.arlingtoncemetery.net/jhking-03.htm.

  7. Admiral Harry DePue Train II, Oral History (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 1997), 237. Excerpts and printed volumes of USNI oral histories are available at www.usni.org/heritage/oral-history-catalog.

  8. The other recommended candidates included Admiral Ralph Wynne Cousins and Vice Admiral Bush Bringle.

  9. Moorer told Bud that he felt he was coming up too early and should wait four years, but he made it clear that he would work with him and be supportive. Bud said that Warner spilled his guts that night and acknowledged that there had been much infighting over the nomination. Warner had favored Chick Clarey. “The Summons,” ZTT.

  10. Clarey served in that position from from Dec. 5, 1970, through Sept. 30, 1973.

  11. Captain Samuel Gravely would be the first one promoted to admiral.

  12. Van Atta, With Honor: Melvin Laird in War, Peace, and Politics, 329.

  13. Ibid., 143–44, and Van Atta’s interview with Warner, Nov. 10, 1999.

  14. June 2, 1972. Bud inscribed a book on riverine warfare “To John Chafee with deep admiration for your leadership, wise counsel and friendship as Secretary of the Navy.” On Oct. 24, 1973, Bud wrote a handwritten P.S.: “What a great opportunity to serve you gave me. I shall always be grateful.” This was in response to Chafee’s Oct. 2, 1973, “Congratulations on the Trident victory. I know you put tremendous energy and effort into that, and the results must have been most satisfying. Please don’t make the votes any closer.” On June 23, 1974, Bud wrote Chafee that “it will be tough to come up with another job which approaches the challenge and opportunity of this one.” Executive Correspondence, NHHC

  15. Telephone conversation, Apr. 13, 1970, National Archives.

  16. Admiral Stansfield Turner Oral History, p. 335.

  17. He first called his father but neglected to tell him not to say anything. The president had yet to announce his appointment.

  18. “The Appointment,” ZTT. See also “The Admiral’s Wife.”

  19. Washington Post, Apr. 16, 1970.

  20. Wall Street Journal, Apr. 16, 1970.

  21. Letter, Apr. 15, 1970. In reply Bud wrote, “As I look back at all California has done for me and for the navy, I am indeed proud and grateful to be her native son.” Letter, Apr. 16, 1970, ZFC.

  22. Executive Correspondence, Apr. 16, 1970, NHHC.

  23. Robert Powers, Executive Correspondence, Apr. 27, 1970, NHHC.

  24. On the tapes, Bud says that he called Abrams from Moorer’s home to tell him when he was returning to Saigon, and Abrams did not congratulate him. “I was quite surprised and a little hurt but did not comment on it.” ZTT.

  25. Letter, Apr. 29, 1970, responding to Jim’s letter of Apr. 23, ZPP.

  26. Letter, Apr. 9, 1970, Robert Powers, Executive Correspondence, NHHC.

  27. William J. Crowe, Jr., The Line of Fire: From Washington to the Gulf, the Politics and Battles of the New Military (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 87. Moreover, retirements and losses had not occurred at anticipated levels, and budget reducti
ons led to the loss of flag positions. To increase the flow of younger officers into flag rank, a policy of nonreversion for vice admirals was adopted by asking three-star officers to retire at the end of their tours when no additional vice admiral billet was available.

  28. Letter, Apr. 27, 1970, NHHC.

  29. May 2, 1970. Nicholson was indeed later recruited to head one of the Mod Squad units.

  30. Letter, Apr. 14, 1970, NHHC.

  31. Letter, Apr. 16, 1970, NHHC.

  32. Letter, June 25, 1970, NHHC.

  33. U.S. Code, title 10, chapter 509, section 5081, subsection D.

  34. Stillwell, Reminiscences by Staff Officers.

  35. The oral history of Salzer, who retired as a vice admiral, is in the Naval Institute collection, www.usni.org/heritage/oral-history-catalog.

  36. Stillwell, Reminiscences of Admiral Zumwalt, Jr.

  37. “Jerome H. King Jr.,” Arlington National Cemetery, www.arlingtoncemetery.net/jhking-03.htm; Stillwell, Reminiscences of Admiral Zumwalt, Jr.

  38. Nomination of Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN, to Be Chief of Naval Operations, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Apr. 16, 1970.

  39. Bud’s farewell staff party in Saigon was held on May 4 at Top of the Duc. It was a raucous affair during which his team offered an adaptation of Hungarian-born American composer Sigmund Romberg’s operetta The Student Prince.

  40. In his speech, Bud identified the sources of inspiration in his life—his family; the seamanship of his officers; the Vietnamese navy, whose personnel, along with Chon, “have helped us to understand and come to love the Vietnamese people”; General Abrams, “tough, demanding, compassionate, and understanding . . . a great military captain in war”; and his Brown Water Navy for “their sacrifices and heroism.”

  41. Letter, Apr. 21, 1970, ZPP.

  42. On Aug. 8, 1970, Bud wrote Chon that Truc was doing quite well at the academy, excelling in certain areas. “He is the best of the foreign students, no doubt.” ZFC.

  43. Zumwalt and Zumwalt, My Father, My Son. Elmo was not technically a state resident, and had low LSAT scores with a few Ds on his transcript. Elmo did not qualify under the out-of-state quota. Caldwell was able to get him admitted as an in-state student because Bud had no fixed residence and had taught there and because both boys had been undergraduates there.

  44. May 7, 1970, ZFC.

  45. Aug. 4, 1970, ZPP.

  46. Author interview with Dr. Narva.

  47. ZTT 30, side A, 8, addition to summons chapter.

  48. Author interview with Dr. Narva. Bud remained in the hospital for seven days under the care of Dr. Narva, who would accompany him on almost 90 percent of his overseas trips as CNO.

  49. Zumwalt tape 26, side A, ZTT.

  50. Much of the discussion here benefits from the work of Malcolm Muir, Jr., Black Shoes and Blue Water: Surface Warfare in the United States Navy, 1945–1975 (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1996; Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2005); Edgar F. Puryear, Jr., American Admiralship: The Art of Naval Command (Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2005); George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890–1990 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993); James C. Bradford, Quarterdeck and Bridge: Two Centuries of American Naval Leaders (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1997); Robert William Love, Jr., The Chiefs of Naval Operations (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1980); and Thomas C. Hone, Power and Change: The Administrative History of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1946–1986 (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1989).

  51. Change-of-command remarks, ZPP.

  52. Chafee wanted the vice chief of naval operations to “truly be your alter ego” and able to enunciate the CNO’s position on all matters of policy. “You will be tied up so much in the JCS that it’s most helpful to have someone who can speak for you with authority.” Bud told Chafee his VCNO would be an “alter ego” and “I have the fullest confidence in Chick Clarey to speak for me on any Navy matter.”

  53. Stansfield Turner Oral History, 336.

  54. Letter, June 18, 1970, ZPP.

  55. B. A. Clarey, president of Line Flag Selection Board, Apr. 8, 1971. Executive Correspondence, NHHC.

  56. Memo from CNO, July 1, 1970, NHHC.

  57. Jeffrey Sands, On His Watch: Admiral Zumwalt’s Efforts to Institutionalize Strategic Change (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1993), www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Zumwalt’s%20Efforts%20to%20Institutionalize%20Strategic%20Change%202793002200.pdf; and David Alan Rosenberg, “Project ‘Sixty’: Landmark or Landmine—an Evaluation,” unpublished draft, July 23, 1982. OP-965. I have relied on both Sands and Rosenberg throughout the discussion of Project Sixty. I have also used Zumwalt tape transcipts titled Project Sixty.

  58. “To some it was the highly idiosyncratic creation of an entirely idiosyncratic individual.” David Alan Rosenberg, “Project ‘Sixty.’ ”

  59. Elting E. Morison, “A Case Study of Innovation,” Engineering and Science 13, no. 7 (Apr. 1950): 5–11.

  60. Stansfield Turner Oral History, 365.

  61. Stansfield Turner Naval Institute Oral History is cited in David Alan Rosenberg, “Project 60: Twelve Years Later,” unpublished manuscript; and Elmo Russell Zumwalt, Jr., “After On Watch,” unpublished manuscript.

  62. Sands, On His Watch, 20.

  63. Rosenberg, “Project 60: Twelve Years Later.”

  64. Zumwalt, On Watch, 64. “For twenty years Rickover has been working successfully toward a super ship navy, and so it is partly his doing that for twenty years the Navy has been getting smaller except of course in the item of nuclear powered submarines.”

  65. ZTT 2, side A, part 6–7.

  66. Polmar and Allen, Rickover: Controversy and Genius.

  67. Zumwalt, On Watch, 65.

  68. Letter, Nov. 18, 1970, to Stansfield Turner, at the time a rear admiral and commander of Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla Eight. “Ps . . . sorry it took me so long to record my great pride in the work you did for me. We have much left to do.” ZFC.

  69. Rosenberg, “Project 60: Twelve Years Later”; Sands, On His Watch.

  70. In “Project 60: Twelve Years Later,” David Alan Rosenberg identified the accomplishments of Project 60:

  Explicit missions and rationale for justifying the navy were developed, which served as an overarching philosophy for the navy.

  Nuclear attack submarines were employed for the first time as carrier battle-group escorts.

  Minesweeping helicopters were developed; the first RH-53Ds entered service in 1973.

  PGs (patrol gunboats) were assigned to the Mediterranean to serve as task-force escorts and protect against Soviet tattletale activity.

  The first interim sea-control ship, the USS Guam, operated with V/STOL (vertical or short takeoff and landing) aircraft and helicopters from 1972 to 1974. The sea-control ship was canceled, and this was a major setback for Project Sixty.

  Major innovations on conduct of fleet exercises were implemented.

  Major improvements were made in Sixth Fleet readiness and logistics, including electronic warfare, surveillance, and antisubmarine warfare.

  The first interim surface-to-surface missile, the standard ARM (antiradiation missile, which homes in on active radars and radios), was converted and deployed.

  Twenty UH-2 Seasprite utility helicopters were converted to SH-2D LAMPS-1 (light airborne multipurpose system) antisubmarine helicopters.

  Development of the basic point-defense missile system was accelerated, and widespread installation soon began.

  The CV (carrier variant) concept was adopted, and the S-3 Viking was procured to help implement it.

  Marine air squadrons began overseas deployments on attack carriers to fulfill both force-multiplier and cross-training requirements.

  The CVN-70, the USS Carl Vinson, was funded in fiscal year 1974.

  The first PFG (patrol frigate, guided missile), the USS Oliver H
azard Perry, was funded after a long struggle in fiscal year 1973.

  The first PHM (patrol hydrofoil guided missile ship), the USS Pegasus, was authorized in fiscal year 1973.

  The undersea long-range missile system became reality with the Trident program.

  The first Trident submarine, the USS Ohio, was authorized in fiscal year 1974.

  Initiatives that became effective after Zumwalt’s term included production of the Harpoon antiship missile.

  71. Richard J. Levine, “A Final Z-Gram from Zumwalt,” Wall Street Journal, May 13, 1974.

  72. Sands, On His Watch; Rosenberg, “Project ‘Sixty’: Twelve Years Later.”

  73. President Carter’s decision not to fund the SCS was significant because “it was the most revolutionary naval technology in all of Project 60 and appeared to a number of naval officers to represent the wave of the future that would enable the surface Navy to survive and prevail against Soviet high-speed torpedo armed nuclear attack submarines.” Ibid.

  74. The president’s foreign policy declaration of February 1970 promised that “our interests, our foreign policy objectives, our strategies and our defense budgets are being brought into balance—with each other and with our overall national priorities.”

  75. Letter, Clarey to Zumwalt, Apr. 22, 1971, NHHC.

  76. Ibid.

  77. Bud decided to bring the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff to Washington so that the JCS and senior military authority could work closely on weapons-system development. He was unsuccessful. Unnumbered ZTT side A, parts 1–2.

  78. After the briefing, Bud shared the view of another JCS member, who thought the Soviets would “soon be able to blackmail and we will have a Cuba in reverse.” Ibid.

  79. ZTT unnumbered side B, part 9.

  80. Presidential briefing, Aug. 18, 1970, NHHC.

  81. In previous crises—Lebanon, the Dominican Republic, Quemoy and Matsu, the Chinese incursion into India, and the Cuban Missile Crisis—the United States had demonstrated the capability to control the seas and project its forces.

  82. Toward the end of his term, Bud became more outspoken about classified studies bearing on war outcomes. On Jan. 23, 1974, Senator William Proxmire wrote James Schlesinger that he had been informed that the CNO “has privately told several members of Congress, while lobbying for Navy programs, that had the US and USSR navies come to battle in the Mediterranean during the recent crisis there, the US fleet would either have been forced to retire or accept huge losses. The point was made emphatically and without qualification.” Proxmire charged “deliberate deception,” since “quite the opposite conclusion was reached by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs on national television.” Executive Correspondence, NHHC.