The Spanish Civil War

by Hugh Thomas

  2. Ortega had been a sergeant of carabineers before 1936, and had commanded republican forces at Irún in August. By mid-1937 he was a communist. For all the following see Hernández, pp. 124–6, and Cervera, p. 304. An account of events from the POUM side is given in Gorkin, El proceso, pp. 102ff. See also Katia Landau, Le Stalinisme en Espagne (Paris, 1938) for horrible stories.

  1. R. Salas, vol. II, p. 1294.

  1. See Peirats, vol. II, p. 334; the CNT statement is printed in full in Martínez Bande, La invasión de Aragón, pp. 293–7.

  2. R. Salas, vol. II, p. 1294; Cervera, p. 305.

  1. Robles, an exile in the US from Spain for some years, had been a friend of Dos Passos, who took up his cause. He was murdered because he knew too much. It was Hemingway’s cynicism over Robles’s fate that broke the friendship between Dos Passos and Hemingway.

  2. Azaña, vol. IV, p. 692. Although Casares Quiroga later explained the false basis of at least the story of the poisoning.

  3. Op. cit., p. 99. Hernández is the only ex-communist (or communist) to mention this explanation of Nin’s death, though Santiago Carrillo later accepted that he was ‘killed in our zone’ (Demain Espagne, p. 57). In his memoirs, he said that at the time he was convinced by the communist line (p. 224).

  1. Casanova, p. 23.

  2. Izvestia, 3 November 1937, qu. Suárez, p. 54 fn.

  3. ‘Destroyed for no reason at all by their own people’, he says of Goriev, Antonov-Ovsëenko, Berzin and Stashevsky (op. cit., p. 176).

  4. For this controversy, see George Orwell, Collected Essays, vol. I, p. 363, and Kingsley Martin’s memoirs Editor (London, 1938), p. 226. Orwell later made the somewhat surprising admission, in a letter to Frank Jellinek, the Manchester Guardian correspondent, that he agreed that ‘the whole business about the POUM has had far too much fuss made about it and that the net result of this kind of thing is to prejudice people against the Spanish government’…‘Actually’, he added, ‘I’ve given [in Homage to Catalonia] a more sympathetic account of the “POUM” line than I actually felt, because I always thought they were wrong … But … I think there was something in what they said, though no doubt their way of saying it was tiresome and provocative in the extreme.’ Orwell also pointed out that communism at that time had an attraction in western countries to the rich, while Trotskyism ‘has no appeal to anyone with over £500 a year’.

  1. See below, p. 842. Moreno Laguía was a friend of Azaña, with whom he was in touch (Obras, vol. IV, p. 828).

  2. Among those executed were José Cullares, José Navarro López and Marciano Mena. Cf. Casanova, p. 23.

  1. Cf. Benavides, Guerra, p. 229.

  2. Azaña, vol. IV, p. 618.

  3. When precisely, one cannot help wishing to ask? Spriano, in his introduction to Togliatti’s work (Escritos sobre la guerra de España, p. 9) says ‘the end of July’. The POUM leaders were arrested on 16 June. Togliatti had thus a good reason for wanting it to be established that he was not in Spain until after 16 June and for having his friends (Vidali, Berti, Longo) repeat it to P. Spriano (vol. III, p. 215). The reasons for leaving Moscow were no less compelling. Togliatti was certainly in Spain when, in August, a circular was issued stating that newspapers which criticized the Soviet Union would be suspended indefinitely (circular of 14 August, qu. Broué and Témime, p. 284).

  40

  1. Rojo, ¡ Alerta los pueblos! (Buenos Aires, 1939), p. 104; España heroica, pp. 87ff.; Lister, p. 132; Aznar, p. 435; López Muñiz; Castro Delgado, pp. 541ff.; Longo, pp. 371–97. In writing of this battle I drew on the memories of Malcolm Dunbar, Giles Romilly, George Aitken, and Miles Tomalin, who fought here with the British Battalion. On general matters of interpretation, see R. Salas Larrazábal (op. cit., vol. II, p. 1215f.). Particularly significant is his note (fn. 9, p. 1275) in which he criticizes the Russian Malinovsky, present as an adviser, for ignoring, in his memoir (Bajo la bandera, p. 37f.), the role of Colonel Matallana in the preparation of the offensive. Martínez Bande, La ofensiva sobre Segovia, p. 103f., gives a good general survey. R. Salas Larrazábal prints the battle-order of the International Brigades in vol. IV, pp. 3434–572. See, too, R. Casas de la Vega, Brunete (Madrid, 1967).

  2. The British Battalion in this brigade was commanded by Fred Copeman, an ex-sailor who had been concerned in the so-called naval mutiny of Invergordon in 1931. According to his own account, Copeman did not become a communist till he had left Spain. He was, nevertheless, so closely associated with the party that this made no difference. The British Battalion was itself one of three regiments, commanded by Nathan, alongside three others commanded by Mihály Szalvai (‘Chapaev’). Szalvai became a general in post-war Hungary.

  3. See Longo, p. 291. Only the 14th (French) International Brigade was quite inactive in this engagement among the ‘Internationals’. Staimer—‘Colonel Richard’—was yet one more important German communist to lead a brigade in Spain. ‘Krieger’ had succeeded another German, Zaisser (‘Gómez’). Staimer had been head of the woodworkers’ union in Germany and chief of the Rot Front organization in northern Bavaria in 1932.

  1. Galland, p. 27.

  2. Miksche, p. 38.

  3. Aznar, p. 443; López Muñiz, p. 171.

  4. Azaña, vol. IV, p. 678.

  1. It is perhaps of more than social interest that, on the night of 8 July, Hemingway, Martha Gellhorn, and Joris Ivens dined at the White House to explain what they thought the US should do to help Spain (FDR papers, Hyde Park, File 422A).

  1. He was mortally wounded by a bomb. In his last moments, he ordered those around him to sing him out of life. At nightfall, he was buried in a rough coffin beneath the olive trees near the river Guadarrama. A funeral oration was pronounced by the brigade commissar, George Aitken. Gal and Jock Cunningham, two tough men who had been jealous of Nathan, stood listening with tears running down their cheeks. Evidence of George Aitken. See also Steve Nelson, The Volunteers (Leipzig, 1954), pp. 166–9.

  2. One might also note the remarks of Colonel Menéndez about Modesto, Lister, Mera, El Campesino and other militia leaders: ‘Modesto is the only one of them who knew how to read a map. The others, in addition to not knowing how, don’t think it necessary’ (Azaña, vol. IV, p. 712).

  1. On the 18th Julian Bell, another English hero of his own time, nephew of Virginia Woolf, was killed, aged twenty-nine, at Villanueva de la Cañada, when driving an ambulance for the British medical aid unit. He had been in Spain a month. (See Quentin Bell, Julian Bell, London, 1938, p. 176, and Stansky and Abrahams, pp. 399–413.)

  2. See R. Salas Larrazábal, vol. II, p. 1254 and references; Jesús Salas, pp. 227–35.

  3. Kindelán, p. 99. Juan Ignacio Luca de Tena, then Varela’s ADC, gives an account of this conversation which implied that Franco’s reasons for stopping Varela’s advance on Madrid derived from his fear of Varela getting too much glory (Luca de Tena, pp. 205–6).

  4. For the casualties see Casas de la Vega, p. 362f.; Martinez Bande, p. 231; R. Salas Larrazábal, vol. II, p. 1256. Miaja told Azaña on 9 August that the republic lost 1,800 dead and 17,000 wounded (Azaña, vol. IV, p. 732), while Giral reported that half the ‘wounded’ were either deserters or malingerers.

  5. R. Salas Larrazábal, in Carr, The Republic, p. 181.

  1. See report of Colonel Matallana printed in De la Cierva, Historia ilustrada, vol. II, p. 242. The commander of the Garibaldi Battalion, Pacciardi, now abandoned Spain, disillusioned with communism in the brigades. Nenni agreed with him over this and also returned to Paris, the ‘Garibaldis’ henceforth being commanded by Carlo Penchienati (a communist who later broke with the party) and subsequently Arturo Zanoni, a socialist. See Pacciardi, pp. 239–40 and 161, and Spriano, p. 223. Arthur Horner, then president of the South Wales miners, succeeded in extracting a pledge from the Brigade authorities that leave should be given to members of the Brigades. But this was never fully implemented. During his visit Horner was briefly imprisoned in Barcelona because a Moorish flag was found in his
luggage and he was accordingly denounced as a monarchist (Arthur Horner, Incorrigible Rebel, London, 1960, p. 159).

  2. Miksche, p. 171. This controversy over the use of tanks can be traced back to their first operational use, in the battle of Cambrai on the Western Front in 1917. Neither side in the civil war had enough lorries to enable motorized infantry to take advantage of the initial breakthrough.

  1. Azaña, vol. IV, p. 698.

  2. The date 23 March commemorated the foundation of the fascist movement in Italy in 1919.

  3. The most careful account of this battle is Colonel Martínez Bande’s El final del frente norte (Madrid, 1972). One can also still consult with profit Aznar, pp. 466–75.

  1. For these abortive efforts which involved a secret meeting between Fr Onaindía and the Italian military attaché near Algorta (Vizcaya) on 25 June and the former’s subsequent journey to Rome to illuminate Ciano—utterly ignorant of the Basque problem—see S. Payne, Basque Nationalism, p. 280.

  2. Aguirre had wanted to move all the Basque forces to the Catalan front in order to advance on Navarre from the rear(!); the idea had been rejected in Valencia (Aguirre, pp. 59ff.).

  1. Castro Delgado, p. 539.

  2. For an account of this depressed gathering, see Gámir, p. 84; Zugazagoitia, vol. II, pp. 307–8; and the report of Major Lamas, quoted in Martínez Bande, op. cit., p. 78, fn. 85.

  1. Martínez Bande has a sad picture of many of these men sitting in the local bull-ring (op. cit., facing p. 104). Some 30,000 were Basques, 20,000 Santanderinos.

  2. Azaña, vol. IV, p. 782.

  3. Martínez Bande, op. cit. (p. 97) publishes a facsimile of the act of surrender and the full document (pp. 228–9). See also General Piazzoni’s account on pp. 230–42, and S. Payne, Basque Nationalism, p. 285, for discussion on Father Onaindía’s account.

  1. Steer, pp. 388–90. This account is confirmed by Jesús María de Leizaola. See however R. Salas, vol. II, p. 1460f., and Martínez Bande, op. cit., pp. 93–4.

  2. He had been head of the UME in pre-war days and had escaped from Valencia in August 1936.

  1. Ciano, Diaries 1937–8, p. 5. The correspondent of The Times who described the nationalist capture of Santander was the spy for the Soviet Union, Philby.

  2. Martínez Bande, op. cit., p. 245f.

  3. GD, p. 434. This recurred in mid-August. Sperrle was himself also shortly recalled (though not for his part in Guernica), being succeeded in command of the Condor Legion by General von Volkmann.

  4. While the Croat Čopić remained leader of the 15th Brigade, Steve Nelson, a shipyard worker from Philadelphia, of Slovene origin, despite his name, was brigade commissar, in succession to Aitken who had returned home. These appointments signified a period of American predominance in the 15th Brigade. There was even some American resentment when the post of chief of operations in the Brigade went to Malcolm Dunbar, an efficient young Englishman who three years before had been ‘leader of an advanced aesthetic set at Cambridge’. Three British brigadiers (Copeman, commander at Brunete; Tapsell, commissar; and Cunningham, chief of staff) returned to England, with a specific purpose in mind—to discuss the nature of communist control over the British Battalion. A quarrel ensued at the central committee of the communist party. Cunningham never went back to Spain, being accused of ‘fascism’. He left the party. The other two returned. The Brigade had been enlarged by the addition of the Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion, formed from Canadians previously with the Americans. This was named after the two Canadian leaders of the revolt of 1837 against Britain. Less than a third of the Battalion were Canadians, the remainder being American. The commissar was Joe Dallet, a longshoreman of New York, of a rich family who had joined the republic to throttle the evidence of his early sheltered life. These details suggest how Spain seemed the world’s testing ground for other things than heavy tanks, Messerschmitts, and anarchist communes.

  1. Lister, p. 152.

  2. Azaña, vol. IV, p. 614.

  3. C. Lorenzo, p. 139. According to Juan Sapiña (Azaña, Obras, vol. IV, p. 635), deputy for Castellón and director-general of mines, he went about with an escort of 24 men. His secretary had once been on the staff of Juan March.

  4. Azaña, vol. IV, p. 685, also p. 744.

  1. See J. Silva, qu. Bolloten, in Carr, The Republic, p. 375. See Negrín’s account to Azaña (Azaña, vol. IV, p. 733).

  2. See Campo Libre in August and September 1937. There is a bitter account of this by the leader of the 26th Division, Ricardo Sanz, in Ch. XII of his Los que fuimos a Madrid. Mantecón later told Azaña that Lister wanted to shoot the councillors but he, Mantecón, had restrained him: I know what would have happened: he would have put the blame on me and posed himself ‘as defender of the people’ (Azaña, vol. IV, p. 897).

  1. The 15th International Brigade played a major part in these battles. The British Battalion’s Irish commander, Daley, died of wounds, to be succeeded by Paddy O’Daire. Thompson and Dallet, commander and commissar of the Lincoln Battalion, were killed, Nelson, the brigade commissar, wounded.

  2. Montenegro’s real name does not seem to be known. See Azaña, op. cit., p. 687 for estimate of his quality. The best general survey of this battle is Martínez Bande’s La gran ofensiva, p. 77f.

  3. Aznar, p. 504; Castro Delgado, p. 560. For this battle, I was assisted by Malcolm Dunbar.

  4. Buenacasa, p. 9. This POUMista, present at the battle, pays tribute to the high Carlist morale.

  1. The BT-5 tank weighed 20 tons, had one 45-mm cannon and two 7.62-mm machine-guns (sometimes four). It was a ‘Christie’ Vickers model of 1929 vintage. Out of 40 tanks in the attack only 28 returned: the ground was a quagmire and they were easily put out of action or captured. For comment, see Alexander Foote, Handbook for Spies (London, 1953), p. 18.

  2. Telegram quoted by R. Salas Larrazábal, vol. II, p. 1324.

  1. Ehrenburg, p. 147.

  2. Azaña, vol. IV, p. 846f. (Prada’s report to the President).

  1. For this campaign, see Martínez Bande, El final del frente norte, p. 109f.

  2. Prada reported this to Azaña personally (Azaña, op. cit., p. 847). He said that the ‘gobiernin’, as Azaña contemptuously referred to the Council of Asturias, refused to admit that, in Asturias, there could be a Fifth Column. Belarmino Tomás, ‘entirely subservient to the CNT’, said: ‘In red Asturias, there are no fascists’. But, even in ‘red’ Avilés, the Fifth Column had attacked a brigade, causing many casualties.

  1. Galland, p. 30.

  2. The minutes of the last meeting are published in Independent News. (See Broué and Témime, p. 380.)

  1. Santos Julía, p. 214. The details of his trial were followed in nationalist Spain with great interest.

  2. Prieto, Convulsiones, vol. II, p. 60; cf. Azaña, vol. IV, p. 830.

  3. An abortive attempt had been made to rescue Goriev by Abel Guides, the star pilot in Malraux’s squadron who afterwards had joined the republican air force. Guides made three flights but was shot down and killed on the fourth. See Ehrenburg, Eve of War, p. 147. Saved in Asturias from Franco, nothing could save Goriev from his own government. Returning to Russia, he was shot. For the further struggles of guerrilleros in Asturias, between 1937 and 1958, see A. Saborit, Asturias y sus hombres (Toulouse, 1964).

  1. The communist party tried to place a good deal of blame on the shoulders of the secretary of the communist party of Euzkadi, Astigarrabía, who was condemned by a plenum of the central committee for having supported too warmly the ‘reactionary and bungling policy of Aguirre’ (Campo Libre, 27 November 1937).

  2. Evidence of the Duke of Mandas.

  41

  1. GD, p. 339.

  2. Ibid., p. 366.

  3. Azcárate, p. 80. In a foreign affairs debate in the House of Commons on 25 June, Chamberlain, making his first speech as Prime Minister, described Germany’s behaviour over the Leipzig ‘as showing a degree of restraint that we ought to recognize’. On non-intervention, he said: ‘Each side is
being deprived of supplies of material of which it feels itself in urgent need’ (Parliamentary Debates, vol. 325, col. 1586).

  4. NIS (c), fifty-fifth and fifty-sixth meetings.

  5. Azaña, vol. IV, p. 654, gives a report by Negrín of this journey.

  1. NIS (c), fifty-seventh meeting.

  2. Nenni, p. 83.

  1. B. Klein, Germany’s Economic Preparations for War (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), p. 41, discusses this. See also Harper, p. 65. Germany’s total iron ore imports in 1936 were 9.2 million tons. Germany needed these imports to sustain her steel industry. She had imported ore from Spain before; for example, in the 1920s Spanish imports accounted for one quarter of German imports. But a great deal of German imports from Spain in 1937 and 1938 were vegetables, fruit and wine (more, in fact, in terms of marks than minerals).

  2. GD, p. 413. See Harper, p. 52f.

  3. GD, p. 417.

  4. Ibid., p. 421.

  5. Ibid., p. 410.

  1. NIS, twenty-fourth meeting.

  2. Ibid.

  3. USD, 1937, vol. I, p. 360. This remark was made at a lunch at which the new British ambassador in Paris, Sir Eric Phipps, and William Bullitt were present.

  4. Ibid., p. 366.

  1. Ciano, Diplomatic Papers, p. 132; Churchill, Gathering Storm, p. 189; Eden, p. 445. The letter was written without Eden’s knowledge. The Spanish government seemed to ignore this change. Azaña, who had regarded the British as a malign influence over Spanish affairs, was assured by Azcárate on 16 August that the British government did not know what it wanted. ‘There is nobody in the political world of these countries who makes plans on a long distance.’ ‘It would cost me a lot of work to believe that the British Empire is governed by fools,’ Azaña replied (Azaña, op. cit., p. 738).